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Typologies and Forms

Practices of Comparing
A New Research Agenda Between Typological and
Historical Approaches
Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart
Comparisons—a ubiquitous tool of powerful thinking?
Introduction to a multidisciplinary field of manifold controversies1
“It’s like comparing apples and oranges”—this is what one might well say when
a comparison is deemed to be impossible. This fruit-based example for not being
able to compare holds at least in the Anglo-American world; Germans prefer to
state the same impossibility by comparing apples and pears (likewise supposed
to be in vain). Speaking of comparison in general, the opposite also holds true:
You can compare everything with everything—as another quite common saying
goes. You definitely can compare apples with oranges. Being fruit, they share a
commonality while differing in many other respects. They are truly comparable
in terms of their size or shape; their weight, color, taste, health index, origin, and
history, the ease of peeling them; their local and global distribution; their economic
positions on markets; and their appearances in seventeenth-century paintings or
world literature. The comparisons are endless, and the fate of apples, oranges, and
pears—being both comparable and incomparable at the same time—might befall
human beings as well: They become objects of comparisons and, what is more, they
constantly compare themselves to each other. But in the end,more than often, they
think of themselves as being truly incomparable.
There is more than one seeming paradox when it comes to comparisons. On
the one hand, comparing is surrounded by warnings and prohibitions: You cannot
compare this; you must not compare that. This therefore implies an important,
even dangerous issue: It addresses and relates things that are different and have to
1 This book has been prepared within the framework of the Collaborative Research Center
SFB 1288 “Practices of Comparing. Changing and Ordering the World”, Bielefeld University,
Germany, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The introduction owes many
suggestions to the lively discussions with colleagues, especially with the co-editor Johannes
Grave.
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be kept separate—be they objects, actions, values, or human beings. A statement
in the form of “this cannot be compared” may be just a different version of saying
that these things are not the same; but when it comes to love and hate, for example,
or to war atrocities and genocides, the much contested statement might also build
walls around “incomparable” entities and differences either treasured or abhorred.
It marks comparison as an outreaching and overbearing mode of thinking that
blurs borders and connects things that may not belong together (or should not
be seen next to each other). Respectively, however, the prohibitions and warnings
surrounding comparisons classify them as powerful tools of thinking: seeing things
as being equal and different at the same time, putting formerly separated things
together, or even distorting common ways of thinking.
On the other hand, when you can compare everything with everything, com-
parisons may lack specificity and contours. Then comparisons are always at hand
andmay, therefore, seem arbitrary or irrelevant.The omnipresence of comparisons
makes them a quite trivial everyday phenomenon—andmay turn the warnings and
prohibitions into an equally trivial caveat, probably a mere rhetorical game. Every-
thing can be compared with everything—so what?
These two sides of comparisons—their ubiquity and their power as a think-
ing tool—can be moved and indeed have been moved in different directions. On
the one hand, comparing can be considered a ubiquitous activity that is easily at
hand and—as a condition of mind—does not require any further investigation.
People, while thinking, compare—no matter what. On the other hand, comparing
is a socially defined practice that provokes both warnings or prohibitions, and fur-
ther comparisons (i.e., the discerning, measuring, and judging of similarities and
differences) may be an important and powerful tool for evaluating things, persons,
and groups; for demonstrating relations of power; and—last not least—for arguing,
convincing, and making decisions. You should always compare, but, at the same
time, you should always be aware of things that cannot be compared. The more
one thinks about it, the more complicated things become. Are these imperatives
(compare and don’t compare) just two sides of a complicated matter, a theoretical
aporia, or a language game (in the sense of Ludwig Wittgenstein)? How could we
better understand what comparisons as a condition of mind and comparing as a
social practice define?
Since Aristotle, comparison has been part of rhetoric, a proper tool to demon-
strate and persuade,2 but also an ingredient of logical thinking through classifying
and concluding, judging andmeasuring, as well as detecting and sorting out same-
ness and difference between all kinds of related (and seemingly unrelated) entities
and matters. As a method of adequate thinking, comparison elevated itself to a
2 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric. Book III, Chap. 4 (1406–1407) and 11 (1412–1413). See also Quintilian,
Institutes of Oratory, 1, 105, 353.
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scientific method in the sciences, especially as a logically proven instrument of
knowledge, judgment, and cognition. In his Regulae ad directionem ingenii (1628/29),
René Descartes builds science and its methods on the foundation that “in all rea-
soning it is only by means of comparison that we attain an exact knowledge of
the truth.”3 This advice was crystallized into a set of methods by gradually special-
izing academic disciplines in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that were
formed and understood themselves as explicit comparative sciences in the fields of
anatomy, religion, law, linguistics, philology, ethnography, and anthropology.4
As a self-evident cognitive tool and as a clear-cut method in scientific con-
texts, comparison gained attention as a quite basic activity of thinking as well as a
propaedeutic instrument for doing scientific research. Psychology established so-
cial comparison research as an analysis of how people compare themselves to each
other in social settings.5 Cognitive sciences have started to examine those brain-
based comparative perceptions that are processed when humans discern and select
objects in general.6 Theories and methodologies of specialized sciences have tried
to reflect on their tools of comparison by shaping and refining the ways to identify
and measure the similarities and differences between their scientific objects and
fields.7
3 René Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in: John Cottingham/Robert Stoot-
hoff/Dugald Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, Cambridge 1985,
57. The statement plays a famous role in the distinction between the “episteme,” the age of
resemblances, and the early modern age of representation in Michel Foucault, The Order of
Things: An Archaeology of theHuman Sciences, New York 1970, 51. For a later scientific validation
of the general standpoint that thinking is comparing, see, for example, Max Schießl, Unter-
suchungen über die Ideenassociation und ihren Einfluß auf den Erkenntnisakt, in: Zeitschrift
für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Neue Folge 61 (1872), 247–282, see 257.
4 See Guy Jucquois/Christophe Vielle (eds.), Le comparatism dans les sciences de l’homme, Brussels
2000; Peter Zima, Vergleichende Wissenschaften, Tübingen 2000; Michael Eggers, Vergleichen-
des Erkennen. ZurWissenschaftsgeschichte und zur Epistemologie des Vergleichs und zur Genealogie
der Komparatistik, Heidelberg 2016.
5 A now classic account is Leon Feistinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, in:Human
Relations 7 (1954), 117–140. See Jerry Suls/LaddWheeler (eds.), Handbook of Social Comparison.
Theory and Research, New York 2000.
6 See, for example, Christian H. Poth, Episodic visual cognition: Implications for object and short-
term recognition, URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/publication/2911816 [last accessedDecem-
ber 9, 2019].
7 Cf. JoachimMatthes, The Operation called “Vergleichen”, in: JoachimMatthes (ed.), Zwischen
den Kulturen? Die Sozialwissenschaften vor dem Problem des Kulturvergleichs, Göttingen 1992,
75-99; Hartmut Kaelble, Der Historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhun-
dert, Frankfurt a.M./New York 1999; Ann Laura Stoler, Tense and Tender Ties: The Poli-
tics of Comparison in North American History and (Post)Colonial Studies, in: The Journal
of American History 88 (3/2001), 829-865; Hans-Gerhard Haupt, Comparative History, in: In-
ternational Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 4, Amsterdam 2001, 2397–2403;
Hans-Gerhard Haupt/Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Comparative and Transnational History. Central Eu-
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So far, comparisons have been discussed as a mental activity or as being in-
volved in theories and methodologies. With a few exceptions that we shall come
back to later on, comparisons per se were, for a long time, not even considered
a problem. This is remarkable, because related antonyms such as incomparabil-
ity, noncommensurability, or incommensurability have been disputed broadly and
controversially in philosophy and the theory of science ever since Thomas Kuhn’s
intervention regarding the structure of scientific revolutions in the 1960s.8 Apart
from these discussions, comparisons as an object of investigation, their history,
and their seeming paradoxes have not gained similar attention for a long time.
This changed for the first time in recent years when scholars from different dis-
ciplines began to think critically about the simultaneity of the so-called “ages of
discovery” and the emergence of comparative sciences in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. What has been called the onset of “Western modernity” not only
relies on numerous encounters with non-European cultures and civilizations, but
is also intertwined with comparisons or, in other words, with the power, the forces,
the causes, the functions, and the effects of comparisons.9 Scholars have begun to
ask whether comparison as a scientific and cultural tool that flourished in Europe’s
imperial era might be a predominatelyWestern and European preoccupation, even
a kind of obsession that is closely tied to enlightened and colonial ways of un-
derstanding, exploring, and dominating the world.10 Starting with the notion of
progress and civilization as temporalmeasures of comparingwho is ahead andwho
ropean Approaches and New Perspectives, New York/Oxford 2009; Thomas Welskopp, Vergle-
ichende Geschichte, in: Europäische Geschichte Online, URL: http://ieg-ego.eu/de/threads/the-
orien-und-methoden/vergleichende-geschichte [last accessedDecember 9, 2019]; AnnChris-
tiane Solte-Gresser/Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink/Manfred Schmeling (eds.), Zwischen Transfer und
Vergleich. Theorien und Methoden der Literatur- und Kulturbeziehungen aus deutsch-französischer
Perspektive, Stuttgart 2013; Annette Simonis/Linda Simonis (eds.), Kulturen des Vergleichens,
Heidelberg 2016.
8 Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962; Carl G. Hempel,
Grundzüge der Begriffsbildung in der empirischen Wissenschaft, Düsseldorf 1974, 83–86; Ruth
Chang, Making Comparisons Count, London/New York 2002; Paul Borghossian, Fear of Knowl-
edge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, Oxford 2006; Martin Carrier, Incommensurability
and Empirical Comparability: The Case of the Phlogiston Theory, in: Peter Gärdenfors/Jan
Woleński/Katarzyna Kijania-Placek (eds), In the Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of
Science, Dordrecht 2002, 551–564.
9 See Pheng Cheah, Grounds of Comparison, in: Diacritics 29 (1999), 3–18; Pheng Cheah, The
Material World of Comparison, in: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.), Comparison:
Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013, 168–190; Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die
Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015; Willibald Stein-
metz (ed.), The Force of Comparison. A New Perspective on Modern European History and the Con-
temporary World, New York/Oxford 2019.
10 Cf. NatalieMelas, All theDifference in theWorld. Postcoloniality and the Ends of Comparison, Stan-
ford 2007; Walter Mignolo, On Comparison: Who is Comparing What and Why? In: Rita Fel-
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is lagging behind, the quantitative comparisons of populations and economic data11
went on to create a world society that is finally united and charted by comparison
through numbers, statistics, and graphs.12 Today, comparing is not just an all-per-
vasive global instrument.The practice of instant digital comparisons along with the
proliferation of rankings, lists, and comparative evaluations is beginning to dom-
inate—or even tyrannize—private and public lives in the digital age.13 Whereas
sociology points to an increase of comparative means as a side effect of or a stim-
ulus for modernization processes—be it through the development of media and
technology or the emergence of culture as a field of second-order observation and
therefore comparison14—postcolonial critics have argued that comparing has al-
ways put and kept those persons, groups, and agents in power who actually decide
what is worth comparing, whose perspective is adopted, and who, by starting to
compare, set the standards and norms that are automatically involved in the act of
comparing.15 Does that indicate that comparative methodologies must be thrown
overboard?
Before making a momentous decision, we should take a closer look at the ter-
minology. A comparison might be described as a logical operation that puts into
perspective two entities, the two comparata, in respect to a tertium comparationis.
A comparison carried out by actors, in contrast, is a socially determined activity.
Its distinctive feature is that actors assume comparability and then relate similari-
ties and differences between two ormore entities.The assumption of comparability
seems to be a crucial point. Only if actors feel that apples and pears are comparable,
they will carry out comparisons. In other words, you truly can compare everything
with everything, but you can do so only, first, when you assume comparability;
ski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013,
99–111.
11 See the now classical work by Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other, New York 1983.
12 Cf. Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World. Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Gov-
ernance, in: Current Anthropology 52 (2011), 83–95; Bettina Heintz/Tobias Werron, Wie ist
Globalisierung möglich? Zur Entstehung globaler Vergleichshorizonte am Beispiel von Wis-
senschaft und Sport, in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 63 (2011), 359–394;
Bettina Heintz, Welterzeugung durch Zahlen. Modelle politischer Differenzierung in inter-
nationalen Statistiken 1948-2010, in: Cornelia Bohn/Arno Schubbach/LeonWansleben (eds.),
Welterzeugung durch Bilder, Stuttgart 2012, 7–39.
13 Cf. Steffen Mau, Das metrische Wir. Über die Quantifizierung des Sozialen, Berlin 2017; Bettina
Heintz, “Wir leben im Zeitalter der Vergleichung”. Perspektiven einer Soziologie des Ver-
gleichs, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 45 (2016), 305–323.
14 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Kultur als historischer Begriff, in: Niklas Luhmann, Gesellschaftsstruk-
tur und Semantik 4, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, 31–54; Bettina Heintz, Numerische Differenz. Über-
legungen zu einer Soziologie des (quantitativen) Vergleichs, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 39
(2010), 162–181.
15 Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan, Why Compare?, in: New Literary History 40 (2009), 453–475.
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and, second, when you find an adequate tertium comparationis. Both features de-
pend heavily on the societal and historical context. Every comparison is made only
with respect to a perspective fromwhich the sorting out of differences and similari-
ties makes sense. Comparing is based on that which the particular comparisons are
aimed toward, the tertium comparationis that is set up or implicitly engaged within
the whole process of comparing.16 Apples, oranges, and pears might be compared,
but this is done very differently by traders, sellers, or consumers who choose very
different purposes and tertia for their comparative actions.
Reconsidering comparisons as practices of comparing—
with a history of their own
Far exceeding a mere mental activity and a methodological instrument, we sug-
gest that comparisons should be reconsidered as practices of comparing that have
a history of their own with different actors, multifaceted deployments, and of-
ten unprecedented effects—all to be studied in their own right. Comparing is not
an activity that could be analyzed as a logical operation that would start with the
characteristics of the comparata. Comparing is shaped (though not determined) by
societal practices. We understand practices as repeatable patterns of action that,
at the same time, enable or even provoke comparisons and shape them. However,
practices are not completely fixed or stable; they depend on being performed by
actors. If an actor carries out comparisons, she or he actualizes a specific prac-
tice; and simply because of a time index, every repetition also shifts the practice
slightly. If other actors take up the shift—willingly or not—practices might change.
The self-evidence of the seemingly objective use of comparisons in everyday life, the
media, the sciences, and the humanities has actually obscured the fact that com-
paring is not neutral or innocent, but is always interwoven with the interests and
perspectives of the ones who compare and is related to the situations and contexts
in which comparisons are made. How tertia comparationis are taken up implicitly for
different purposes—how, for example, they may be altered or left behind while the
objects of comparison stay the same—is in no way self-evident or objective. The
postcolonial critique has convincingly questioned the historical uses of compari-
son as a quasineutral tool of Western hegemony and domination. It even went so
far as to ask whether comparing itself could be a predominately Eurocentric in-
strument of thinking and judging that might be replaced by other means in order
to renounce the normative implications of comparison: by juxtaposition while cut-
16 Cf. Andreas Mauz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.),Hermeneutik des Vergleichs. Strukturen, Anwendun-
gen und Grenzen komparativer Verfahren, Würzburg 2011.
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ting out judgment and evaluation,17 by stopping at the mere acknowledgment of
“comparability,” and by emphasizing “lateral comparisons” in order to balance the18
“frontal comparisons” of “us” and “them” as practiced in much traditional as well
as in postcolonial anthropology.19 Postcolonial approaches, however, more often
than not, have repeated the dichotomies of the “colonial powers” and the “colonial
other” within their studies. This repetition has to do with the postcolonial inter-
est in analyzing “othering,” as Homi K. Bhabha would have it.20 We would like to
suggest a new research agenda that, instead of criticizing the methods and the
construction of the Other through comparison, focuses on the very practices of
comparing. The analysis of comparative practices makes it possible to gain a bet-
ter understanding of both the doing of differences and the doing of similarities.
It helps reveal the constructed relation between the two and puts the dynamics of
comparing in the foreground. Sometimes actors do not mention, and sometimes
they do not even realize, that comparing puts differences and similarities evenly
in perspective. Comparing is a “relationing” activity that goes way beyond stating
mere differences. As a consequence, “othering” might appear as an extreme form
of comparing—a form that might point exclusively to differences in respect to a
specific tertium, but that, nevertheless, relies primarily on the broad assumption of
comparability.
We could summarize so far in two points:
1.With the postcolonial critique at the latest, it is the phenomena of comparing
itself that comes into view. Instead of comparison as an instrument or tool, be
it cognitive, socially or scientifically, instead of the substantive and the entity of
“comparison,” we rather should take the verb and thereby the action of “comparing”
into account. Comparing as a social and historical practice is always bound up
with actors and agencies that perform the comparisons and connect them with
their purposes and possible outcomes—intended or not. At the end of the day, the
question of who is comparing and why actors compare becomes more important
than the objects that are actually compared. Instead of objects ever waiting for all
possible kinds of comparisons, there are actors who actually start the comparing
process while charging it with purposes and shifting tertia comparationis.
While doing comparisons, actors are never free from their normative back-
ground and the historical context in which comparisons are situated. As a prac-
17 Cf. Susan Stanford Friedman, Why not Compare?, in: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman
(eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013, 34–45.
18 Natalie Melas, Merely Comparative, in: PMLA 128 (2013), 652–659.
19 Matei Candea, Going Full Frontal: Two Modalities of Comparison in Social Anthropology, in:
RenaudGagné/SimonGoldhill/Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd (eds.), Regimes of Comparatism. Frameworks
of Comparison in History, Religion and Anthropology, Leiden/Boston 2019, 343–371.
20 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, New York 1994.
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tice—according to the insights of practice theory21—comparing has to be reconsid-
ered not as an individual singular action performed randomly and spontaneously
across space and time (and correspondingly hard to grasp), but as part of a frame-
work of comparative practices that have been established through repetition and
routines, cultural habits, and historical patterns.22 As such practices, comparative
acts in history are no longer contingent and arbitrary, but are clustered and or-
ganized along collective cultural schemes and models according to different fram-
ings of actors, groups, classes, nations, or other historical conditions and circum-
stances.
This shift in perspective also sheds new light on what at first sight appeared to
be contradictory or even the paradoxes of comparison: trivial mental activity ver-
sus powerful tool of thinking, arbitrariness versus importance, everyday practice
versus historical change, or permanence of comparisons versus incomparability. If
we analyze the practices of comparing instead, mental activities are no longer the
exclusive objects of research. In addition, comparisons are no longer perceived as
a neutral instrument that is always at hand with the same devices, but as a prac-
tice that changes its rules according to its use and context. As a consequence of
the “practical turn” in comparison research, the permanence of comparing and the
simultaneous statements of incomparability appear either as divergent tensions or
conflicting positions of different actors or as different stages within the very pro-
cess of comparing. An actor can first assume comparability and then assert incom-
parability or vice versa. Practices do not necessarily live up to logical operations.
The shift in perspective also reacts to the postcolonial critique by slightly changing
its point of attack. The analysis of practices of comparing overcomes the analysis
of “othering” and thus opens the door for deeper insights into the subtle and not so
subtle power relations in comparative situations. The one who claims comparabil-
ity and detects or determines the perspective, the tertium comparationis, holds the
power to confront and to evaluate the comparata, to keep them either fixed to estab-
lished normative standards, or to open them up to hitherto unknown perspectives.
21 Cf. Theodore R. Schatzki, Social Practices. AWittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the
Social, Cambridge 1996; Andreas Reckwitz, Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken.
Eine sozialtheoretische Perspektive, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 32 (2003), 282–301; Marian
Füssel/Tim Neu, Doing Discourse. Diskursiver Wandel aus praxeologischer Perspektive, in:
Achim Landwehr (ed.), Diskursiver Wandel, Wiesbaden 2010, 213–235.
22 Cf. Johannes Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis. Vorüberlegungen zu einer praxistheoretisch ori-
entierten Untersuchung von Vergleichen, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt
beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a.M./NewYork 2015, 135–159; JohannesGrave,
Comparative Practices and their Implications: The Case of Comparative Viewing, in:Willibald
Steinmetz (ed.), The Force of Comparison. A New Perspective on Modern European History and the
Contemporary World, New York/Oxford 2019, 53–79.
Practices of Comparing 19
However, the act of comparing, by relating entities, objects, processes, living be-
ings, or humans vis-à-vis a tertium comparationis, always challenges the comparata
involved. To compare distant objects, for instance, always means decontextualiz-
ing each object and putting—recontextualizing—it in a new framework with a new
tertium comparationis. What is more, comparing relies not only on the assumption
of comparability but also on a tertium comparationis that has also been called the
tertium commune.The latter expression makes it even clearer that comparing puts
similarity and difference into perspective.
2. Comparing as a practice depends not only on the societal context but also on
the historical situation. Whereas psychological and sociobiological investigations
point to the everlasting pervasiveness of comparing as a quite stable resource of
human cognition,23 the historiographies of comparative sciences have not come
to terms with the history of comparing as a social and historical practice whose
means, perspectives, and performances may change according to different actors
and to either longues durées or shorter time periods. “This is the age of compari-
son!”24 Friedrich Nietzsche once was quick to diagnose the predicaments of his
imperial and antiquarian nineteenth century. However, histories and transforma-
tions in the manners and magnitudes of comparisons are quite difficult to assess
and to analyze. It is by no means certain and self-explanatory that comparisons
writ large started with the “bourgeois” imperial age,25 and it is equally doubtful
whether comparisons have remained the same across time and space over the cen-
turies.
A broadly discussed example might illustrate this: During the so-called “dis-
pute of the New World,” long-lasting traditions of comparing were picked up and
reframed. The comparison of fruits (and other plants) played a major role when
European scholars such as Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon or Cornelis de Pauw
proved the American climate to have a degenerative effect for humans, animals,
and plants alike by also reducing the variety of all living organisms. Comparisons
did vary depending on the cultural background. However, the native Mexican Fray
23 See, for example, Bram P. Buunk/Thomas Mussweiler, New Directions in Social Comparison
Research, in: European Journal of Social Psychology 31 (2001), 467–475. “In its broadest sense,
the concept of social comparison—relating one’s own features to those of others and vice
versa—is an important, if not central, characteristic of human life. […] the need to compare
self with others is phylogenetically very old, biologically very powerful, and recognizable in
many species.” Transferring the concept and the practice of social comparison from humans
to animals has recently led to skepticism: See Vanessa Schmitt et al., Do Monkeys Compare
Themselves to Others?, in: Animal Cognition 19 (2016), 417–428.
24 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, all too human, Cambridge 1996, 24.
25 For a different perspective see, for example, Anthony Grafton, Comparisons Compared: A
Study in the Early Modern Roots of Cultural History, in: Renaud Gagné/Simon Goldhill/Ge-
offrey E. R. Lloyd (eds.), Regimes of Comparatism. Frameworks of Comparison in History, Religion
and Anthropology, Leiden/Boston 2019, 18–48.
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Francisco Javier Clavijero, for instance, did not hesitate to counter the argument
with a different fruit-based comparison: “If America had no pomegranates, lemons
&c. it has them now: but Europe never had, has nor can have, chirimoyas, agua-
cates, musas, chicozapotes, &c.”26 Behind the fruit comparisons, we easily detect
that actually something else was being negotiated: the question which world region
should be the standard, the norm against which others are to be compared.Who is
meant to set the standards for evaluation; who is in the position to decide whether
a comparison-based hierarchy is convincing; and who, on the other hand, is forced
to react? Whatever the reaction looks like, it is difficult to escape comparisons once
they are in the world. However big the differences in standpoints between Clavijero
and de Pauw, both scholars were familiar with a long-lasting tradition of compar-
ing the old and the newworld. Already in 1609, Inca Garcilaso wrote about compar-
ing America to Europe and the difficulty in countering the imposition of already
introduced patterns of comparison. He tried in vain to get rid of comparisons be-
tween Europe and America by simply declaring: “every comparison is odious”27 (as
Gary Shaw shows in his contribution to this volume, the saying “comparisons are
odious” goes back at least to John Fortescue in 1471 but spread rapidly and with little
hindrance in the early modern period). As Garcilaso was claiming incomparabil-
ity, he nevertheless continued with comparisons. However, long-lasting traditions
of comparing Europe to America (tellingly, hardly ever vice versa) should not hide
the specific differences and the significant changes in the respective practices. Not
only the comparata and the tertiawere changing but also the subjects and the goals,
the complexity, and the contexts. Garcilaso around 1600 and de Pauw or Clavijero
roughly 200 years later used comparisons very differently insofar as the former
tried to render visible the given divine order whereas the latter insisted on proving
the truth quite empirically by doing comparisons. For an evaluation of the outcome
of comparisons with different tertia, de Pauw and Clavijero both needed a measure
for weighing the importance of comparisons. What is to be more important: the
size of the animals or the variety of species? For an evaluation, a ranking of com-
parisons so to say, they carried out comparisons of comparisons—a complex and
26 Francisco Javier Clavijero,History ofMexico, London 1787, 189. For the dispute of the newworld,
see: Ottmar Ette, Die ‘Berliner Debatte’ um die Neue Welt. Globalisierung aus der Perspek-
tive der europäischenAufklärung, in: VicenteBernaschina/Kraft, Tobias/Kraume,Anne (eds.),
Globalisierung in Zeiten der Aufklärung. Texte und Kontexte zur ‘Berliner Debatte’ um die NeueWelt
(17./18. Jh.). Frankfurt a. M. 2015, 27–55; Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, De l’usage de la comparaison
dans les écrits des Jésuites sur les Amériques, in: Marc André Bernier/Clorinda Donato/Hans-
Jürgen Lüsebrink (eds.), Jesuit Accounts of the Colonial Americas. Intercultural Transfers, Intellec-
tual Disputes, And Textualities, Toronto 2014, 418–436.
27 Inca Garcilaso de la Vega,Primera Parte de los Commentarios Reales, Lisbon 1609, 56.
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reflexive comparison. Without a given divine or natural order, actors themselves
were forced to find arguments for searching and proving truth by comparing.28
The “dispute of the new world” is but one example illustrating historically dif-
fering practices of comparing.There can be no doubt that we need to know farmore
about it. How can we achieve more knowledge? We would like to put to discussion
the combination of a typological endeavor and the investigation of the history of
practices of comparing.
Making the new agenda feasible:
Typology and the historicity of comparative practices
When postcolonial critique vigorously cast doubt on “Western” practices of com-
paring, the question of comparison—as a problem; as a way of thinking; and as
a contested arena of cultural theory, intercultural perception, and history—arose
anew. Despite all the historical vices and defaults of comparison, and even while
vigorously facing its rhetorical and ideological bias, comparison is even more in
need of a reevaluation that takes the ambivalent status of comparing fully into ac-
count.29 A once colonial practice of comparing may give way to a new “ethics” of
comparison based on the “inevitability” and the translation processes of compari-
son30 as well as on the “self-relativizing and self-critical function” of a “comparative
viewpoint.”31The European history of comparing may be paralleled and viewed dif-
ferently by looking at comparative examples and histories of comparison in other
equally central parts of the world.32 The scientific undertakings of comparative re-
28 See for the long-lasting tradition of comparing the new and the old world: Angelika Epple,
Comparing Europe and the Americas: The Dispute of the NewWorld between the Sixteenth
and Nineteenth Centuries, in: Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), The Force of Comparison, New York
2019, 137–163.
29 Haun Saussy, AreWe Comparing Yet? On Standards, Justice, and Incomparability, Bielefeld 2019.
30 Zhang Longxi, Crossroads, Distant Killing, and Translation: On the Ethics and Politics of Com-
parison, in: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses,
Baltimore 2013, 46–63, see 59–60.
31 Xie Ming, What Does the Comparative to Theory?, in: PMLA 128 (2013), 676–682, see 680.
32 Cf. Marcel Detienne, Comparing the Incomparable, Stanford 2008; Xie Ming, Conditions of Com-
parison: Reflections on Comparative Intercultural Inquiry, London 2011; Zhang Longxi, Compari-
son and Correspondence: Revisiting an Old Idea for the Present Time, in: Comparative Litera-
ture Studies 53 (4/2016), 766–785.
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ligious studies,33 comparative literature,34 and anthropology35 currently seem to
be transforming their practices in search for “comparatism as an ethos”36 imme-
diately after it became apparent that the grand theories of comparing “us” and
“them”—which had taken center stage in the enlightened and colonial historiogra-
phies of religion, history, and anthropology—may have failed altogether. However,
what would render such a comparative approach to the history of comparisons fea-
sible? There is a sense of new beginnings in the air. Anil Bhatti and Dorothee Kim-
mich, for instance, instead of being satisfied with just postcolonial criticism, have
recently argued for a new cultural theoretical paradigm that will rely on similarities
instead of differences.Their hope to overcome difference-oriented comparisons by
a strategic emphasis on similarity shares the moral commitment of postcolonial-
ism.37 However, we would like to make a slightly different suggestion by taking
the full picture of comparing and its dynamic into account. For the time being, we
would like to structure all kinds of questions concerning the ethics and the politics
of comparison along with the variations, the enabling conditions, the history, and
the effects of comparing according to two, partly overlapping bundles of questions
that make up a rather typological approach on the one side, and a rather historical
approach on the other.
The first bundle of questions deals with typological features and general chal-
lenges of comparing without pointing primarily to a temporal index. Given that
comparisons are not an innocent tool in the service of objective insights, but a
practice shaped by actors situated in a specific societal and historical context, this
first bundle of questions points to issues that characterize all practices of com-
33 Cf. Guy G. Stroumsa, History of Religions: The Comparative Moment, in: Renaud Gagné/Si-
mon Goldhill/Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd (eds.), Regimes of Comparatism. Frameworks of Comparison in
History, Religion and Anthropology, Leiden/Boston 2019, 318–342.
34 Cf. Rey Chow, The Old/NewQuestion of Comparison in Literary Studies: A Post-European Per-
spective, in: English Literary History 71 (2004), 289–311; David Ferris, Why Compare?, in: Ali
Behdat/Dominic Thomas (eds.), A Companion to Comparative Literature, Malden/Oxford 2011,
28–45; David Porter, The Crisis of Comparison and theWorld Literature Debate, in: Profession
2011, 244–258; Jacob Edmond, No Discipline: An Introduction to “The Indiscipline of Compar-
ison”, in: Comparative Literature Studies 53 (2016), 647–659.
35 Cf. Richard Handler, The Uses of Incommensurability in Anthropology, in: Rita Felski/Su-
san Stanford Friedman (eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013, 271–291;
Matei Candea, Comparison in Anthropology. The Impossible Method, Cambridge 2018; Philippe
Descola, Anthropological Comparatisms: Generalisations, Symmetrisation, Bifurcation, in:
RenaudGagné/SimonGoldhill/Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd (eds.), Regimes of Comparatism. Frameworks
of Comparison in History, Religion and Anthropology, Leiden/Boston 2019, 402–417.
36 Stroumsa, History of Religions, 339.
37 Cf. Anil Bhatti/Dorothee Kimmich (eds.), Similarity. A Paradigme for Culture Theory, New Delhi
2018.
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paring—no matter where and when they are carried out. This would also include
reflections on the academic methodology of comparing.
During the last decade, scholars from different disciplines have been discussing
the advantages and shortcomings of typologizing comparisons.38 Most have not
referred explicitly to practices of comparing but to comparisons as such.39 How-
ever, their suggestions can also help to typologize the respective practices. When
it comes to comparing other humans, groups, and societies, Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd
has offered a typology of five “valences” of comparatism as a way of using com-
parisons.40 First, “comparatism can be used to claim superiority for the views and
practices of those who are doing the comparing.”41 Second, comparing, in turn,
may be used to acknowledge the superiority of the other (or at least in certain
respects). Third, instead of differences, the commonalities between the two com-
parata may be emphasized. The fourth possibility is to discern only differences,
thus stressing incomparability. The fifth valence consists in taking radical differ-
ence not as amatter of ranking and judging or not just stopping at incomparability,
but looking at comparisons “as a resource for learning something new.”42 Whereas
Lloyd tries to put comparing in a typological order, sketching almost ideal types in
the sense of Max Weber, Willibald Steinmetz has a similar but more historical ty-
pology in mind when he—proceeding from social comparison research—differen-
tiates between comparisons along the two axes of “above/below” and “better/worse”
while adding as a third possibility the emphasis on differences and incomparabili-
ties (“just different”).43 In away, this typology combines the two different bundles of
questions that run through this volume, because it also carries a historical index:
Whereas comparison as a social scale of “above and below” ranks is quite com-
mon in premodern times, better/worse comparisons situated within a competitive
framework and incomparability as a sign of uniqueness attributed to persons and
individuals are specific modern features of comparative actions.
However, even by establishing typologies of comparisons (andKirill Postoutenko
gives a first-off example of their linguistic possibilities in this volume), the ten-
sions and ambivalences of comparing might not disappear and not even have been
fully understood. It is important to note, though, that historical typologies do not
38 See, for instance, Hartmut von Sass, Vergleiche(n). Ein hermeneutischer Rund- und Sinkflug,
in: AndreasMautz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.),Hermeneutik des Vergleichs,Würzburg 2011, 25–48.
39 For some thoughts on how to integrate typologies of comparisons into research on practices
of comparing, see Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis, 135–159.
40 Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Analogical Investigations. Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Hu-
man Reasoning, Cambridge 2015, 29–42.
41 Lloyd, Analogical Investigations, 30.
42 Lloyd, Analogical Investigations, 31.
43 Willibald Steinmetz, Above/below, better/worse, or simply different? Metamorphoses of So-
cial Comparison, 1600–1900, in: Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), The Force of Comparison, ANew Per-
spective onModernEuropeanHistory and theContemporaryWorld, NewYork/Oxford 2019, 80–112.
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necessarily conflict with the dynamic of comparative practices that—once con-
structed and performed—moves easily beyond typological confines. Comparing
the self and the other in a colonial or postcolonial context, for example, can lead to
stereotypes fixing judgments and established norms within a wide array of public
and philosophical thinking. Comparing the self and the other can also—almost at
the same time—open up horizons that restructure the whole field of comparative
knowledge.44
The second bundle of questions has a temporal index—in different ways: It
looks at practices of comparison built on inherited traditions and incorporated
routines or patterns of comparisons thus pointing back to historical continuities.
Comparing cultures, for instance, has been a constant focus of attention and a driv-
ing force of irritation and transformation from early modern time onward45 (and
Andrea Frisch gives another intriguing example in this volume), and it may well
even be Greek ethnography that laid the groundwork for this kind of double-faced
comparatism.46 Comparative practices served to negotiate matters of religion, eth-
nicity, and law in early modern contact zones. They were also tools to fuel compe-
tition in a nationalist and capitalist age—from ethnic uprisings in global conflicts
and colonial wars to economic competition or military rivalry and arms races be-
tween nation states and superpowers in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Practices of comparing, however, do not just follow historical traditions and
point to continuities; they also change over time. A thought-provoking sugges-
tion by Renaud Gagné and his research group points to different “regimes of com-
paratism”47 that have been established over time but that also may have changed
44 A perfect example may be the so-called ages of discovery with multiple encounters of travel-
ing Europeans with non-European civilizations that—with their quite obvious but frequently
neglected emphasis on comparison—have been studied in research on world travel litera-
ture: See Anthony Pagden, European Encounterswith theNewWorld: FromRenaissance to Roman-
ticism, NewHaven 1993;Walter Erhart,Weltreisen,Weltwissen,Weltvergleich – Perspektiven
der Forschung, in: Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur 42 (2017),
292–321; Christine Peters, Reisen und Vergleichen. Praktiken des Vergleichens in Alexander
von Humboldts “Reise in die Äquinoktial-Gegenden des Neuen Kontinents” und Adam Jo-
hann von Krusensterns “Reise um die Welt”, in: Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der
deutschen Literatur 42 (2017), 441–465.
45 See Joan-Pau Rubiés, Comparing Cultures in the Early Modern World: Hierarchies, Genealo-
gies and the Idea of European Modernity, in: Renaud Gagné/Simon Goldhill/Geoffrey E.R.
Lloyd (eds.), Regimes of Comparatism. Frameworks of Comparison in History, Religion and Anthro-
pology, Leiden/Boston 2019, 116–176.
46 Cf. Raimund Schulz, Als Odysseus staunte. Die griechische Sicht des Fremden und das ethnographis-
che Vergleichen von Homer bis Herodot, Göttingen 2020.
47 See Renaud Gagné/Simon Goldhill/Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd (eds.), Regimes of Comparatism. Frame-
works of Comparison in History, Religion and Anthropology, Leiden/Boston 2019.
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slightly or even vanished completely. Most often though, these practices and prac-
tice formations, these patterns and regimes of comparing, combine continuities
with either ruptures or transformations. This general observation opens the door
for challenging questions. In the history of comparisons, what does exactly change:
the techniques, the procedures, the topics, the tertium (or tertia) comparationis, the
power constellations, or the societal circumstances? Why do comparative practices
change and to what end? If we want to write a comprehensive history of com-
paring, we have to know far more about different historical comparative practices
in different cultures or communities or in other kinds of groups that share spe-
cific practices. As the example of the scholarly comparisons of the old and the new
world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has clearly shown, there are, at
first sight, many continuities in the history of comparing. However, a closer in-
spection reveals significant differences that might question or even displace the
assumed continuity.
There is an even more complex question about comparative practices that ac-
companies temporality and addresses the problem and phenomenon of historical
change itself: Do practices of comparing trigger historical change? This question
is challenging, because the causes of historical change are always manifold. Con-
tingency and nonhuman influences play a major role, and the effects of practices
are difficult to prove. Nonetheless, recent research has found strong arguments in
support of the assumption that comparing provokes change. This is most obvious
in situations of conflict and competition. Discussions about the strength of a hos-
tile army, for instance, are usually based on comparisons—be they comparisons of
courage, bodily shape, strategy, or equipment and the power of weapons. Military
experts derive instructions for action from these discussions, and these instruc-
tions are bound to bring change into the world. In competitive contexts, it is also
immediately convincing that comparisons are carried out to legitimize or at least
to ask for change. The proliferation of rankings and ratings are another case in
point. But does the power of comparative practices also apply to broader historical
changes?
Recent research at least supports the idea that the encounters, conflicts, and
entanglements of different cultures and the evolution of a comparative scholarly
methodology were just two sides of one coin: the making of so-called “Western”
modernity. The question whether “Western” modernity is an outcome of specific
practices of comparing seems to be a promising thesis. It combines the postcolo-
nial criticism of comparative methodology with a historical finding: In eighteenth-
century European academia, comparisons became the basis for methodology in
many different disciplines such as anatomy, ethnology, literature, and the like.
They also were crucial for coming to terms with new, sometimes challenging, or
even confusing and irritating encounters with formerly little or unknown regions,
cultures, geographies, people, plants, and animals—both within and outside of
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Europe. With comparisons, scholars, adventurers, military experts, explorers, and
travelers helped—willingly or not—to naturalize or hide hierarchies by introduc-
ing allegedly neutral norms and standards for evaluations. Through comparison,
they ordered the world.The decisive point, however, goes beyond this: By ordering
the world, the doing of comparison also helped to change the world. Not only the
request for equal rights is based on comparisons, also the stress on inequality or
unevenness cannot do without comparing. Both ask for change. In the nineteenth
century colonial context, imperialism and conquest were legitimized (among oth-
ers) through the comparison-based argument that people “without history” were
in need of education by “people with history.”48 If the importance of comparisons
as drivers of historical change applies for a specific time period in a specific part
of a specific world region, would that mean that comparing is also an important
practice for triggering change in world regions beyond Europe? What would that
mean?There are manymore questions to be asked about the relation between com-
parisons and historical change, some of which are taken up in contributions to this
volume.
Contributions to this volume
Wehave sorted the two parts of this book according to the two bundles of questions.
The first part includes four chapters that chart the field of comparative practices
by taking typological, methodological, and theoretical approaches to comparative
speech acts, incomparability, metaphors and poetry, and rankings as a way of com-
paring by numbers. The second part of the book includes nine contributions that
deal with the historicity of comparison. Contributions range from the Middle Ages
and the early modern period to the twentieth century and present times; they cover
religion; historiography; East–West encounters between Europe, China, and Japan;
art and aesthetics; race and slavery systems; politics; and the issue of comparing
in the digital age.
The first part starts with preliminary linguistic, semantic, and philosophical
reflections on comparison as an operation of thinking, arguing, and speaking.The
endeavor to identify comparative utterances and speech acts in languages does not
just provide the path to comparison’s practices, it also lays the foundation for com-
puter-basedmethods of detecting comparative phrases within languages and writ-
ten texts that would enable research on their statistical occurrences and historical
transformations. As Kirill Postoutenko shows in his contribution (Preliminary Typol-
ogy of Comparative Utterances: A Tree and Some Binaries), a vast taxonomy of possible
comparisons must be taken into account if we want to order and classify different
48 Fabian, Time and the Other.
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types of comparative utterances. Such typologies—with their examples and highly
specified classifications—give a first impression of the wide range of speech acts
that are used and performed for comparative purposes. Their data may be taken
into consideration each time the historical material of comparative practices has
to be structured and scrutinized in written documents.
Whereas a linguistic and semantic archive of possible comparisons composed
in this waymay be inexhaustible,Hartmut von Sass undertakes the almost opposite
move and looks at incomparability as a statement about entities—be they actions,
objects, or human beings—that allegedly cannot be compared at all (Incomparabil-
ity. A Tentative Guide for the Perplexed). Also starting with semantic, linguistic, and,
this time, philosophical and logical-analytical observations, von Sass shows with
great care that the assertion of incomparability—the very opposite of the com-
mon-sense statement that everything can be compared with everything—is hard
to maintain in a strict logical or structural sense. If objects or statements could
be said to be incomparable to each other, the realm and the range, even the very
practices of comparison, might have been left and abandoned altogether. Whereas
noncommensurability—putting objects together that have nothing in common—is
a synonym for “incomparability” (but usually is just the starting point of compar-
isons to come), incommensurability is the outcome of bringing up somany similar-
ities and differences between objects that an overall comparison is no longer pos-
sible.49 Whereas statements about the principal incomparability of two or more
things need to be specified or just remain problematic, a “performative incom-
parability”—according to Hartmut von Sass—is widely used to address the most
important moral, personal, and political issues. What incomparability loses on the
side of logical thinking, it clearly gains as a performative practice turning incom-
parability and incommensurability into a rhetoric and a discourse on shared and
contested values among couples and groups, communities and societies.
The contributions of Kirill Postoutenko and Hartmut von Sass both point to the
fact that characteristics and descriptions of the linguistic and philosophical struc-
ture, the very “nature” of comparison, are almost impossible to have as long as the
performative uses of comparing are not taken into account.The paradoxes of com-
parison as a speech act and as a language game make sense or break down only
when the practice and the actors of comparing gain full-blown attention. What is
characterized as a problem of proper definition, as a loss or a circuit of never-end-
ing efforts for clear-cut and all-encompassing definitions and typologies, turns into
an important aspect for research on the historical, social, and cultural functions of
comparative practices.
49 We owe this clarification to Martin Carrier. On “incommensurability” see Martin Carrier,
Changing Laws and Shifting Concepts. On the Nature and Impact of Incommensurability, in:
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 216 (2001), 65–90.
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From early on, ever since comparatiowas coined a rhetorical device, metaphors
and similes have gained attention as the smallest and maybe purest form of com-
parisons. These and other rhetorical and literary comparisons constantly move be-
tween the world as it is and the possibilities of creating a fictional or poetic world
of its own. AsWalter Erhart shows in his contribution (Odysseus, Blackbirds, and Rain
Barrels: Literature as a Comparative Practice), the “semantic innovations” (Paul Ricœur)
provided by literary comparisons disclose relations that have not been there before.
Literature and poetry extend the range and the dynamics of comparing not only
by doing comparisons on microlevels such as metaphors and similes, especially in
poetry, but also by comparing literary figures and narratives throughout literary
history and world literature.
Whereas metaphors, poetry, and fictional narratives create new worlds and
worldviews by the world-disclosing activities of their comparative practices, statis-
tics and rankings, quite on the opposite side, seem to register and actually narrow
down the world as it is by displaying comparisons by numbers. However, although
rankings and graphs seem to represent the peak of neutrality and objectivity, they,
nevertheless, do not just collect facts and classify realities but construct their com-
petitive fields while simultaneously just pretending to describe them.The examples
in Tobias Werron’s and Leopold Ringel’s contribution—art, sports, and university
rankings—quite tellingly demonstrate that rankings have a history of their own
that is closely linked to the emergence of modernity and the rise of fast chang-
ing markets, publics, and technologies (Where Do Rankings Come From? A Historical-
Sociological Perspective on the History of Modern Rankings). Their analyses of rankings
quite explicitly dismantle the illusio of comparison’smost foregrounded, in this case
almost mathematically proven neutrality, while, at the same time, calling for a ge-
nealogy of the diverse historical forms of comparative practices. While opening up
the competitive field of contemporary comparisons made easy by computers, the
internet, algorithms, and artificial intelligence,Where Do Rankings Come From? re-
veals the agenda and the history of doing comparisons in general. By shaping and
transforming the realities that comparisons pretend to just register and rearrange,
practices of comparing make history in more than one sense: They are bound to
specific historical media and technologies that transform comparative acts corre-
spondingly, and they change the realities that they allegedly describe in a seemingly
innocent comparative way.
The second part of the volume starts with a contribution by Gary Shaw that
fills a whole unmarked chapter in the history of comparative practices (TheWeight
of Comparing in Medieval England). Until now, the history of comparisons and com-
paratisms has been traced back mostly to early modern and modern periods, thus
implicitly falling back on the old notion of medieval times as a dark age that had
seen neither the rise of individuality nor decisive encounters with non-European
civilizations and the important cross-cultural comparisons they produce. Contrary
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to this hardly contested notion, Gary Shaw draws on a broad picture of the role
of medieval comparisons—from everyday practices such as weighing, selling, and
buying on agricultural markets to the increasing importance of money for facil-
itating comparative acts on a daily basis. Furthermore, he highlights comparing
as an administrative tool that easily expands to and fosters economic and politi-
cal matters including questions of rank and clothing that actually permeate me-
dieval societies on a very general basis. It is by no means incidental that Francis
Bacon stretches the range of comparisons to the religious realm or that the warn-
ing against comparison—the saying that “comparisons are odious”—appears al-
most simultaneously in poetry and law in the fifteenth century, thus emphasizing
the dynamics that made comparing a routinized practice but also a site of politi-
cal and moral as well as legal and religious conflicts and contestations. Moreover,
Shaw makes an important methodological point: He asks how the historian is able
to trace comparative practices, even when these practices are not addressed ex-
plicitly in his sources. By taking into consideration different social, economic, and
cultural fields, Shaw demonstrates that it is indeed possible to reconstruct com-
parative practices without relying on explicit documents alone.
In France, almost at the same time, history is another site of these contes-
tations in which the act of comparing—according to Andrea Frisch—triggers
epochal “transformative effects” precisely by being continued, taken to its very
limits, and loaded with implicit underlying ambivalences and contradictions (The
Shifting Grounds of Comparison in the French Renaissance: The Case of Louis Le Roy).
The work of Louis le Roy in the sixteenth century is a quite telling case in point.
Comparing civilizations—overall France with ancient Greece and Rome—is chal-
lenged as much by a third term such as Islam as by following subcomparisons and
juxtapositions. Instead of clear-cut traditional worldviews and rankings, a lack of
common ground starts to unsettle old notions of differences and sameness, while
slowly indicating losses of historiographical standards that open up history (and
its writing) in unforeseen directions.
This may also apply to larger cross-cultural comparisons—as Zhang Longxi ex-
plores in his contribution on the comparisons between Europe and China (Compar-
ison and East–West Encounters: The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries). Starting with
the Renaissance andMarco Polo’s travels, these comparisons, right from the begin-
ning, did not just provide a tool to compare civilizations on an almost equal level of
civilization in terms of culture, refined manners, and taste—thus creating resem-
blances and comparables on a large scale.The portraits of China in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries are also used to shift cultural difference from a reflection
on one’s own achievements to a medium of social critique addressing Europe itself.
Nonetheless, Asian countries and Far-Eastern civilizations remain a resource
for imagining the other in numerous ways. As Emanuel Lozerandmakes clear in his
contribution on the European reports and fantasies on Japan from the fifteenth to
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the twentieth century (Japan as the Absolute Other: Geneology and Variations of a Topos),
Japan has served as an image and a projection of alterity throughout the centuries.
Yet, the content of this mirror image and the implied comparative negotiations
vary at great length due to the different comparative methods applied. From time
to time, for example, in the eighteenth century (paralleling the cases of China and
Japan on this point), differences were reduced and similarities gained ground. Yet,
as Lozerand shows in great detail, the observed facts and the content of the re-
spective comparisons often remained in place while the perspectives and the in-
terpretations, the tertia comparationis, were shifted and changed, invented, and left
behind. Therefore, former opposites turned into resemblances under a new head-
ing, and the mirror image of Japan as a topsy-turvy version of Europe—up until
Claude Lévi-Strauss—does not reveal a rigid structure (or stereotype) at all, but
a very mobile comparative strategy with numerous variations and quite different
purposes.
The range and contestations of comparative practices over the centuries extend
not only geographically but also according to the modes and objects of knowing,
the episteme, and scientific practices in general. As Leopold Ringel and Tobias Wer-
ron already showed in their contribution, art has a long history of rankings, but
also developed as a field of its own in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Art-
works are utilized as a realm of taste and common sense (sensus communis). The “je
ne sais quoi” as a quite common formula of the undefinable evaluation of beauty
and art works in the seventeenth century leads to the emergence of the philosoph-
ical subdiscipline of “aesthetics” as an analysis of the lower capacities of mind in
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750/58). But such theoretical or philo-
sophical discourses eclipsed important practices, particularly practices of compar-
ison that were established by connoisseurs, amateurs, and collectors. In his con-
tribution (‘Goût de Comparison’. Practices of Comparative Viewing in Eighteenth-Century
Connoisseurship), Joris C. Heyder points to an important trajectory in the history
of art when comparing became the very essence of judging artworks long before
the comparative sciences also took hold of the institutionalized academic efforts of
art criticism. When Jean-Baptist Dubos claimed a “goût de comparison” as the core
method of judging the value of art in 1719, he was referring to taste and connois-
seurship that mark not only a community of art critics but also a practice in front
of paintings that was being remodeled and refined as well as continued up to the
nineteenth century. The communities of connoisseurs doing and establishing spe-
cific patterns of comparing art gave way to academic practices in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries that often denigrated those comparing judgments as am-
ateurish but nevertheless depended on similar criteria for their own comparative
judgments.
As in art history, studying comparative practices in seemingly well-known top-
ics such as the construction of the Other, theories of race, and practices of slavery
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often challenges the established temporal, geographical, and theoretical scope of
research. Angelika Epple in her contribution (Inventing White Beauty, Fighting Black
Slavery: Blumenbach’s, Humboldt’s, and Arango y Parreño’s Share in Cuban Race Compar-
isons in the Long Nineteenth Century) shows that the concept of race, however vague it
used to be, has always been strongly combined with the discussion on slavery and
“limpieza de sangre” (blood purity) ever since the sixteenth century. Around 1800,
when Humboldt visited Cuba for the first time, race comparisons partly merged
with new instruments of statistical population control. Humboldt’s famous essay
on Cuba became a seminal point of reference in Cuba and beyond—even in the US
presidential election of 1856.The contribution traces howHumboldt was influenced
not only by the Göttingen-based comparative anatomist, Johann von Blumenbach,
but also by the Cuban slave owner, Arango y Parreño. Blumenbach, a committed
abolitionist, tried to prove the equal roots of all races, and used this to derive equal
rights for all humans. Arango y Parreño, in contrast, defended the Cuban way of
slavery that—in his eyes—made Cuban slaves “the happiest in the world.”The (com-
parative) question whether or not a better slavery existed undermined Humboldt’s
conviction that slavery was incomparable to other systems of violence. In addition,
even though Humboldt mistrusted statistics, with his huge collection of data and
supported by Arango y Parreño, he helped to establish the race comparisons by
numbers that triggered conflicts in Cuba until the twentieth century.
The comparison of the “old” and “new” world, of race and matters of slavery
and domination, as well as the temporalities of comparisons in terms of progress
and development opens an arena in which different types of comparative situa-
tions come into play. Comparative practices are used widely either in situations of
competition and conflict or in situations of negotiation, contact, and distinction.
Comparative arguments in a site of conflict or negotiation can arise all of sud-
den, whereas comparative judgements might develop differently in situations in
which they are reflected and contemplated retrospectively. The twentieth century
as a much-disputed “age of extremes” might have seen a lot of comparative prac-
tices borne out of conflict and competition that were enhanced by capitalism and
the market economy (as also outlined by the contribution of Leopold Ringel and
Tobias Werron). As a specific case in point, Thomas Müller studies the politiciza-
tion of comparisons in the realm of arms races and military competition between
superpowers in the Cold War (The Politicization of Comparisons: The East–West Dispute
OverMilitary Force Comparisons in theColdWar). Asmuch as the politicization of com-
parisons of these comparisons depends on public disputes, the dynamic set forth
by political actors could also alter the comparative framework, thus changing the
whole situation and opening the way to either more conflict and competition or to
a depoliticization of the whole debate.
Whereas the politicization of comparisons in the arenas of conflict and com-
petition might be a dominant course in the twentieth century—often blurring the
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boundaries between politics, economics, and moral issues—the modern and con-
temporary system of art seems to have developed as a sphere of its own in terms of
its markets, its values, its critics, and its public. Yet, as Britta Hochkirchen clearly
demonstrates in her contribution (Genealogies of Modernism: Curatorial Practices of
Comparing in the Exhibitions “Cubism and Abstract Art” and “Documenta I”), compar-
isons do not only have their place in the evaluative judgments of spectators and
art critics (as already developed with the practices of connoisseurship studied in
Joris C. Heyder’s contribution). However, by means of spatial arrangements and
displays, exhibitions and presentations in museums themselves enable, stimulate,
and perform comparisons. Hence, Hochkirchen’s examples from the middle of the
20th century show that museums and exhibitions create their own narratives of
modernism. By suggesting temporalities via the differences and similarities of
artworks that inevitably carry implicit temporal indices, curators and art critics
displayed those kinds of comparative settings and storylines that implied the cor-
responding framework of modernist history. Therefore, their practices induced a
term and phenomenon such as “modernity” or “modernism” going far beyond just
art history. By taking this approach, the chapter explicitly draws attention to in-
terrelations between comparative practices and concepts or experiences of time.
Studying comparative practices in detail offers a different view on history in
general. Whereas many well-established comparisons seem to draw on either di-
chotomies or on results of long-lasting developments, a closer look reveals a sur-
prising complexity of short-ranged transformations, renegotiations, and historical
change.The dynamics of comparative practices sometimes allow the compared ob-
jects, the comparata, to stay in place while the framework, the perspectives, and the
tertium comparationis change implicitly. Or, vice versa, an established framework
organizing the comparisons slowly relates the differences and similarities of the
comparata in unforeseen new and different ways, thus changing the whole picture.
Therefore, the analysis of the shifting, recalibrating, and changing of comparative
practices does not just deepen and strengthen the way a relational history might
operate without falling back on the assumption of seemingly strong binaries, enti-
ties, or dichotomies. It also delivers an insight into how historical change is about
to happen on the microlevel of everyday comparative practices and discourses that
range from the basic forms of perception, judging, and knowing to the structur-
ing of reality; and it does this by discerning cultural patterns of differences and
similarities between human beings, religions, morals, societies, or civilizations.
The contemporary digitalization, at the latest, has brought to mind that me-
dia and technologies contribute heavily to the formation and transformation of
comparative practices—be it through new media such as money exchange (in Gary
Shaw’s example of the Middle Ages) or the printing press; or through numbers,
graphs, statistics, or algorithms. Technologies change the way comparing is con-
ducted on a daily basis, and they change the way we reconstruct the past and do
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historical research. The final contribution in this volume by Anna Maria Neubert
and Silke Schwandt (Comparing in the Digital Age: About the Transformation of Prac-
tices) presents an outlook on how contemporary and future comparative practices
are being remodeled by digital devices. Again, comparing as a practice sets in mo-
tion an unpredictable dynamic that does not leave the comparata untouched and
does not leave the frame of references in place. As much as digital analyses—as
demonstrated by Neubert and Schwandt—will shed a new light and provide new
research on the historical practices of comparing, this general “transformation” of
relating and comparing objects of knowledge that is coming about through digital-
ization will also strongly influence our everyday practices of perceiving, learning,
and knowing. Practices and patterns of comparing have shaped history in what
were previously unknown ways; they will also go on to shape the future in many
unpredictable ways as well.
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Preliminary Typology of Comparative Utterances
A Tree and Some Binaries
Kirill Postoutenko
Abstract1
The paper presents the classification of comparative utterances and offsets its logical precision
with a sample of typical inconsistencies informing comparisons in poems, political speeches,
and religious pamphlets. Unlike formal languages used in logical, mathematical or mechan-
ical communication, discourse- or image-based communication favors (or, at least, tolerates)
fuzzy logic: as a result, some seemingly robust and basic differentiations (such as compara-
bility vs. incomparability, or quantitative vs. qualitative differences) routinely cancel out or
duplicate each other without jeopardizing narrative clarity. Rather than despairing at the
sight of collapsing binary oppositions, the paper argues for careful conceptual and semantic
analysis of bundling between various comparative expressions which may unearth regular
correlations between text types and patterns of comparison. Along with the studies of com-
parative inventories as such, the assessment of formation, spread, and historical development
of such recurrent patterns may be the contribution of conceptual history to the wider study of
comparative practices.
I.
The importance of tracking comparative utterances down and putting them in or-
der is manifold: On the one hand, the ubiquity of comparisons is readily admitted.2
1 Designed and conceived as part of a collaborative effort, this article benefited from criticism
offered at various stages by Angelika Epple, Joris Heyder, and Thomas Müller.
2 Just a few examples: “in omni ratiocinatione per comparationem tantùm veritatem præcise
cognoscamus” (ReneDescartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii [1619], in: ReneDescartes,Œu-
vres, T. X, Paris 1908, 439); “The faculty of comparison is that which produces ideas, and is
therefore the foundation of intellect, and all the intellectual powers of the human mind”
(James B. Lord Monboddo, Of the Origin and Progress of Language, Vol.1, Edinburgh 1779, 68);
“Toutes les opérations denotre esprit sont des comparaisons.Ainsi,une idée générale ne peut être,d’une
part, que le résultat des comparaisons que l’esprit a faites, de l’autre, que l’aperçu de celles qu’il doit
faire” (Henri Saint-Simon, Science de l’homme, physiologie religieuse, Paris 1813.—Henri Saint-
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On the other, there is little understanding of how comparative operations in hu-
man minds are mapped onto codes routinely employed in communication. Even if
this gap betweenmental and social facts is not going to be closed at once, one could
at least attempt to look at comparisons from the standpoint of their realization in
interactional practices. 3 The first step in this direction would be to go beyond sin-
gle words or even word combinations and focus instead on utterances (understood
here as elementary units of social interaction, usually expressed by means of verbal
language).4 Next, one could try to find out to what extent their internal organiza-
tion of comparative discourse mimics the systemic construction of language. It
stands to reason that privative opposition (a vs. –a) could be a convenient common
denominator:5 Whereas comparisons are commonly described as combinations of
similarities and differences,6 various subsystems of language (and, somewhat less
convincingly, discourse, society, and culture) have been portrayed in the linguistics,
Simon, Œuvres choisies, Paris 1859, 212); and “Denken heißt Vergleichen!” (Walther Rathenau,
“Auf dem Fechtboden des Geistes – Aphorismen aus seinen Notizbüchern” [1922], Wiesbaden 1953,
71). There is a growing body of literature on these and similar absolutizations of comparison:
Peter Galison, Descartes’s Comparisons: From the Invisible to the Visible, in: Isis 75 (2/1984),
311-326, see 323. Melvin Richter, Two Eighteenth-Century Senses of “Comparison” in Locke
and Montesquieu, in: Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 8 (2000), 385-406, see 391, 405; Walter D.
Mignolo, Who Is Comparing What andWhy?, in: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.),
Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013, 99-119, see 99; Willibald Steinmetz,
‘Vergleich’– eine begriffsgeschichtliche Skizze, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die
Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 91; Michael Eggers,
Vergleichendes Erkennen, Heidelberg 2016, 35.
3 Cf. Bettina Heintz, Numerische Differenz. Überlegungen zu einer Soziologie des (quantita-
tiven) Vergleichs, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 39 (3/2010), 162-181, see 163.
4 Cf. John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge 1978, 16. Ac-
tually, there are sound reasons for going even further, including reception of comparative
messages into the contents of comparative utterances and the treatment of minimal ex-
changes between sender and recipient as atoms of a comparative world (cf. Harvey B. Sar-
les, Language and Human Nature, Minneapolis 1985, 35). This could be truly indispensable for
visual comparisons in which comparative intentions are shared more equally between com-
munication participants than is the case in verbal texts (cf. Heintz, Numerische Differenz,
164; Johannes Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis. Vorüberlegungen zu einer praxistheoretisch ori-
entierten Untersuchung von Vergleichen, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt
beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 135-159, see 146; Stein-
metz, ‘Vergleich’, see 108–110). However, just one exception aside, this article confines itself
to words not images, and taking up the speaker’s/writer’s position is probably an acceptable
price for avoiding excessive intricacy.
5 See the convenient summary: Ryszard Zuber, Privative opposition as a semantic relation, in:
Journal of Pragmatics 4 (5/1980), 413–424.
6 For the representative sample, see: Günther Schenk/Andrej Krause, Vergleich, in: Joachim
Ritter/Karlfried Gründer/Gottfried Gabriel (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 11
(2001), 677.
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philosophy, and anthropology of the last two centuries as huge bundles of distinc-
tive features.7 Even if comparisons cannot be broken down into privative oppo-
sitions as easily as, say, phonemes in language—and they probably cannot—they
might still reveal some internal organization akin to the one of language, which,
in turn, would simplify the study of their embeddedness in discourse.8
Before proceeding with the actual classification of comparative utterances,
though, it might be worth sketching out the convergences and divergences
informing distinctions within comparative and discursive practices.
Generally speaking, all communicative activities generate information by pro-
ducing handfuls of minimal differences against the backdrops of innumerable sim-
ilarities. Whereas in the theater, we watch a play about real life and find most of
the things seen and heard eminently familiar; in speech production, we mostly try
to choose the right words for the respective (inner and outer) situations. What we
do not normally do is go over the likenesses and unlikenesses between life and the-
ater while enjoying a play, or explore all possible alternatives to saying “hello!” to a
friend. If we did not behave like machines in most of the situations calling for deci-
sions, our brains would explode, and life would stop in its tracks.9 But “most” is not
“all”, and occasionally we do step out of the flow and ponder upon the relations be-
tween theater and life10 or associate words with minimal distinctive features.11 The
7 Cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Structural Study of Myth, in: The Journal of American Folklore 68
(270/1955), 428-444, see 443; Roman Jakobson, Verbal Communication, in: Scientific American
227 (3/1972), 72-81, see 76; Algirdas J. Greimas,OnMeaning. SelectedWritings in Semiotic Theory,
Minneapolis 1987, 65; Edna Andrews, Markedness Theory: The Union of Asymmetry and Semiosis
in Language, Durham 1990, 154; Edwin L. Batistella, The Logic of Markedness, New York 1996, 17.
8 Perhaps the analogy between phonetics and comparisons is even less misleading than it
might seem: One of the founding fathers of structuralism admitted “multidimensional op-
positions” into the club of phonetic distinctive feartures (cf. Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, Grundzüge
der Phonologie, Prague 1939, 60). That is probably as close as we can get to comparisons in the
realm of formal linguistic analysis (for some related ideas, see: Ruth Chang,Making Compar-
isons Count, London 2014, 25).
9 A case in point is everyday communication that simply cannot afford doubts about its seman-
tics: “‘I had a flat tire’.—‘What do you mean, you had a flat tire?’ She appeared momentarily
stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: ‘What do you mean “What do you mean?” A
flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing special. What a crazy question!’” (Harold
Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs 1967, 50).
10 “In ordinary life she tried to stifle a passion that she knew very well was ridiculous, a love that
was unworthy of the woman she was, and she steeled herself to think as little as possible of
the wretched boy who had wrought such havoc with her; but when she came to this scene
she let herself go” (William Somerset Maugham, Theatre [1937], in: W. Somerset Maugham,
Selected Novels, Vol. 1, Melbourne 1953, 145).
11 “In spoken English, the difference between a stop [in p] and a continuant consonant [in f ],
other things being equal, may change the meaning of the message” (Roman Jakobson, The
Cardinal Dichotomy of Language, in: Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed.), Language: An Inquiry into its
Meaning and Function, Port Washington, NZ 1971, 155-173, see 157). Jakobson makes use of the
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only practical way to perform this associating and pondering upon is to produce
comparative utterances—reflexive references to semantic oppositions within the
social world. But why should they be “reflexive”? And what does “reflexivity” mean
in this context? This probably calls for a more detailed explication of the variance
between difference and comparison briefly outlined above.12
Each and every sign necessarily relates to its “own” visual, verbal, or tactile code
in two different ways: First, it marks the difference between the meaningful order
of the linguistic system and the noisy chaos of its environment. Whatever may be
the meanings of the letter i in the English language, it stands first and foremost
for human speech per se (as opposed to twittering or a waterfall’s roar). Second,
the same i signals dissimilarity within innumerable minimal pairs in English in
which its presence (or absence) changes the meaning of words (e.g., big vs. bag, big
vs. beg, big vs. bog, big vs. bug, bin vs. ban, bin vs. ben, bin vs. Ben, bin vs. bun, etc.
etc.).13 But, again, in order to talk, write, speak, or listen, none of these distinc-
tive features must be invoked or even registered—normally, they just accompany
communication without being noticed, let alone reflected upon. By means of be-
ing used, human language refers to itself as a functionally differentiated, intact,
and relatively autonomous system fit for transmitting messages, as opposed to its
disorderly, mute, and uncertain surroundings. In this self-referential activity of
language, humans play a modest instrumental role, jointly upholding the semantic
potential of verbal communication without giving it pause.
Things change, however, when the semantic differentials of language become
the object of human reflection. Reflexivity presupposes agency, which, in the case
of communication, means ability to arbitrarily select and combine distinctive fea-
tures of language on the top of preexisting semantic differentials that are more
or less obligatory for all competent language users. Nonreflective beings—such as
thermometers—cannot but continually mirror environmental pressures in an ex-
ternally predetermined way. In contrast, the subjects of reflection are capable of
cherry-picking data about the environment and using them for various adaptative
purposes.14 Homo sapiens, for instance, can use a thermometer twice a day to scan
following passage that conveniently singles out theminmal pair of comparata but stops short
of comparing them: “‘Did you say pig, or fig?’ said the Cat. ‘I said pig,’ replied Alice” (Lewis
Caroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, London 1866, 92).
12 The following two paragraphs are loosely related to the opposition between the “basal self-
reference” of the communicative system and its “reflexivity” suggested by Niklas Luhmann
(Niklas Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt a. M. 1987,
600–601).
13 Needless to say, the same kind of minimal pairs (for example, “hot versus cold”) exists in se-
mantics (Matt Davies, Advances in Stylistics: Oppositions and Ideology in News Discourse, London
2014, 94).
14 For this distinction, see: Heinz von Foerster,Wissen und Gewissen: Versuch einer Brücke, Frank-
furt a. M. 1993, 246.
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and write down day and night temperatures all year round; significantly, she or
he can also comment upon the device’s aesthetic features as opposed to the other
thermometers in the neighborhood. The last detail is quite important for under-
standing that human selections within verbal semantics are in no way limited by
the respective language’s established distinctive features. For example, when Ernst
Jünger calls the vowels [a] and [o] high and sublime, [i] and [u] low and dark, and
puts [e] in-between,15 he is ignoring both the phonetics and the phonology of Ger-
man. Indeed, Jünger’s grouping reflects neither the vocal features of the sounds
in question (roundness, openness, and depth of the sounds vary more within the
groups than between them)16 nor their ability to differentiate within minimal lex-
ical pairs (see examples in the previous paragraph). However, the writer’s indif-
ference to the basic distinctive features of the sounds he is writing about does
not make his remarks incomprehensible or even senseless: Quite on the contrary,
Jünger furnishes us with unique information unavailable anywhere else. This is
achieved in three more or less simultaneous steps:
1. Selecting a novel set of objects (comparata) picked out of the existing phonose-
mantic repertoire of German ([a] + [o]), [e], and ([i]
2. Producing a fresh bundle of distinctive features by relating those objects—pos-
itively or negatively—to the previously unapplied categories “height,” “sublim-
ity,” and “likeness” (tertia)
3. Forcing these selections and combinations into a procrustean bed of verbal lan-
guage (utterance)
At first glance, the comparative utterance thus defined looks like a motley collec-
tion of its creator’s whims, and stands in stark contrast to the impersonal regu-
larity of speech in general. To take this impression at face value, however, would
be a grotesque exaggeration of the actual disparity between comparative and lin-
guistic semantics. To be sure, the role of sender in the production of compara-
tive utterances is highly important—particularly if we are talking about the verbal
15 “Innerhalb dieser größeren Spannung drängt sich die allgemeine Beobachtung auf, daß das A und
das O den hohen und erhabenen, das I und das U den tieferen und dunklen Dingen zugewandt sind,
während das E eine Mittellage beizubehalten strebt. An eine Welt des A und O schließt sich eine an-
dere des I und U, und es klingen hier nicht nur die Unterschiede zwischen Oben und Unten, Hoch und
Tief, Flamme und Dunkelheit, sondern auch die zwischen Vater und Mutter an” (Ernst Jünger, Lob
der Vokale [1934], in: Ernst Jünger, Sämtliche Werke (Band 14, Essays VI), Stuttgart 2015, 28).
Likemany other authors writing about vowels, Jünger fails to differentiate them clearly from
letters. However, the unmistakable reference to sound (klingen) allows, it seems, for the pho-
netic interpretation of his passage.
16 Cf. Thomas Becker, Das Vokalsystem der deutschen Standardsprache, Frankfurt a. M. 1998, 11–13.
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and written language.17 However, similar to all other human choices, selections in
comparative practices are rarely made completely at random. On the one hand, the
number of comparata and tertia is subject to the constraints imposed by human
computational capacity.18 On the other hand, the specific references to both things
compared and grounds for comparison are conditioned multiply by various social
factors (which are yet to be studied closely). All in all, both comparisons and lan-
guage operate in a gray zone between rational and irrational,19 and every taxonomy
of comparative utterances (II) is likely to be seriously compromised by the limited
consistency of verbal language, not to mention further irregularities provoked by
intrusions of political, legal, and moral systems (III). Still, what may look like a
disappointment for a classificator with structuralist leanings could hopefully serve
as a roadmap (replete with detour signs) for the historical studies of comparative
practices (IV).
II.
If we attempt to conceptualize comparative utterances as a bundle of distinctive
features reminiscent of verbal language, their classification could look like this
(Fig.1).
The heterogeneity—a tree and a list of binaries—is inevitable because some
privative oppositions have a more limited scope than others: All comparative utter-
ances must be either qualitative (4.1) or quantitative (4.2), but only some—namely,
messages containing the division between relative (1.1.2.2.1) and absolute (1.1.2.2.2)
grading comparisons—makes sense only within comparative sentences displaying
or featuring gradability (1.1.2.2). As for the second part of the typology, it could
be, in principle, formulated as a list of formally impeccable but clumsy-sounding
privative oppositions (e.g., “4.1 Nonquantitative comparisons vs. 4.2 Quantitative
17 Cf. Andreas Dorschel, Einwände gegen das Vergleichen, in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113
(1/2006), 178; Hartmut von Sass, Vergleiche(n). Ein hermeneutischer Rund- und Sinkflug,
in: Andreas Mauz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.),Hermeneutik des Vergleichs. Strukturen, Anwendun-
gen und Grenzen komparativer Verfahren, Würzburg 2011, 25-48, see 27; Angelika Epple/Wal-
ter Erhart, Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Er-
hart (eds.),DieWelt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 7-31
see 18; Angelika Epple, Doing Comparisons – Ein praxeologischer Zugang zur Geschichte der
Globalisierung/en, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), DieWelt beobachten. Praktiken des
Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 161-199, see 163.
18 See, for instance, Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, in: The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 69 (1/1955), 99-118, see 101.
19 See the characteristic admission from the bastions of generative grammar: Ray Jackendoff,
A User’s Guide to Thought and Meaning, Oxford 2012, 233–244.
Preliminary Typology of Comparative Utterances 45
comparisons”). Here, as elsewhere in the text, the pedantic precision is abandoned
for the sake of readability.
Fig. 1
2.1 Narratives vs. 2.2 Sets
3.1 Evaluative comparisons vs. 3.2Nonevaluative comparisons
4.1 Qualitative comparisons vs. 4.2 Quantitative comparisons
5.1 Comparisons with explicit tertia comparationis vs. 5.2 Comparisons without
explicit tertia comparationis
6.1 Comparisons with all comparata present vs. 6.2 Comparisons with some com-
parata hidden
7.1 Self-comparisons vs. 7.2 Other-comparisons
8.1 Positive comparisons vs. 8.2 Negative comparisons
9.1 Nondiachronic comparisons vs. 9.2 Diachronic comparisons
10.1 Comparisons with x-tium non datur (finite sets) vs. 10.2 Comparisons without
x-tium non datur (infinite sets).
11.1 Comparisons with exocentrically defined comparata vs. 11.2 Comparisons with
egocentrically defined comparata
12.1 Reversible (symmetrical) vs. 12.2 Irreversible (asymmetrical) comparisons
13.1 Real comparisons vs. 13.2 Irreal comparisons
14.1 Auctorial vs. 14.2 Nonauctorial comparisons
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 1. Comparison-related utterances vs. 2. All other utterances
This privative opposition seems to be straightforward, almost perfunctory, but it
does conceal some relatively fine distinctions invisible on the level of single lex-
emes. The first example should not raise any eyebrows:
(1). “The theoretical and practical problems of sustained strict comparison are
enormous. Experienced comparatists, usually acutely aware of many of these dif-
ficulties, tend to skirt the pitfalls, make disclaimers, and lower their sights. Few
comparatists compare, for they know the difficulties.”20
The quotation features comparison professionals—specialists in comparative law
(“comparatists”) as well as their comparative practice (“compare”)—so it comes
as almost natural that this is a comparison-related utterance. The qualification
“almost” refers to the unpopularity of comparisons described in the passage,
but—even if this “few” comes perilously close to “nobody”—there is no denial that
the passage somehow has to do with comparative practices (which may or may not
take place).
Note, however, the counterexample:
(2). “Au cours de la première moitié du XXe siècle, les comparatistes évitent le mot com-
paraison.”21
Here, too, we have two words related to comparisons, and one of them, as in the
previous example, refers to scholars—this time, literary critics—dealing with com-
parisons. The second reference, however, has no discernible relation to the prac-
tices of comparing, describing lexical idiosyncrasies instead. True, common sense
makes it likely that at least some comparatists mentioned in the passage could have
engaged in some comparative activities as a part of their research, but the sentence
neither confirms nor denies this supposition, focusing entirely on the word usage.
1.1 Comparisons vs. 1.2 Metastatements concerning comparisons
Having singled out the utterances having to do with comparison, it seems natural
to tell the actual comparative utterances (X in relation n to Y is Z)22 from the second-
20 William Twining, The Great Juristic Bazaar: Jurists’ Texts and Lawyers Stories, London 2017, 182.
21 Daniel-Henri Pageaux, Littérature comparée et comparaisons, in: Revue de Littérature com-
parée 72 (3/1998), 285-307, see 289.
22 In this model of comparative utterance, I deliberately abstain from the misleading transla-
tion of verbal relational terms into logical symbols.
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order statements about them (“X in relation n to Y is Z” is a peculiar statement). Log-
ically, metastatements antecede their objects—first-order utterances.23 However,
cultural memory can turn this order backward. For example, the word combination
“comparing apples and pears” is mostly known to the speakers of German as an al-
legory of ill-conceived appraisal. In the modern discursive field, it rarely descends
from its homey metalevel and not infrequently climbs to the meta-metalevel, as
in the following passage in which strongly suggesting the incomparability of both
fruits is said to be “based upon a popular prejudice”:
(1.2).“Wer im Brustton der Überzeugung äußert, Äpfel und Birnen solle man nicht ver-
gleichen, beruft sich auf ein verbreitetes Vorurteil.”24
1.2.1 Metastatements concerning comparisons in general
vs. 1.2.2 Metastatements concerning comparability of specific comparata
in particular
Metastatements could be subdivided into references to comparison as a universal
practice (Comparisons are N) and allusions to specific kinds or even cases of compar-
ison (The comparison [type of comparisons] X is N). A good example of the first variety
is a dictionary entry, which is normally supposed to provide a general overview of
the notion in question.Wilhelm Krug’s definition stands out as one of the very few
second-order statements about comparisons that allow for the existence of more
than two comparata:
(1.2.1). “Comparation […] ist Vergleichung, d. h. Gegeneinanderhaltung zweier odermeh-
rerDinge, um sich ihrer Einerleiheit (Gleichheit, Parität) oder Verschiedenheit (Ungleich-
heit, Imparität) bewusst zu werden.“25
In the second category, the variations of scope and modality are so enormous that
each illustration would be more or less accidental. Bearing that in mind, it might
make sense to use examples combining reference to various kinds and levels of
comparisons in a single utterance: William James, for instance, constructs a com-
parison ofmetacomparisons: Grading simultaneous and successive comparisons in
nearly every area of perception (from hearing to touch) on the scale between “easy”
23 Cf. Paul F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (Routledge Revivals [1952]), London 2012,
15.
24 Horst Wenzel, Initialen in der Manuskriptkultur und im digitalen Medium, in: Helga
Lutz/Jan-Friedrich Missfelder/Tilo Renz (eds.), Äpfel und Birnen. Illegitimes Vergleichen in den
Kulturwissenschaften, Bielefeld 2006, 41-56, see 175.
25 Wilhelm T. Krug, Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischenWissenschaften, Band 1, A bis
E, Leipzig 1832, 499. I am grateful to Olga Sabelfeld for sharing this quotation with me.
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and “impossible,” he goes on to compare data not only within, but also between
perceptual categories:
(1.2.2). “It is easier to compare successive than simultaneous sounds, easier to
compare two weights or two temperatures by testing one after the other with the
same hand, than by using both hands and comparing both at once. […] in the case
of smell and taste it is well-nigh impossible to compare simultaneous impressions
at all.”26
1.1.1 Equations vs. 1.1.2 Differentiations27
In the sample of definitions of comparison presented in the note 1, both similar-
ity and dissimilarity of comparata feature prominently. Hence, the breakdown of
comparative utterances into equations and differentiations, stressing respectively
likeness and unlikeness of comparata in relation to specific tertia, comes as no
surprise. So, in John Locke’s identification between the unity of consciousness and
human identity, the differences are overshadowed by similarities:
(1.1.1). “As far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action
or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was
then.”28
The otherwise polyvalent opposition between “now” and “then” is used here merely
to set two comparata apart (i.e., to manufacture a set of discrete human states out
of the continuous memory flow). For the sake of the argument made by Locke, it
could be replaced by nearly any other two-word marker of différance. Inversely, in
Claude d’Abbeville’s account of his missionary travel to Brazil, the corresponding
spatial difference “here” versus “there” is intensified by a triple reiteration of dissim-
ilarity between the animal worlds of continental France and the isle of Maranhão:
(1.1.2). “Nous ne voyons icy rien de toutes les especes d'animaux qu'ils ont là, comme aussi
ils n'ont rien de semblable aux nostres, au moins qu'il ne soit de beaucoup differend.”29
1.1.2.1. Nongrading comparisons vs. 1.1.2.2. Grading comparisons30
The very concept of tertium comparationis seemingly calls for a scalar interpretation
of differences between comparata: If there is a common ground n for comparing X
26 William James, The Principles of Psychology [1907], New York 2007, 495.
27 On this opposition in general, see: Willibald Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 88–89.
28 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1689], Vol.1, New York 1894, 449.
29 Claude d’Abbeville, Histoire de la mission des pères Capucins en l’isle de Maragnan et terres circon-
voisines, Paris 1614, 208.
30 On this contradistinction, see: Willibald Steinmetz. ‘Vergleich’, 88.
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and Y, both comparata should somehow be graded on the scale in which the value
of n is expressed in some terms (numbers?) falling between 0 and ∞. However, not
all tertia are gradable—one person can hardly be more vegan than another, and
the language—under normal circumstances—cannot be “most” or “least English.”31
As with many other minimal pairs, the opposition between grading and nongrad-
ing comparisons could be rather indifferent to the content of comparison: In other
words, the same situation could be described in one or another way with minimal
semantic variation.The case in point is Voltaire’s obsession with the so-called “Jew-
ish self-alienation” depicted at various occasions as either the nongradable apart-
ness:
(1.1.2.1). “Les Juifs, par leur religion et leur politique, étaient séparés du reste dumonde”32
or the highest degree of self-imposed isolation:
(1.1.2.2). “La nation juive est la plus singulière qui jamais ait été dans le monde.”33
1.1.2.2.1 Relative grading comparisons vs. 1.1.2.2.2 Absolute grading
comparisons
Once the grounds of comparison allow for gradation, the choice between relative
and absolute values of comparata is usually expressed by, respectively, compara-
tive and superlative adjectives (“usually” does not mean “always”—see below III,
1.1.2.2.1/1.1.2.2.2). The first variety could be exemplified by one of the numerous
excursions of the seventeenth-century French classicism to its Antique origins. In
contrast to many of his contemporaries, though, François Blondel was not preoc-
cupied with the cross-evaluation of the “new” and “old” classicism, but more in-
terested in the internal hierarchy of the latter. In his opinion, Horace was beating
Pindar on no less than nine counts (“knowledge,” “equality,” “tenderness,” “playfulness,”
“faultlessness,” “nobility of thought,” “precision,” “purity of language,” and, finally, “cheer-
fulness”):
(1.1.2.2.1). “Mais pour Horace, il a bien plus d'étenduë de sçavoir et de connaissances que
Pindare, plus d’égalité, plus de douceur& d’enjoüement& beaucoupmoins de deffauts. Ses
pensées ont aussi tres nobles, mais sa diction est bien plus correcte & plus épurée […], et
souvent mesme beacoup plus heureux.”34
31 Peter Klecha, Bridging the Divide: Scalarity and Modality, Chicago, IL 2014, 24.
32 Voltaire, [Review:] De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum Praelectiones Academicae, Oxonii Habitae, a
Roberto Lowth, A. M. Poeticae Publico Praelectore, etc. [1764], in: André Versaille (ed.), Dic-
tionnaire de la pensée de Voltaire par lui-même, Paris 1994, 677.
33 Voltaire, Des Juifs [1756], in: André Versaille (ed.), Dictionnaire de la pensée de Voltaire par lui-
même, Paris 1994, 688.
34 François Blondel, Comparaison de Pindare et d’Horace, Amsterdam 1686, 77.
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In its turn, the absolute grading comparison features prominently in Alfred Ten-
nyson’s apologetic obituary to Arthur Wellesley, the famous longtime head of the
British army:
(1.1.2.2.2). “Thine island loves thee well, thou famous man, // The greatest sailor
since our world began”.35
2.1 Narratives vs. 2.2 Sets
Verbal languages can produce differences and engender comparisons in ways un-
known to other kinds ofmessaging systems,which probably has to do, among other
things,with their directionality.Whatevermakes it to the surface of language—ter-
tia, comparata, and relations thereof—gets organized in narratives (the sequences
of before–after relations between signs that are loosely modeled upon time asym-
metry).36 At various speeds and levels, information is being generated, and it is
only natural that the logical reflexivity (for every A, A = A) is one of the first candi-
dates for going down in the mighty stream of one-way semantic differentiations.
In its classical form, the equation A = A is a symmetrical tautology with no possi-
bility of differentiation, let alone comparison.37 But, of course, narrative asymme-
tries are bound to eclipse this time invariance—for example, supplying information
that would create a gap between the first and the second A notwithstanding their
homonymy. The case in point is the following passage from the Divine Comedy:
(2.1). “Io cominciai: ‘Voi siete il padre mio; // voi mi date a parlar tutta baldezza; // voi mi
levate sì, ch'i' son più ch'io.”38
The narrator’s accolade to Cacciaguida is structured as an anaphoric series of sen-
tences all beginning with the second-person personal pronoun voi (“you are my fa-
ther …/you prompt me to speak with bold assurance”). It is, however, in the last sentence
that this list begins referring to a change (“you raise me up”) that—together with the
causal relation between the main and the subordinate clause—makes possible, if
35 Alfred Tennyson, Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington (1852), in: Alfred Tennyson,
Selected Poetry, London 1995, 112.
36 For a general pespective, see, for instance: David K. Berlo, The Process of Communication: An In-
troduction to Theory and Practice, New York 1960, 25; Vilém Flusser, Kommunikologie, Frankfurt
a. M. 1996, 38, 55–56; Kirill Postoutenko, From Asymmetries to Concepts, in: Kay Junge/Kir-
ill Postoutenko (eds.), Asymmetrical Concepts after Reinhart Koselleck: Historical Semantics and
Beyond, Bielefeld 2011, 197-251, see 199.
37 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, Pfüllingen 1957, 5.
38 Dante, Paradiso [1321], Indianapolis, IN 2017, 154.
Preliminary Typology of Comparative Utterances 51
not necessary, the difference and comparison between the earlier (“smaller”) and
later (“bigger”) self (“I am more than I”).39
However, many narratives tend to offset their sequential and directional prop-
erties by gravitating toward sets (messages with semantics that are invariant to the
ordering of their elements).40 In the example below, this includes asyndetic coor-
dination between individual sentences and the multiple repetitions of the tertium
(“law”) in their same (final) position:
(2.2). “Die Heiden hatten ein ungeschriebenes, die Juden ein geschriebenes Gesetz, die
Christen ein Exempel, ein Vorbild, ein sichtbares, persönlich lebendiges Gesetz, ein Fleisch
gewordenes, ein menschliches Gesetz.“41
To be sure, these symmetrical tendencies do a fine job of selecting clearly commen-
surable comparata: The utterance even includes one privative opposition expressed
by the presence/absence of the negative prefix un- (“written”/“unwritten law”). Still,
the internal cohesion of the sentence hangs by a thread: In the absence of explicit
references to comparison, it is held together by someminor syntactic features such
as omission of similar verbs in the coordinated sentences. In sets, the sender’s com-
parative autonomy is at its lowest: No other kind of comparative utterances stands
so close to rankings, lists, pendants, and other interaction-based comparisons (see
also note 3 above).42
39 A slightly more intricate case of dissociation between two homonyms preceding their com-
parison is the example fromAugust Strindberg’s dramawith the telling title Crimes andCrimes
(1899) discussed below in 7.2.
40 Cf. Bernard Bolzano, Einleitung zur Größenlehre und erste Begriffe der allgemeinen Größenlehre
[1841], Stuttgart 1975, 152.
41 Ludwig Feuerbach, DasWesen des Christentums [1849], Stuttgart 1994, 226.
42 The problem is dealt with in the following article: Susan Stanford Friedman, Why Not Com-
pare?, in: PMLA 126 (3/2011), 753-762, see 758. Of course, the situation changes dramatically
in favor of a full-blown, solid comparison when the set is complemented by a special com-
parative sentence. This is the case of a summary demolition of monotheism undertaken by
Holbach that begins like a différance with some genealogical undertones, and ends as equa-
tion: “La Religion d’Égypte servit évidemment de base à la Religion de Moyse, qui en bannit le culte
des idoles; Moyse ne fut qu’un Egyptien schismatique. Le Christianisme n’est qu’un Judaïsme réformé.
Le Mahométisme est composé du Judaisme, du Christianisme & de l’ancienne Religion d’Arabie. […]
Toutes les religions, anciennes et modernes, se sont mutuellement empruntées leurs abstraites rêver-
ies et leurs ridicules pratiques” (JeanMeslier [Paul Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach], Le bon-sens; ou,
Idées naturelles opposées aux Idées surnaturelles, Londres/Amsterdam 1772, 292).
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3.1 Evaluative comparisons vs. 3.2 Nonevaluative comparisons43
A handful of old and influential traditions treat all practices of comparison as eval-
uations, tacitly smuggling in grading comparisons (1.1.2.2) as the middle ground.
For example, the institution of ranking strives to reduce all aesthetic, intellectual,
and economic diversity to a single scale grading relative goodness of objects com-
pared.44 In a similar vein, reflexive comparisons in which one of the comparata
is identifiable with the sender of the comparative message are routinely nailed to
the one-dimensional scalarity assessing humanness or propriety, with themaximal
value placed as close as possible to the messenger.45 For Arthur de Gobineau, one of
the founders of modern xenophobia, speaking about races was indeed impossible
without an absolute grading comparison (1.1.2.2.2) placing his own ethnic group
at the top of any racial ladder. In the nineteenth century, European anti-Semitism
switched from religion to economics without hile retaining much of its rhetorical
ammunition.46 Under such circumstances, Gobineau’s choice of tertium (“beauty”)
was more or less random:
43 For the discussion of this opposition, see: Heintz, Numerische Differenz, 165; Mauz/Sass,
Vergleiche verstehen , 13–14; Willibald Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 88–89 ; Grave, Vergleichen als
Praxis, 144.
44 Cf. Carlos Spoerhase, Das Maß der Potsdamer Garde, Die ästhetische Vorgeschichte des
Rankings in der europäischen Literatur- und Kunstkritik des 18. Jahrhunderts, in: Jahrbuch
der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft 58 (2014), 90–126; Willibald Steinmetz, Above/below, bet-
ter/worse, or simply different? Metamorphoses of Social Comparisons, 1600–1900, in: Stein-
metz,Willibald (ed.), The Force of Comparison. ANewPerspective onModern EuropeanHistory and
the ContemporaryWorld, NewYork/Oxford 2019, 80–112; TobiasWerron/Leopold Ringel, Rank-
ings in a comparative perspective, (manuscript, 2015); BettinaHeintz, “Wir leben imZeitalter
der Vergleichung.“ Perspektiven einer Soziologie des Vergleichs, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 45
(5/2016), 305-323, see 307, 311; Elena Esposito, What’s Observed in a Rating? Rankings as Ori-
entation in the Face of Uncertainty, (manuscript, 2016); Robert Eberhardt, Bilderpaare und
Pendanthängung. Praxeologische Überlegungen zum Ordnungssinn, (manuscript, 2019).
45 For a general overview of this tradition, comdemned first by Rousseau in Émile, ou de l’édu-
cation (1762) and later by Nietzsche inMenschliches, Allzumenschliches (1879) but still influen-
tial, see: JoachimMatthes, The Operation Called ‘Vergleichen’, in: JoachimMatthes, Zwischen
den Kulturen? Die Sozialwissenschaften vor dem Problem des Kulturvergelichs, Göttingen 1992, 75-
100, see 75; William J. T. Mitchell, Why Comparisons are Odious, in: World Literature Today 70
(2/1996), 321-324, see 32; Pheng Cheah, The Material World of Comparison, in: New Literary
History 40 (3/2009), 523-545, see 524; Willibald Steinmetz, Above/below.
46 Cf. Kirill Postoutenko, Wandering as Circulation: Dostoevsky and Marx on the “Jewish Ques-
tion”, in: Gideon Reuveni/Sarah Wobick-Segev (eds.), The Economy in Jewish History: New Per-
spectives on the Interrelationship between Ethnicity and Economic Life, New York/Oxford 2010,
43–61.
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(3.1). “Je n’hésite pas à reconnaître la race blanche pour supérieure en beauté à toutes les
autres.”47
But, of course, it is perfectly possible to compare differently colored people—and
many other phenomena—without either grading or evaluating them.The following
example is no less common for themodern urban anthropology as Gobineau’s racist
outbursts were for late nineteenth-century France:
(3.2). “A high percentage of whites reside in the suburbs, whereas African Ameri-
cans and other minorities, especially the less affluent, mainly occupy urban areas
left behind by white flight.”48
Those on the lookout for biases would probably frown upon lumping together di-
verse “minorities,” but, in fact, neither Whiteness nor affluency have any firm as-
sociation with any values—positive or negative—in this passage.
4.1 Qualitative comparisons vs. 4.2 Quantitative comparisons49
Along with the streamlining of evaluation by means of grading, briefly discussed
a couple of paragraphs above, the use of numbers for comparing quantities is a
standard, if equally controversial, way of reducing comparative complexity. The
pros and contras of both abstractions are perhaps best illustrated by juxtaposing
quantitative and qualitative comparisons between the same comparata:
(4.1). Entre tous ces Cantons […], Bale a la plus belle ville, le sejour & le rendez-vous de
plusieurs sçavans.50
(4.2). Basel zählt, ohnerachtet sie die größte Stadt der Schweiz ist, nur 15000 Einwohner;
also noch nicht halb so viel, wie Brünn.51
Calling Basel—in a slightly circuitous way—the most beautiful city in Switzer-
land, Pierre Du Val is no doubt aware of the highly subjective nature of his com-
parison. Sensing that his personal opinion may not be enough to sway the read-
ers’ minds, the French geographer seems to deploy a thinly veiled argumentum ad
verecundiam, citing the residence of “many scholars” in Basel as possible proof of
his high opinion of the city. In contrast, the objectivity of the measure used in
the second statement is clearly beyond doubt: Even if one—in theory—agrees with
Christian C. Andre’s calculation, nobody would ask why the city with 15,000 inhab-
itants is bigger than the one with a population of 14,999 or less. However, sensing
47 Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, Paris 1853, 256.
48 Charles M. Lamb, Housing Segregation in Suburban America since 1960, Cambridge 2005, 2.
49 On this difference, see: Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis, 144.
50 Pierre Du Val, La géographie universelle, Band 2, Lyon, 1688, 482.
51 Christian C. Andre, Hesperus, oder Belehrung und Unterhaltung für die Bewohner des österreichi-
schen Staats, Brünn, 1810, 281.
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that an absolute grading quantitative comparison (1.1.2.2.2 + 4.2) is too abstract
for his fellow Austro-Hungarians (what does it feel like a city of 15,000?), Andre
literally drives his argument home—comparing remote Basel with his hometown
Brno. This second comparative utterance is actually a pair of intertwined relative
grading comparisons: Whereas its quantitative part (1.1.2.2.1 + 4.2) gives a rough
approximation of Basel’s population in relation to the Moravian capital (*less than
a half ), the second, qualitative part (1.1.2.2.1 + 4.1), conveys the author’s personal
evaluation of this difference (“the biggest city of Switzerland […]is not even a half as big
as Brno”). In the examples shown, the complementary semantics of comparative ut-
terances countervails their precision and intelligibility; however, as one could see
below (III, 4.1/4.2), the interweaving of quantitative and qualitative comparisons
can also cause incoherence and confusion—deliberate or not.
5.1 Comparisons with explicit tertia comparationis vs. 5.2 Comparisons
without explicit tertia comparationis52
Including tertium comparationis into the body of comparative utterance is an option,
not an obligation. One could easily expect many explicit tertia in contexts possess-
ing the stringent requirement of clarity (such as science or law). But this is also
possible in politics, if the real or fake precision can contribute to the speaker’s aura
of knowledgeable authority. In a thoroughly calculated radio speech on national
defense given a year after the outbreak of World War 2, the president Franklin
D. Roosevelt offers a characteristic sequence of two almost identical (and closely
linked) comparisons:
(5.1, 5.2). “The navy is far stronger today than at any peace-timeperiod in thewhole
long history of the nation. In hitting power and efficiency, I would even make the
assertion that it is stronger today than it was during the World War [I].”53
Here, as in the case above (II, 4.2), combining two diametrically opposed distinctive
features within a single comparative utterance creates synergy that goes beyond
individual persuasive potentials of the same comparisons standing alone. Under-
standably, the first sentence lacks details: No experienced politician would barrage
his nonspecialist audiences with numerous technical parameters of the past and
present American naval fleets in a short radio appearance. Instead, the unspecific
positive evaluation of the defense capabilities is probably aimed at conveying to
the worried nation a sense of watertight security around the United States. Still,
for the more inquisitive part of the audience, which may be looking for an expert
52 On this minimal pair, see: Mauz/Sass,Hermeneutik des Vergleichs, 13–14.
53 FranklinD. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 15 (OnNational Defense [1940]), in: FranklinD. Roosevelt,
FDR’s Fireside Chats, Norman, OK 1992, 156.
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rather than a savior at the helm of the state, a couple of tertia (“hitting power and
efficiency”) are displayed to make essentially the same statement look like an undis-
putable quantitative comparison.Because no exact figures are given, and a cautious
subjective qualification (“I would even make the assertion”) is added to the claim,
the objective validity of the second comparison is not much higher than that of the
first one. Still, together, the two parts of the comparative utterance make a desired
impression of a broad and yet factual statement confirming the safety of the United
States in the approaching war.
6.1 Comparisons with all comparata present vs. 6.2 Comparisons with some
comparata hidden54
As shown in the previous paragraph, the flexibility of comparisons allows for omis-
sion of tertia from the comparative discourse without jeopardizing their meanings
(and sometimes even boosting their pragmatic efficiency). In a similar vein, there is
no requirement for all comparata to be present in the text of a comparative utterance
in order for a comparison to be valid. Juxtaposing comparisons with all (6.1) and
some (6.2) comparata present, one can see how this variation makes it possible to
achieve both semantic diversification and precision within relatively constrained
semantic areas. Five years past his exploratory trip to Russia, Marquis Astolphe
de Custine, a French conservative essayist and travel writer, produced a damning
indictment of Russian society and politics:
(6.1). “Le servage se légalisait en Russie quand on l’abolissait dans le reste de l’Europe”.55
(6.2). “S’il n’y a pas de justice en Russie, vous voyez qu’il y a des habitudes plus fortes que
la loi suprême”.56
In the first sentence, lamenting the reluctance of tsars to press ahead with the
abolition of serfdom, de Custine skillfully balances on the verge of redundancy
to highlight the legal gap between the two comparata. Indeed, if “Russia” and “the
rest of Europe” constitute a privative opposition, as they do, the utterance “serfdom
was abolished in the rest of Europe” means, by default, that in Russia, at the same
time, it remained in force. Still, despite little evidence to back his claim, de Custine
insists on an even sharper distinction between the “legalization” and *de-legalization
(“abolition”) of serfdom, choosing a contrary opposition instead of a contradictory
one. It seems at least likely that for the sake of de Custine’s argument, the presence
of both comparata in the comparative utterance is not essential; however, supported
by noticeable syntactical, grammatical, and even phonetic parallelism (the verbs
54 On this distinction, see: Mauz/Sass,Hermeneutik des Vergleichs, 13–14.
55 Astolphe de Custine, La Russie en 1839, Bruxelles 1844, 109.
56 Custine, La Russie, 162.
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légalisait and abolissait have the same stress pattern of – - – /), the hypercorrect
contradistinction does make for good prose.
Alternatively, the second example of comparative utterance from de Custine’s
travel diary, also devoted to Russia’s difficult relations with moral and legal norms,
is (at least) one comparatum short.Uttered by a disgruntled Russian, the saying “there
is no justice in Russia” could well be understood outside of the comparative context;
but in the mouth of a skeptical foreigner, it is likely to have comparative seman-
tics. But “likely” is not “certain,” and de Custine seems to reduce this ambiguity by
adding the second—this time relative grading—comparison (1.1.2.2.2 + 6.2): Russia
is said to be governed by “customs stronger than the supreme law.” The author of
Russia in 1839 neither defines the areas over which this suprema lex holds sway nor
spells out what kind of traditions trump it in the Russian empire. However, both
the general historical and the local narrative contexts—for instance, the abundance
of statements such as (II, 6.1) in de Custine’s text—tell us where the diarist’s heart
lies and where the counterpole to Russia’s lack of justice is located. To sum up, both
complete and partial presence of comparata in comparative utterances can provide
templates for specialization of their semantics, although the choices between re-
inforcement and attenuation of differences are more context- than form-specific.
7.1 Self-Comparisons vs. 7.2 Other-Comparisons
Theopposition self/other is commonly used in European discourse for reflexivemes-
sages telling their sender (self ) from her or his environment (which could be any-
thing from the message’s recipient to a piece of inanimate nature). But there is
also a tradition of using the term “self ” (or, rather –self ) to refer to the different
states of the same object separated by time and/or space; and it is this meaning
that will be used for the minimal pair below.57 Although such gaps seem to corre-
late with differences (from the temporal “evolution” to the spatial “variety”), they
could also suggest similarity despite detachment, and this contrastive semantics
looks tailormade for praising—or cursing—permanence against the odds (see also
III, 3.1/3.2). For instance, Joaquin Ruiz de Morales comes up with an anaphoric
series of equations (1.1.1 + 7.1) between “Spain then” and “Spain now” in order to
describe—and decry—the immutability of the Spanish political landscape: Clearly,
he is fed up with the perpetual choices between the bad and the worse, the un-
derdevelopment of citizenship, the unpopularity of the liberal cause, and the blind
faith in the crown:
57 See the survey of both traditions: Kirill Postoutenko, Social Identity as a Complementarity of
Performance andProposition, in: EdmundoBalsemãoPires/BurkhardNonnenmacher/Stefan
Buttner-von Stulpnagel (eds.), Bezüge des Selbst. Selbstreferentielle Prozesse in philosophischen
Perspektiven, Coimbra 2010, 271–298.
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(7.1). “España se encontraba entonces, como se encuentra ahora, en la anómala situacion
de no poder estirpar lo malo, sin esponerse de unu manera cierta á un mal mayor. En Es-
paña ahora como entonces, los ciudadanos no constituían la gran masa de la nacion, sino
que estaban circunscriptos al límite numérico de un partido, del partido liberal; y decimos
que ni entonces ni ahora eran ciudadanos todos los españoles […]Y en España entonces
como ahora habia una granmayoría realista, para la cual no haymas que el rey, y siempre
el rey.”58
In its turn, other-comparisons deal with any sets of comparata except references
to the same object in different situations.This sounds like an extremely broad defi-
nition, and, indeed, the bulk of comparative utterances employ not self- but other-
comparisons. However, the unmarkedness of the latter does not disqualify them
from the same interplay between differences and similarities that one could ob-
serve in (7.1). For instance, the superficial sameness of homonyms can conceal their
essential difference:
(7.2). “ADOLPHE (liksom för sig sjelf). Det fins brott som icke upptas i lagboken, och de
äro de värsta, ty demmåste vi straffa sjelfva, och ingen domare är så sträng som vi.”59
As in (6.2), the second comparatum is missing, but is easily restored through
the provocative title (Crimes and Crimes) and the undoing of negation (*crimes
unmentioned in the Criminal Code vs. “crimes unmentioned in the Criminal Code”). The
semantic opposition is then reinforced by means of an absolute grading com-
parison: the judges—who are the perpetrators themselves—are the harshest one
could imagine (1.1.2.2.2). With such a forceful support, the opposition between
comparata, invisible at first, looks like a deep abyss (see also III, 1.1.2.2.1/1.1.2.2.2).
8.1 Positive comparisons vs. 8.2 Negative comparisons
The centrality of negativity for comparative practices stems from the fact that it
can by itself produce seamless sets of distinctive features. Thus, the pair affirma-
tion/negation has noticeable affinity with the structure of privative opposition in
which the presence of a certain distinctive feature is opposed to its absence (see
58 Joaquin Ruiz deMorales,Historia de la milicia nacional: desde su creación hasta nuestros días, Ma-
drid 1856, 180.
59 August Strindberg, Brott och brott, Stockholm 1899, 263. The quote is eerily reminiscent of
the aforecited example from Divine Comedy (II, 2.1) in which the relative grading comparison
(1.1.2.2.1) differentiates between comparata despite their formal indistinguishability (both
are first-person personal pronouns referring to the same person). However, in Dante’s poem,
one deals with a self-comparison (7.1); whereas Strindberg, on the contrary, emphasizes the
essential difference of the comparata.
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multiple examples in I). At first sight, this resemblance turns negation into a differ-
ence-makingmachine capable of greatly simplifying comparative practices: In fact,
it is much easier to compare white and nonwhite than, say, white and red right away.
Alas, negation has no special place in natural language: unless one is inclined to go
one level up and negate the whole statement—which, inmost contexts,wouldmake
for an awkward sentence (I deny that this wine is white)—the relation between nega-
tion and differentiation of comparata is all but straightforward.60 Still, it appears
possible to detect a special role of negation in comparative utterances—which is
underspecification: Unless one deals with externally defined binaries such as chess
colors, “white” normally means “white” and “nonwhite” stands for “anything but
white” (where “anything” could fluctuate between 2 in wines and ∞ in paints). In-
deed, when applied to single words within a sentence, negation may well produce
an approximate equation (1.1.1) instead of an expected full-blown differentiation
(1.1.2):
(8.2). “ἄρα τηλικοίδε γέροντες ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς
αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες” (Plato Crit. 49 a–b)
Mildly scolding Crito (and himself) for being “no different from children in serious
discussions,” Socrates stops short of stating direct equivalence between the two
ages: Unlike in mathematics, double negation in natural language does not yield
affirmation: “no different” is not the same as “similar.”61
As for the positive comparisons, being more semantically determined in spe-
cific comparative utterances, they are also less determined as an analytical cate-
gory: In effect, all comparative utterances without negation should be classified as
manifestations of positive comparisons. Another equation—a simile—turning the
popular identification between “savages” and “children” upside down, is chosen as
a typical example:
60 “That negation applies to sentences is true only for artificial languages […]. In natural lan-
guages, negation applies to expressions other than sentences, namely words and non-sen-
tential phrases.” (JaakkoHintikka, Negation in Logic andNatural Reasoning, in: Linguistics and
Philosophy 25 (5–6/2002), 585-600, see 590–-591; cf. Paul A. Chilton, Negation asMaximal Dis-
tance in Discourse Space Theory, in: Groupe de Recherches Anglo-Américaines de Tours 1 (2006),
351–378; Ernesto Napoli, Negation, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (2006), 233-252, see
233). For a general interdisciplinary perspective, see: Kirill Postoutenko, Der Antichrist und
seine Widersacher, in: Kay Junge et al. (eds.), Kippfiguren. Ambivalenz in Bewegung, Weiler-
swist 2013, 143–152.
61 As Stoics did not fail to notice, “Socrates is just” entails, but is not entailed by, “Socrates is not
unjust” (see: Laurence Horn, ANatural History of Negation, Chicago, IL 1989, 22; Michael Israel,
The Pragmatics of Polarity, in: Laurence Horn/Gregory Ward (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics,
New York 2004, 701-723, see 711).
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(8.1). “Wendet man ein, es sei nur darum, weil Kinder wie Wilde einander ähnlich sehen
und ähnlich reden und handeln, und man also an fremden nur die Echos der eignen Liebe
habe.“62
9.1 Nondiachronic comparisons vs. 9.2 Diachronic comparisons
With this pair of distinctive features, we have another classical privative opposi-
tion with vastly unequal level of semantic certainty on both ends. The marked part
of the binary (9.2.) subsumes all “before–after” comparisons regardless of their lo-
cation in the past, present, and future. Conversely, its unmarked counterpart (9.1)
includes an even wider and much more mixed assortment of comparative utter-
ances disregarding relations of their comparata to all kinds of time markers. This
sounds like a covert reference to synchronicity, but, in fact, it is perfectly possible
to compare things with obviously different time spans and orientations without
paying attention to them.63 The case in point is another simile
(9.1). “It is a beauteous evening, calm and free, // The holy time is quiet as a Nun
// Breathless with adoration.”64
Few would consider “the holy time”—one single end of the day—analogous (let
alone identical) with the lifetime of a holy sister, but this incommensurability has
no bearing upon the meaning of comparative utterance: Clearly, the alleged quiet-
ness of comparata is perceived as their summary feature, unrelated to any specific
date(s) or duration(s).
62 Jean Paul, Die Elternliebe gegen Kinder. Eine einfache Erzählung [1810], in: Jean Paul
[Richter],Werke (Band 2, Teil 3), München 1978, 217. Unlike metaphors in which “dangerous”
(in Aristotle’s words) equations are packaged as subject–predicate constructions (X is Y), sim-
iles operate with discernible sets (usually pairs) of comparata separated, if not created, by a
preposition “like” (X is like Y)—cf. Aristotle, Rh. 3.4; Willibald Steinmetz. ‘Vergleich’, 88–89,
91). The typical absence of an explicit tertium encourages similes to stray far away from the
paths of everyday language, which explains their popularity in poetry (cf.Mitchell,Why Com-
parisons are Odious, 322; Stefano Agosti, Remarques sur la figure de la comparaison dans la
poésie baudelairienne, in: Dagmar Wieser/Patrick Labarthe (eds.), Mémoire et oubli dans le
lyrisme européen: hommage à John E. Jackson, Paris 2008, 57; Bertrand Marschal, De quelques
comparaisons baudelairiennes, in: MaxMilner (ed.), Baudelaire toujours: hommage à Claude Pi-
chois, Paris 2007, 189-201, see 189; Stefan Willer, The problem of theorizing comparisons (in
science and literature), in: Neohelicon 41 (2/2014), 371–380; Adam Gargani, Similes as Poetic
Comparisons, in: Lingua 175–176 (2016), 54–68.
63 This is one of the reasons for rejecting the term “synchronic” that is widely used in other
typologies,see: Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis, 144; Sass, Vergleiche(n), 34.
64 William Wordsworth, “It is a beauteous evening, calm and free…” [1802], in: William
Wordsworth, Poetical Works, London 1896, 332.
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Alternatively, the temporal gaps are often exposed and laid bare in diachronic
comparisons, although this explicitness may well conceal the indeterminacy con-
cerning comparata and even tertia, as in the following passage:
(9.2). “Ah, Dickens! You admired him, then! That is where wemoderns agree with
you.”65
It seems natural to associate diachronic comparisons with self-comparisons (7.1),
because relating A at the time t° to B at the time t° ± n appears to lack common
ground.This association holds ground even if the readerships compared clearly dif-
fer from one another, because relations can also function as comparata.66 In this
respect, the relations between Dickens and his readers in the capitalist past (re-
ferred to as “then”) and in the communist future (disguised in the utopian novel as
the narrator’s present) are indeed quite similar.67 It is probably not too far-fetched
to see the role of such equations in utopian/dystopian narratives as conveying the
sense of continuity between unbridgeable gaps in social experience.68 However, in
less extravagant genres. They could merely suggest the internal coherence of the
development of genres and other discursive subsystems.69
10.1 Comparisons with tertium, quartum, quintum, […] etc., non datur (finite
sets) vs. 10.2 Comparisons without tertium, quartum, quintum, […] etc., non
datur (infinite sets)
All comparisons, regardless of their type and medium, operate with two distinctly
different kinds of comparata sets: Whereas in the first case, the selection of com-
parata is attributed to the environment and is commonly seen as “objective,” that is,
beyond anyone’s control (10.1); in the second, the things compared are seen as more
65 Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward from 2000 to 1887 [1887], Boston 2012, 73.
66 Cf. Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis, 144. The tradition goes at least as far back as Aristotle (cf.
Ursula Coope, Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10–14, Oxford 2005, 116).
67 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte. Über Beziehungen zwischen Zeithori-
zonten und sozialen Strukturen gesellschaftlicher Systeme, in: Peter Ch. Ludz (ed.), Soziologie
und Sozialgeschichte, Opladen 1973, 81-115, see 91.
68 “Jede Zukunftsutopie muß zeitliche Kontinuitäten unterstellen, gleich ob sie offen thematisiert wer-
den oder nicht” (Reinhart Koselleck, Zeitschichten, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, 135–136).
69 The case in point ist the functional equivalence of successive stanzaic structures in German
verse expressed through equation of relations verse/meaning “then” (in classicism) and “now”
(in Baroque): “Eine lyrische Strophe, die, wie der Alexandriner uns jetzt lang dünket, galt damals
für eine schöne poetische Periode” (Johann Gottfried von Herder, Früchte sogenannt – golde-
nen Zeiten des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts [1803], in: Johann Gottfried von Herder, Sämtliche
Werke, Bände 9–10, Stuttgart 1862, 296).
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or less freely chosen by the sender of the comparative message (10.2).70 The first
case can be illustrated by the habitual sets of binary oppositions pieced together in
the attempt at worldly wisdom:
(10.1). “What lies behind us and what lies before us are tiny matters compared
to what lies within us. And when we bring what is within us out into the world,
miracles happen.”71
The pairs before/behind and within/out in the world, interlinked in the sentence in
the X-like fashion, are commonly perceived as finite sets of comparata in ver-
bal languages along with other orientational markers such as here/there, life/death,
or Asia/Africa/North America/South America/Antarctica/Europe/Australia. Naturally, po-
etry and scholarship occasionally challenge and even change the contents of sets:
For example, the planet Pluto was added to the list of planets in 1930, only to be re-
moved from it in 2006.72 However, it is highly uncommon to change the set status
between finite and infinite, although, as one could see below (note 72), the poetic
discourse can be an exception.
Alternatively, some sets of comparata are perceived as dependent on the cir-
cumstances of their uses:
(10.2). “Dagegen hat die nordische Sage den Zusammenhang erhalten, während die
deutschen Lieder, deren Daseyn und Inhalt andere Zeugnisse außer Zweifel setzen,
gleichfalls verloren sind.”73
Of course, the choice of comparata here is also far from being accidental. Since
Grimm had taken it upon himself to track down and contextualize the roots of
German literary tradition, the disappearance of German folk poetry was cunningly
contrasted with the preservation of the linguistically close Nordic tradition. Still,
the history of oral poetic traditions is replete with lacunae, and the folklorist could
have made his point just as easily by mentioning the lost texts of Archaic Greek or
Early Arabic poetry. So, although the genre and topic do constrain the selection of
comparata, this limitation is largely self-imposed following the choices made by
the author of the comparative utterance.74
70 This division has a long philosophical prehistory going back to the ancient wrangling about
the status of relation (cf. Eelcko Ypma, La relation est-elle un être réel ou seulement un être
de raison, d’après Jacques de Viterbe, in: Jean Jolivet/Zenon Kałuza/Alain de Libera (eds.),
Lectionum varietates: Hommage à Paul Vignaux, Paris 1991, 155–162).
71 Cf. Henry S. Haskins,Meditations in Wall Street, New York 1940, 121.
72 Cf. David A.Weintraub, Is Pluto a Planet? AHistorical Journey through the Solar System, Princeton
2007, 121–128.
73 Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsche Heldensage [1829], Berlin 1867, 2.
74 The opposition (10.1)/(10.2) gets compromised when the comparata and the tertium send
conflicting signals to the reader about the semantics of comparative utterance. The case in
point is the famous poem Vowels by Arthur Rimbaud: A noir, E blanc, I rouge, U vert, O bleu:
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11.1 Comparisons with exocentrically defined comparata vs. 11.2 Comparisons
with egocentrically defined comparata
The difference between “subjective” (speaker-based) selections of comparata and
their “intersubjective” (environment-based) preselections concerns not only the
configuration of comparative sets (as in (10.1/10.2) but also the wording of com-
parata: Whereas some references to the things compared can make sense only in
relation to the speaker’s position (“you”/“the person next to me”/“stranger,” etc.), others
would be more or less invariant to it (“mister X”/“the person at the podium”/“the teacher
at school X”).The difference could best be illustrated by relatively independent parts
of the same sentence devoted to the cross-evaluation of American and European
cities:
(11.1). “I could see very much in New York, which contrasted favorably with what
I had seen in Paris and London; (11.2) but, in one thing, that of cleanliness, I was
sorry to notice that she fell far behind those old foreign cities.”75
The first comparative utterance (11.1) contains an extremely vague relative grading
comparison (1.1.2.2.1) without explicit tertia comparationis (5.2)—virtually all we can
say is that, on many instances, the travel writer had a higher opinion of New York
than Paris and London. Aside from a minor side remark hinting at Thompson’s
extensive sightseeing at all three locations, there is no information about the rea-
sons for putting one city ahead of two others: To accept the positive evaluation (3.1)
of New York on some unspecified counts, one has to trust the narrator’s personal
predisposition. For all that, the references to comparata are made in a thoroughly
impersonal fashion, so that the utterance could be attributed to a travel writer from
Paris, London, or any other place on earth.
voyelles, //Je dirai quelque jour vos naissances latentes: //A, noir corset velu des mouches éclatantes
//Qui bombinent autour des puanteurs cruelles, //Golfes d’ombre; E, candeurs des vapeurs et des tentes,
//Lances des glaciers fiers, rois blancs, frissons d’ombelles; //I, pourpres, sang craché, rire des lèvres
belles //Dans la colère ou les ivresses pénitentes; //U, cycles, vibrements divins des mers virides, //Paix
des pâtis semés d’animaux, paix des rides //Que l’alchimie imprime aux grands fronts studieux; //O,
suprême Clairon plein des strideurs étranges, //Silences traversés des [Mondes et des Anges]: //—O
l’Oméga, rayon violet de [Ses] Yeux! (Arthur Rimbaud, Voyelles [1871], in: Arthur Rimbaud,Œu-
vres, Paris 1983, 110.) The first line suggests, in fact, a sort of “sextium non datur”—the five col-
ored letters stand for the full set of French vowels and are referred to as such. However, the
main body of the poem challenges this tertium: The alleged vowels turn into random colors
(black, white, red, green, and blue), iconic signs (V as a wave), and sounds (O as a trumpet).
At the end, this murky hodgepodge of diverse comparata puts the original finiteness of the
set of “vowels” (?) into question.
75 Zadock Thompson, Journal of a Trip to London, Paris, and the Great Exhibition, in 1851, Burlington
1852, 133.
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As for the second half of the long sentence (11.2), it differs from the former one
on many, if not most, counts. Most importantly, two of the three cities compared
in the first half are named here in a way revealing the speaker’s own position: By
referring to Paris and London—but not New York—as “old foreign cities,” the au-
thor discloses his belonging to the United States. This formal departure from the
referential evenhandedness is amplified by the author’s “sorrow” at the sight of
New York lagging behind Paris and London. However, this emotional engagement
is counterbalanced somewhat by the explicit reference to the tertium comparationis
(5.1)—the “cleanliness” of the two cities in question: Thompson’s patriotism could
not be shared by Parisians or Londoners, but the common ground for comparisons
provides experiential terrain for alternative evaluations. Taken together, both parts
of the sentence neatly balance considerable personal engagement with relative im-
partiality.76
12.1 Reversible (symmetrical) vs. 12.2 Irreversible (asymmetrical)
comparisons
The case made above (II, 2.1/2.2) for the asymmetry of narration in general (and
comparative utterances in particular) has been tested briefly on the simplest pos-
sible symbolic expression of invariance to time (the logical reflexivity): In Dante’s
poem, the equation A = A changed—literally—into A > A because both the syntax
and the lexicon of the line in question implied changes in its semantics; and,more-
over, expressed the resulting difference by means of a relative grading comparison
(“I ammore than I”) linking two first-person personal pronouns to one another (2.1).
Expectedly, the logical symmetry (if x = y, then y = x), too, cannot always withstand
the directionality of narration: In logic, X = Y means the same as Y = X, but “John is
76 Naturally, most of the comparisons with egocentrically defined comparata are not nearly
as fair. Throughout the millennia, the prevailing tradition in cross-cultural comparisons was
to egocentrically define the disjoint “other” as a manifestation of cultural, communicative,
and moral inferiority under the motto “L’enfer, c’est les autres” (Jean-Paul Sartre, Huis clos, in:
Jean Paul Sartre, Théâtre I, Paris 1947, 182).The case in point is the term “barbarians” sum-
marily applied to disjoint groups whose only common feature was not belonging to the
dominant sociopolitical discourse (cf. Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik
geschichtlicher Zeiten, Frankfurt a.M. 1979, 211–259; João Feres Jr., Building a Typology of Forms
of Misrecognition: Beyond the Republican-Hegelian Paradigm, in: Contemporary Political The-
ory 5 (2006), 259–277; Kirill Postoutenko, Asymmetrical Concepts and Political Asymmetries:
A Comparative Glance at 20th Centuries Democracies and Totalitarianisms from a Discursive
Standpoint, in: Kay Junge/Kirill Postoutenko (eds.), Asymmetrical Concepts after Reinhart Kosel-
leck: Historical Semantics and Beyond, Bielefeld 2011, 81–114; Peter Strohschneider, Fremde in
der Vormoderne. Über Negierbarkeitsverluste und Unbekanntheitsgewinne, in: Anja Becker
(ed.), Alterität als Leitkonzept für historisches Interpretieren (Reihe: Deutsche Literatur, Bd. 8),
Berlin 2012, 387–416.
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my father” has a markedly different meaning from “My father is John.”77 So it comes
as no surprise that the schism between logic and narration within the semantics
of verbal language becomes one of the distinctive features in the typology of com-
parative utterances. In such a conflict, many comparisons would side with logic,
displaying a significant degree of symmetry. Consider the following sentence:
(12.1). “Amidst the enthusiasm, chivalry, or fanaticismof the other states of Europe,
Venice stands, from first to last, like a masked statue; her coldness impenetrable,
her exertion only aroused by the touch of a secret spring”.78
The stark opposition between a single (former) city state and all “other states of
Europe” could scarcely be seen as balanced, but, in terms of relations between com-
parata and their properties, it is quite reversible: Instead of saying that the com-
parata A and B have, respectively, attributes (X, Y, Z) and (M, N), one could state
that A does not have M and N and B does not have X, Y, and Z. Indeed, it is possible
to say that, while Venice lacks “enthusiasm, chivalry, or fanaticism,” its counterim-
age has no “impenetrable coldness” and does not look like a “masked statue”. To
be sure, the elegance of Ruskin’s style would be gone, but otherwise the compari-
son would be intact and mean pretty much the same. The sentence is reversible: It
can move between positive (8.1) and negative (8.2) comparative utterances without
losing much of its meaning.
This is not the case, however, with the following sentence:
(12.2). “Amsterdam est la Venise de Nord”.79
If we take this privative opposition at a face value, the two comparata—Amster-
dam and Venice—share everything but location: the Dutch capital is in the north
of Europe, and the capital city of the province Veneto, indeed, is to its south. But
this description would be excessive, because, some exceptions aside, the latitudinal
division of the globe has just two values—“above” and “below” the equator.The pair
north/south is apparently employed here in this very sense—as a binary opposi-
tion, and a contrary one at that, with both positions marked. Under such circum-
stances, just one geographical reference, as in Cousin’s text, is enough to figure out
the other. What is “not in the north” is not just “anywhere but in the north”—it is “in
the south”; the same, of course, is true for “not in the south”—it is nowhere else but
“in the north.” This symmetry apparently allows one to turn around the comparative
77 Cf. Otto Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, Woking/London 1963, 153.
78 John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, London 1851, 6.
79 Victor Cousin, De l’instruction publique en Allemagne, Paris 1841, 253. The modifier “of the
north”plays a crucial role here in assigning Cousin’s saying to similes (comparisons), because
it excludes the possibility of Amsterdam and Venice being the same thing (see Aristotle’s
distinction between “bow [is] a lyre” (a metaphor) and “bow [is] a lyre without strings” (a
simile/comparison)—Aristotle Rh. 3.11.
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utterance in the same way as the previous one: *Venice is the Amsterdam of the north
must have the samemeaning as “Amsterdam is the Venice of the north.”80 One tries, and
. . . oops, it does not work: Wikipedia lists no less than 39 “Venices of the north,”
but not a single “Amsterdam of the south.”81 So the relation between comparata is
asymmetrical indeed, and it is subject to further discussion whether the position of
comparata in the sentence or their intrinsic meanings—if those factors can be sep-
arated at all—contribute to this violation of logic in a highly popular comparative
utterance.
13.1 Real vs. 13.2 Irreal comparisons
Similar to the difference between the relative (1.1.2.2.1) and the absolute (1.1.2.2.2)
grading comparisons, the opposition between real and irreal comparisons is linked
closely to the choice between indicative (13.1) and other (subjunctive, conditional,
imperative, interrogative) grammatical moods. For comparative utterances, the
difference is relevant insofar as it may affect the distance between the com-
parata—in much the same way as literary fantasy (see note 59), dreams, wishes, or
terrors expressed by means of ordinary language place less constraints upon the
choices of comparata or tertia than observations of reality (whatever is taken for
it).
Thus, the popular comparison between adults and children, already discussed
above (see 8.1/8.2), has a markedly different dynamics in indicative and irreal
moods. Similar to Jean Paul and Plato, Lucretius portrays likeness across ages as a
tangible part of everyday experience:
(13.1). “namvel uti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis // in tenebrismetuunt, sic nos in luce
timemus // inter dum, nihilo quae sunt metuenda magis quam // quae pueri in tenebris
pavitant finguntque futura.”82
Paradoxically, this equation is amplified by an appended privative opposition of
“darkness” (which scares children) and “light” (which fails to dispel the adults’
80 There is a more formal logical argument for reversibility based on the syntax of the compar-
ative utterance. It consists of the subject x (“Amsterdam”) and the predicate y (“Venice”) with
the modifier z (“of the north”). Syntax is not math, so we do not know if the modifier adds to
or subtracts from the meaning of the predicate—but it does not matter. In the first case (the
modifier adds to the meaning of the predicate), we have an equation x = y + z; in the second
(the modifier subtracts from the meaning of the predicate), the respective formula is x = y –
z. In the first case, “Amsterdam is the Venice of North” is x = y + z , and *Venice is the Amster-
dam of North is y = x – z. In the second case, “Amsterdam is the Venice of North” is x = y − z
, and *Venice is the Amsterdam of North is y = x + z . This, apparently, would work for all
numbers—but not for words in a comparative utterance!
81 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venice_of_the_North [last accessed April 9, 2020].
82 Lucretius, De rerum natura (II, 55–58).
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fears). Not only are the adults likened to children (because they, too, can be afraid);
they are also shown to be more childish than children themselves (because while
youngsters get scared at night, the grown-ups cannot get rid of their horrors in
broad daylight).
In contrast, the very same equation between children and adults, put in one of
the irreal moods in the Gospel, feels like a much bigger distance:
(13.2). “Unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the
kingdom of heaven”.83
Besides the double negation, which substantially decreases the determinacy of the
message (see 8.2. above), the miraculous character of the expected effect of the
equation widens, together with the adjective “little,” the gap between children and
adults that seemed to be so small in Plato and Lucretius.84
14.1 Auctorial comparisons vs. 14.2 Nonauctorial comparisons
Similar to the previous distinction, the difference between the authors’ and their
characters’ comparative utterances expresses the contrast between “real-life” com-
parisons embedded in common wisdom with all the restrictions this puts on the
selection of comparata and tertia, and fictional comparisons that are partially free
from such limitations. The gaps between auctorial and nonauctorial comparisons
could perhaps be evaluated best when the same comparisons appear in fictional
and nonfictional contexts. Thus, when Leibniz insists on the fact that, thanks to
Divine grace, humans live in the best possible world, this absolute grading of com-
parisons feels like a sound replica in a philosophical debate of his time and a natural
offspring of his thinking:
(14.1) “Il y a une infinité deMondes possibles, dont il faut que Dieu ait choisi le meilleur.”85
However, when his satirical shadow—a pathological optimist Pangloss—extends
the same property to the house and wife of his patron, which are also deemed
“the best possible” of their kind, the improbability and pragmatic servility of the
derivative comparisons invalidates the soundness of the main one:
83 Matthew 18.3.
84 In the saying, the tentative character of the relation between cause and effect has been
routinely disregarded, so the words attributed by the Apostle Matthew to Jesus had
been commonly treated as the imperative “be like children” (“Будьте, как дети’—сказал
спаситель.”—Иван С. Тургенев, Путешествие по святым местам русским [1836], in: Иван
С. Тургенев, Сочинения, Т. 1. М. 1978, 173).
85 Gottfried W. Leibniz, Essais sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal
[1710], in: Gottfried W. Leibniz,Œuvres. Paris 1846, 115.
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(14.2). “Pangloss enseignait la métaphysico-théologo-cosmolonigologie. Il prouvait ad-
mirablement qu’il n’y a point d’effet sans cause, et que, dans ce meilleur des mondes pos-
sibles, le château de monseigneur le baron était le plus beau des châteaux et madame la
meilleure des baronnes possibles.86
 
                                                                                     * * *
 
It is hard to say howmuch the typology presented above accounts for the variety of
meanings that comparative utterances might acquire in social interactions. What
could be stated with certainty, though, is that it takes little notice of complications
caused by the malfunctioning of certain distinctive features. Linguistics calls this
the failure to distinguish “neutralization.” In the normal case, the privative phono-
logical opposition “voiced” versus “voiceless” is solely responsible for the semantic
differentiations between “time” and “dime,” “tangle” and “dangle,” “tee” and “D,” and
so forth, because it makes the only difference that between the consonants [t] and
[d]. However, in a situation in which these consonants are paired and squeezed
between two vowels (e.g., “ladder” vs. “latter”), the opposition does not work—what
one says and hears is neither [t] nor [d], but something in-between. As a result, the
recipient of the message containing any of these words has no direct way to find
out whether its sender meant “ladder” or “latter,” and has to rely on the context in
order to make the semantic distinction.87 Expectedly, the notion of neutralization
was developed within phonology as the most advanced part of structural linguis-
tics, but the phenomenon is pervasive in other domains of human language,88 and
any theory of language ignoring it would be a wildly utopian enterprise. The same
is ostensibly true for comparisons, and therefore it makes sense to cast a cursory
glance at some neutralizations of distinctive features within comparative utter-
ances: In both cases, it is the specific combination of adjacent distinctive features
that results in nondifferentiation.
III.
1.1 Comparisons vs. 1.2 Metastatements concerning comparisons
The fragility of the distinction between comparative utterances andmetautterances
referring to them is predetermined by the fact that human beings cannot but use
86 Voltaire, Candide [1759], Paris 2012, 1.
87 Josef Vachek, Selected Writings in English and General Linguistics, The Hague 1976, 53.
88 Cf. Petr Sgall, Jazyk,mluvení,psaní, Praha 2011, 161–166;Daniel Silverman,Neutralization, Cam-
bridge 2012, 1–12.
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one and the same natural language for the first- and second-order statements: 89
Unless one strays away from habitual interaction into the realms of logic andmath-
ematics, there is no code difference whatsoever between the statements “Moscow is
bigger than Bielefeld” and “‘Moscow is bigger than Bielefeld’ is a comparative utterance.” As
a result of this mixture, the separation between comparisons (1.1) and metastate-
ments concerning comparisons (1.2) is enforced only in its universal variant (1.2.1).
Indeed, the statements addressing the value or probability of comparative practices
in toto (see note 1) can do without comparisons at all, although many of them are
merely preludes to the more specific judgments and evaluations regarding specific
comparative practices and specific circumstances (see below, III, 1.2.1/1.2.2). How-
ever, metastatements concerning comparability of specific comparata in particular
(1.2.2) typically include one or several comparisons (1.1, for exceptions, see note
108). Even if the subordinated comparative utterance—the object of the metastate-
ment—is represented on the surface of language bymerely a pair of comparata—as
quoted in II, 1.2—every competent reader would get the impression that it is the
difference, not similarity, of apples and pears that stands in the way of their com-
parison.90 Inversely, when George Sand describes sociopolitical circumstances be-
fore the French revolutions of 1789 and 1848 as being theoretically “comparable” to
one another (1.2.2 + 8.1. + 13.2), the long list of common features including a critical
attitude to the present (“real”) and dream of the future (“ideal”) society, as well as
the freedom of press, strongly suggests the likeness of both time periods (1.1.1 +
13.1):
“C'était en 1845, époque où la critique de la société réelle et le rêve d'une société idéale
atteignirent dans la presse un degré de liberté de développement comparable à celui du
XVIIIe siècle.”91
Evidently, somemetastatements regarding comparability of specific comparata can
also be read as first-order comparative utterances; and at times, it is fairly easy to
find out how comparata are related to one another, even if this relation has not been
spelled out explicitly.92 Of course, the associations of comparability with equation
(1.2.2 + 8.1 = 1.1.1) and noncomparability with differentiation (1.2.2 + 8.2 = 1.1.2)
89 See a survey of the studies on this topic, John A. Lucy, Reflexive language and the human dis-
ciplines, in: John A. Lucy/Lucy A. Lucy (eds.), Reflexive Language: Reported Speech andMetaprag-
matics, Cambridge 1993, 9–13.
90 II, 1.2 is actually a meta-metastatement seeking to quash this verdict, but, for our purposes,
the second metalevel can be safely ignored.
91 George Sand, Le Péché de Monsieur Antoine [1845], Paris 1864, 1.
92 The famous Oxford Dictionaries second George Sand’s interpretation, offering as defini-
tions of the word “comparable” two references to similarity—“able to be likened to an-
other; similar” and “of equivalent quality; worthy of comparison” <https://en.oxforddictionar-
ies.com/definition/comparable>.
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are far from being accidental. Traditionally, comparisons are associated far more
strongly with similarity than difference: Alone the fact that most of the available
dictionary entries on “comparison” in various languages literally put “similarity”
before “difference” (II, 1.2.1 is a typical case) attests to the unmistakable prefer-
ence given to equations over differentiations within comparative semantics.93 It is
likely that such associations—especially the first, positive, one—facilitate extract-
ing comparative meanings from metacomparative sentences.
1.2.1 Metastatements concerning comparisons in general vs.
1.2.2 Metastatements concerning comparability of specific comparata in
particular
As has been stated in the previous paragraphs, the metastatements concerning
comparisons in general can be unspecific: Referring to all comparisons in the world
as a type of activity is enough, insofar as an average recipient of such a compara-
tive message knows what the word “comparison” means.94 In a world bent on effi-
ciency of information transmission, one universal metastatement “all comparisons
are good” (1.2.1) would turn evaluation of any specific comparata or classes thereof
on the scale “good”/“bad” into a waste of time. However, in discussions of social
practices, it is common, if not essential, to see how general principles function un-
der specific circumstances, and this functioning leaves ample room for deductive
reasoning moving from (1.2.1) to (1.2.2). Whenever this movement occurs outside
of well-trodden paths of logical reasoning, it often stalls or gets stuck in between,
thereby complicating the relation between premises and conclusions and some-
times obliterating their difference.
93 Cf. Schenk/Krause, Vergleich, 676; Stefan Willer, Die Allgemeinheit des Vergleichs. Ein kom-
paratistisches Problem und seine Entstehung um 1800, in: Michael Eggers (ed.), Von Ähn-
lichkeiten und Unterschieden. Vergleich, Analogie und Klassifikation in Wissenschaft und Literatur,
Heidelberg 2011, 155; Mauz/Sass, Hermeneutik des Vergleichs, 10–11. The correspondences be-
tween comparison and similarity pop up at nearly every level of comparative activities—from
terms (similitudo) to social practices (the consensus-building procedure known in German as
“Vergleichung,” see: Marsh H. McCall, Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison, Cam-
bridge 1969, IX; Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 84, 106). Overalll, cross-evaluation of obviously dif-
ferent things is discouraged: Whereas Latin poetry contains standard apologies for compar-
ing “big” things with “small” ones (Vergil, Georgica, IV, 170–178; Vergil, Bucolica, I, 19-25; Ovid,
Tristia I, 3.25, 6.28), European political writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
obsessively warn against juxtaposing “top” and “bottom” of the social ladder (cf. Steinmetz,
‘Vergleich’, 112; Steinmetz, Above/below). For the things that are even more disparate—such
as God and humankind—the outright prohibition of comparisons was put in place (see be-
low, III, 8.2).
94 Cf. Bertrand Russell, Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types, in:American Journal
of Mathematics, 30 (3/1908), 222-262, see 236.
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In the history of comparative discourse, deduction often presents itself as a
slightly duplicitous totum pro parte. A general—usually pejorative—evaluation of
comparisons (1.2.1) loudly fronts for hidden specific metastatements (1.2.2), feed-
ing the suspicion that the narrator’s only goal is to borrow some authority for an
otherwise petty claim. In this way, the two opposed kinds of metastatements melt
together: Whereas the universal metastatements lose their generality, their partic-
ular counterparts tacitly uphold some mid-level generalization without bringing it
to the narrative surface.
The case in point is the popular saying “All comparisons are odious,” easily found
on the pages of proverbial wisdom manuals in many languages.95 Instead of end-
ing all discussion of comparative practices, this general metastatement often in-
troduces pointed bans on particularly explosive comparata (e.g., female beauty).
So, in Fernando de Rojas’ macabre comedy Celestina (1499), the prostitute Elicia re-
fuses to share a table with a servant named Sempronio, because the latter has just
showered the young Melibea with compliments. Sempronio, in turn, reminds fu-
rious Elicia that he has never looked at Elicia and Melibea from the comparative
standpoint, and it was her, not him, who was “guilty” of “having compared”:
ELIC[IA]. […]? Hauía yo de comer con esse maluado, que en mi cara me ha porfiado que es
más gentil su andrajo de Melibea, que yo?
SEMP[RONIO]. Calla, mi vida, que tú la comparaste. Toda comparación es odiosa: tú
tienes la culpa y no yo.96
The same pseudological following from the general maxima (“toda comparación es
odiosa”) to its only relevant specific application—refraining from comparing mis-
tresses of various hidalgos—is a recurrent topic in another milestone of pre-mod-
ern Spanish fiction.97 And the gap between premises and conclusions appears to be
even more glaring in John Fortescue’s Commendation of the Laws of England (1499), in
which the success of a comparative enterprise proving—surprise!—the supremacy
of English laws is crowned by the phrase (“comparaciones odiosas esse”) put in the
mouths of both the auctorial narrator and his conversation partner (modeled upon
Prince Edward, the only son of exiled Henry VI).98 All in all, the chief purpose of
deliberate paralogical mixing between general and specificmetacomparative state-
ments appears to be a case of isolating and ring fencing some unspoken incom-
95 Cf. Pedro Vallés, Libro de refranes y sentencias [1549], Madrid 2003, 66; Gonzalo Correas, Vocab-
ulario de refranes y frases proverbiales [1627], Madrid 2000, 336; Giacomo du Bois de Gomicourt,
Sentenze, e proverbij italiani cavati da diversi famosi autori antichi, e moderni [...], Lyon 1683, 153.
96 Fernando de Rojas, La Celestina, ó, Comedia de Calisto y Melibea [1499], Barcelona 1841, 176. See
also: Mauz/Sass, Vergleiche verstehen , 1.
97 Cf. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quijote de la Mancha [1615], Madrid 1999, 350, 386.
98 Cf. John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae [1499], Cincinnati, OH 1874, 225–238.
Preliminary Typology of Comparative Utterances 71
parables—be they the object of romantic love or a subject of imperial rule (see in
more detail below III, 8.1/8.2).99
1.1.1 Equations vs. 1.1.2 Differentiations
Above, it has been shown how the directionality of discourse, reflecting time asym-
metry, produced the difference between “left” and “right” of the written line, or “be-
fore and after” of the spoken line. Indeed, the same signifier (“I”), referring to the
same signified (the narrator), can have different meanings in the subject and the
predicate parts of the statement, because the production of speech is accompanied
by a steady influx of information that alters the overall semantics of the utterance
while it is being produced (II, 2.1).Mapped onto the lexical level of the sentence, this
change (namely, the alleged spiritual growth of the narrator’s identity), cancels out
logical reflexivity, turning the standard equation (*I = I, 1.1.1.) into a relative grad-
ing comparison (“I ammore than I,” 1.1.2 + 1.1.2.2.1): The latter statement sounds like
an odd paradox until one tries it out on any saying involving comparata separated
only by the time of their reference (see, e.g., below: III, 3.1/3.2).
If initial sameness of comparata can be turned into contrast in the process of
message production, the neutralization of their difference appears equally possible:
In any case, the coincidentia oppositorum has been one of the cornerstones of philo-
sophical dialectics,100 and many empirical observations of likeness and unlikeness
of certain objects leave matters unsettled. Thus, departing from the a priori as-
sumed difference in the feeling capacity between flora and fauna, Buffon inverts
the habitual scheme of deductive reasoning, conditionally accepting the difference
first, contesting its universality later, and refusing to make any judgment on the
matter at the end:
“Une différence plus essentielle pourroit se tirer de la faculté de sentir, qu'on ne peut guère
refuser aux animaux, et don’t il semble que les végétaux soient privés. […] Cette différence
entre les animaux et les végétaux non-seule ment n'est pas générale, mais même n'est pas
bien décidée.“101
99 To be sure, there are exceptions: A handful of authors take the notion of “odious comparisons”
seriously. See: Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 114–115 (on the entry “Comparison” in the Dictionary of
the [French] Academy (1694));WilliamHazlitt, Table Talk. Essays onMen andManners [1821], Lon-
don 1903, 141.
100 The most basic expression of this tradition is Heracleitus’ insistence on “being” and “nonbe-
ing” at the same time: εἶμέν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν (Heracleitus, Alleg. Hom. 24).
101 Georges-Louis Leclerc (Comte de Buffon), Œuvres completes. Tome VIII. Histore des animaux
[1749], Paris 1833, 7. OnBuffon’s comparisons, see: ThierryHoquet, Logique de la comparaison
et physique de la génération chez Buffon, in: La Découverte 39 (1/2007), 595–612.
72 Kirill Postoutenko
In a single, albeit extensive, comparative utterance, the relation between the com-
parata “animals and “plants” is presented in three ways: (1) a possible difference
(1.1.2 + 13.2); (2) a mixture of difference and indifference (some animals and plants
are similar in their ability to feel [1.1.1] and others are not [1.1.2]); and, finally, (3)
no relation at all (2). Proceeding from surety to uncertainty, Buffon’s statement has
a negative informational value in relation to his subject. However, the zoologist’s
unvarnished report of his squabbling with the thorny subject more than makes up
for this loss.
1.1.2.2.1 Relative grading comparisons vs. 1.1.2.2.2 Absolute grading
comparisons
Superficially, the boundary between relative and absolute grading comparisons
should be watertight, because the opposition seems to be directly and effortlessly
translatable into the grammatical distinction between comparative (better) and su-
perlative (best) adjectives. However, a second glance at the passage from Strind-
berg’s Crimes and Crimes (see above, II, 7.2) documents the fairly easy neutraliza-
tion of both oppositions at once. In the quote, as we remember, Adolphe clearly
compares two kinds of crimes, and deems one category (moral wrongdoings) to
be worse than the other (criminal transgressions). Notwithstanding the relativ-
ity of comparison, he uses for the first category the superlative adjective “värsta,”
conflating a relative grading comparison (*moral wrongdoings are worse than criminal
transgressions [1.1.2.2.1]) with an absolute one (*nothing is worse than moral wrongdo-
ings [1.1.2.2.2]). Understandably, such conflations are particularly plentiful in finite
sets consisting of two elements (1.1.2.2 + 10.1) in which it is impossible to drive a
wedge between “X is better/worse/… than N” and “X is the best/worst/… in the set (X, N).”
3.1 Evaluative comparisons vs. 3.2 Nonevaluative comparisons
Unlike the previous binary, the privative opposition between evaluative and
nonevaluative comparisons has a very diverse semantics. Accordingly, it can be
expressed in amyriad of ways that sometimes have no discernible references to any
values at all. Not infrequently, the diachronic nongrading self-comparisons (1.1.2.1
+ 3.2 + 7.1 + 9.2) are cast in the idiomatic forms referring indirectly to progress or
decay occurring within a certain entity (3.1). This is the case in Anthony Trollope’s
novel Linda Tressel (1868) in which “Herr Molk,” the burgomaster of Nuremberg, is
shown at pains to arrange the protagonist’s marriage with the respectable Peter
Steinmarc. In pursuit of this goal, he addresses Linda’s aunt with the following
words:
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“The city is not what it used to be, Madame Staubach, but still Peter does his work
very well”.102
The semantics of the first part of the sentence swings back and forth between the
disinterested contrasting of Nuremberg now to Nuremberg then (3.1), and the sug-
gestion of the city’s decline in the meantime (3.2). To tilt the utterance’s meaning
toward the latter possibility, the narrator inserts the coordinating conjunction “but”
between the report on the city’s changing fortunes, and the overt praise of Linda’s
prospective husband. In this situation, as in many similar ones, the neutralization
of distinction (evaluative and nonevaluative comparisons within comparative ut-
terance [3.1/3.2]) has been overcome by its context (the adjacent noncomparative
evaluation of the external object named Peter Steinmarc).103
4.1 Qualitative comparisons vs. 4.2 Quantitative comparisons
Right from the outset, the handy and seemingly unchallengeable opposition be-
tween qualitative and quantitative comparisons is compromised by the latter’s la-
tent semantic inconsistency.104 Although numbers are both precise references to
sets (“he has two children”) and approximate references to quantities (“he is two meters
high”), the difference between the two has no direct linguistic expression: Typi-
cally, the exactness of counting is attributed automatically to measurement. Con-
sequently, nearly every time a number appears in a comparative utterance, it is be-
lieved to stand for the incontrovertibly specific and intersubjectively verifiable rela-
tion between comparata. Alas, this is an illusion, andmany numbers express highly
subjective relations between immeasurable comparata. Charles Péguy’s compara-
tive utterance could illustrate the point:
102 Anthony Trollope, Linda Tressel [1868], Frankfurt a. M. 2018, 88.
103 A somewhat similar strategy of mixing up evaluative and nonevaluative comparative ut-
terances could also be implemented in nondiachronical settings. It involves the tacit dis-
tancing of similar—and equated to one another—comparata (1.1.1 + 3.1 + 7.1) from ob-
server: “Die Linken sind doch alle gleich” (Máriam Martínez-Bascuñán. Die Linken sind doch
alle gleich.—Zeit Online (10.2.2017) https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/podemos-
spanien-linke-partei-pablo-iglesias-streit. Again, the sentence can be read both as a neutral
equation of various left-wing movements from within (1.1.1 + 3.2) and as their critical differ-
entiation from without (1.1.2 + 3.1).
104 “Between two and three, there is a jump, In the case of quantity, there is no such jump; and
because jump ismissing in the world of quantity, it is impossible for any quantity to be exact.
You can have exactly three tomatoes, You can never have exactly three gallons of water. Al-
ways quantity is approximate” (Gregory Bateson, Man and Nature. A necessary unity, Glasgow
1980, 72; see also: Alfred Brunswig, Das Vergleichen und die Relationserkenntnis, Leipzig 1910;
16–17; Chang,Making Comparisons Count, 26–27).
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“Nous entrons ici […] dans un domaine inconnu, dans un domaine étranger qui est le do-
maine de la joie. Cent fois moins connu, cent fois plus étranger, cent fois moins”nous“ que
les royaumes de la douleur. Cent fois plus profond, je crois et cent fois plus fécond.”105
Even before one attempts to check the distance between “joy” and “suffering” in the
passage, a brief look at the comparata selected and the internal organization of the
passage casts grave doubts on the quantitative character of the comparison. To be-
gin with, both notions compared constitute a binary set with the fairly strong and
largely predefined qualitative valuations (2.2 + 3.1 + 4.1): It would be fairly uncom-
mon to see suffering as anything but “good” and joy as anything but “bad.” Someone
may argue that this is possible, and that the decision to assign a positive and a neg-
ative value to the respective poles of the opposition is based on thoroughly measur-
ing and comparing their parameters that are, according to Péguy, “familiarity,” “us-
ness,” “foreignness,” “profundity,” and “fertility.” But even if this fanciful argument
were accepted and the gap between joy and suffering lent itself to measurement,
it would be wildly improbable for the variations of all their subcomparata to con-
form either to the ratio of 100:1 or to the ratio 1:100 as they do in the text.106 In all
probability, the reason for putting one and the same number in the same syntac-
tic frame with two opposed valuations (“100 times more/less [than] X”) has nothing
to do with quantification and a lot to do with literary and rhetorical properties.
The growing rhythmic and phonetic regularity of the passage, culminating in the
rhyme of two comparata (“profond”/“fécond”) shows that numbers in the Note serve
exclusively as a rhetorical embellishment of the qualitative valuation, adding to it
some faux quantitative flair.107
105 Charles Péguy, Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne [1914], in:
Charles Péguy,Œuvres completes, T. IX, Paris 1924, 329.
106 Truth to be told, the numerical equality appears credible in antonyms and synonyms: “One
hundred times less known” is roughly the same as “one hundred times more foreign” and
“one hundred times less ‘us’”. However, this equation is valid with any number, as long as it
is repeated in all parts, and also without any numbers. So it turns out that the value “100”
in this contest does not mean anything, and can be removed or substituted at will without
causing any noticeable change to the comparisons involved.
107 The dissolution of quantitative in qualitative comparisons can also take place whenever the
strategicmanipulation ofmultiple hidden tertia (5.2) discourages attention to comparability:
The text on Viktor Koretsky’s poster comparing Soviet and American schools (1950) informs
the reader that in the USSR “the construction of city and village schools will increase approxi-
mately by 70% compared to the previous five years”, whereas in the U S, “1 % of the budget is
devoted to the public education and 74% of the budget aremilitary expenses”, “the illiterate
population of USA amounts to 10 million”, and “around one-third of the school age children
do not study”. It is easy to see that there is no commondenominator for the figures describing
the Soviet and American educational situation: For instance, the viewer never learns about
the size of the Soviet military budget or the dynamics of school construction in the US, which
would have enabled direct quantitative comparisons. The contrast between a pioneer smil-
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8.1 Positive comparisons vs. 8.2 Negative comparisons
It has been shown above that the remarkable contrast between the perfect logical
form of negation, ideally suitable for the mass production of privative oppositions,
and its restlessness within natural language results in multiple inconsistencies and
asymmetries within negative comparisons (II, 8.2). But perhaps the weakest point
of linguistic negativity is its curious inability to draw the line between the negative
and the negated statement:108 It is impossible to withhold a statement “x” from “-x,”
“I deny that x,” “anti-x,” and any other thinkable negative statements. For this rea-
son, negative comparisons (8.1) nearly always contain positive comparisons (8.2),
and the difference between one and another appears neutralized, to some degree,
in each and every negative comparative utterance.109
Needless to say, this habitual neutralization exercises a profound influence on
the form and functions of (non)comparisons. Arguably the most productive social
use of negative comparisons is the tacit transformation of nonevaluative incompa-
rability into absolute and relative grading comparisons: “Incomparable” just means
“very, very different.” In the first case (1.2.2. + 8.2. = 1.1.2.2.2), the rejection of com-
parability between absolute manifestations of Good (e.g., God and its properties)
or Evil (e.g., Shoah) automatically places them on the very top (or bottom) of every
comparative ladder.110 In the second (1.2.2. + 8.2. = 1.1.2.2.1), instead of focusing on
ing at the bright upper part of the poster, and a stooping American teenager on the picture’s
dark bottom leaves nodoubt as towhich school system is seen as the better one.However, the
abundant statistics fail to take part in the comparison: Again, their role is to wrap the highly
biased qualitative comparisons in the cloak of objectivity (I am grateful to Joris C. Heyder for
generously sharing with me his insightful interpretation of the poster).
108 “Negation ist keine Vernichtung, sondern ein Modus der Erhaltung von Sinn. Negation ist daher für
gewisse Absichten zu positiv. Dann kann nur gehandelt werden” (Niklas Luhmann, Über die Funk-
tion der Negation in sinnkonstituierenden Systemen, in: HaraldWeinrich (ed.), Positionen der
Negativität. (Poetik und Hermeneutik, vol. X), München 1975, 201-218, see 201.
109 “Negation is just as much Affirmation as Negation” (Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution,
Boston, MA 1960, 122); “Information introduced via negation is often retained rather than
suppressed” (Rachel Giora et al., Negation as positivity in disguise, in: Herbert L. Colston/Al-
bert Katz (eds.), Figurative Language Comprehension: Social and Cultural Influences, Hillsdale
2005, 233-258, 117). Specifically on incomparability statements, see: Niklas Luhmann, Liebe
als Passion. Zur Kodierung der Intimität, Frankfurt a. M. 1982, 154.
110 The “incomparability” of God and its properties, common in monotheist canonic texts (The
Quran 112.4, Isaiah 46: 09) andmuch beyond (e.g., Martin Luther, Auslegung uber das fünffte
Buch Mose/Deuteronomium genant/Verdeudscht Anno 1525, in: Der Achte Teil der Bücher des
Ehrwirdigen Herrn D. Martini Lutheri, Wittenberg 1556, 164; Søren Kierkegaard, Kjerlighedens
Gjerninger, in: Søren Kierkegaard, Samlede vaerker, Band 9, Kjøbenhavn 1847, 177), provides
a template for the similar superlativeness of a sovereign, master, lover, or romantic friend
(see above III, 1.2.1/1.2.2). On the “incomparability” of the opposite side (Shoah), see: An-
dreas Mauz/Hartmut von Sass, Vergleiche verstehen. Einleitende Vorwegnahmen, in: An-
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the extreme position of a single comparatum, the emphasis is put on the massive
disparity between the phenomena compared. For example, Hitler’s refusal to com-
pare the “new Germany” with “Germany of the past” means, in effect, the propaga-
tion of considerable social and economic changes valued positively and attributed
to the power grab of his party (NSDAP):
„Dieses neue Deutschland kann daher nicht in Vergleich gebracht werden mit dem
Deutschland der Vergangenheit.“111
13.1 Real vs. 13.2 Irreal comparisons
The neutralization of the real and the possible in comparative utterances has a
somewhat more intricate semantics than the conflations of other distinctive fea-
tures discussed above. On the one hand, it may follow the logic of the previous ex-
amples (see above, III, 1.2./1.2 and 8.1/8.2): Often, the statement that some specific
comparisons are admissible or even desirable contains a first-order comparative
utterance suggesting equality of the comparata (1.2.2. + 13.2. = 1.1.1). This is the de-
vice deployed many times in Charles Perrault’s juxtaposition of arts and sciences
in Antiquity and in his own time:
“Je voy les Anciens sans plier les genoux, // Ils sont grands, il est vray,mais hommes comme
nous; // Et l’on peut comparer sans craindre d’estre injuste, // Le Siecle de LOUIS au beau
Siecle d’Auguste.”112
dreas Mauz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.), Hermeneutik des Vergleichs. Strukturen, Anwendungen
und Grenzen komparativer Verfahren, Würzburg, 2011, 15; François Noudelmann, La Traite, la
Shoah... sur les usages d’une comparaison, in : Littérature 174 (2/2014), 104-113, see 104.
111 Adolf Hitler, Rede vor dem Reichstag am 21. Mai 1935, Berlin 1935, 9. Again, even if the nega-
tive metastatement concerning comparability of specific objects has neutralizing potential,
one should not treat this high probability as certainty. Particularly in scholarly discourse in
which exaggerations are untypical, specific incomparability (1.2.1 + 8.2) can simply mean dif-
ferentiation (1.1.2): “The duration of dreams bears no comparison to that of the events and
circumstances which they picture” (William S. Savory, On Dreaming and Somnambulism, in Re-
lation to the Functions of Certain Nerve-Centres, London 1864, see 207). Last but not least, there
is always a small chance that the explicit negation of comparability is just what it is with no
hidden comparisons lurking in the background. This usually occurs when the complexity of
comparata prevents rigorous comparisons in the first place, as is the case with “state” and
“religion” in Jakob Burkhardt’s ambitious account of world history:“Unmöglich ist es zu vergle-
ichen,welcher Prozeßder größere gewesen: die Entstehung des Staates oder die einer Religion” (Jakob
Burkhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen [1905], in: Jakob Burkhardt, Kritische Studien-
ausgabe, vol. 10, München 2000, 379).
112 Charles Perrault, Parallèle des anciens et desmodernes en ce qui regarde les arts et les sciences [1687],
München 1964, 10.
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Even if the grammar of comparative utterance (“one could compare”) suggests its ir-
reality, the actuality of comparison is proved beyond doubt by adjacent sentences.
The equality between the comparata is first suggested by the positional (interactive)
symmetry of the speakers eschewing bodily hierarchies: Perrault looks at “the An-
cients” “without bending his knees.” Furthermore, this parity is reinforced by a sim-
ile (“they are […] like us”) and consolidated by the grammatical parallelism between
“the century of Louis [XIV]” and “the century of Augustus.” At the same time, Perrault’s
choice of conditional mood can also follow the practice of “mitigation”: In most
cultures, it is common to reduce the directness of indicative judgments in order
to avert direct confrontation in case of disagreement.113 As said before (see note 3),
the standard—indicative—mood of comparative messages in verbal language “X is
better than Y” concentrates all the comparing authority in the sender’s hands: Every
other result of cross-evaluation between X and Y would invariably take the shape of
a counterstatement challenging the validity of the original comparison (*I doubt/do
not think/disagree . . . that X is better than Y ). Alternatively, the irreal mood compari-
son (*Xmight be better than Y *Isn’t X better than Y?/. . .) allows for less confrontational
expressions of alternative opinions such as answering questions, specifying prob-
ability, and so forth. So, at the end, it is likely that Charles Perrault’s controversial
equationwas styled as an irreal one to avoid confrontation, in case the controversial
equation of the “Old” with the “New” were not to his interlocutor’s liking.
IV.
As long as comparisons are seen as an actual social practice (rather than as an ab-
stract set of rhetorical devices), their typological studies would take time, and the
quality of the resulting classification would move only slowly toward the rigorous
standards set by linguistic phonology.The attempt to describe the whole semantics
of natural languages in terms of distinctive features called “componential analysis”
could have provided, in principle, some guidance, but in its present form, this lin-
guistic methodology appears to be both grotesquely complex and unsuitable for
our purposes.114 With these pitfalls in mind, the current typology has focused on
113 Cf. Penelope Brown/Stephen C. Levinson, Politeness, Cambridge 1978, 40, 87, 116, 145, 156–157,
172–173, 226; Bruce Fraser, Conversationalmitigation, in: Journal of Pragmatics 4 (1980), 341–350;
Geoffrey Leach, Principles of Pragmatics, Harlow 1983, 108; Claudia Caffi, On mitigation, in:
Journal of Pragmatics 31 (1999), 881–909; Lotfi Abouda, Deux types d'imparfait atténuatif, in:
Langue française 142 (2/2004), 58-74, see 58; Dominique Willems/Claire Blanche-Benveniste,
A constructional corpus-based approach of ‘weak’ verbs in French, in: Hans C. Boas/Fran-
cisco Gonzálvez-García (eds.), Romance perspectives on construction grammar, Amsterdam 2014,
113–138.
114 Cf. John Lyons, Linguistic Semantics: An Introduction, London 1995, 114–115.
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the most basic sets of distinctive features, presenting them first as ideal types (free
from internal contradictions and external influences [II]) and then as real practices
(generating their information in specific sociohistorical environments [III]). In the
best-case scenario, the descriptions of distinctive features in the typology should
have been unambiguous enough to enable automatic (computer-based) fishing for
comparisons.
Geared primarily toward the practical use in sociocommunicative analyses of
historical practices, the description above does not aim at sweeping generaliza-
tions. Nonetheless, a brief summary of some of the main findings is probably in
order:
1. Comparisons—at least those expressed by means of verbal communica-
tion—have regular semantics that, similar to natural language, can be broken
down into single bits of information by means of privative (a vs. non-a) op-
positions. However, the overlap between the distinctive features of linguistic
and comparative systems is not that big. Even when the meaning of the
comparative distinction is roughly similar to the grammatical one (relative vs.
absolute grading comparisons ≈ comparative vs. superlative degree), the means of
expression could be very different.
2. Although the comparative system often amalgamates some logical (“negation/af-
firmation,” “first-/second-order statements”) and mathematical (“finite sets”/“infinite
sets”) distinctions, in communicative practice, it regularly overrides them: For
instance, the absence of fully abstract, specialized “second-order” terms in lan-
guage leads to the neutralizations between statements and metastatements
within comparative utterances. Another example is the directionality of dis-
course that turns equations into differentiations.
3. Comparative utterances play a significant role in forming, upholding, and sus-
taining the basics of social order, supporting hierarchies (taboos on comparing
“highest” and “lowest” values with all other comparata), and enabling coopera-
tion (prevention of conflicts in case of alternative cross-evaluations by means
of mitigation). Between these two extremes of societal regulation, multitudes
of clichés ensure both the stability and flexibility of various socially meaningful
mid-level comparative scales.
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Incomparability
A Tentative Guide for the Perplexed
Hartmut von Sass
Abstract
The idea of incomparability has been an attractive one – and remains largely obscure.This pa-
per aims at structuring the recent debate through distinguishing between different accounts,
mostly defending the possibility of incomparability. Arguments for incomparability are crit-
ically scrutinized and a possibility for attacking them is presented by relying on the parity
account. Lastly, what is coined as structural incomparability will be refuted in order to create
a conceptual space for its evaluative (normative or moral) counterpart.
To begin with: Reporting from the margins of comparison
You can furnish an entire library with books solely dedicated tometaphors; you need
a good part of that library for sheltering your volumes on analogies; and it still takes
a couple of high shelves to store the exegetical and philosophical literature on para-
bles. And what about comparing? A mini-board might already be more than you
need. It is an interesting but hardly self-evident circumstance that tropes have tra-
ditionally gained a significant attention by rhetorics, in theories of argumentation
as well as in semantics; and despite comparisons being the most prominent fig-
ure of speech given their permanent usage in our everyday dealings—who lives,
compares –, they are academically still lingering in the shade. Hence, this striking
misbalance between factual prominence and intellectual ignorance is telling. But
what exactly does it tell us? That comparisons and the practice of comparing—as
an exception to the rule among the tropes—are just trivial?
As a matter of fact, it is not easy to find contributions to the topic in ques-
tion coming from theoretical or moral philosophy. And to do this from a philo-
sophical angle might already be based on an assumption that is highly disputed:
namely, that it is fruitful or makes at least sense to speak of comparisons without
the immediate reference to a practical and scientific context. In other words: one
might have to subscribe to the claim that there is (something like) a more gen-
eral hermeneutics of comparison that lies in front of the divergent fields in which
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concrete comparisons are applied. If one repudiates this possibility of a general
account applicable or being relevant to all these different areas of application while
maintaining the academic interest in the practice of comparing, one could refer to
the disciplinary work on comparisons and comparing. There are several compara-
tively oriented subjects—some of them have the term even in their name—and here
we do find methodological reflections on what they are actually doing, yet always
tied to a specific field: literature, law, religion, etc.1 Hence, we are facing a simple
and binary alternative: a general comparative structure actualized within different
areas (top-down) or a variety of comparisons bound to particular areas (bottom-
up)—a comparison or practices of comparing? This is, admittingly, an unhappy al-
ternative, but for heuristic purposes I will go here with the former option.
This is not to say that the philosophical work on comparisons that actually exists
would not be bound tomore focussed issues.There are, as far as I can see, especially
two specific debates in which comparisons and also the problem of incomparabil-
ity play a significant role: the clash of conflicting values and the incommensurability
of rival scientific theories.2 The one issue belongs to the debate on value and virtue
theories challenged by inner-personal or,more importantly, social and cultural plu-
rality. The fear is here that without being able to compare values, a rational choice
between moral or existential options is up in the air; comparability of divergent
values is, then, considered to be part of moral rationality. The counter-position
called comparativismmeeting that fear defends this all-encompassing possibility of
comparatively weighing values.3 The other issue, the rivalry of scientific theories,
is linked to the problem of incommensurability—a classical chapter within the phi-
losophy of science since Fleck, Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend.4 Here, the general view
is, that theories are embedded in paradigms; and these paradigms are supposed
to be diachronically or synchronically separated in such a way that there are no
translations of one paradigm into another one possible. Since there is no meta-
1 Very instructive accounts are given by Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method. Moving Be-
yond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1987; and Charles
Tilly, Big Structures. Large Processes. Huge Comparisons, New York 1985.
2 See Thomas S. Kuhn, Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability, in: Proceedings of
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two, Symposia and Invited
Papers (1982), 669-688.
3 Cf. RuthChang,MakingComparisonsCount, London/NewYork 2002, 43; see alsoDonaldRegan,
Value, Comparability, and Choice, in: Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability,
and Practical Reason, Cambridge/London 1997, 129-150.
4 For Ludwik Fleck see his Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache.
Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, ed. by Lothar Schäfer/Thomas
Schnelle, 10th ed., Frankfurt a.M. 2015, 82 and 145; on Kuhn and Feyerabend see Eric
Oberheim/Paul Hoyningen-Huene, The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories, in: Ed-
ward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), URL: https://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/incommensurability/ [last accessed April 9, 2020].
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paradigm either, incommensurability entails not only intranslatability, but also in-
comparability.
Now, while these debates, in particular the first one, did not amount to a gen-
eral account on comparisons, they may help us to come nearer to that goal. For this
purpose, I have to give a short reminder concerning the structure of comparisons
that enables us, in further steps, to see more clearly where precisely the problem
of incomparability might arise—and where and why not.
The structure of comparison: a short reminder
The structure of comparison is, at first glance, very simple. Different items (relata)
are compared in relation to one respect (tertium comparationis). Since there is not
and cannot be a comparison simpliciter the comparative regard is a necessary ele-
ment of every act of comparing items. I suggest to call the items the material part
while the tertium serves as the formal aspect of the comparison. However, this anal-
ysis is insufficent, since both, the material and the formal elements of the compar-
ison, have a context that is essential for the comparison not only to be meaningful
but also to be possible in the first place. This implies that the items do not exist in
a void but within a concrete arrangement. Imagine, a friend of yours has birthday,
and you have two ideas for a present or gift. Suppose now that it turns out (and you
get to know) that your friend has already present B. Comparing A and B without
that particular context might have led to a very different decision than the one you
will actually make now, namely chosing A. One could also say that the connection
between A and its context CA (and the same goes for the contextualized B and CB)
entertain an ‘internal’ relation; CA is then only analytically separatable from A but
nevertheless intrinsically connected to it as long as the comparison between A and
B should have any relevance.
Now, I, however, claimed more; namely that the comparison between A and B
is not only meaningless (and not reliable) without taking the contexts CA and CB
into account, but not possible either. Why that stronger claim? Since one cannot
switch off the context. Assuming that your friend had not been given the gift B is
itself part of an implicit context that was—here wrongly—presupposed, but that
is, nevertheless, open to be made explicit. Hence, there are no As and Bs without
CsA and CsB. These contexts may be tacit, but that does not mean that they are not
there, at least latently.
There are not only the contexts of the material parts of the comparison to be
considered. The formal aspect, the tertium comparationis, has also its specific con-
text, call it CT. Let us, again, refer to an example: it is an already established com-
plain—typical within and for the discourse on comparisons—that one cannot com-
pare apples with pears. What causes this reservation is simply the presupposition
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that A and B have to entertain a certain degree of resemblance (similitudo). Apples
and pears connected to each other by comparison would, then, not meet that con-
dition. This claim is, obviously, confused.
What is, however, not wrong-headed is the call for a specific similarity, but the
question is of how to understand this call correctly. One might say, the similarity
between A and B is not an ontological one (the actual semblance between apples and
pears), but rather a constructed one—by way of already having or now chosing the
formal respect (tertium) in virtue of which one delivers the relevant comparison.
Now, this constructive regard creates, in a way, the kind of resemblance needed
for comparing even apples and pears. And that creation is based on the context of
the comparative regard (CT ). For example, you want to bake a pie, and the question
is which fruits are better fitting the taste the pie should have. According to that
regard, one might prefer pears over apples. By CT the fruits turned to be similar
enough, while determinating as well as contextualizing the regard enabling the
comparison in question. Here again, enabling is to be read not only in the sense
of securing the meaning and significance of comparing A and B, but to make that
comparative act possible.
To complicate things a bit more, one should also take into account that both
kinds of contexts—of the material items (A,B,…) and of the formal regard (T)—are
not independent of each other. Refer again to our birthday present example: take T
to be the criterion of newness and surprise—not the worst choice when speaking
of the anniversary gift for your friend. The context of having a friend’s birthday as
an institution informs the significance and sense of T; to put simplier: usually, a
birthday present should be surprising; that is the context T which establishes the
criterion of newness. Hence, if you know that your friend has already present B,
you will chose A. Change the example a bit now: imagine your friend possessed a
loved watch and desperately forgot and lost it somewhere. Given that background,
you decide to buy a new one of the same kind. Now, you will chose A, since the
context of the items has changed so that the criterion T, newness and surprise, is
met in a different way.
To sum up: a comparison (between two items; more are, obviously, possible) is
a relation of, at least, five elements of three kinds:
• material: the items A and B;
• formal: the comparative regard T;
• contextual: the interacting contexts of the items (CA, CB) as well as the context
of the particular regard (CT ).
At the outset, I have claimed that it is fruitful, but also possible to give a general
account of comparisons without necessarily starting from a particular comparative
usage or having a specific discipline in mind—but to apply the general formula to
Incomparability 91
these contexts of potential application. Accordingly, this claim implies now that
this account just given is relevant for the particular act of comparing, in everyday
life as well as in disciplinary work, that it applies to different kinds of comparisons
distinguishable by a typology,5 and that it is independent of the status of compar-
ing items, i.e. independent of the old philosophical question of whether the act to
compare is just a logical structure or even a mental operation of the human mind, as
authors like John Locke have it.6
Incomparability. A first spot
A lovermight say that her loved one is unique—remember SinéadO’Connor singing
in the 1990 Prince cover “Nothing Compares to You”; or recall the constant warn-
ing not to relativize the Holocaust precisely by comparing it to other instances
of mass murder and destruction; or take the late Karl Barth who took Mozart to
be the incomparable, “Der Unvergleichliche”.7 “Incomparability” is, hence, a part
of our ordinary language, a usual language-game we play, one might say. How-
ever, it would be exaggerated to claim, incomparability represented a major topic
in theoretical or moral philosophy. To my knowledge, and as indicated, there are
only two more concrete issues in which comparative moves and their limits play a
significant role, the incommensurability of different theories and the plurality of
divergent values. I will leave the first problem aside since it would entail questions
whose answers would lead us astray given our topic; and instead, I would like to
concentrate on comparing (moral) values—putting the stress on ‘comparing’ and
not on ‘values’—or on comparing non-evaluative things.
The significance of the debate might appear to be clear in a straightforward
sense: It is hold by many authors that different values confront us with situations
of partly severe choices; if we go with their incomparability, one might fear, then
chosing rationally between alternatives is turned to be a hopeless endeavor. The
counterpart to this position is called comparativism meaning “the view that a com-
parison of the alternatives with respect to an appropriate covering value ‘deter-
mines’ a choice as justified, where this relation of determination is to be filled out
5 For the typology see Hartmut von Sass, Vergleiche(n). Ein hermeneutischer Rund- und Sink-
flug, in: Andreas Mauz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.), Hermeneutik des Vergleichs. Strukturen, An-
wendungen und Grenzen komparativer Verfahren (Interpretation interdisziplinär 8), Würzburg
2011, 25-48, see 39.
6 Cf. Henrik Birus, Das Vergleichen als Grundoperation der Hermeneutik, in: Henk de
Berg/Matthias Prangel (eds.), Interpretation 2000: Positionen und Kontroversen (Festschrift
Horst Steinmetz), Heidelberg 1999, 95-117, see 97.
7 Cf. Peter Paul Sänger (ed.), Der Unvergleichliche – Karl Barth über Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart,
Berlin 1983.
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in due course”8. Hence, the more space we relinquish to incomparability the less
rational choices can be justified.The lack of being able to compare A and B is, some
say, tantamount to the threat of irrationality.9
Generally speaking, comparability means (or, according to the standard view, is
defined as) the relating of A to B by either ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ or ‘equally good’
in terms of a particular regard. What we, hence, need for items to be comparable
is, 1) a positive value relation (saying what is—and not only, what is not—the case
between A and B) as well as 2) a tertium comparationis (since there is no comparison
between A and B simpliciter, but only in regard to a certain respect) (see, again,
section 1).10
It follows that incomparability—like comparability (at least) a three-place-
relation—presupposes also a comparative respect while lacking a positive value
relation (not necessarily a negative one). Or in definitive terms: “two items are
incomparable with respect to a covering value if, for every positive value relation
relativized to that covering value, it is not true that it holds between them.“11
There are three general reactions to this view of having potential incompara-
bility: the epistemicist tells us that there is no real incomparability which is, instead,
only an apparent one based on ignorance or insufficient information;12 the incom-
parabilitist defends the view that there are cases in which no positive value relation
holds—and, thus, we have actually to deal with incomparability;13 and finally, there
are the indeterminists stating that alleged incomparability is nothing but the (se-
mantic) vagueness of the predicates ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ and ‘equally good’.14
All three positions subscribe to the trichotomy thesis, i.e. to the claim that ‘better
than’, ‘worse than’ and ‘equally good’ exhaust the conceptual space for comparabil-
ity. This view has been contested (see section 7.3.).
8 Chang,Making Comparisons Count, 43.
9 Cf. Ruth Chang, Introduction, in: Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and
Practical Reason, Cambridge/London 1997, 1-34, see 23; for a different account criticizing the
implicite rationalism in comparativism cf. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford 1986,
126-27.
10 Obviously, there are further logical relations possible, such as ‘not worse than…’ or ‘at least as
good as …’—but, as the standard view has it, these are derivative relations reducible to the
three basic ones.
11 Chang, Introduction, 6; see also Chang,Making Comparisons Count, 9; in italics in the original
text.
12 Cf. Regan, Value, Comparability, and Choice, 130, 136, 144.
13 Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom.
14 Cf. John Broome, Incommensurable Values, in: Roger Crisp/BradHooker (eds.),Well-Being and
Morality: Essays of Honour of James Griffin, Oxford 2001, 21-38.
Incomparability 93
On the conceptual neighborhood
There are some specific features that comparability possesses. Such as categoriality,
complementarity, reflexibility, transitivity: ifA is comparable (with B) this is either true
or false and not a matter of degree or grades; A is either comparable to B or not,
tertium non datur;15WhileAmight be comparable to something else, it is not to itself
(it is not better or worse than itself, but it is not equally good either); and finally,
if A is comparable with B, and B is with C, A is also with C. Now, when we refer to
incomparability nothing changes in terms of categoriality, complementarity and
reflexibility. A bit different is the case of transitivity: it does, one might argue, not
follow that if A is incomparable with B, and B is with C, that A is also incomparable
withC.Take an example: if you cannot decide what to prefer, an orange or an apple,
and if you cannot decide between an apple and a banana, it does not follow that
you do not know what to do confronted with the admittingly trivial choice between
an orange and a banana.16
Incomparability is, often enough, confounded with incommensurability as a
covering term for relative, but different concepts; and it is helpful to save theses
differences.17 One might denote options as incompatible (and not incomparable) if
the choice in favor of the one option is only possible at the cost of the alterna-
tive—you can’t have it both ways.18 Different items, values for instance, are incom-
mensurable, according to another account, if they cannot be reduced to one supe-
rior value (think of ‘happiness’ in Mill and Bentham); this is the problem of plurality
or diversity. Then, there is a phenomenon called trumping, i.e. a case in which the
duty not to perform x outweights the benefitting from x; so, for example, one’s
obligation not to lie trumps the utility to do so in a given situation (now you see,
that this kind of trumping has absolutely nothing to do with the nincompoop in
the White House right now). Again another case is what is called nonsubstitutability
meaning when the loss in one value cannot be compensated by the gain of (or in)
another one; this applies particularly to values that are taken to be ‘sacred’ and per
definitionem not replacable.19 Finally, there is incommensurability in a narrower sense
meaning that items are incommensurable if there is no cardinal scale according
to which both could be measured. This version has, again, two other subversions:
15 It does not follow, however, that, if A is comparable to B, non-A would be incomparable to B.
16 Please note, that in the example I transformed the imcomparability talk into talking about
decision and choice.
17 See also James Griffin, Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?, in: Ruth Chang (ed.), In-
commensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge/London 1997, 35-51, see 38.
18 Cf. for these distinctions Ruth Chang, Incommensurability (and Incomparability), in: Hugh
LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Oxford 2013, 2591-2604.
19 Cf. Hans Joas, The Sacredness of the Person: A New Genealogy of Human Rights, Washington D.C.
2012.
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either it is meant that the scales we have are insufficient to deliver a ranking or one
accepts the items to be “unrankable”20.
Performative and structural incomparability
How to compare a Mercedes 230 SEL with the description of how to use your TV-
remote control? How to compare the imagination that you are the striker scoring at
the final game of the soccer world cup with the moral conviction that it is necessary
to help refugees coming from areas suffering from famine and war? How to com-
pare the beauty of Bielefeld with the force of a deductively successful argument?
One might find that these instances articulate complete nonsense. The standard
answer might be: “Well, these items are so different that comparing them is under-
mined from the outset.” But the problem is whether we are rather dealing with
meaningless comparisons being open for the possibility to eventually find a regard
under which a comparison is fruitful or whether comparing these items truly lead
us to an impossibility of being compared. It is a debated issue if there are actually
cases of that absolute and not only rhetorical incomparability or whether the com-
parativistic view is true according to which everything could, structurally speaking,
be compared to anything else.
I hold, however, the quest for incomparability to be only partly a structural
problem. If this is so, then one might refer to the dimensions of comparisons in-
sofar as structural incomparability must be based on the relation between the ma-
terial (items to be related to each other), formal (tertia) and contextual aspects of
comparisons—I will come back to this in a minute. Nevertheless, not every ver-
sion of incomparability is a structural one. Contrary to that first form we have to
deal—and one might add, very often—with what we could call performative incom-
parability. Then, we have cases in which a comparison is indeed possible, and that
very possiblity is actually the problem—with the consequence to commit oneself,
morally or intimately, not to compare.
The distinction between performative (comparing is possible but suspended)
and structural incomparability (comparing is impossible) is not self-evident. The
first version is often dismissed as mere equivocation to restrict the term ‘incom-
parability’ to the second version.21 I won’t follow that suggestion because the per-
formative and rhetorically accompanied suspension of structurally possible com-
parisons is a highly important institution, in morals and public life as well as in
intimate contexts. I will briefly concentrate on cases in which the suspension to
compare is morally loaden.
20 Griffin, Incommensurability: What’s the Problem?, 37.
21 Cf. Chang,Making Comparisons Count, ch. 4.
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By comparing items one creates a cluster on which one’s orientation is based.
Hence, a comparison is meaning- and successful insofar as it satisfies the practical
need for a concrete orientation.22 The call for suspending a structurally possible
comparison could, therefore, be considered as a critique of creating a disputable
cluster or a wrongheaded orientation. When, back in 1986, the German historian
Ernst Nolte related the Holocaust to the Gulags in the Soviet Union insinuating
that the first had been the reaction to the second the vast majority of replics ex-
pressed a severe critique of Nolte’s historiographic orientation based on a compar-
ative attitude that was regarded to be morally indefensible. Either one assumed
that comparing the Holocaust with other horrendous events undermined its sin-
gular character; or one did not assail the comparative mode itself, but referred
critically to the devastating results of this instrumentalized comparison, as Jürgen
Habermas had it.
What comes to the fore here is the dimension of an ethics of comparison. This is
particularly significant for the limits of comparing different items, a demarcation
that is not easy to define. One way to do this is to refer to our “reactive attitudes”23
towards those stiking to debatable comparative orientations: “attitudes of discom-
fort, embarrassment, chock, outrage, or horror that is displayed when such cal-
culation or commensuration is engaged in by others”, as the English philosopher
Steven Lukes holds.24 Therefore, the performative incomparability is a reaction to
the predicament that the comparison is actually possible and yet, for many,morally
untenable. Put technically: performative incomparability implies structural compa-
rability.
Constitutive incomparabilty
A case that, one might say, lies between structural and performative (or normative)
incomparability is a version that is often labelled as constitutive. This idea goes
back to what Charles Taylor and Joseph Raz refer to as “constitutive goods”, goods
that constitute our life.25 What turns these goods to be so specific including being
22 Cf. Stefan Berg, Vergleichsweise orientiert. Eine orientierungstheoretische Betrachtung des
Vergleichens, in: Andreas Mauz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.), Hermeneutik des Vergleichs. Struk-
turen, Anwendungen und Grenzen komparativer Verfahren, Würzburg 2011, 277-303, see 282.
23 Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in: Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1/1962),
1-25.
24 Steven Lukes, Comparing the Incomparable: Trade-offs and Sacrifices, in: Ruth Chang (ed.),
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Cambridge/New York 1997, 184-195,
see 189.
25 See Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in: Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability,
and Practical Reason, Cambridge, MA/London 1997, 170-183, see 173.
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incomparable is, according to Raz, the following feature: “The view that two options
cannot be compared is viewed as an obstacle to trade-offs.”26 As example serves
often a couple wanting desperately to have a child. No money on earth would be an
adequate replacement for that desire.They, Raz claims,would not only not compare
both options, but would explicitely repudiate this comparison:
“Formany, having children does not have amoney price because exchanging them
for money, whether buying or selling, is inconsistent with a proper appreciation
of the value of parenthood.” (ibid., 348)
The incomparability in cases like parenthood versus money instead (or more clas-
sically: money versus friendship) is not based on the breakdown of the three predi-
cates ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ and ‘equally good’, but the refusal to compare in the
first place as an expression of the deep appreciation for the value in question.What
makes this case to be located at the threshold between structural and performative
incomparability is the ambivalent status of that refusal.This means that either one
takes this appreciative act to be a ‘noncognitive’ attitude allowing for a structurally
possible comparison that is refuted or one considers that refusal as an (conceptual)
entailment of that very value.
Raz wants to say the second but, actually, the way in which he presents his case
rather elicits connotations going into the first direction. He sees in this refusal the
“symbolic significance” of the parenthood or friendship (349), that belongs to this
value itself. For him, then, there is no real distinction between this judgment of
incomparability and the case of incomparability itself. He states:
“My claim regarding incommensurablity is that belief in incommensurability is
itself a qualification for having certain relations. […] Certain judgments about the
non-comparability of certain options and certain attitudes to the exchangeability
of options are constitutive of relationswith friends, spouses, parents, etc.” (351 and
352)
The constitutive character is this incomparability implies, for Raz, also that only
those refuting to compare friendship with money are able to be real friends or to
have real friends.27 Someone saying that money is more valuable than friendship
is neither confused nor is claiming something wrong, but is just incapable of true
friendship (cf. 352-53).
The idea of constitutive incomparability has met severe criticism. One might
argue that since incomparability between A and B is a symmetrical relation while
26 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 346.
27 This is a similar and similarly debatable claim as the one by Aristotle who holds that one
can only be a friend if one is friends with oneself; see Julia Annas, Plato and Aristotle on
Friendship and Altruism, in:Mind 86 (344/1977), 532-554.
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the relation between friendship and money is not, something must be wrong in
Raz’ analyses.28 Furthermore, one has to take the concrete context into account:
Assume someone has already more than ‘enough’ friends but is struggeling finan-
cially.Would that person be incapable of friendship preferringmoney over an addi-
tional friendship under the particular conditions of having a vivid social life with an
empty wallet? And is the expression to value friendship more, in a categorial sense,
than money not itself a comparison? Perhaps, what Raz (and others) call constitu-
tive and symbolic concerning this kind of incomparability is not structural, but a
deepening of our understanding of instances of performative incomparability.
Locating incomparability I: On what it is not
There are further demarcations to be made in order to locate more precisely where
we find cases of incomparability. First of all, in- and noncomparability are not the
same. Two items are noncomparable if the formal requirements necessary for there
to be a claim of comparability or incomparability are not fully met. For instance,
one of these conditions is that there is a tertium comparationis, a regard according to
which different items can be related to each other comparatively. If there is no such
regard we are dealing with a formal failure, but not with incomparability. Apart
from this formal understanding of noncomparability there is also a substantial one:
here we do not have a lacking element to turn the comparison possible, but—in
having all elements required together—the items to be compared to each other are
belonging to different classes or categories (cf. again, section 1).
Take again our examples from above: how to compare a Mercedes 230 SEL with
the description for using a TV-remote control? How to compare the notion that
you are a successful striker with the moral conviction that it is necessary to help
refugees? How to compare the beauty of Bielefeld with the power of a deductively
successful argument? One might come up with a covering value, but it is hard to
imagine a context in which these comparisons make any sense. Hence, in the one
sense of noncomparability, the formal and rather trivial one, an element necessary
for the comparison is lacking. In the substantial case, formally everything is in
right order besides the problem that the comparatives cannot be related within a
comparison that deserves its name.This last, slightly vage phrase indicates already
the problem connected to substantial noncomparability: it is a fine line between
meaningful comparisons and noncomparability based on lacking a common cate-
gory.29 However, that begs the question to the problem of categoriality: what does
28 Cf. Chang, Incommensurability (and Incomparability), 2601; she speaks, instead, of “em-
phatic comparability”.
29 Cf. Chang,Making Comparisons Count, 9.
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it exactly mean to belong to a shared category? A Mercedes and a remote control,
a position and a conviction, beauty and an argument. What about comparing the
“incomparable” Mozart with Michelangelo—do they belong to a common category,
artists, or not, as a musician and a sculptor? Or David Bowie versus Bryan Ferry?
While formal noncomparability is easy to detect, the substantial sibbling is not.
A second candidate of incomparability is incommensurability; it is a false candi-
date. While there are authors using both concepts interchangeably,30 the field of
their relevance is highly different. It is the established usage to speak of incom-
mensurable scientific theories (itself a debatable idea)31 while reserving the term
incomparability to plural values and their potential clash.32 A stronger argument
for differentiation is the fruitful restriction of ‘incommensurability’ to instances
where a scale is lacking and, hence, a precise measurement impossible. However,
scalarity is not a necessary condition for comparability which means that incom-
mensurability (in the sense just proposed) is compatible with comparability. It is
still possible to ordinally compare items beyond scale, think of valuing friendship
more than money.
A third case is vagueness. According to John Broome all instances of incompara-
bility are based on the vagueness (of predicates). Take, for example, the term ‘bald’:
when is someone bald or not? Obviously, there are cases in which applying that
term to someone is a borderline case. Now, it is clear that even in vague cases a
comparison might be easily possible. In those where the problem really arises one
might say, as done by Ruth Chang,33 that predicates such as ‘bald’ could be applied
to a case or not—stipulation is possible and helpful here; whereas ‘incomparable’
is, per se, not a vague predicate: something is comparible or not—see above, ter-
tium non datur. Therefore, a straightforward identification of incomparability with
vagueness is not without problems (see below, section 7.5.).
30 See Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 322.
31 A case against the compartmentalisation by the incommensurability theory in Fleck and,
more prominently, in Kuhn raises, for instance, Michael Hampe, Die Lehren der Philosophie.
Eine Kritik, Berlin 2014, 199-201.
32 However, often enough both terms were, nevertheless, intertwined; see Ober-
heim/Hoyningen-Huene, The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories, 2: “By calling
two fundamental theories incommensurable, Feyerabend meant that they were concep-
tually incompatible: The main concepts of one could neither be defined on the basis of
the primitive descriptive terms of the other, nor related to them via a correct empirical
statement.”.
33 Cf. Ruth Chang, Parity. An Intuitive Case, in: Ratio 29 (4/2016), 395-411, see 396; Ruth Chang,
The Possibility of Parity, in: Ethics 112 (4/2002), 659-688, see 682.
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Locating incomparability II: On what it actually might be
If one has a clear measurement, a scale, to relate A to B, one does not have to deal
with incomparability. It is obvious that the attendence at Trump’s inaugural lec-
ture was far lower than Obama’s in 2013. Thus, incomparability, it is safe to say,
belongs to the realm beyond (clear) measurement. However, it does not follow that
everything that lacks a scale entails incomparability. Think, again, of friendship
versus 1000 Dollars; for the vast majority it is perfectly clear what is ‘better’ (more
valuable, more satisfying, etc.). All what we can infer from this might be that cases
of comparative breakdown should be explained in terms of a certain kind of in-
determinacy. Which kind? In the following passage I would like to distinguish
four—alledged—sources of incomparability—plus an argument, to be refuted, that
negates or mitigates the existence of incomparability:
 
Trichotomy and its failure (Joseph Raz)
Repudiating to compare (Derek Parfit*)
Parity—instead of incomparability? (Ruth Chang)
Indeterminacy of the covering value (John Broome)
Indeterminacy of (the meaning of) comparatives (John Broome)
 
Let’s go!
1. Trichotomy and its failure
The moral philosopher Joseph Raz has presented what one might call the standard
view of incomparability. This view is based in the trichotomy assumption mean-
ing that there are (see above) three comparative predicates exhausting together
the logical space of describing a comparison between A and B: better, worse, and
equally good. Incomparability is, then, the breakdown of applying better, worse,
and equally good to the relation between A and B. Is liberty or security preferable?
Here, Raz claims, we have not only to deal with the sense of comparison and its
limits, but also with the truth of that very relationship.34
Now, one could imagine to improve A a bit compared to B.The claim implied
by their being incomparable is that this slight improvement cannot trigger com-
parability between A and B either. So, if one takes again liberty and security while
‘improving’ the latter by giving everyone in the ‘secure(d)’ world 1000Dollars on top,
nothing has changed. Liberty and security remain in themode of being incompara-
ble, since the improvement suggestion elicits the notion that the countable element
of money might introduce the scalability of the whole comparison—but it doesn’t.
34 Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 322-23.
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Raz also underlines the difference between incomparability and equality. A
judgment, Raz holds, concerning the relative value of A and B is impossible in the
case of them being incomparable—whereas equality is precisely such a judgment.
There is another difference, the case of transitivity: If A and B are equal, and if B
andC are equal too, it follows that A andC are equal as well. However, if A and B are
incomparable and B and C are too, it does not follow that one could not compare A
and C (325). A similar response goes also for what has been coined as ‘rough equal-
ity’ meaning that A and B are in that relation when there difference is very small
in such a way that all other options that are better (or worse) than A are also better
(or worse) than B (330). In the case of rough equality one is, Raz adds, entitled to
be indifferent concerning a preference between A and B.However, incomparability
does not mean indifference and is not based on it either; it is rather the lack of
sufficient reasons to go in one direction or the other.
Raz thinks that both elements just sketched—non-transitivity and non-im-
provement—constitute together a test (not a definition) for incomparability (335).
That means: if A and B are incomparable, and an option C is better than A but not
better than B, and if an improvement of A (or B) does not turn A (or B) better than
B (or A) both, A and B are ‘truly’ incomparable.
This account has caused some protest since, for some, it is not clear whether tri-
chotomy really exhausts the logical space of positive value relations. Especially Ruth
Chang has suggested that some (or all?) cases that run under, in Raz, the heading
of incomparability are, in reality, cases of ‘parity’ and, thus, of being comparable
(see 7.3.).
2. Repudiating to compare
In part IV of his seminal Reasons and Persons Derek Parfit invites us to contemplate
different and increasingly complicated scenarios of future states. The criteria are,
for a good part, the amount of people who will populate the planet, the quality of
their lives—combined with discussing what it means to speak of a life worth living
(as a minimal standard of living) plus more specific conditions varying possible
outcomes, for instance a higher standard of living for the next 100 years at the cost
of a lower standard for the generations then to come—as part of ‘future ethics’—or
the promise of health while accepting a crucial sacrifice such as a nearer death or
having a minority of people living under poor conditions while all others having a
good life—as part of ‘populations ethics’.35
Parfit starts off by introducing the picture you can see in figure 1 (on 385).
First of all, Parfit is not so much concerned with reflecting on comparisons
(that’s why I added a (*) to his name above; an exception is what he calls ‘rough
equality’ and ‘rough or partial comparability’, cf. 357 i.a.).However, he is comparing
35 Cf. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford 1984, 384-390.
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Fig. 1
all the time scenarios like A, B, C,…. , Z—while the height of the columns signifies
the quality of life and their width represents the amount of people living accord-
ing to a specific scenario. Hence, in A people enjoy an extremely high standard of
living whereas the population is rather small; its amount is doubled in B in having
a population with a slightly lower standard.
If one conceptualizes both parameters—quality and quantity of life—and if one
presupposes, as utilitarians may have it, that qualitative judgments are eventually
reducible to a scalable measurement, one is, henceforth, entitled to compare fu-
ture states of affairs: B is better than A, C is better than B, …. Now, the scope of
Parfit’s argument is the paradox that is waiting for us if we continue like this up
the scenario Z: here, we have an enormous amount of people living a life hardly
worth living. That is, obviously, a “repugnant conclusion” (387).
It is astonishing that Parfit invests so much effort in elaborating on scenarios
like the sketched one (and its far more complex sibblings) without paying heed
to the question of the comparability of their outcomes or, more to the point, of
our willing- and readiness to compare here in the first place. Hence, what might
justify this reservation on our part? To begin with, there are two trivial while far-
reaching assumptions that make these scenarios keep going, namely that quality of
life is somehow measurable and that, even if it were, we can measure that quality
of life on the same scale as the one we may use for the amount of people. Both
assumptions are either plainly false or have first to be defended.
Putting these deliberations aside for a moment, one might ask why one could
hesitate to compare here. I don’t think it is enough to refer again to the standard
account by Raz and others saying that the comparative predicates ‘better than’,
‘worse than’ and ‘equally good’ remain out of business here since we do compare
A and Z to refute the latter. But why not A and B or C? One answer is that we are
dealing here with what Raz called ‘constitutive incomparability’, i.e. it is, then,
an intrinsic element of A, B, C … not to be compared in the case of really valuing
A, B, C. His own example is, as seen above, money versus friendship—but there,
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we can compare in giving (usually) the privilege to friendship. However, what to
do confronted by A, B, and C … is not that clear.36 Another way of explaining the
difficulty at hand is to refer to the complex situation consisting of the mixture of
quantitative and qualitative elements aswell as divergent values thatmay come into
the picture in evaluating the scenarios in question. By values (in a broad sense), I
have in mind problems such as whether the notion to benefit a person by causing
his/her existence, as Parfit holds (see 394 i.a.), has any sense. The way we answer
that question influences our willingness to compare A and B (amounting to prefer
B).
I stop here for a moment. For sure, there is more to be said concerning the phe-
nomenology of these cases and our hesitation against a straightforward meeting
these problems. However, one lesson that can be learnt from this here could be the
direction in which we should go: the problems of comparability may be based on
different kinds of indeterminacies effecting the elements constituting the compar-
ison, i.e. the relata as well as the covering value by which these relata are set into a
relation. We will come back to this in section 7.4. and 7.5.
3. Parity—Instead of incomparability?
A good deal of the debate concerning incomparability is, however, not dedicated to
this notion itself, but to refuting the trichotomy thesis. Hence, it would be wrong to
claim that comparing A and Bmeans that one of them is better or both are equally
good—since there is, it is argued, a forth logical relation possible that is called
by the main proponent of this move, Ruth Chang, ‘being on a par’ or ‘parity’.37
This has obvious implications for the scope of incomparability, but it is not clear
what exactly is meant to be achieved if the idea of parity could be established in
the first place: sometimes it seems to entail the stronger claim according to which
there is no room anymore for incomparability (of different values) by explaining
these instances away in referring to parity;38 sometimes, however, Chang is not
attempting to replace incomparability but to reduce its scope, by correcting false
characterisations of cases as allegedly being incomparable in describing these cases
as being on a par.39
But what exactly is parity? Chang uses a particular kind of arrangement to sub-
stantialize this somehow vague or surprising notion by attacking the trichotomy
thesis and the standard view based on it. I quote the relevant passage at some
length:
36 See also Lukes, Comparing the Incomparable, 184-195, 188 and 195.
37 Esp. in her influential paper “The Possibility of Parity”, and one might take that to be the
starting point of trying to establish further logical relations beyond the classical trichotomy
plus parity.
38 Cf. Chang,Making Comparisons Count, xix.
39 Cf. Chang, The Possibility of Parity, 662.
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“[T]ake an arbitrary pair (X, Y ) of evaluatively diverse items. For at least some (X,
Y ) we can create a continuum of X-items by successively adding or subtracting
dollars (or pleasurable tingles, etc.) fromX. If we add enough dollars, we get an X-
item, X+, that is better than Y, and if we subtract enough dollars, we get an X-item,
X-, that is worse than Y. Now according to our abstract intuition, adding a dollar,
pleasurable tingle, and so forth cannot make a difference to whether one item is
better or worse than another item evaluatively very different from it. Therefore,
there must be some X-item, X*, in the continuum between X- and X+ that is nei-
ther better nor worse than Y. But what relation holds between X* and Y? Suppose
one of the trichotomy always holds. Then since X* is neither better nor worse than
Y, it and Ymust be equally good. According to our intuition that a dollar can’tmake
a difference, however, this is impossible. For if we add fifty cents to X*, we get an
item that is better than Y; if we take away fifty cents fromX*, we get an item that is
worse than Y. And the difference betweenX* fifty cents, which is better than Y, and
X* fifty cents, which is worse than Y, is a dollar. Thus X* and Y cannot be equally
good. Therefore, we must reject the assumption that one of the trichotomy al-
ways holds; X* is not better than Y, not worse than it, and the two are not equally
good.”40
The less abstract, but structurally parallel version of the argument uses the com-
parison between Mozart and Michelangelo in terms of creativity. What follows is
the attempt to create a reductio: suppose the trichotomy holds and both Ms are
incomparable, i.e. neither is better than the other and they are not equal either.
Now, imagine, there is a guy called Talentlessi, a very bad sculptor. Obviously,
he is far worse than Mozart in terms of creativity. Now, imagine that we succes-
sively improve Talentlessi to T+, T++, … and so on—in the end, we will have, again,
Michelangelo. However, the standard view entails also, what is called the “small
improvement argument” according to which, as we have seen in section 2., a tinily
improved element in A—given thatA andB are taken to be incomparable—does not
turn A better than B.41 Hence, if Talentlessi is worse than Michelangelo and Mozart
(and comparable with them), and if the small improvements (T+, T++, …) cannot
make a crucial difference meaning not to be able to trigger incomparability, Tal-
entlessi+++++++….. is Michelangelo and he is not comparable with Mozart without
being better or worse or equal. In other words, insofar as Mozart is comparable
with Talentlessi, he is comparable with Talentlessi+, since the difference between
T and T+ is just a small one, and such a difference cannot cause incomparability
between different items when we had before comparability. If Mozart is compa-
rable with T+, then applying the principle anew, it follows that he is comparable
40 Cf. Chang, The Possibility of Parity, 672.
41 Cf. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 328.
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with T++, and so on. Comparability with Mozart is secured through the reapplica-
tion of small differences, and hence we are lead to the conclusion that Mozart is,
finally, comparable with Michelangelo. However, Mozart is not more or less cre-
ative than Michelangelo, and nor are both equally creative. Yet it seems that they
are nevertheless comparable; thus, there is a forth relation between them.
Chang thinks that those rejecting parity are committing the same mistake as
potential dichotomists only allowing for being better or worse than; a trichotomist
has, then, to show that there is indeed a third relation, being equal; and a par-
allel discussion, Chang holds, we have between the standard view and defenders
of parity.42 Nevertheless, there is enough veil surrounding the notion of parity to
maintain doubtful. First, one might try to explain what is captured by ‘parity’ in
sticking to more common observations, such as indeterminacy and vagueness of
the relation and relata in question.43 Second, both arguments, the abstract and the
Mozart/Michelangelo-form, seem to be based just on a sorites-argument—under-
mining the transitivity of comparability through small improvements.44 And third,
one might come back to the unclarity mentioned at the beginning of discussing
parity, namely the ambivalance of adding a forth relation to comparability and the
stronger claim that parity substitutes all cases of incomparability between values.45
However, we in fact need a notion to express our comparing items under, let’s say,
fuzzy circumstances, i.e. that these items are different in kind while, nevertheless,
being compared. In the case considered, we, one might say, actually do compare
Mozart and Michelangelo. Holding that it is hard to privilege one of them in terms
of creativity is itself a comparative result.
4. Indeterminacy of the covering value
According to Raz there are two types of incomparability going back to the follow-
ing versions: number one is the position Raz himself was concerned with, namely
meaning by ‘being incomparable’ that, as we have seen, all three traditional compar-
ative predicates fail; number two is the alternative that John Broome, in criticizing
Raz, was focussed on saying that it is neither true nor false that the traditional
42 Cf. Ruth Chang, Parity, Imprecise Comparability, and the Repugnant Conclusion, in: Theoria
82 (2016), 182-215, see 193.
43 For this option see Joshua Gert, Value and Parity, in: Ethics 114 (3/2004), 492-510; a counter-
defence of parity is to be found here: Mozaffar Qizilbash, The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity
and Vagueness, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1/2007), 129-151.
44 Chang has tried to dispel the sorites appearance, but not in a convincing manner; see her
The Possibility of Parity, 673 and 680; cf. also Erik Carlson, Parity Demystified, in: Theoria 76
(2010), 119-128.
45 For a general critique of (the possibility of) parity see RyanWasserman, Indeterminacy, Igno-
rance and the Possibility of Parity, in: Philosophical Perspectives 18 ‘Ethics’ (2004), 391-403.
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predicates apply. This second version puts the stress on the indeterminacy that is
based on different candidates causing the vague character in question.46
This vagueness concerns either the covering value of the comparison or the ele-
ments that are compared in regard to that value. Let’s begin with the first problem
and take the example of baldness.47 This predicate belongs to the non-gradable
ones, denoting properties that do not possess certain degrees. Hence, we are often
dealing here with borderline cases in, again, two forms: whether a person A falls
under the extension of ‘baldness’ and whether it is possible to decide whether A or
B is balder. Ghandi and Churchhill serve here as the prominent example. Who is
balder? First of all, that might be a case of trivial vagueness that is accompanied by
further circumstances typical for indeterminacy: tolerance meaning here that you
could add or substract hairs from Churchhill without solving the question of who
is balder; but also the sorites-danger we have encountered already that it leads to
a paradox in applying that move too often.48 Since Gandhi and Churchhill belong
in terms of their hair to a particular range of applying the vague predicate ‘being
bald’, it is, as Broome holds,49 true that it is neither true nor false to state that one
of them is balder than the other or that they are equally hairy.
To deepen that case a bit it might be helpful to recognize some differences in
our predicates here. First, it is obvious that, for incomparability,we need predicates
denoting non-countable elements; second, amoung these vague predicates (such as
‘tall’), some have sharp comparatives (such as ‘taller’ contrary to ‘bald’ and ‘balder
than’);50 third, one might analyse a predicate by referring to its properties on which
that predicate supervenes: for instance, one could hold that baldness is analysable
by the amount of hairs, their distribution, their thickness. Now, these sub-features
do not suffer from nonquantifiability, because amount and thickness are measur-
able, and the distribution is determined insofar one stipulates a particular cluster.
However, measurement on the sub-level (amount of hair, distribution, thickness)
does not bring about a measurement on the supervening level (baldness). And that
move of having sub-layers is repeatable, of course.
Therefore, one might say that it is indeterminable whether Gandhi or Church-
hill is balder. And this truly frustrating result might go back to two sources involved
here: that being bald(er) is in this case a borderline application challenging a pre-
cise comparative result including equality; and that we have, on the sub-lever, a
46 Hence, I do not distinguish further between ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘vagueness’.
47 See also Cristian Constantinescu, Vague Comparisons, in: Ratio 29 (4/2016), 357-377, see 359.
48 If one hair does not make the difference, and if you repeat the substraction, you end up with
the contradictive result that a completely bald guy has fine hair.
49 See John Broome, Is incommensurability vagueness?, in: Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurabil-
ity, incomparability, and practical reasoning, Cambridge/London 1997, 67-89.
50 Cf. again Constantinescu, Vague Comparisons, 365.
106 Hartmut von Sass
multidimensionality of different regards that entail precise comparatives while it
still is not determinate how exactly to combine them.
Thus, the indeterminacy of the covering value challenging incomparability
amounts to sub-cases: indeterminacy caused by the vague applicability of the
predicate and the indeterminacy caused by the different regards of comparing A
and B without knowing how to come to a comparative result between A and B in
terms of a supervening regard. However, in both cases we can and we do compare,
often enough by stipulation, by making the regard more concrete, by defining the
relation between the sub-level and the covering value. If it is, then, still difficult
to say who’s balder—Gandhi or Churchhill—we might hold that they are, in this
respect, fuzzily equal.
5. Indeterminacy of (the meaning of) comparatives
Apart from the indeterminacy of the comparative regard there is also indeter-
minacy possible—and widespread—concerning the items to be compared. Here,
again, we have to distinguish two forms, one having to do with the application of a
predicate, another one with its meaning, hence, a practical and a semantic version.
A somewhat weird but illustrative example for the first form is given in the
following scenario:
“Suppose Ayemeasures 180 cmwith themole and 179.5 cmwithout it. Exactly how
tall is Aye? This may be vague—the sentence ‘Aye is exactly 180 cm tall’ seems in-
determinate. But the vagueness at play is not predicate vagueness: expressions of
the form ‘exactly x cm tall’ are paradigmatic examples of sharp predicates. Rather,
the vagueness seems to reside in the name.”51
So, the predicate ‚tall’ might itself be vague while its comparative form ‘taller than’
is not at all. Nevertheless, comparability is only possible by stipulation to solve the
indeterminacy here. But speaking of incomparability in these rather simple cases
might resemble a stipulative act as well.
A bit more sophisticated is the semantic form. Take, for instance, the predicate
‘virtuous’ and compare two people in this regard. Obviously, ‘virtuous’ is a vague
predicate, and—contrary to ‘tall’ and ‘taller thwitan’—‘being more virtuous’ retains
that vagueness. What precisely is meant here? Consider the following scenario: we
attempt to determine whether A or B is more virtuous. There are different dimen-
sions that are relevant to our comparingA and B; think of the classical list of virtues
such as justice, prudence,modesty, truthfullness, but also love and hope.Now,what
about the cardinal virtue that is missing in this list: faith. Even among theologians
it is highly debated whether we should include fides here, not to speak of the com-
51 Cf. Constantinescu, Vague Comparisons, 363.
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munity beyond dogmatic circles. Now, how to pursue with our comparing A and B
in terms of their virtuousness?
One answer might be, again the reference to stipulation: if A is a true be-
liever and if we include faith to the list, A is more virtuous—if all other things
are same—than B; if we don’t include faith as a virtue A and B are equally good. In
total, Amight be seen virtuously at least as good as B.
However, there are still two problematic aspects. First, it is assumed here that
all this is a matter of plain addition without implicitely allowing for a holistic ver-
sion of being virtuous, meaning that the virtues may inform each other possitively
of negatively. Hence, enjoying an additional virtue (such as faith) does not auto-
matically mean to be ‘more’ virtuous. Second, assume that we speak only of intel-
lectual or epistemic virtues such as wisdom, understanding, creativity, or curiosity,
among many others.52 So, here again, it is impossible to put them on a scale and it
is equally difficult, then, to come up with a all-encompassing result. Both problems
could, of course, appear in a combined fashion.
Could we speak of incomparability here? We do not have to.53 Not being able
to state who is more virtuous is, again, itself a comparative result without having
a scale. And it is not really clear what it should mean that A and B are not com-
parable given that we have a tertium and that A and B fall under the extension of
that respect. What I want to suggest here is that incomparability—in a structural
sense—is an empty concept denoting something incomprehensible.
Near the end
I distinguished two forms of incomparability, a performative (or normative) and
a structural one. Performative incomparability presupposes the structural version:
here, we can compare, but are asked or even morally forced to suspend the struc-
turally possible comparison. I do think that performative incomparability is indeed
an important institution within our private life as well as in the social and polit-
ical discourse. Things are different with structural incomparability I focussed on
here, i.e. the structurally impossible act of comparing items. I have tried to argue
that either theses alledged cases of incomparability are, correctly conceived, cases
of noncomparability or they fall under the category of being fuzzily equal, an equality
without scalability, but within the realm of comparability. This either/or leads to
the suggestion that there is no such thing as structural incomparability.
52 Some even think of comparability to be a virtue; see Jonathan Culler, Comparability, in:World
Literature Today 69 (2/1995), 268-270, see 270.
53 See also Ronald de Sousa, The Good and the True, in:Mind 83 (1974), 534-551, see 545.
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Odysseus, Blackbirds, and Rain Barrels
Literature as a Comparative Practice
Walter Erhart
Abstract
Instead of asking the well-known question, if and how literary works can be compared with
each other, the paper asks if literature and poetry themselves can be seen as comparative
practices. Starting with Paul Ricœur’s assumption about the ‘semantic innovation’ through
narrative and metaphor, the paper explores literary practices of comparing through two case
studies: the reception of the literary figure of Odysseus in world literature and the function of
metaphors in modernist poetry. While the comparing of literary figures as re-deployed and
re-contextualized in succeeding literary adaptations can be analyzed as a key to the dynamics
of world literature in general, metaphors and similes constitute the power of poetry to disclose
relations that have not been there before.
The first part of the paper studies comparative techniques in Homer’s “Odyssey” and
the transformations of its hero, and its narrative from Vergil and Dante up to Adorno and
Horkheimer’s “Dialectic of the Enlightenment” (and Stanley Kubrick’s “2001—A Space
Odyssey”). The second part looks at the American modernist poet Wallace Stevens (“Thirteen
Ways to Look at a Blackbird”) and his famous poem’s echo in the work of the German author
Jan Wagner (“Regentonnenvariationen”). While Stevens’ metaphors demonstrate the perfor-
mative power of language by obliterating a tertium compatationis, Wagner’s metaphors and
similes melt the semantics of nature and culture in order to create an unprecedented post-
materialist world-view of the 21st century.
 
The case of literary studies: For and against comparisons
In literary studies, comparisons are everywhere. Even the title of this chapter may
stimulate the reader’s imagination and draw scholars into a well-trained compara-
tive habit: What is the tertium commune of these three terms: Odysseus, blackbirds,
and rain barrels? There are obvious differences: between a human being, animals,
and things. But there are also commonalities that link some of these items to-
gether: nature as signified by “blackbirds” and “rain,” culture and human agency as
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indicated by the hero Odysseus, and the preservation of water in rain barrels. Or
do the terms all appear in the Odyssey? Birds do; rain barrels, probably not.
An example such as this resonates with a famous article by Stanley Fish, “How
to recognize a poem when you see one,” in which Fish describes the following sit-
uation: A bunch of students, well-trained in interpreting religious poems of the
seventeenth century,enter a classroom in which the notes from a previous class are
written on the blackboard—in this case, the names of authors of linguistic text-
books one below the other: “Jacobs-Rosenbaum,” “Levin,” “Thorne,” “Hayes,” and
“Ohman.” Stanley Fish, the teacher, turned this into a philological experiment by
telling his poetry students that the words on the blackboard were a religious poem
and the students should start to interpret it. What the students actually did was to
find meanings through comparisons. The term “Rosenbaum” [rose tree], for exam-
ple, indicates a metaphorical “reference” to the Virgin Mary (“often characterized
as a rose without thorns”) and can be compared to the equally addressed “crown of
thornes.”The double name Jakob-Rosenbaummight be part of an allegory referring
to Jacob’s ladder and is followed by a comparison between “ladder” and “tree” (in
which the “fruit” signifies the product of Mary’s womb—that is, Jesus). The term
“Ohman,” through phonetic, semantic, and contextual similarities, triggers com-
parisons with the terms “omen” (as prophesy), “Oh man” (as a kind of title theme),
or “amen” (as the poem’s “proper conclusion”). The Hebrew names “Jacobs,” “Rosen-
baum,” and “Levin,” finally, can be held against the Christian names of “Thorne”
and “Hayes,” thus starting analogies and comparisons between the Old and New
Testament.1
What Stanley Fish was trying to demonstrate, of course, was that we should
not look for hidden meanings in poems, but that we create meanings and poems
by ourselves—after all, that is what reader-response theory wanted to tell us.2 Cre-
ating meaning in poetry seems to be all about comparison. Instead of training and
testing our comparative habits, however, the three items in my title indicate the
parts of a chapter aiming to tackle a rather general problem: Comparisons may be
everywhere in literary studies, but is literature a comparative practice itself?
American comparative literature scholars have recently questioned “compar-
ison” as a practice of literary studies.3 Comparing is not a neutral business: By
comparing works of literature, there is always a notion of measuring, judging, and
evaluating involved: a tertium comparationis that has already structured the field of
1 Cf. Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities, Cam-
bridge/London 1980, 322–337, see 324-325.
2 For an early example within the Anglo-American context, see Jane P. Tompkins (ed.), Reader-
Response Criticism. From Formalism to Post-Structuralism, Baltimore/London 1980.
3 Cf. Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Balti-
more 2013
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comparison; a “centrism”4 that assembles the comparata as related objects seen from
a dominant point of view. The comparing of cultures starts as a specific Western
and European enterprise.5 The term and the idea of “world literature” still holds
true to the assumption that literary works can be measured and compared from a
dominant point of view—wherever this may come from.6 We should be aware of
our prejudices while comparing, because there has always been a power structure
deciding who is able to compare, who is interested in keeping the incommensu-
rable “other” within the confines of a presupposed horizon of comparison, and who
determines the norms of comparative judgments.7
In the meantime, however, some have questioned this rather one-sided notion
of comparison by seeing comparing as an ambivalent practice that could just as well
head off in the opposite direction. Comparisons are inevitable and set off a search
for similarities and differences without knowing where this leads to.8 The practice
of comparing—like using metaphors—sets the compared objects in motion, thus
transforming the objects by constantly challenging and changing the tertium com-
mune. Therefore, you can just as well describe comparing as a way of “decentering”
because it relates objects in a quite different and often unexpected way: It may
as well be “a questioning of certainties and a suspension of security.”9 By putting
common perceptions and our ownworld in unforeseen relations; that is, by looking
at familiar settings from the outside, comparisons alter the perspectives when it
comes to seeing ourselves and the “other” (an issue on which cultural and global
comparisons, in the wake of the eighteenth century, have always performed their
most centralizing and imperializing power). If performed differently, comparisons
not only produce knowledge, they also challenge the way we see ourselves:
4 Rajagopalan Rhadakrishnan: Why Compare? In: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.),
Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013, 15–33, see 20.
5 Cf. Walter D. Mignolo, Who is Comparing What and Why?, in: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford
Friedman (eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses, Baltimore 2013, 99–119.
6 Cf. Emily Apter, Against World Literature. On the Politics of Untranslatability, London 2013;
Rajagopalan Rhadakrishnan, World Literature, by Any Other Name?, in: PMLA 131 (2016),
1396–1404; Walter Erhart, Weltliterarische Vergleichspraxis—am Beispiel des Odysseus, in:
Dieter Lamping (ed.), Vergleichende Weltliteraturen, DFG-Symposion 2018, Stuttgart 2019, 137-
155.
7 Cf. Sheldon Pollock, Comparison Without Hegemony, in: Hans Joas/Barbro Klein (eds.), The
Benefit of Broad Horizons. Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science,
Leiden/Boston 2010, 185–204; Zhang Longxi*, Comparison and Correspondence: Revisiting
an Old Idea for the Present, in: Comparative Literature Studies 53 (2016), 767–781.
8 Cf. Susan Stanford Friedman, Why not compare?, in: Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman
(eds.), Comparison: Theories,Approaches,Uses, Baltimore 2013, 34–45; Haun Saussy,AreWeCom-
paring Yet? On Standards, Justice, and Incomparability, Bielefeld 2019.
9 César Domínguez/Haun Saussy/Darío Villanueva, Introducing Comparative Literature. New
Trends and Applications, London/New York 2015, xvi.
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“Comparisons, to be educative, need to happen in a site that belongs to no one.
Comparisons should not be the vehicles of a latent calculus that has predeter-
mined who, within the comparative continuum, is more developed than whom.
Rather, they should function as precarious and exciting experiments where ev-
ery normative ‘Self’ is willing to be rendered vulnerable by the gaze of the ‘Other’
within the coordinates of a level playing field.”10
The quite controversial assessment of comparison and comparative literature—the
critique of comparison as a philological, cultural, and political measurement on the
one hand; the call for decentering, relativizing, and provincializing the “western”
perspectives via comparisons on the other—have all left the problem unresolved. As
a practice of scholars and cultural critics, it might be up to amere choice, a political
conviction, or the confines of a historical paradigm to decide which strategies or
options of comparing were picked up or should be picked up. By comparing while
studying literature, it is supposedly we who choose the method and the strategy.
The obvious two-sidedness of comparing, though, could also lead to a considera-
tion whether and how these ambivalences and tensions are part of the practice of
comparing itself.
Any comparison as a method of literary studies can be traced back to a well-
known everyday reading practice. As readers, we constantly compare different
heroes and different actions, different fictions and different reading experiences.
Moreover, reading itself might be conceptualized as a “transfer” whereby readers
always compare the fictional figures and actions with their own: a “constant
analogizing” that enables the reader “to rewrite and extend the narrative of his
own identity.”11
The literature lays it out for us—and we, as readers, start to compare not only
heroes and objects within the text but fictions with previous fictions, with our own
reading and our own experiences.That is why comparative literature studies are so
powerful and so self-evident: They double and deepen the practices of the readers
who immediately start to compare when they start to read.
As readers and scholars, we partake and we invest in the practice of comparing,
but we seldom ask whether literature itself is a comparative practice.12 Comparing
has been—at least since the eighteenth century—the declared self-evident basis of
the sciences and the humanities alike13, and it is up to a critical history of the hu-
10 Rhadakrishnan, Why Compare?, 32.
11 Winfried Fluck, Reading for Recognition, in: New Literary History 44 (2013), 45–67, see 59.
12 Cf. Ralf Schneider, Comparison, Analogy, and Knowledge in Literature: Some Basic Consider-
ations and the Case of Early Modern English Texts, in: Christoph Haase/Anne Schröder (eds.):
Analogy, Copy, and Representation. Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Bielefeld 2018, 139–156.
13 Cf. Michael Eggers, Vergleichendes Erkennen. Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte und zur Epistemologie
des Vergleichs und zur Genealogie der Komparatistik, Heidelberg 2016.
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manities within the realm of Science Studies to study when and how literary scholars
have used comparisons as scientific tools; what suppositions, interests, and con-
sequences were at stake while scholars chose and abandoned their strategies and
practices of comparing.
The recent discussions and negotiations of comparison in the field of compar-
ative literature, however, limited their scope almost exclusively to comparison as
a method and as an all- embracing tool of the humanities instead of taking dif-
ferent and often changing historical practices into account. However, if historians
and literary scholars turn their attention away from comparison as a method to
comparative practices, from comparison to comparing, they suspend their own
habitual procedures by turning their eyes to the actors who compared, the situ-
ations in which comparing took place, and the interests and strategies that were
involved.14 Comparison may have its own history in the field of comparative his-
tory and comparative literature, but it has hardly ever been studied as a historical
practice in itself. If our purpose is to study what actors did when they compared,
we immediately face serious—and quite familiar—problems in literary studies. If
not the scholars themselves, who is comparing in literature: the author, the narra-
tor, the hero, or the reader? Literary communication partakes in ordinary language
and everyday communication, but usually there is no author being held responsi-
ble for her or his words and actions. Narrators compare, literary figures sometimes
compare—but does literature itself compare? I want to suggest that we at least try
to approach this question by taking up Rita Felski’s recent proposal to treat lit-
erature—with the help of Bruno Latour—as an agency, to treat literary works as
actors who communicate and act across time and space.15 How does literature do
this? What does literature do when it compares?
From early on, since Aristotle at least, literary critics have trusted in the com-
parative power of the arts. When Aristotle, in the famous ninth chapter of his Po-
etics, declares that poetry and the epos are more philosophical than history because
what is at stake in the mimesis of literature is the “general” instead of the “particu-
lar,”16 comparison lies close at hand.The “general” that a literary hero embodies and
that can be observed in his actions—Achilles’ anger for example—is a kind of ter-
tium commune that enables readers to measure and judge particular and contingent
traits, patterns, and practices of human beings.
Within quite another historical context rooted in analytical philosophy and
Gestaltpsychologie, I. A. Richards connected his Principles of Literary Criticism in the
14 Cf. Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), DieWelt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frank-
furt a. M./New York 2015.
15 Cf. Rita Felski, Latour und Literary Studies, in: PMLA 130 (2015), 737–742.; Rita Felski, Com-
parison and Translation. A Perspective from Actor-Network-Theory, in: Comparative Literature
Studies 53 (2016), 747–765.
16 Aristotle, Poetics, 1451b.
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1920s with the belief that literature and the arts—as a “storehouse of recorded val-
ues”—contain an internal mechanism to open up our capacities for experiencing
and recognizing values via comparing: “For without the assistance of the arts we
could compare very few of our experiences, and without such comparison we could
hardly hope to agree as towhich are to be preferred.”17 Quite explicitly, for Richards,
the act of comparing is not rendered to the readers but to literature itself, to the
works and the poets, a “body of evidence” and a “vehicle of communication” that
contains and guides the comparisons.18
Paul Ricœur has considered literature’s function as a capacity for “semantic in-
novation,” a new perception and description of reality altogether: “the power of the
metaphorical utterance to redescribe a reality inaccessible to direct description.”19
Ricœur identifies two literary forms of semantic innovation: fabula, narrative and
mimesis on the one side, metaphor and metaphorical invention on the other. I
want to argue that in both cases, comparison plays a crucial role; that comparing
is, indeed, responsible for the semantic innovation that takes place in and through
literature. In what follows, I shall try to give a short outline of different comparative
practices that literature may be able to perform—from inner-textual comparisons
to the circulation of literary forms, figures, and themes. Following Ricœur’s distinc-
tion, I focus on comparing as a feature of narratives in the first part (Odysseus),
then move on to the question of metaphors (such as “birds”) by discussing poems
by Wallace Stevens (“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird”) and Jan Wagner
(“Regentonnenvariationen”).
Suffering and success: Comparing Odysseus
In narrative mimesis, comparative acts are supposedly organized around actions
and heroes, and for specific reasons, I would like to turn to the archetype of a hero,
to Ulysses. As Odysseus, as Ulysses, in many languages and national literatures, he
became a literary figure for centuries through both time and space. Comparison—I
would say—plays a crucial role in answering a question that Hans Blumenberg once
asked in his work on the continuity of mythic constellations:What makes Odysseus
“a figure of mythical quality”?20Where Blumenberg spoke of the “significance” (“Be-
deutsamkeit”) of mythical themes and figures as a proof for their lasting existence
through adaptations and variations, Haun Saussy recently described the compara-
tive practice of world literature as an “atlas of migrating themes”21 that—similar to
17 I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, New York 1925, 32.
18 Richards, Principles, 32.
19 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative. 3 vols., vol. I, Chicago 1990, XI.
20 [My translation]. Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit amMythos, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, 86.
21 Domínguez/Saussy/Villanueva, Introducing Comparative Literature, 66.
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Ricœur’s metaphorical power—invent and redescribe ways of being in the world:
“They could be proofs-of-concept in the exploration of new ways of being human
[…] useful precedents for reiteration—a formula that would apply as well to the
poetic forms transiting across borders of language and costum.”22
The Odyssey offers a variety of comparisons right from the start, as early as
in the first canto, when Zeus responds to Athene: “How for all this could I forget
godlike Odysseus, the man who is beyond all other mortal men in power of mind,
and beyond all others has offered sacrifices to the immortal gods who hold the wide
heaven?” (I, 65–68).23
The “godlike Odysseus” is the common translation of “theioio” (ϑείοιο). Being
compared to the gods in this way is a quite common Homeric expression form-
ing a whole set of epitheta: theioio (ϑείοιο), dios (δἰος), theoeidés (ϑεοειδής), and theo
enalichios (ϑεῷ ἐναλίγκιος). These reappearing expressions are so-called formulaic
compositions; the epithet “god-like” (δἰος) in the Odyssey—as has been observed
(and counted)—is attributed to thirty-two different heroes.24 These formulas are
not specific to this particular epos, but deeply embedded in its overall cultural con-
text: the relation of humans to gods.
The god-like character of Greek heroes is an inner-textual comparison. What
the speech of Zeus also compares, within the literary work itself, is Odysseus as the
wisest man, “beyond all other mortal men in power of mind,” with the most sacri-
fices, the most obligations in dealing with the gods. In this respect, he is compared
to all other heroes and figures who have sacrificed (that is the similarity) but not
as much as Odysseus (that is the difference). Sacrifices point to the circumstances
of the hero’s sufferings that, later on in the Odyssey, are repeated over and over
again. Take the words of Menelaos in the fourth canto: “because no man among
the Achaians labored harder or took more on himself than Odysseus” (IV, 106).
Odysseus is beyond others but, at the same time, through comparing, a com-
mon ground, a tertium comparationis, is involved in which heroes might be similar
but also different. “Power of mind” and “sufferings” as well as the dependency on
gods documented by sacrifices are tertia comparationis that produce and enable com-
parisons between heroes (and readers).
Within the Odyssey, the point of comparison is coined by the epithets that
lay at the source of the “mythical quality” of the Odysseus figure: the god-like
endurer (polytlas dios, πολύτλας δῖος); the much-wandering, much-turned, wily,
and crafty hero (polytropos, πολύτροπος); the skilled, ingenious Odysseus (polymetis,
22 Domínguez/Saussy/Villanueva, Introducing Comparative Literature, 66.
23 The translation of the Odyssey is by Martin Hammond in: Homer, The Odyssey. Translated by
Martin Hammond. With an Introduction by Jasper Griffin, London et al. 2000.
24 Matthew Clark, Formulas, metre and type-scenes, in: Robert Fowler (ed.), The Cambridge Com-
panion to Homer, Cambridge 2004, 117–138, see 128.
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πολύμητις); and the talented and experienced sailor (polymechanos, πολυμήχανος).
The hero Odysseus became a literary figure beyond the Odyssey through these at-
tributes and qualities. He becomes a figure of suffering and of ingenuity by being
compared to all other heroes, and he is transferred from the Odyssey to other texts
and historical contexts now putting forward comparisons between the “old” and
the “new” Odysseus.
Variations of themes and figures in world literature constitute a practice of
comparing not by mere transfer or “adaptability”25 of famous literary characters,
but by a comparative action that puts the traditional figure in relation to the newly
invented figure through an established tertium comparationis that sorts out similar-
ities and differences. Virgil’s The Aeneid starts with a hero who is thrown across
land and sea by a god’s rage—a much-turned man who suffers and endures like
Odysseus, the over-all exemplum that is clearly implied in the opening of the Ro-
man epos: “multum ille et terris iactatus et alto / vi superum, saevae memorem Iunonis obi
ram” (I, 3f.).
There are obvious similarities with the Greek hero—and an important differ-
encementioned right at the beginning: Odysseus, in the end, comes home,whereas
Aeneas founds a city. And the comparison goes even further by establishing the
translation of myths to the Roman epos: Odysseus is turned into the “horrible
Ulysses” [dirus Ulixes] (II, 261, 762) and (in the rhetoric of a Rutulian Latin prince)
into the master of deceptive speech, “fandi fictor Ulixes” (IX, 602) who is held up
against the straightforward virtuous founder of the Roman capital and Roman em-
pire. While Aeneas’ narrative and his travels are closely linked—as similar as the
Roman epos itself—to the Odyssey, Ulysses, here, is different according to a newly
established (or foregrounded) tertium comparationis based on warfare and related
Roman virtues.
My case in point here is that the variations of figures and characters in world
literature, their mythical qualities, are triggered by the dynamics of comparative
practices. The Odyssey becomes a pre-text when its actions and characters, already
borne out by comparative practices, appear in a new context, a post-text or—ac-
cording to Genette’s terminology—in a “hypertext”26 in which similarities and dif-
ferences are worked out through a common framework, be it the theme of suffering
or ingenuity or the narrative structure that the two texts have in common: suffer-
ings with a happy ending,man fighting against natural powers, culture conquering
the “other,” homecoming.
In Dante’s Inferno in the Divina Commedia, Odysseus does not come home and
does not found a city but—in the famous scene of the twenty-sixth canto—encour-
25 William B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme. A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero, Oxford
1968.
26 Gerard Genette, Palimpseste. Die Literatur auf zweiter Stufe, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, 9–18.
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ages his companions to sail outside of civilization to the open West and faraway
lands where they are shipwrecked and swallowed by the sea. Sufferings lead to
different narratives but what is at stake here, again, is the comparison of Dante’s
Ulysses to his ancient counterpart. Sufferings, ingenuity, the cunning art of lying
and doing fraudulent tricks, endurance, or navigating power are common grounds
for the variations of the literary figure Odysseus. They are turned into narratives,
though, in which new meanings, new circumstances, new contexts are ascribed to
the hero’s suffering, his ingenuity, and his homecoming. With Dante, for exam-
ple, Ulysses is suffering as a result of his ingenuity (and his burning restlessness:
“l’ardore”),27 he is a sinner punished for his superbia but he is also offering a new
experience of exploring the world. Up until today, Dante’s Ulysses is a much-dis-
puted ambivalent counter-hero: a Christian exemplum of deadly pride and a self-
portrait of the author who is travelling through hell and paradise.28
Adaptations of literary figures display the main dynamics of comparative
practices: They decontextualize one element, one comparatum (here: the figure of
Odysseus), and start to recontextualize it in a new environment, a new fictional
setting that redescribes the themes of the Odyssey. Adaptations, allusions, and
citations are not restricted to fiction, of course; but they reveal one of the powers
of literary narratives: redescribing our experience through comparative practices.
Fables, fictions, and narratives, for Paul Ricœur, are “privileged means whereby
we reconfigure our confused, unformed and at the limit mute experience.”29
Comparative practices: Experiencing modernity with Odysseus
The tertia comparationis that connect the traveling and migration of literary figures
and themes are not fixed; they rather establish mobile points of reference that be-
come loaded with new meanings and experiences. In the twentieth century, the
narratives of the Odyssey and the figure of Odysseus gain their significance out of
a tertium commune that gives meaning to wanderings, exiles, and homecomings.30
27 […] né dolcezza di figlio, né la pieta /del vecchio padre, né ‘l debito amore /lo qual dovea Penelopè far
lieta, /vincer potero dentro ame l’ardore /ch‘i ebbi a divenir delmondo esperto / […] /Noi ci allegrammo,
e tosto tornò in pianto XXVI, 94–98, 136.
28 Cf. Karl-Heinz Stierle,Das großeMeer des Sinns. Hermenautische Erkundungen inDantes “Comme-
dia”, München 2007.
29 Ricœur, Time and Narrative, XI.
30 See the various contributions of Manfred Karnick, Formen der Fremdheit und Wandlun-
gen der Odysseus-Rezeption in der frühen deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur, in: Eijiro Iwasaki
(ed.), Begegnungmit dem Fremden. Achter Internationaler Germanisten-Kongreß, vol. 9, München
1991, 422–432; Volker Riedel, Metamorphosen des Odysseus-Bildes, in: Deutschunterricht 51
(1998), 394–406; Gunter E. Grimm, Irrfahrt als Motiv im Werk deutscher Exilautoren (1933-
1950), in: Walter Erhart/Sigrid Nieberle (eds.), Odysseen 2001. Fahrten—Passagen—Wanderun-
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Redescribing reality in this way also implies a social significance and sociological
meaning of literature, because these comparisons—an odyssey, an Odysseus in a
new textual environment—also point to hitherto unseen, even unfelt experiences
of the social world: of conflicts, contradictions, inconsistencies, constraints, in-
justices, and pathologies. Therefore, to give one significant famous example, Max
Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, in their Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), do
not use the figure of Odysseus for the purpose of illustration as a simple example
of a capitalist and bourgeois type of character—a method that could easily be crit-
icized (and has been criticized) as a crude neglect of historicity. With the Odyssey
as the main narrative, an “allegory”31 (as Horkheimer and Adorno themselves call
it), The Dialectic of Enlightenment recontextualizes a literary form to convey a new
description of contemporary society.
Actually, Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s narrative puts the figure of Odysseus into
new historical contexts by a series of comparative transactions. The hero moves
through infinite but clearly geographical space; as a “trembling shipwrecked” he
nevertheless anticipates “the work of the compass” (p. 53). He triumphs over myth-
ical powers by behaving “like an actor” changing his roles and performances; he
thinks in “equivalent terms” (p. 56) like a modern business-man; and his strategies
already contain the “scheme of modern mathematics” and the philosophical tricks
of “formalism” (p. 68). He already is—like Robinson Crusoe—a “homo oeconomi-
cus” (p. 69), and he betrays the gods of nature “like the civilized traveler once has
done” with the “natives” trading “glass beads for ivory” (p. 55). Odysseus—in the
episode with the Sirens—is like a “landlord who lets others work for him” (p. 40);
he is chained and passive while listening to the sirens, motionless “like, in later
times, the concertgoers” (p. 40).
The rhetoric of comparison constantly moves the figure of Odysseus into con-
texts of modernity—from the age of discoveries to modern landlords, from robin-
sonades to businessmen and analytic philosophers, from early imperialism to bour-
geois concert halls. Horkheimer and Adorno call the Odyssey a “founding text of
European civilization” (p. 52), not because everything that is in capitalism and in
the “dialectic of enlightenment” is already to be found in Homer, but because the
ancient epos provides a formula for unforeseen adaptations and continuities made
gen, München 2003, 102–118; GünterHäntzschel, Odysseus in der deutschen Literatur vor und
nach 1945, in: Walter Erhart/Sigrid Nieberle (eds.), Odysseen 2001. Fahrten—Passagen—Wan-
derungen, München 2003, 119-131; Bernd Seidensticker, Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern. Transfor-
mationen der Odysseusgestalt in der literarischen Moderne, in: Bernd Seidensticker/Martin
Vöhler (eds.),Urgeschichten derModerne. Die Antike im20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart/Weimar 2001,
249–270.
31 Max Horkheimer/Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente,
[1947], Frankfurt a. M. 2002, 41 [in the following, page numbers are given within the text
with my translations].
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out of comparisons. To equate Odysseus and modern man, ancient Greek and cap-
italism, would be a crude sociological statement or a false historiographic argu-
ment; what makes theDialectic of Enlightenment a literary text, though, is the trans-
position of Odysseus into a new narrative containing different scenes of civiliza-
tion while embodying ethnographic encounters, economics, science, and art. Every
one of these images tells a different story, not the Odyssey again or an illustrated
Marxist world history, but new ways of experiencing modernity—“suffering” and
“ingenuity” retold.
The double aspect of the Odyssey as a suffering and a successful homecoming,
as a figuration of “suffering that leads to success”32 (Hans Blumenberg), marks
the ambiguity of the history of civilization. As a hero who finally triumphs over
mythical and natural powers but also—because of this—suffers and has to make
sacrifices, he is easily adapted to Critical Theory’s dark tales about instrumental
reason. When Homer und Odysseus describe the home of the cyclops as self-con-
tained, without work, without law, there is, in this comparative view of the epos
and modernity’s history, a “guilty plea” on behalf of “civilization” (p. 72). Odysseus’s
skills and smartness lead to rationality and power, but they also produce isolation
(for the homo oeconomicus as well as for the art connoisseur); his wanderings are
legible as an experience of suffering, endurance, and loss put forth precisely by
the domination of nature and rationality. Odysseus, after all, may be the exemplum
of a hero prone to adaptations, renewals, and these kinds of comparative prac-
tices because, in Homer as well as in European literature, he inhabits a threshold
between an old mythical and a new, self-reflexive, and restless figure: “simultane-
ously ancient and modern” already in classical times, “an ideal observation point
from which to measure the similarities and differences between the ‘alterity’ of the
past and the ‘modernity’ of the present.”33
Like numerous other literary adaptations of the Odyssey, Adorno’s and
Horkheimer’s redescriptions of modernity do not possess theoretical value or
historical truth in themselves but, as Axel Honneth has claimed, are literary
comparisons that serve to defamiliarize the everyday world, to distance the self-
evidence of our social practices, and to make us aware of something we have
not registered before.34 Horkheimer and Adorno read the Odyssey as an allegory,
a metaphora continua in rhetorical terms: They create a series of metaphors and
comparisons (with the particle “like”) to put modernity’s experience in a new light,
to let it be experienced in another way.
32 [My translation]. Blumenberg, Arbeit amMythos, 87.
33 Piero Boitani, The Shadows of Ulysses. Figures of a Myth, Oxford 1994, 2.
34 Cf. Axel Honneth, Über die Möglichkeit einer erschließenden Kritik. Die “Dialektik der Aufk-
lärung” im Horizont gegenwärtiger Debatten über Sozialkritik, in: Axel Honneth, Das Andere
der Gerechtigkeit. Aufsätze zur praktischen Philosophie, Frankfurt a. M. 2000, 70–87.
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Comparing humankind’s travels: 2001—A Space Odyssey
Following Ricœur again, we can call “metaphors” specific “local” events, whereas
narratives provide “regional’ context”35—both being part of comparative practices
that aim to alter the familiar ways of seeing and redescribing our realities.Whereas
The Dialectic of Enlightenment constructs a narrative out of “local” metaphors and
comparisons, thus performing the comparative practice of world literature’s mi-
grating forms, metaphors themselves establish a tertium comparationis that is open
for “regional” narrative space.
One of the most famous metaphors in film history also draws its energy from
the Odyssey: in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001—A Space Odyssey (1968). The film’s opening
scenes titled “Dawn of Mankind” finish on the image of an animal bone that is dis-
covered by an ape as a powerful weapon with which to kill other animals. In one
of the most spectacular cuts in film history, the bone thrown into the air turns
into a spaceship by its sheer form and movement, turning, twisting, and float-
ing through the sky. The bone and the spacecraft form two similar objects at the
beginning and the end of an Odyssey writ large in which several departures—the
hominids, humans leaving Earth for outer space, the self-reflexive computer’s arti-
ficial intelligence transcending humanity—mark the Odyssey’s new plot. After the
juxtaposition of bone and spacecraft, and a little later on when, for the first time,
human beings appear inside the spacecraft, a third comparable object comes into
sight: the floating weightless pen of Captain Dr. Floyd, a new Odysseus of course,
who is floating in outer space on a new mission.
In a quite mechanical theory of metaphor, we would look for one tertium com-
parationis that unites bone, spacecraft, and pen: be it the shape, the form, or the
floating of these objects. However, we also are drawn immediately into the dy-
namics of a comparative practice that is worked out by the metaphors and by the
film’s narrative alike.The series and variations of three comparata—bone, spaceship,
pen—form a complex net of possible narratives by metonymic and metaphorical
operations. While bone and spacecraft may easily be compared with the help of
one tertium (a tool, a weapon, a phallus), the bone, the pen, and the spacecraft also
form a story: three stages of world history (prehistory, humankind, posthuman);
three cultures (based on weapon, literacy, technology); three anthropological and
technological extensions of the human body; and three technical objects moving
away from the human body, gaining a life of their own, and floating through space
35 Paul Ricœur, Die Metapher und das Hauptproblem der Hermeneutik [1972], in: Anselm
Haverkamp (ed.), Theorie der Metapher, Darmstadt 1996, 356–375, see 373.
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by being freed from gravity and human control.36 You can see the different tertia
comparationis—world history, machines, and floating—move and change according
to the context and the narrative that the film itself provides.
Apart from an often fruitless discussion over whether metaphors are compar-
isons with abbreviations or missing links or maybe no comparisons at all,37 com-
paring is the key element and an essential dynamic operation in the practice and
rhetoric of metaphors, tropes, and similes alike. Comparative practices, therefore,
might be reintroduced in literary theory as one of the basic elements of litera-
ture. Metaphors are a central feature of ordinary language use and of concep-
tual thinking.38 What turns literature, the aesthetic use and the poetic variations
of metaphorical thinking, into a specific and productive practice is not just new
metaphors, but—as we have seen with the bone, the pen, and the spacecraft—the
possibility of moving the metaphor into new sets of relationships constructed by
fictional contexts.
With the spaceship, human civilization not only moves into foreign uncontrol-
lable territories but has lost its control: It is no longer guided by human agency and
power but by the artificial intelligence of the computer HAL. The new Odysseus
and the new Odyssey in Kubrick’s film use their metaphors—and the comparative
practice—to invert Homer’s and Adorno’s narrative. The “old” hero as an agent of
civilization is surpassed and defeated by posthuman technology; the navigating
hero who once triumphed over space becomes a rather passive object of the fi-
nal space trip that dissolves time and narrative into mythical space again.39 The
course of human civilization as a tertium comparationis of Homer’s, Adorno’s, and
Kubrick’s Odyssey is finally directed to an unforeseen future in which times and
epochs collapse and history’s teleological course is put to rest and turned into a
cyclical repetition (with an evolving, circling, and floating embryo as its very last
sign).
There is an appearance of a transcendent power, however, that virtually takes
over humankind’s agency. The bone and the spaceship in the initial scenes of
Kubrick’s film are also metaphorically related to the black monolith that, first in
the ape scenes of the Stone Age, appears out of space and seems to govern the
course of humankind by moving it to a next step. Its appearance first triggers
the “dawn of mankind” with the apes gathering around it, and, in the final scene,
36 “Gravity” as a central theme of the film is emphasized in: Jay P. Telotte, The Gravity of 2001:
A Space Odyssey, in: Robert Phillip Kolker (ed.), Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey. New
Essays, Oxford 2006, 43–53.
37 Cf. Schneider, Comparison, 142-143.
38 Cf. George Lakoff/Mark Johnson,Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 1980.
39 Cf. Hans-Thies Lehmann, Die Raumfabrik—Mythos im Kino und Kinomythos, in: Karl Heinz
Bohrer (ed.), Mythos und Moderne. Begriff und Bild einer Rekonstruktion, Frankfurt a. M. 1983,
572–609, see 594.
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the psychedelic trip of the spaceship ends in an eighteenth-century-like luxurious
chamber in which the dying old astronaut, again, reaches out his hand to the
black monolith. Compared to Homer’s Odyssey, the monolith could be seen as
a variation of Athena guiding and protecting the human heroes, whereas the
all-mighty (one-eyed) computer HAL signifies the cyclops. The astronaut David
Bowman disconnects (“blinds”) the computer, thus using his human “ingenuity” to
triumph not over natural but over posthuman (artificial) power.40
The reappearing monolith as well as the spaceship moving through sky and
universe represent powerful superhuman artifacts and formal equivalents to the
Homeric gods appearing and disappearing in the sky. After her first appearance
on earth, Athena, in Homer’s Odyssey, flies away “like a bird” (I, 320), marking a
well-known metaphorical context in the Greek epos: connecting the gods with the
power of nature. Since then, the bird, of course, is part of a metaphorical context
that links “birds” and “flying” to the semantics of freedom, from the godlike power
moving across the sky to the iconographic imagery of science fiction and Kubrick’s
SpaceOdyssey.Metaphors, however, are never limited to a fixed tertium comparationis;
the range of metaphorical comparisons may be endless in relation to the context
in which the comparative sign may be placed.
How to look at birds and rain barrels: Poetry’s comparative practice
One of the most famous poems of Modern American poetry is Wallace Stevens’
“Thirteen ways to look at a blackbird” (written around 1917).41 It is also famous
and well-studied because it is a poem about the fact that “every perception is a
metaphor.”42 The blackbird, as a sign, enfolds its metaphorical power exactly as a
poetic device to never stand still and therefore links its “freedom” to the world-
disclosing gesture of poetry itself.
“Among twenty snowy mountains, / The only moving thing / Was the eye of
a blackbird.” (p. 92). The opening chapter of thirteen stanzas marks a difference:
There are two objects, the mountains and the blackbird’s eye; one standing still,
one moving. But what is more, the “moving eye” also figures as the poetic freedom
to move the word and the sign, the perception and the imagination of a “blackbird”
into entirely different directions and contexts: “The mind seeks meaning through
40 Cf. David W. Cole, Homer’s Odyssey and Clarke’s/Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, in: Notes
on Contemporary Literature 31 (2001), 5-6. A rather forced allegorical reading of Kubrick’s 2001
in the light of Homer’s Odyssey is presented by Leonhard F. Wheat, 2001: A Triple Allegory,
Lanham 2000, 41–62.
41 Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems, New York 1990, 92–95. (In the following, the page num-
bers of the poem’s citations are given within the text).
42 Robert Rehder, The Poetry of Wallace Stevens, Basingstoke/London 1988, 59.
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discovery of resemblance, through metaphor, and each subsequent stanza offers
a metaphoric context against which the moving eye can find meaning.”43 “Thir-
teen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” is not about viewpoints but about thirteen
metaphorical and comparative transformations, “a series of examples of how the
imagination works.”44The second stanza uses another comparative context but also
performs several movements of comparing. “I was of three minds, / Like a tree /
In which there are three blackbirds.” (p. 92). The comparison, here (with the cop-
ula “like”), is between the “I” and the “tree,” but it moves on to an equation of the
“three minds” and the “three blackbirds” pointing to the plurality of the mind and
the imagination. The stanza also marks another comparison on a phonetic basis
with the rhyming assonance of the “three” and the “tree” already binding together
the images phonetically and linguistically.
As often in poetry, tertia comparationis are hard to find—but they are everywhere.
They are evoked and performed as a fluid convergence and a range of possibili-
ties that are created, continued, and acted out by the reader’s mind. The tertium
commune of the lyrical speaker with the three minds and the tree (“like a tree”) is
quite difficult to discern as being a clear case of a “bold” or “audacious” metaphor
in Harald Weinrich’s sense: with wide semantic distances and conceptual gaps.45
When—in Stevens’ case—the “three minds” and the “three blackbirds” are juxta-
posed poetically (“I was of three minds, / Like a tree / In which there are three
blackbirds”), the “tree” becomes the tertium (as does the number “three”) fusing a
sign and an image (“three blackbirds”) with a mental state (“three minds”) but leav-
ing the semantic distance as wide open as possible.
Almost every stanza of the poem tells us that seeing, perceiving, and recogniz-
ing are a comparative practice. In the thirteen sections, minipoems like Japanese
haikus, perception is moving with the verbal sign of the “blackbird.” Like a bird
rising, it is put next to a comparatum (be it mountains, the mind, a river, language,
man and woman) where it creates its own poetic space out of similarities and dif-
ferencesmixed up in imaginary landscapes or pure imaginative powers of language
and mind. “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” forms variations of—some-
times explicit—comparative acts: “I do not know which to prefer, / The beauty of
inflections / Or the beauty of innuendoes, / The blackbird whistling / Or just after.”
(p. 93). There is no end to these comparisons because—as in this case—a tertium
comparationis is clearly missing. At the same time, like many other poems of Wal-
lace Stevens, the whole poemmarks poetry as a practice that opens up comparative
space by words and by imagination.
43 Herbert J. Stern,Wallace Stevens’ Art of Uncertainty, Ann Arbor 1966, 130.
44 Ronald Sukenik,Wallace Stevens. Musing the Obscure, New York 1967, 72.
45 Harald Weinrich, Semantik der kühnen Metapher, in: Anselm Haverkamp (ed.), Theorie der
Metapher, Darmstadt 1996, 316–339.
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The works of Wallace Stevens strive to portray a world in which religion and
analogy as ways of transcending the material and human world via metaphysical
and cosmological resemblances are substituted by poetic descriptions of the world
as it is and of the way things simply are.46 This is the reason why Stevens’ poems
often refer to sights, sounds, and objects while the lyrical speaker uses the verb “to
be” as in “it was,” “I was,” “it is.”47 “The eye’s plain version” (p. 465), for example, is
the starting point of the late poem “An Ordinary Evening In New Haven” followed
by the endeavor to get hold of a poetic experience based solely on things and their
corresponding words: “The poem of pure reality, untouched / By trope or devia-
tion, straight to the word, / Straight to the transfixing object, to the object / At the
exactest point at which it is itself, / Transfixing by being purely what it is” (p. 471).
The desire to be “exact” does not exclude similes and metaphors. On the con-
trary. It is the metaphor (or the simile) in Stevens’ poetry that often turns into a
statement about things (how they supposedly really are); at the same time, it re-
veals the world’s hidden materiality or points to metonymic extensions of signs
and objects: “The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. / It was a small part of
the pantomime.” (p. 93). The simple sight and picture (a blackbird whirling in the
autumn winds) exercises its metaphoric power in the eye of the beholder who sees
and interprets it as a “part” of something else, a “pantomime” as an unfolding of
nature’s spectacle.
Therefore, in Stevens’ poetry, things, perceptions, and imaginations are inter-
twined in a process in which language unfolds its comparative power by estab-
lishing similarities between opposed independent elements, by exercising poetry’s
power to convey and to produce meaning at the same time. On the one hand, lan-
guage and words identify and signify the world; on the other hand, they constantly
move away from the signified order of things by pointing to language-related simi-
larities of signifiers (often working with the “likeness” of similes).48The “creation of
resemblance by the imagination”49 is a synonym for metaphor, Stevens concludes
in his late essay “Three Academic Pieces” (1951), a human activity and a human de-
sire that are performed in their purest form in poetry: “The study of the activity
of resemblance is an approach to the understanding of poetry. Poetry is a satisfy-
ing of the desire for resemblance. […] Its singularity is that in the act of satisfying
46 Cf. Matthew Mutter, Wallace Stevens, Analogy and Tautology: The Problem of a Secular Po-
etics, in: English Literary History 78 (2011), 741–768.
47 Cf. Beverly Maeder, Stevens and linguistic structure, in: John N. Serio (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Wallace Stevens, Cambridge 2007, 161.
48 Cf. Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, Stevens and Simile. A Theory of Language, Princeton 1986.
49 Wallace Stevens, Three Academic Pieces: I, in: Marie Borroff (ed.):Wallace Stevens. A Collection
of Critical Essays, Englewood Cliffs 1963, 24–29, see 24.
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the desire for resemblance it touches the sense of reality, it enhances the sense of
reality, heightens it, intensifies it.”50
“ThirteenWays of Looking at a Blackbird” is an early poem about the impossibil-
ity of looking at objects straightforwardly and about the impossibility of fixing and
grasping their identity and their meaning. On the other hand, this poetry opens
up the richness of creating meaning by simply putting words and perceptions to-
gether. Stevens’ poetry wants to portray the world made out of things as they are,
but exactly by looking and observing, the lyrical activity turns into a comparative
process with words, things, and meanings; it turns into a cubist-like collage that
assembles juxtapositions and combinations, thus creating unforeseen differences
and similarities.51Thepoemabout looking at a blackbird, therefore, puts literature’s
affinity to a comparative practice to the test: As a comparatum, the blackbird un-
folds images and a variety of surprising and never-ending (‘thirteen’)52 comparata,
whereas the tertium comparationis is almost hidden or “moving” away like the black-
bird itself.
Jan Wagner, the 2015 winner of one of Germany’s most prestigious literary
awards, the Georg-Büchner-Preis, has taken up Stevens’ variations about the black-
bird in the title poem of his volume Regentonnenvariationen (2014).53 It’s about look-
ing at a rain barrel, in fourteen stanzas—actually thirteen, because the first stanza
starts the whole process going:“Ich hob den Deckel / Und blickte ins riesige / Auge
der Amsel” (p. 76).
Opening the lid of a rain barrel leads to a metaphor, the “giant eye of the black-
bird”: poetry awakened by Stevens’ pre-text.54 First, it is the sheer form that triggers
themetaphorical comparison:The rim and the surface of a rain barrel are similar to
a blackbird’s eye.Themetaphor, though, is just the starting point to let the rain bar-
rel move into different metaphorical contexts marking—this time—thirteen new
and different ways of looking at a rain barrel. “Regentonnenvariationen” is a poem
about variations and, through variations and comparisons, a poem about poetry’s
affinity to comparative practices.The word “Regentonnenvariationen” is a phonetic
variation in itself—the “Tonnen” and the “variaTIONEN,” and, with each variation,
the rain barrel—like the blackbird in Stevens’ poem—turns into something else.
50 Stevens, Three Academic Pieces, 27.
51 Cf. Daniel R. Schwarz, Narrative and Representation in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, New York
1993, 38–57 (“‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’: Stevens’s Cubist Narrative”).
52 “Thirteen has long been the favorite number for anyone wishing to represent uncontainabil-
ity and irreducible plurality.” Bart Eeckhout, Stevens and philosophy, in: John N. Serio (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to Wallace Stevens, Cambridge 2007, 103–117, see 114.
53 Jan Wagner, Regentonnenvariationen, München/Berlin 2014, 76–78 (in the following, page
numbers are given within the text).
54 See Wagner’s homage to Stevens in: Jan Wagner, Die Sandale des Propheten. Beiläufige Prosa,
Berlin 2011, 113-122 („Seidenkleider aus Würmern. Über Wallace Stevens“).
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In the second stanza, the rain barrel is compared (againwith the copula “like”) to
a “Zen master”: “unterm pflaumenbaum / hinterm haus – gelassen, kühl / wie ein zenmeis-
ter.” (p. 76). There are two tertia comparationis (“gelassen” and “kühl”, “serenely” and
“cool”) that are respectively produced by the reversal of the metaphor’s elements
(the “barrel” and the “Zen master”), changing the source domain (or ‘vehicle’) and
the target domain (or ‘tenor’). The metaphorical ground of comparison between
the rain barrel and the Zen master is shifting with the concomitant metaphors: the
imaginary of the water on the one hand (“cool”), the Zen master’s attitude on the
other (“serenely”). In the third stanza, the rain barrel turns into an oven (“a sort of
oven”) in its “negative” form, one that “does not smoke” and—instead of burning
and using up wood—“swallowed the clouds”: “eine art ofen / im negativ; qualmte nicht,
/ schluckte die wolken.” (p. 76).
There are all kinds of comparative acts in this poem: similes (“als stiege durch sie
die Unterwelt herauf”), comparative likenesses (“wie ein zenmeister”, “alt wie der garten,
/ duftend wie ein waldsee”), metaphors and personifications (“bleib, sprach das Dun-
kel”), and allegories (the barrel is giggling, beaten up but not divulging: “gluckste
nur kurz auf, / trat man zornig dagegen, / aber gab nichts preis”). The charac-
teristics of the rain barrel blend objects and things with states of mind providing
strong metaphoric meanings (when, for example, the barrel is calm and immersed
in summer while angrily brimming over in an autumn storm): “einen sommer lang /
ganz versunken, dann / bei sturm, / schäumte sie über.” (p. 77).
‘Fourteen ways to look at a rain barrel’ moves the object in all kinds of directions
again, though this time not randomly as in Stevens’ case. Instead, Jan Wagner’s
poem also forms a narrative out of “local” metaphors. The rain barrel changes with
the seasons: “self-absorbed in summer,” “overfull” in autumn, and, in winter, after
moments of “brooding” (“ein grübeln, grübeln”), the inspiration comes in the form of
ice giving the barrel, once again, a twist of Zen master’s wisdom: “die erleuchtung als
scheibe von eis.”
The rain barrel, while being similar to landscapes, human emotions, teachings
of a Zen master, to cultural- symbolic forms like “pumping” organ pipes, under-
worlds (“ein barrel styx”) and mental activities, comes alive as a human being, and
as an agency: It is swallowing clouds, it is discreet but talking, it is calm and it
moves.
“Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird” by Wallace Stevens and the corre-
sponding “Regentonnenvariationen” by JanWagner highlight poetry’s power to trans-
form the world by metaphoric acts and “semantic innovation” (Paul Ricœur). At the
heart of these poetic transformations lies a comparative practice—through similes,
juxtapositions, comparisons, and metaphors—that moves the object in directions
and contexts where the borders between reality, perceptions, and imaginations as
well as between nature and humans are constantly blurred.While both poems look
at one object from many perspectives to make it signify other things, the purpose
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and function of the poems, however, and the tertia comparationis of their compar-
isons, are quite different.
Wallace Stevens’ poem is using the sign and the metaphor of the blackbird to
point to the randomness and the language-based conceptual frames of perception.
In doing this, in moving signs and imagination beyond recognition and beyond a
tertium comparationis, Stevens’ early poetry—at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury—articulates the epistemological skepticism of his age. Poetry itself tries to
give an answer to the on-going metaphysical needs in a secular time: by creating
worldviews that appear unexpectedlywithin rearranged settings of poetic forms; by
forming the connectedness of sounds, visions, and things within imaginary land-
scapes. Instead of allegorizing the blackbird (what scholars have done), instead of
decoding it as a symbol (for “death,” or “poetry,” or “life”), the poem’s blackbird
evades a common ground, and the transforming of meaning, the metaphors and
comparisons, do not lead to a fixed or unified tertium that binds the “ways of look-
ing” together.
Jan Wagner opens up a world of the twenty-first century by remodeling our
experiences with nature. The comparative practice of his “Regentonnenvariationen”
transforms a natural object into a living thing. The rain barrel, as a compositum,
connects nature (“rain”) and culture (“barrel”); it links nature’s power to human
needs while, at the same time, it opens up a third space in which humans and nat-
ural things form entities and alliances. The poem therefore points to an ecology of
attention and awareness. The rain barrel, seen from this perspective, is disclosed
as a thing and a cultural form in which human and nature’s attentiveness work and
fit together—nature being part of the human world; the human, in turn, being em-
bedded in the natural and the material world. The poem’s capacity to “materialize”
human worldliness and to animate things lies in the resemblances and the tertia
comparationis that are played out in every stanza.
The barrel in the sixth stanza, for example, is compared to an organ because
the “organ pipe” and a “downspout” are similar in form.Moreover, though, the rain
barrel becomes a silver pump organ because the “weather” is “pumped through”
like the sounds of music (and the “falling” and “pumping” action is made sensi-
ble and audible by the enjambement): “silberne orgel- / pfeife, fallrohr: dort hindurch /
pumpte das wetter.” (p. 77). Nature and culture become virtually indistinguishable by
creating a third ground of comparison in which they meet through similarity of
forms or actions. By the different ways of looking at the rain barrel, the stanzas of
the poem transform human agency and material things into a web of references
and networks that, not by chance, perform the style and rhetoric of contemporary
theories that question the anthropology of the moderns, the separation of humans
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from their material word.55 Reframing adaptations and variations in literary nar-
ratives, poetry and metaphors as powerful comparative practices opens the way to
address literature’s function as a world- disclosing activity. Literature, while do-
ing comparisons, gives existence to a context, a “tertium” that has not been there
before. At the same time, this creation reflects back on our real-life experiences,
rearranging the ways of seeing and experiencing the world as we know it.
How to do things with words and poems—Odysseus’ last journey
The poetry ofWallace Stevens deals with metaphors even in the titles of some of his
major poems. “The Motive for Metaphor” traces the origin of metaphoric thinking
back to a world that never reveals itself completely: “The obscure moon lighting
an obscure world / Of things that would never be quite expressed, / Where you
yourself were never quite yourself” (p. 288). Freed from gods and transcending
powers, the world as it is is always connecting objects through the power of words
and the activities of perception. Metaphoric thinking, therefore, is contained in
doing things with words; they create resemblances with words and imaginations
that were not there before.
In one of his late poems, “Not Ideas About The Thing But The Thing Itself,”
the scene opens with a sound that originates in nature as well as in the cognitive
and imaginative inner-side of humankind: “At the earliest ending of winter, / In
March, a scrawny cry from outside / Seemed like a sound in his mind.” (p. 534).
Only after echoing in the mind is this “scrawny cry” labeled and truly “heard” as a
“bird’s cry” and later compared to a “chorister” and being (in ametonymic as well as
a metaphoric move) “part of the colossal sun, / Surrounded by its choral rings.” (p.
534). That “cry” made up by nature and the mind’s imagination finally, in the very
last verse, is compared (again with the copula “like”) with what poetry is disclosing
after all: “Still far away. It was like / A new knowledge of reality.” (p. 534).
By wanting to get rid of a religious and cosmic analogical thinking, Stevens’
poems discover—more and more—the comparative power of words and language
to form relations, similarities, andmetaphors.Therefore, almostmysteriously, they
connect things and unknown words, human attitudes, and feelings. Pure objects,
sounds, perceptions, images, and imaginations—like the blackbird that was looked
upon in the early poem—never rest but become involved in ever more comparative
transactions of newly found similarities and differences. The “fisherman”—in the
poem “Thinking Of A Relation Between The Images Of Metaphors”—is “all / One
55 See Philippe Descola, Jenseits von Natur und Kultur, Berlin 2011; Bruno Latour, Existenzweisen.
Eine Anthropologie der Modernen, Berlin 2014.
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ear” and “all / One eye” when he hears and sees the “wood-doves,” but reality is mul-
tifolded because things get at least doubled in the eye of observer: “The fisherman
is all / One eye, in which the dove resembles a dove.” (p. 356). The resemblance of
objects in relation to their words may be deceptive as well as illuminating, because
things stay the same as they are (“In that one eye the dove / Might spring to sight
and yet remain a dove.”), but the image and the object, through seeing and hearing,
might immediately change, become different, or something else within the spec-
tator’s inner life: “The fisherman might be the single man / In whose breast, the
dove, alighting, would grow still.” (p. 357).
Like Jan Wagner today, the late Wallace Stevens uses poetic language to rep-
resent the world and imagination in its entanglement. His poems circle around
objects and landscapes while constantly using comparisons—metaphors, similes,
juxtapositions, blending nature and culture—to test and sharpen perceptions, yet,
at the same time, to transform the world throughmetaphoric acts and semantic in-
novations. In Stevens’ last years, he discovers the figure of Odysseus as an explorer
of the unknown that has not been signified yet, as a man who transforms himself
beyond recognition: “Is it Ulysses that approaches from the east, /The interminable
adventurer?” (p. 520) (“The World as Meditation”).
In a poem titled “Prologues to What Is Possible” (1954), Wallace Stevens has
added another comparative space for the reception and adaptation of the figure
of Odysseus who is clearly alluded to in the poem: “being alone in a boat at sea”
with his “rowers” (p. 516) and his “oarsmen” (p. 517), “he that stood up in the boat
leaning and looking before him” (p. 515). The poem obviously hinges on Dante’s vi-
sion of the audacious, restless and exiled sailor navigating even farer into remote
territories as another version of the polytropos (already well- represented by Alfred
Tennyson’s and Gabriele d’Annunzio’s Ulysses56) exercising modernity’s quest into
the unknown: “He belonged to the far-foreign departure of his vessel and was part
of it, / Part of the speculum of fire on its prow.” (p. 516). In Stevens’ poem, however,
the new Odysseus moves into a completely new ground of comparison and takes
on a comparatum that transforms the Odyssey into an adventure and exploration of
language. “As he traveled alone, like a man lured on by a syllable without any mean-
ing, / A syllable of which he felt, with an appointed sureness, / That it contained
the meaning into which he wanted to enter, / A meaning which, as he entered it,
would shatter the boat” (p. 516).
Steven Wallace, here, draws on the episode of the sirens, the pure sound of the
“syllables” that promises meaning that never really is captured or brought together
with the linguistic signifier of pure words. The poetic and most intrusive form
of this cleavage, again, is the metaphor, a comparative process in which meaning
56 Cf. Boitani, The Shadows of Ulysses, 97–106, 130–134.
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is created by something—a tertium—that is not there in the single syllables and
signifiers.
“The metaphor stirred his fear” (p. 516) is the opening of the second part of the
poem in which the unseen, undiscovered meaning takes on the form of Odysseus’
final destination (that never comes close to a homecoming this time). Moreover,
the hero himself is looking for his own meaning, his own self that is transformed
while being “removed from any shore, from anyman or woman, and needing none”;
he moves into the unknown of things and of himself: “The object with which he
was compared / Was beyond his recognizing. By this he knew that likeness of him
extended / Only a little way, and not beyond, unless between himself / And things
beyond resemblance there was this and that intended to be recognized” (p. 516).
The quest of this new Ulysses, painful again (“fear”), and born out of ingenuity
again, focuses on “comparing” and “recognizing” this time, on language and the self
as modes of constantly changing, unconceivable forms.The transforming power of
the Odyssey—as a trip to the unknown feature of the world (and the self)—serves
as a simile of metaphors and similes, as a constant proof that “recognizing” and
“likeness” form the exchange between humans, language, and the “things.” Stevens’
poem adds a new comparative space to the Odyssey by an epistemological journey
to the lands of metaphorical and comparative thinking: The “fear” of losing ground
matches up with “a free universe out of nothingness” and “unexpectedmagnitudes”
that are present in the poem’s final verses: “A flick which added to what was real
and its vocabulary, / The way some first thing coming into Northern trees / Adds
to them the whole vocabulary of the South, / The way the earliest single light in
the evening sky, in spring, / Creates a fresh universe out of nothingness by adding
itself, / The way a look or a touch reveals its unexpected magnitudes.” (p. 517).
“Prologues to What Is Possible” takes sailing and traveling as models and
metaphors by reframing the Odyssey as humankind’s parable for the transforma-
tive power of language and literature. By putting the comparative power of world
literature’s narrative and the poetic innovation of poems and metaphors into one
place and one poem, these “prologues” transform an origin of literature, the Greek
epos, the adventure ride and fairy tale of the Odyssey, into the starting point of
what is “possible” in language and poetry, a promising prologue to all the poetic
comparisons that are still to come.
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Where Do Rankings Come From?
A Historical-Sociological Perspective on the History
of Modern Rankings
Leopold Ringel/Tobias Werron
Abstract
Extant research tends to perceive rankings as a relatively new phenomenon. This chapter ar-
gues that rankings have a long history that we need to study if we want to explain the recent
rise and the specific roles that they play in different societal fields. We start by defining rank-
ings as modern practices of comparison that, by comparing performances quantitatively and
publicly on a continual basis, contribute to the social construction of competitive fields. We
particularly highlight what we call the performative dimension of modern rankings—that is,
the fact that they visualize the results of comparisons and publish them on a regular basis.We
use this concept as a heuristic tool to develop a sociological perspective on the historical tra-
jectories of rankings in three fields: the arts, competitive sports, and science/universities. Our
findings suggest that (1) the institutionalization of rankings can be traced back to a largely
Anglo-American context in the mid-to-late nineteenth century when modern notions of per-
formance, competition, and publicity/transparency created a favorable environment for their
production and proliferation. They also indicate that (2) variation between the fields can be
attributed to the degree to which these notions guide communication within these fields and
to the different ways in which rankings have been institutionalized.This has led to a seamless
integration in the case of sports and to constant debate and controversy in the other two fields.
Introduction: Mapping the field of ranking research
Every year, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index compares
the success of countries in their fight against corruption; every year, global univer-
sity rankings compare the best universities worldwide; week per week, the ATP or
WTA world rankings compare the best tennis players based on a continually up-
dated scoring system; Trip Advisor, by constantly keeping track of guest reviews,
creates “popularity indices” that advise us on the best hotels and restaurants when-
ever and wherever we want; and the PiPa Ranking provides “pigeon connoisseurs”
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with up-to-date information on the best racing pigeons everywhere around the
world. As these examples demonstrate, rankings have become an inseparable part
of modern life.Whether universities, athletes, artists, hospitals, businesses, hotels,
restaurants, nation states, or racing pigeons, rankings measure and publicly com-
pare the products and performances of all kinds of actors on a continual basis. The
omnipresence of rankings has not failed to attract the attention of social scientists.
These studies, however, tend to focus on the kind of rankings that have proliferated
since the 1980s. They can be divided roughly into studies on (1) the production, (2)
the effects, and (3) the discursive reception and institutionalization of rankings.
(1) Studies on the production of rankings emphasize social processes such as the
editing of data in order to regulate an organizational field,1 the legitimization of
rankings,2 the public construction of competition3 and the intricacies of visualiz-
ing comparisons4. Such studies tend to focus on the sociomateriality of rankings
and describe them as performative “devices” that not only observe but also gen-
erate fields, markets, or reputation. Yet others criticize rankings on methodolog-
ical grounds, thus suggesting the need to improve indicators and the underlying
calculative operations.5 (2) Scholars studying the effects of rankings have found that
organizations adapt their structures and routines to the measured criteria.6 Poorly
ranked organizations strive to improve their status,7 whereas those at the top try to
maintain theirs,which becomes all themore important considering that reputation
tends to be sticky.8 This is particularly the case in higher education where, accord-
1 Cf. AfshinMehrpouya/Rita Samiolo, PerformanceMeasurement in Global Governance: Rank-
ing and the Politics of Variability, in: Accounting, organizations and society 55 (2016), 12-31.
2 Cf. Garry R. Barron, The Berlin Principles on Ranking Higher Education Institutions. Limita-
tions, Legitimacy, and Value Conflict, in: Higher Education 73 (2/2017), 317-333; Miguel A. Lim,
The Building of Weak Expertise. The Work of Global University Rankers, in: Higher Education
75 (3/2018), 415-430.
3 Cf. Martin Kornberger/Chris Carter, Manufacturing Competition: How Accounting Practices
Shape Strategy Making in Cities, in: Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 23 (3/2010),
325-349.
4 Cf. Neil Pollock/Luciana D’Adderio, Give me a Two-by-two Matrix and I will Create the Mar-
ket: Rankings, Graphic visualisations and Sociomateriality, in: Accounting, Organizations and
Society 37 (8/2012), 565-586.
5 Cf. Simon Marginson, University Rankings and Social Science, in: European Journal of Edu-
cation 49 (1/2014), 45-59; Catherine O’Connell, Research Discourses Surrounding Global Uni-
versity Rankings: Exploring the Relationship with Policy and Practice Recommendations, in:
Higher Education 65 (6/2013), 709-723.
6 Cf. Wendy Nelson Espeland /Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity. How Public Measures
Recreate Social Worlds, in: American Journal of Sociology 113 (1/2007), 1-40.
7 Cf. Judith G. Kelley/Beth A. Simmons, Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in
International Relations, in: American Journal of Political Science 59 (1/2015), 55-70.
8 Cf. Majken Schultz/Jan Mouritsen/Gorm Gabrielsen, Sticky Reputation: Analyzing a Ranking
System, in: Corporate Reputation Review 4 (1/2001), 24-41.
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ing to the often-observed Matthew Effect, advantages accrue disproportionately
at the top.9 Some, however, argue that rankings do not determine organizational
behavior but allow for creative forms of “reflexive transformation”.10 Yet others em-
phasize the distress rankings cause among those who are subject to them, because
they threaten to undermine or outright reject organizational identities.11 (3) Stud-
ies on trajectories of institutionalization argue that the successful embedding of rank-
ings in fields can be explained by the efforts of powerful actors who use them as
a resource of legitimacy.12 Others apply a sociology-of-knowledge perspective to
emphasize the cultural value of rankings, particularly their aura of rationality and
modernity.13 However, statements in public discourses can range from uncritical
support to fierce critique, with the latter often evoking counterarguments by sup-
porters, thereby unintentionally contributing to the institutionalization of rank-
ings as a topic of debate and contestation.14 Comparisons of countries support
the claim that discursive processes are fundamental to understanding the varying
degrees of institutionalization, showing that public debates in the media play an
important part when it comes to defining rankings as more or less convincing and
important.15
In sum, there is a growing body of literature on rankings that has produced
rich insights. However, because this literature has limited its scope predominantly
to the last 20-30 years when the modern-day ranking frenzy seems to have started,
historical perspectives are still rare. Against this backdrop, we aim to explore rank-
ings by addressing three shortcomings of the existing research: First, the “presen-
tist” focus on recent decades tends to neglect the long-term prerequisites of the
9 Cf. Julian Hamann, The Visible Hand of Research Performance Assessment, in: Higher Educa-
tion 72 (6/2016), 761-779; Ellen Hazelkorn, Rankings and the Reshaping of Higher Education. The
Battle for World Class Excellence, Basingstoke 2011; Richard Münch, Academic Capitalism. Uni-
versities in the Global Struggle for Excellence, London 2014.
10 Neil Pollock et al., Conforming or Transforming? How Organizations Respond to Multiple
Rankings, in: Accounting, Organizations and Society 64 (2018), 55-68.
11 Cf. Kimberly D. Elsbach/Roderick M. Kramer, Members’ Responses to Organizational Identity
Threats. Encountering and Countering the BusinessWeek Rankings, in: Administrative Science
Quarterly 41 (3/1996), 442-476.
12 Cf. LindaWedlin,RankingBusiness Schools. Forming Fields, Identities andBoundaries. International
Management Education, Northampton 2006.
13 Cf. Andrea Mennicken, From Inspection to Auditing: Audit and Markets as Linked Ecologies,
in: Accounting, Organizations and Society 35 (3/2010), 334-359.
14 Cf. Jelena Brankovic/Leopold Ringel/TobiasWerron, How rankings produce competition: The
case of global university rankings, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 47 (4/2018), 270-288.
15 Cf. Ellen Gutterman, The Legitimacy of Transnational NGOs. Lessons from the Experience
of Transparency International in Germany and France, in: Review of International Studies 40
(2/2014), 391-418; Kerstin Martens/Dennis Niemann, When Do Numbers Count? The Differ-
ential Impact of the PISA Rating and Ranking on Education Policy in Germany and the US, in:
German Politics 22 (3/2013), 314-332.
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rise of rankings.We need to study these long-term factors—not only to understand
the history of rankings but also to develop a sociological explanation of their recent
proliferation that goes beyond vague references to neoliberalism or digitalization.
Second, because studies focus mostly on specific cases and fields, particularly uni-
versities, they have largely missed the opportunity to learn from comparisons of
rankings across fields. And third, the literature has largely failed to determine the
distinct characteristics of rankings as specific practices of comparison, particularly
in contrast to similar practices such as ratings or benchmarks.
Our chapter aims to address these shortcomings by developing a sociological
perspective on the origins and careers of modern rankings. We start by introduc-
ing a conceptualization that allows for a more specific characterization of rankings
as a modern practice of comparison. Specifically, we define them as social opera-
tions combining comparisons of performances, quantification, visualization, and
repeated publication, which, by integrating these elements, partake in the social
construction of competition. We particularly highlight what we call the performa-
tive dimension of rankings: the fact that they not only compare and evaluate per-
formances but also visualize the results of these comparisons and publish them
on a regular basis. This definition allows us to distinguish rankings from similar
practices while also serving as a heuristic tool for historical studies. The theoret-
ical implications for historical studies are discussed in the second section. Here,
we argue that our conceptualization draws attention to long-term prerequisites of
the institutionalization of rankings, namely to the formation of modern notions of
performance, competition, and publicity/transparency as well as to the role of the
mass media and different publics. On this basis, the third section explores his-
torical trajectories of rankings in three fields: the arts, competitive sports, and
science/universities. Based on this analysis, we argue that the sociocultural pre-
requisites of today’s rankings first came together in the mid-to-late nineteenth
to early twentieth century in the Anglo-American world when a new alignment of
notions of performance, competition, and publicity/transparency let rankings ap-
pear to contemporary observers as a useful, even necessary practice of comparison.
We also conclude that the trajectories of rankings in different fields are associated
with different discursive manifestations of these notions and with heterogeneous
audiences:Whereas in the case of sports, rankings were soon taken for granted and
integrated seamlessly into the field, in science and the arts, they became a constant
topic of controversy, institutionalizing them as a topic of conversation and object
of contention rather than as a part of the field that is simply taken for granted.
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What are rankings? Conceptual remarks16
We conceptualize rankings as social operations that partake in the construction
of public forms of competition: The Human Development Index pushes modern
nation states to be constantly striving to improve their GDP, healthcare, and edu-
cation systems, as a result of which they bolster their reputation at the expense of
other nation states; the World University Ranking by Times Higher Education puts
universities in the position of seeing other universities, anywhere in the world,
as competitors for reputation and students. We argue that modern, fully devel-
oped rankings achieve this by combining four analytically distinct operations that,
when taken together, contribute to the social construction of competitive fields.
These four operations are: (1) comparison of performances, (2) quantification, (3)
visualization, and (4) repeated—regular or periodic—publication. We summarize
the first two operations as the informative dimension of rankings; but, given the
state of research, we particularly emphasize the third and fourth operations, which
we define as the performative dimension of rankings.
(1) Sociologically speaking, the comparison of performances entails making entities
comparable along the same category, defining them as identical or similar, and si-
multaneously comparing and differentiating them according to some additional
criteria.17 For instance, different social entities are first declared similar by sub-
suming them under the same category “artist,” “university,” or “basketball player;”
and they are then evaluated and distinguished according to some criteria of perfor-
mance such as “genius,” “excellence,” or “points per game.” Studies on rankings are
often oblivious to the complexities of the social processes undergirding the produc-
tion of comparisons, because they tend to take categories for granted. They accept
the assumption that there is something like “scientific excellence” that only has to
be captured by applying “the right instruments.” In contrast, seeing rankings as
practices of comparison emphasizes that there is nothing natural about the social
act of comparing.18
16 This section is based on Brankovic/Ringel/Werron, How rankings produce competition.
Some paragraphs are identical or contain only minor changes (see also Tobias Wer-
ron/Leopold Ringel, Rankings in a comparative perspective. Conceptual remarks, in: Stephan
Lessenich (ed.),GeschlosseneGesellschaften (Verhandlungen des 38. Kongresses derDeutschen
Gesellschaft für Soziologie), Essen 2017.
17 Cf. Bettina Heintz, Numerische Differenz. Überlegungen zu einer Soziologie des (quantita-
tiven) Vergleichs, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 39 (3/2010), 162-181.
18 Cf. Angelika Epple, Doing Comparisons – Ein praxeologischer Zugang zur Geschichte der
Globalisierung/en, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), DieWelt beobachten. Praktiken des
Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 161-199; Johannes Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis.
Vorüberlegungen zu einer praxistheoretisch orientierten Untersuchung von Vergleichen, in:
Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frank-
furt a.M./NewYork 2015, 135-159;Willibald Steinmetz, Vergleich. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche
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However, we see rankings not merely as comparisons but as zero-sum compar-
isons. With “zero-sum” we wish to highlight that within a ranking, the quality as-
cribed to one entity is usually not ascribed simultaneously to another entity of the
same category.The “sum” of possibilities created by the assumption of comparabil-
ity is transformed into a dependent relationship between the compared entities.
The social production of zero sum is rarely discussed in the literature on rank-
ings—which is surprising given that, after all, many of the qualities measured by
rankings such as the genius of an artist, the development of a country, or the ex-
cellence of a university do not necessarily come at the expense of other artists,
countries, or universities. Rankings, however, seem to be able to create some kind
of zero sumness even in these cases. How do they achieve that?
(2) Zero-sum comparisons can be made on qualitative or quantitative grounds.
Qualitative comparisons are possible but potentially contentious and limited in
scope. By claiming that Juventus F.C. is the greatest football team in the world, we
would make a qualitative zero-sum comparison that implies that all other teams
are, in some sense, worse and thus cannot claim to be the greatest football team
in the world. However, there are certain limitations to such judgments, especially
when talking about a large number of entities. If we argue that actually RealMadrid
is better than Juventus F.C., the advocate of Juventus might ask us to elaborate on
how we came to such a conclusion: Do Real play more efficiently? Do they have a
more attractive style? Do they have a particularly rich tradition? The proponent of
Real Madrid might have just as many good reasons as does the champion of Ju-
ventus F.C. And things would get even more complicated in the case of multiteam
comparisons in which you would have to explain not only the hierarchy between
Real and Juventus but also the relative greatness of all other teams in the world.
In other words, qualitative zero-sum comparisons can easily lead to highly con-
tentious and potentially endless debates.
Against this backdrop, the appeal of quantification as a rhetorical means of compari-
son becomes apparent: By attaching numbers to qualities, rankers can validate their
zero-sum statements in seemingly unambiguous terms. After all, a third person
might argue that Real Madrid is not just “better” than Juventus F.C. but indeed won
the Champions League final in 2017 “four goals to one” against Juventus. From this
perspective, Real is of course “better” than Juventus by exactly three goals (at least
for the time being). Similarly, the University of Oxford gets a certain “score” on the
World University Ranking published by Times Higher Education, which suggests a
clear difference between Oxford and lower-scoring universities. At this juncture, it
is important to take notice of the communicative quality that quantification adds
Skizze, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.),DieWelt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens,
Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 85-134.
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to zero-sum statements: Whereas the literature on rankings often criticizes quan-
tification as a mode of simplification, we argue that it is precisely this “reductive”
aspect that makes rankings such a successful tool (combined with their ability to
reflect the observations and opinions of others).19 Thus, neither comparison nor
quantification as such, but the combination of both operations, explains the dis-
tinct allure of rankings.
(3) Visualization allows ranking organizations to present a “picture” of the com-
parable entities and the differences between them. Visualization does not merely
encode information, but fundamentally transforms it.20 Visualizations are part and
parcel of the seductiveness and coerciveness of rankings in that they present a clear
overview of differences in performance that are easy to understand. They provide
a visual order that affects the very way in which information is received and pro-
cessed. Visualizations thus should not just be observed with regard to how “accu-
rately” they represent information but also be taken seriously as a performative
element of rankings.
Themost common device used for this purpose is a table providing an overview
of comparable entities in a hierarchical order starting with the best performers on
the top. In all of the three fields that we analyze—the arts, sports, and science/uni-
versities—tables are the most frequent way of visualizing rankings. They usually
contain information about recent performances but can also include references to
positions in earlier tables representing the same competitive fields (E.g., Rank 3 in
2017 vs. Rank 7 in 2018), thereby allowing audiences to grasp historical trajectories
in a field immediately. Moreover, ranking tables can be made available in digital
formats allowing users of websites to create their own individual rankings. To fully
account for how rankings suggest competition, analyzing such visual presentations
is vital for an adequate understanding of their production, reception, and effects.
(4) As a social operation, rankings depend on a fourth element that has not
yet been theorized adequately in the literature: the repeated act of publication. The
continual publication of rankings—annually, monthly, weekly, daily, and even real-
time updates—creates a situation in which the ranked entities are constantly ob-
served for and presented to an audience or public whose attention and appreciation
is imagined as a scarce good for which the compared entities ought to compete.
An audience in these terms is not merely a sum of living and breathing people, but
a social construction projected in the process of publication. The effective institu-
tionalization of rankings is therefore contingent upon them being published not
19 Cf. Elena Esposito/David Stark, What’s observed in a Rating? Rankings as Orientation in the
Face of Uncertainty, in: Theory, Culture & Society 36 (4/2019), Online First.
20 Cf. Hans K. Hansen/Mikkel Flyverbom, The politics of transparency and the calibration of
knowledge in the digital age, in: Organization 22 (6/2015), 872-889.
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just once or twice but continually: This is how they suggest competition for rep-
utation, prestige, or status. Rankings thus combine two performative elements,
visualization and repeated publication, that transform quantified comparisons of
performances into a powerful publicly available tool. It is this performative dimen-
sion that also qualifies them as a particular social practice of comparison: a serial
practice of comparison with its own visuality, temporality and regularity.
This dimension of rankings is rarely discussed in research on rankings. How-
ever, it is on the performative level that modern rankings distinguish themselves
from related practices such as ratings or benchmarks.The latter contain some, but
not all, of the four elements described above. Ratings are often based on quantifi-
cations and invite users to compare performances. However, they do not visually
depict all rated actors in repeatedly published tables, and therefore, per se, do not
suggest competition between these actors. Benchmarks define a standard based on
the top result in a population of organizations, and they test the degree to which
these organizations’ performance corresponds to the said standard. By identify-
ing a number one, benchmarks aim to motivate all other organizations to catch
up. Rankings, on the other hand, produce a hierarchical order of all members of a
competitive field; any improvement of some entity is thus imagined as potentially
coming at the expense of others. For these reasons, rankings are connected more
closely to the idea of competition than are ratings and benchmarks.
Using this definition, we can identify the characteristics of contemporary rank-
ings in order to trace their historical careers in different fields.We can also use it to
trace the history of protorankings that share some, but not all, of these characteris-
tics. Taking the performative dimension into account thus helps to define rankings
as a particular social practice and to study the social prerequisites of their long-
term institutionalization.
On the history of rankings: Theoretical considerations
Based on our conceptualization, we suspect that the historical rise of rankings is
contingent on a sociocultural infrastructure rendering the regular public and quan-
titative comparison of performances plausible or even desirable.This insight draws
attention to the formation and content of modern notions of performance/achieve-
ment, competition, and publicity/transparency. According to Verheyen,21 modern
notions of performance/achievement, which define performance as something that is
achieved and can be improved constantly by individual actors, emerged in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, forming, among other things, the
21 Nina Verheyen, Die Erfindung der Leistung, München/Berlin 2018.
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ideal of a “meritocracy.” The modern notion of competition and its societal advan-
tages emerged in the mid-to-late eighteenth century based on the work of clas-
sical political economists on “free competition” (Adam Smith), and it was used to
describe and promote market competition. However, since the mid-to-late nine-
teenth century, it was also used increasingly to discuss and promote competition in
other spheres.22 Both lines of thought are closely intertwined, because competition
is often considered to be a product and a driver of performance (creativity, produc-
tivity, etc.). Ideas about performance/achievement and competition are also related
to modern concepts of publicity and transparency: Publicity, that is, the idea that the
public has a right to know about political and administrative decisions in order to
improve the conduct of those subject to norms of disclosure, became a hot topic
in the late eighteenth-century philosophical discourse, spread in the nineteenth
and twentieth century, and intensified in the 1980s. Since the 1980s, the discourse
commonly refers to “transparency”—now covering all kinds of spheres and not just
politics.23
At a general level, all three discourses entertain a mutually enhancing rela-
tionship with rankings as described above: Rankings compare performances pub-
licly on a regular basis, thereby suggesting competition to motivate the ranked enti-
ties to constantly improve their performance. However, field-specific interpretations
of these three discourses might also spur criticism of rankings, effectively block-
ing their diffusion and institutionalization. We therefore suspect that, depending
on the different meanings attributed to publicity/transparency, performance, and
competition, rankings can be expected to be more or less likely to become institu-
tionalized practices of comparison.
There is a second proposition that we can derive from our conceptualization
of rankings: By emphasizing the performative dimension of rankings, particularly
their publicity, we suggest that their success, or lack thereof, also depends on the
ways in which they address publics, and on the degree to which they succeed in
attracting attention and appreciation. The historical background for this assump-
tion is innovations in telecommunication technology during the course of the nine-
teenth century that provided the material infrastructure for the fast movement of
information on a global scale.24 These changes in the technological infrastructure
22 Cf. Tobias Werron, Why do we believe in competition? A historical-sociological view of com-
petition as an institutionalized modern imaginary, in: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 16
(2015), 186-210.
23 Cf. Leopold Ringel, Transparenz als Ideal und Organisationsproblem. Eine Studie am Beispiel der
Piratenpartei Deutschland, Wiesbaden 2017.
24 Cf. Roland Wenzlhuemer, Globalization, communication and the concept of space in global
history, in: Roland Wenzlhuemer (ed.), Global communication: Telecommunication and global
flows of information in the late 19th and early 20th century (Special Issue of Historical Social
Research, 35), 2010, 19-47.
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coincided with the emergence of a global media system that, in the years between
1860 and 1930, was based mainly on a global oligopoly of news agencies.25 This
infrastructure for global communication coupled with the professionalization of
journalism, increasing literacy rates, and the establishment of local and national
markets for print products helped to erect the modern public sphere as we know
it today: a global system for the distribution of “news” differentiated into national
publics.26
Analyzing the historical implications of mass media communication is crucial
for understanding the distinct allure of rankings. Mass media enable intermedi-
aries (journalists, critics, international organizations, etc.) and wider audiences to
observe and evaluate performances of primary actors in a field. This opens up new
possibilities for the comparison of performances and draws attention to the plu-
rality of expectations of different kinds of publics, particularly because they relate
to (assumed) differences in knowledge. High school graduates, for instance, can-
not be expected to be able to evaluate the teaching and academic skills of scholars
working at their prospective university. University rankings acknowledge this and
use it to their advantage by presenting all readers with a (seemingly) clear picture:
University A is more excellent than University B, C, or D. The same holds true for
connoisseurship in the arts. We can suspect that people who are not dedicated
aficionados of the arts are going to have a hard time comparing Monet to Picasso.
Thus,when struggling with how to invest their money, theymight consult the rank-
ingKunstkompass to identify “good bargains.” Rankings can cater to the expectations
of those nonprofessional audiences by providing short cuts. However, as soon as
they exist, they might retroact on expert discourses as well, thereby creating new
connections and relationships between expert and non-expert audiences.
Our suggestion to focus on the performative dimension of rankings draws at-
tention to the fact that addressing and imagining publics is an integral part of how
rankings operate.27 Against this background, it comes as no surprise that rankings
often seem to act as a connector between different publics—particularly expert au-
diences and mass audiences—inviting them to compare performances from their
respective vantage points. By doing so, they can also create tensions between both
audience perspectives, especially by inspiring experts to criticize the simplicity of
25 Cf. Simone M. Müller/Heidi J. S. Tworek, ‘The Telegraph and the Bank’: On the Interdepen-
dence of Global Communications and Capitalism, 1866-1914, in: Journal of Global History 10
(2/2015), 259-283, see 283.
26 Cf. John B. Thompson, The Media and Modernity. A Social Theory of the Media, Cambridge 1995.
27 Cf. Carlos Spoerhase,DasMaßder PotsdamerGarde.Die ästhetischeVorgeschichte desRank-
ings in der Europäischen Literatur- und Kunstkritik des 18. Jahrhunderts, in: Jahrbuch der
Deutschen Schillergesellschaft 58 (2014), 90-126; Carlos Spoerhase, Rankings: A Pre-History, in:
New Left Review 114 (2018), 114, 99-112; see also Brankovic/Ringel/Werron, How rankings pro-
duce competition; Werron/Ringel, Rankings in a comparative perspective.
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the rankings and confront them with their own, supposedly more complex views.
Taking publics into account is thus crucial to explain the institutionalization of
rankings in different societal fields. In the next section, we use this perspective to
explore the long-term historical trajectories of rankings in three fields: the arts,
professional sports, and science/universities.
On the institutionalization of rankings: Three historical cases
Arts, competitive sports, and science/universities: these three fields share a procliv-
ity to experiment with rankings long before the onset of the frenzy in the 1980s.The
historical trajectories of rankings, however, vary considerably from field to field:
Whereas in the case of sports, they were incorporated quite quickly and effectively,
their career in the arts and science/universities has been more complex and am-
bivalent. Studying these three fields comparatively thus might help to specify the
ways in which, and the conditions under which, rankings are likely to become insti-
tutionalized. In all cases, our conceptualization of rankings draws particular atten-
tion to (1) discourses of performance, competition, and publicity/transparency; and
(2) the roles of, and possible tensions between, expert and non-expert audiences.
From the Balance de Peintres to the Kunstkompass: The artistic field
The field in which some though not all of the characteristics of modern rankings
were first assembled may come as a surprise: Instead of athletes, governments,
or universities, those subject to table-based public comparisons of performance
were artists—painters, writers, composers, and actors.28 The takeoff point seems
to have been the publication of the Balance des Peintres by the French critic Roger de
Piles in 1708. This is a table that combines some, but not all, of the characteristics
of modern rankings. It evaluates European painters from different epochs accord-
ing to four criteria (composition, design, coloring, and expression) and on a scale
from 0-20, and it visualizes the results on a table. However, it neither calculated an
overall score nor did it bring the quantitative measurements of performances into
a hierarchical order. Instead, the order was alphabetical (see Fig. 1).
The Balance apparently struck a chord. Over the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury, various art critics and commentators from France, German-speaking coun-
tries, and Great Britain adopted its basic idea and applied it to other forms, and
28 The account of early experiments with art rankings in this section is based on Spoerhase,
Das Maß der Potsdamer Garde, to whom we are indebted for the rich variety of empirical
examples from which we draw.
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Fig. 1: Balance des Peintres (De Piles 1708, in Spoerhase, Rank-
ings: A Pre-History, 96 ).
this amounted to a vibrant international discourse on the quantitative compari-
son of artistic performances. Among those emulating de Piles were Mark Arkenside’s
Balance of Poets (1746), the anonymously published Scale to Measure the Merits of Mu-
sicians (1776), as well as the Kritische Skala der vorzüglichsten deutschen Dichter (1792)
by Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart.29 For 100 years, none of these early ex-
periments was followed by the creation of a hierarchical order based on an overall
score. It was only at the beginning of the nineteenth century that the copycat pro-
cess finally resulted in the production of the first table with overall scores and a
hierarchical order compiled by the French author Jean-Francois Sobry in 1810 (Fig.
2).30 As it turned out, Raphael, according to Sobry, was the greatest painter of all
time.
29 Mark Arkenside’s Balance of Poets (1746), Scale toMeasure theMerits ofMusicians (1776), Kritische
Skala der vorzüglichsten deutschen Dichter (1792) by Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart.
30 Jean-Francois Sobry, Poétique des arts ou cours de peinture et de littérature comparées, Paris 1810,
S. 148–169 (De la balance des peintres).
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Fig. 2: Balance des Peintres rectifiée (Sobry 1810, in Spoerhase,
Rankings: A Pre-History, 121 ).
This might have been the first proper art ranking—if it had been continued
by similar tables in the following years. However, it seems to have remained the
last one of its kind. Indeed, artists and art critics alike had grown deeply skeptical
of such types of comparisons early on. Even some of the creators such as Jean-
Francois Sobry were among the critics: “‘Let us love what is beautiful when we see
it, without bothering about weighing it. Let us repay the enthusiasm of talent with
the enthusiasm of esteem; and leave the scales to themerchants.”31 In this quote, he
clearly emphasizes the view, shared by others in the decades to come, that quanti-
tative comparisons resemble economic reasoning and are therefore alien to purist
ideals of aesthetic-artistic excellence. We might speculate that rankings and other
forms of quantification carry a level of specificity of judgment that is at odds with
the somewhat ambiguous understanding of genius in the emerging artistic field
in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, as Bourdieu (1994) elaborates, the rules of
art, institutionalized in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, prescribe the produc-
tion of artworks for their own sake and not for fame or money.32 Competition for
reputation, as suggested by the rankings, might give rise to “wrong” motives that
taint the ideal of l’art pour l’art.
31 Sobry 1810, in Spoerhase, Rankings: A Pre-History, 111.
32 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field, Cambridge, Eng-
land 1994.
150 Leopold Ringel/Tobias Werron
Another distinguishing characteristic of these early experiments can be found
in the writings of the aforementioned Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart: “It is
indeed hard to measure spirit and intellect like body height. It still has its value,
though: The dwarf sees more clearly that he is indeed a dwarf if he compares him-
self with the Potsdam guard (our translation)”.33 In applying the metaphor of body
height, Schubart rejects the idea of artists striving to improve their performances
on the grounds of comparisons with other artists. A dwarf evidently will always be
a dwarf because he cannot change his body size. Contemporary rankings, as in the
section defined above, build on the opposite idea—that is, the possibility of move-
ment between positions and the notion that everyone can, and should, constantly
improve her or his performance. Indeed, most contemporary rankings would not
make much sense if scores were final and set in stone. Against this backdrop, it
seems as if early experiments with the quantification of artistic performances in
the eighteenth to early nineteenth century focused on evaluating the history of art
genres rather than suggesting the production of competition. According to our con-
ceptualization, they should therefore be designated as protorankings, rather than
as rankings in the contemporary sense.
In the decades following the publication of Sobry’s ranking, art critics and ex-
perts confirmed the critical rejection of any kind of quantitative judgment of artis-
tic performance. In 1866, Carl Justi describes quantitative evaluations as “formu-
las which attribute numbers to creative minds just like students receive grades”;
Clement de Ries, in 1882, calls them “foolish” and “absurd.” Others even seemed to
fail to get the purpose of creating rank-ordered tables: Richard M. Meyer, refer-
ring to Schubart’s table, thinks of them as “strange” (1911); Sigmund von Lempicki
deems them “odd” (1920).34 Conspicuously, the demise of these early experiments
with the quantitative evaluation of art performances coincided with the profes-
sionalization of art criticism, which suggests a successful monopolization of the
authority to evaluate artistic performance by a professional group of intellectual
“gatekeepers”.35
Quantitative evaluations of artistic performances remained scarce thereafter.
The situation, however, changed in the second half of the 20th century with an in-
flux of new quantified evaluations in the arts.36 The most visible of those forms
did not seem to evaluate artistic performance as such but instead the market value
and/or reputation of artists. In other words, in contrast to the protorankings of the
eighteenth century, they do not claim to be able to quantify aesthetic comparisons.The
33 Schubart, Kritische Skala, in Spoerhase, Rankings: A Pre-History, 123.
34 All quotes are retrieved from Spoerhase, Das Maß der Potsdamer Garde, 93–95, and trans-
lated by the authors.
35 Howard S. Becker, Art Worlds, Berkeley 2008.
36 Larissa Buchholz, What is a global field? Theorizing fields beyond the nation-state, in: Julian
Go/Monika Krause (eds.), Fielding Transnationalism, London 2016, 31-60.
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best explanation for their emergence and spread since the 1970s might be that the
idea of making the market value and reputation of artists transparent has become
more legitimate37 without directly conflicting with the established view that artistic
performance cannot be quantified. Whereas the determination and knowledge of
prices had been amatter of private trading networks and/or auctions for centuries,
rankings were viewed as instruments with which to unveil the opaque dynamics of
the art world—particularly for potential investors who lack the necessary knowl-
edge and expertise to make informed buying decisions.38 Rankers often make this
expansion of scope in terms of audience outreach explicit, for instance in state-
ments such as the following, retrieved from the homepage of the TOP 100 Artist
Ranking:
“The Artist Ranking Tool cannot judge the work of a specific artist, it works by or-
dering artists according to the professional attention that is invested in them. It pro-
vides the wider audience with a feeling for the standing of a particular artist in the eyes
of the professionals but is not reflective of the artist’s actual economic success. Art-
Facts.Net™ acknowledges that there might be a correlation between fame and
money but this is not the method of calculation behind the Artist Ranking tool.”
[emphasis added].39
By focusing on indicators such as prices, exhibitions in renowned galleries, or fea-
tures in magazines, current rankings steer attention to a very specific set of indi-
cators. These indicators relate at best indirectly to artistic performances, but allow
for the depiction of movement within a competitive field and thus spark intense
discussion between experts as well as in broader audiences. In many cases, those
concerned try to delegitimize their opponents often by using vitriolic language.40
To put it in Bourdieusian terms,market-oriented rankings in the artistic field spark
controversy at both the autonomous and the heterogeneous pole of the field. As
a result, rankings inspire discussions as to whether such comparisons of perfor-
37 Cf. StefanWilbers, Grenzarbeit im Kunstbetrieb. Zur Institutionalisierung des Rankings Kun-
stkompass, in: Leopold Ringel/TobiasWerron (eds.),Rankings–Soziologische Fallstudien,Wies-
baden 2019, 57-87.
38 Cf. Paul Buckermann, Back from Business. On Commensuration, Construction, and Commu-
nication of a Global Art World in the Ranking Kunstkompass, in: Kapsula 1 (3/2016), 12-18.
39 Artfacts, 2018, in: the homepage of the TOP 100 Artist Ranking, URL: https://www.art-
facts.net/tour/artist-ranking. The quote has been retrieved in 2018 and is not available any
more. However, since it sums up very poignantly the ways in which rankings position them-
selves in the artistic field, we decided to keep it.
40 Cf. Olav Velthuis, ArtRank and the Flippers: Apocalypse now?, in: Texte zur Kunst 24 (96/2014),
34-49.
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mance are legitimate or not, with participants being engaged in constant and often
tense forms of “boundary work”.41
A prime example is the GermanKunstkompass (art compass), created by the jour-
nalist Willi Bongard and published annually since 1970 (with the exception of 1985,
when the ranking took a hiatus) in variousmagazines such asCapital,ManagerMag-
azin, and Weltkunst.42 The Kunstkompass has used a multiplicity of indicators over
the years to measure “Ruhm” (fame, reputation) such as exhibitions in esteemed
museums and at major events (e.g., the documenta in Kassel or the biennales in
Venice) or articles in art magazines. The scores are then published alongside the
market prices of the artists, thereby suggesting that audiences should evaluate
whether or not an artist is “a good bargain.” According to Bongard’s original vision,
the economic and the artistic sphere can stimulate each other: For progressive art
to flourish in Germany and to “catch up” with American artists, the German art
scene of the 1960s needed the stimulation of progressive market mechanisms. The
need to manufacture market transparency via rankings was thus triggered by the
comparison of Germany with the United States. The reactions within the commu-
nity were fierce, especially because the originator, Willi Bongard, was neither an
artist nor an art critic but a journalist who challenged the authority of established
gatekeepers (curators and art critics). In contrast to the early experiments in the
eighteenth century, the Kunstkompass and other contemporary art rankings pre-
vailed, and are regularly produced and published by media organizations to target
large (nonexpert) audiences. Some rankings, such as the online platform ArtRank,
are even more explicit in their emphasis on the market value of art.
To sumup, quantitative comparisons resembling today’s rankings emerged ini-
tially in the artistic field in the eighteenth to early nineteenth century.We call them
protorankings rather than rankings, because in contrast to modern rankings, they
did not aim at constructing competition. They quantified the historical-comparative
judgments of critics about famous dead artists and did not suggest competition be-
tween contemporary artists. Even these protorankings were rejected in the artis-
tic field in the nineteenth century, based not on resistance against comparison as
such but on critique of the economic aura surrounding quantified comparisons.The
rejection of rankings coincided with the institutionalization of other practices of
comparing artistic performances, especially art criticism that tends to see quanti-
fied performances as “foolish,” “absurd,” “odd,” or “strange.” Rankings based on aes-
thetic criteria seem to have never fully recovered from this rejection. “Full” rankings
and other forms of quantification have emerged only since the 1970s. In contrast to
41 Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and theDemarcation of Science fromNon-Science: Strains
and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, in: American Sociological Review 48
(6/1983), 781-795; Wilbers, Grenzarbeit im Kunstbetrieb.
42 Cf. Wilbers, Grenzarbeit im Kunstbetrieb.
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the early experiments, they are published regularly and attract considerable atten-
tion from both expert and broader audiences. However, they do not contradict the
critical view of quantified comparisons in the arts specifically, because they do not
claim to measure aesthetic performance directly but rather reputation or market
value. Today’s art rankings thus seem less concerned with the intricacies of com-
paring aesthetic performance and more focused on including nonexpert audiences
in the field.
Early and eager adopters: Sports
Rankings and statistics have become an inseparable and largely taken-for-granted
part of competitive sports.43 Today, it is hard to imagine one without the other.
However, the alignment of sports and rankings is not as natural as it may seem.
Whereas both antique and early modern sport cultures knew organized, even pro-
fessionalized athletic competition, sports rankings have proliferated only since the
second half of the nineteenth century, when, based on a combination of standard-
ized rules, new modes of competition, and the regular public comparison of per-
formances, modern sports emerged as a truly autonomous field.44
The first sports rankings in the above terms seem to have developed in the
context of the invention of a specific mode of competition: the league system. The
first leagues were organized in US-American Baseball in the 1870s,45 soon to be
copied by the British Football League founded in 1888.46 Subsequently, the league
system and other serial forms of competition spread around the world, arguably
turning into the most important modes of modern sports competition.
What made the league system such an important innovation was that it in-
troduced a new kind of temporality into the organization of sports: In contrast
to earlier forms of sports competitions such as single contests or knockout tour-
naments, league systems aim at determining the “champion” over the course of a
longer period of time,mostly a year-long “season.” Additionally, league systems in-
clude a larger number of participants (e.g., clubs), usually between 10 and 30 that
compete as members of the league while playing directly against each other only
a few times a year. These characteristics of the league system create a competi-
tion across spatial distance with a dual relationship to time: It both stretches time
(over a season) and compresses time (simultaneity across spatial distance, often
comprising a “national” space).
43 Cf. Allen Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, New York 1978.
44 Cf. Tobias Werron, DerWeltsport und sein Publikum, Weilerswist 2010.
45 Cf.WarrenGoldstein, Playing for Keeps. AHistory of Early Baseball, Ithaca 1989; George B. Kirsch,
Baseball and Cricket. The Creation of American Team Sports, 1838-1872, Chicago 1989.
46 Cf. Matthew Taylor, The Association Game. A History of British Football, London/New York 2008.
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Such forms of competition require modes of comparison that allow the au-
dience (including the participants) to follow the “championship race” from match
day to match day over the course of a season. A league table reducing past games
to “points” and “overall scores” to determine a league “standing” does exactly that.
It can even be argued that it is impossible to understand a league competition
without tables. The institutionalization of the league system therefore depended
on the publication of tables just as much as the success of rankings depended on
the invention of the league system. Put more precisely, the observation of a league
competition requires up-to-date tables that reflect all the past results of a league com-
petition. This form, which is still in use today, seems to have been available right
from the start, including the very term “up to date” (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3: “The league—Division I” (Nottingham Evening Post, De-
cember 3, 1892 ).
The emergence of league tables was accompanied by an avalanche of statistics
on individual players and teams based on categories such as “goals scored” (football)
or “batting average” (baseball). Consequently, themeaning of athletic performances
changed. Instead of being connected inseparably to particular events (a “match”
or “contest”), they could now be understood as a reflection of a larger number of
performances over the course of a season or even a career. In American baseball, for
instance, such modes of quantitative observation were firmly institutionalized as
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early as in the 1880s.47 In the example below (Fig. 4), taken from a baseball yearbook
from 1881, the average performance of individual players over the course of a season
is used to produce a ranking that includes every single player of the league with a
minimum number of games (this particular list included 77 players):
Fig. 4: “The League Averages for 1880”, (Beadle’s Dime Base-Ball
Player, 1881, 41 ).
As a result of these and similar modes of observation, “performance” or
“achievement” in sport have been associated with a sense of consistency. Although
both performance and achievement are more demanding, because they focus on
excellence over a longer period of time, the fact that they allow even champions
to lose occasionally makes them at the same time more forgiving. The affinities
between rankings and modern sports thus suggest a preference for consistent
and not spectacular performance. In other words, based on the institutionaliza-
tion of league tables and similar modes of quantification, the notion of athletic
achievement assumed a statistical—rather than just a narrative—meaning.48 The
institutionalization of this discourse and these modes of competition combined
with the global standardization of rules led to an avalanche of sports statistics
starting in the 1870s, which has stayed with us ever since. Sports rankings are not
47 Cf. Jules Tygiel, Past Time. Baseball as History, Oxford 2000.
48 Cf. TobiasWerron, ‘Die Liga’: Entstehung, FunktionenundSchwächeneinesKonkurrenz-mod-
ells, in:WolframPyta (ed.),Geschichte des Fußballs inDeutschlandundEuropa seit 1954, Stuttgart
2013, 51-83.
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just a way of observing sports; they are constitutive of the very meaning of modern
sports as we know them.
How does this case compare to our account of the artistic field? In contrast, the
emergence of sports rankings was tightly connected to the public interest in consistent
performance over longer periods of time that emerged in the late nineteenth century. By
the same token, competition quickly emerged as the raison d’être ofmodern sports. A league
system, for instance, is organized competition and does not make much sense
without the perception of competition as entertaining and desirable. For these rea-
sons, perhaps, the criticism of modern sports since the nineteenth century, which
included controversies surrounding professionalization, “character development,”
health questions, or audience behavior,49 never seems to have focused much on
rankings and other types of quantified comparisons of performances. Similarly,
tensions between the expectations of expert and nonexpert audiences do not seem
play an important role in sports. Sports statistics might be complicated, but they
are also inclusive, a lingua franca of sorts that you need to speak or at least under-
stand in order to grasp whatmodern sports are about. Although different segments
of the audience are more or less versatile in the statistical language of sports, rank-
ings are largely accepted as a natural element of the sports field. In a sense, then,
the sports field turned out to be the ideal environment for the institutionalization
of rankings, while rankings, in turn, helped to institutionalize competitive sports.
Adaption and ambivalence: Science and universities
The vast majority of research assumes America’s Best Colleges (published since 1983
in the U.S. News &World Report) to be the natural starting point for examinations of
university rankings. A closer historical look, however, reveals an astonishing num-
ber of experiments with rankings or related forms of performance measurement
in the United States dating back to the late nineteenth century.
The first university rankings originated in the context of the then popular dis-
cussions on whether “eminence”—intellectual performance—is due to nature (i.e.,
hereditary qualities) or nurture (i.e., a person’s education).50 Hence, the field-spe-
49 Cf. Melvin. L. Adelman, A Sporting Time. New York City and the Rise of Modern Athletics, 1820-
1870, Champaign 1986; Gary K. Peatling, Rethinking the History of Criticism of Organized
Sport, in: Cultural and Social History 2 (3/2005), 353-371.
50 Another possible place of origin of modern university rankings is the emergent field of med-
ical schools in the United States. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the Amer-
ican Medical Association (AMA) produced a list of medical schools bearing some resem-
blance to modern-day rankings. However, rather than suggesting competition between all
medical schools, these tables aimed at denigrating those medical schools that did not fol-
low the ideal of "scientific medicine". When all "non-pure" medical schools eventually disap-
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Fig. 5: James McKeen Cattell, Doctorates Conferred by American
Universities for Scientific Research, in: Science 8 (190/1898), 197-
201, see 198.
cific understanding of performance was itself an object of a scientific debate. In
opposition to European scholars, many of whom aligned themselves with Francis
Galton’s claim that eminence is hereditary (Hereditary Genius, 1869), the American
psychologist James McKeen Cattell and others were convinced that social factors
(“nurture”) might be even more important.51 In 1910, Cattell argued that “eminent
peared, the AMA stopped publishing the list. Since our preliminary findings suggest that,
in contrast to Cattell and others, the AMA lists had little to no impact on the general rank-
ing discourse within the scientific field, we do not discuss it here in detail (for details cf.
Stefan Wilbers/Leopold Ringel/Tobias Werron, Zu den Anfängen der Hochschulrankings:
Amerikanische Medical Schools zwischen 1850 und 1930, in: Frank Meier/Thorsten Peetz
(eds.), Organisation und Bewertung, Wiesbaden (forthcoming)).
51 David S. Webster, Academic Quality Rankings of American Colleges and Universities, Springfield
1986.
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men are lacking; and this we must attribute to changes in the social environment
rather than to deterioration of the stock.”52 To emphasize the importance of such
factors, he created several tabular representations of the “scientific strength” of
American institutions of higher education which he used to claim that evidently
the place of study has an impact on an individual’s “eminence”.53 In his first rank-
ing, published in the journal Science, which he also edited, Cattell used the number
of PhDs conferred by universities as an indicator of their scientific strength (see
Fig. 5). In so doing, he explicitly drew attention to organizations as facilitators of
individual performance.
Cattell experimented with a variety of indicators. He is best known for send-
ing questionnaires to esteemed American scientists whom he asked to evaluate the
“eminence” of their colleagues.54Heused the responses to attributeweighted scores
to individuals that he then aggregated to organizational scores. Curiously, his rank-
ings compared a variety of organizations such as universities, government agen-
cies, and museums, as Figure 6 demonstrates.This ranking is remarkable in that it
compares performance not only synchronically but also diachronically (movement
over time) as indicated by the column on the right entitled “Gain or Loss” (a couple
of years earlier, Cattell had already collected data based on questionnaires).The sci-
entific strength of the leading institutions is, in other words, the first attempt to create
a competitive scientific field by reflecting and visualizing changes in performance
over time. There was no follow up, however, making this ranking for a longer time
the last of its kind in the scientific field.
In contrast to Cattell’s dedication to universities, which he saw as the main
determinant of whether a significant number of individuals are able to develop
“eminence,” those arguing for hereditary factors tried to downplay the role of or-
ganizations because they were convinced that education cannot change what has
already been determined by hereditary factors.The following quote of Francis Gal-
ton makes precisely this point:
“One-third of those who sent replies have been educated at Oxford or Cambridge,
one-third at Scotch, Irish or London universities, and the remaining third at no
university at all. I am totally unable to decide which of the three groups occupies the
highest scientific position: they seem to me very much alike in this respect” [emphasis
added].55
Cattell and his successors saw rankings primarily as a means to the end of dis-
covering environmental factors that have a positive impact on the performance of
52 James McKeen Cattell, A statistical study of American men of science, New York 1910, 577.
53 Björn Hammarfelt/Sarah De Rijcke/Paul Wouters, From Eminent Men to Excellent Universi-
ties: University rankings as Calculative Devices, in:Minerva 55 (4/2017), 391-411.
54 Hammarfelt/De Rijcke/Wouters, Eminent Men.
55 Francis Galton, English men of science: Their nature and nurture, London 1874, 236.
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Fig. 6: Cattell: “The scientific strength of the leading institutions”
(1910, see 591 ).
a population of scientists. In other words, they considered rankings a method of
scientific inquiry. Remarkably, Cattell even experimented with comparisons of the
scientific “productivity”56 of nations in order to demonstrate that the United States
had to catch up with other nations, particularly Germany, in terms of contributions
to psychology (see Fig. 7).
While rankings were clearly compatible with discovering and improving sci-
entific performance, competition for status or reputation and hierarchies were much
less in accordance with the dominant discourse of the time. The scandal revolv-
ing around efforts by the United States Federal Government to create a four-tier
classification scheme is indicative of scientists’ skepticism toward such forms of
competition.57 In 1911, a preliminary report on the classification of higher educa-
tion institutions was leaked to the American press and spurred adverse reactions by
56 James McKeen Cattell, Statistics of American Psychologists, in: American Journal of Psychology
14 (3/4/1903), 310-328, see 327.
57 Note that according to our definition, the classification scheme is not a ranking proper be-
cause it does not attribute single ranks but clusters organizations.
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Fig. 7: “Classification of Contributions to Psychology”, James McKeen Cat-
tell, Statistics of American Psychologists, in: American Journal of Psychol-
ogy 14 (3/4/1903), 310-328, see 328.
university leaders.58 Apparently, the creation of a four-class system, legitimized by
the United States Government, created a lot of turmoil and—in consequence—re-
sistance among those concerned. From a sociological perspective, such fierce reac-
tion comes as no surprise, because the scientific field is deeply rooted in the idea of
an egalitarian community with its members adhering, in Bourdieusian terms, to
the illusio of a relentless and communal quest for truth—and for neither status nor
reputation.59 Even though it might very well be the case that, empirically speaking,
scientists are often more interested in the accumulation of reputation and status,
such motives have only partial legitimacy and thus cannot easily be made explicit.
Because rankings suggest competition for individual and organizational reputa-
tion, they are likely to be met with skepticism.
There are other examples of similar reactions to hierarchies introduced by rank-
ings. Raymond Hughes published two reports on graduate schools, the first in 1925
and the second in 1934, both based on peer surveys and measuring the reputation
of departments (and not entire organizations, as in the case of Cattell). Whereas
the first report ranked departments according to their scores, its successor, pub-
lished nine years later, listed the findings in alphabetical order.The popular Cartter
Report, published in 1966 and subsequently replicated in 1970, presented rankings of
58 Webster, Academic Quality Rankings.
59 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the
Progress of Reason, in: Social Science Information 14 (6/1975), 19-47;Münch,Academic Capitalism.
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departments in its first edition, while the authors of the replication study claimed
that they “tried to de-emphasize the pecking-order relationships”.60
The Hughes Report and even more so the Cartter Report demonstrate that an
important change had taken place over the decades. In their early experiments in
the first half of the twentieth century, Cattell and others had the goal of comparing
the scientific performances of individuals that they then aggregated to institution-
wide scores of “scientific strength.” The selection of such “eminent men” was usu-
ally made on the grounds of encyclopedias, for example, American Men of Science or
Who’s Who in America. Starting in the 1960s, however, reputational rankings of the
quality of teaching became more fashionable. Such rankings tended to focus on
the performance of departments (which they did not aggregate to institution-wide
scores) based on peer evaluations.The emphasis on performance in teaching—and
not, or not only, on research—shows that the audience of rankings had become sig-
nificantly larger: The more recent rankings addressed not only scientists but also
prospective students.
An important aspect of this expansion of the comparative scope is the increase
in the media infrastructure in the field. For instance, in 1966 the Chronicle of Higher
Education was founded, an important outlet for bringing discussions on academia
and related issues such as rankings to a nonexpert audience. From a macroper-
spective, the increasing interest in academia and teaching performance does not
come as a surprise given the popularization of scientific knowledge and the sanc-
tity attributed to science in the post-World War II era, as documented by research
on the “scientization” of the modern world.61 The producers of rankings, however,
were still individual scientists (even renowned sociologists such as Peter M. Blau
and Seymour M. Lipset) who published and debated their findings in reports or
scientific journals such as Science, the Journal of Higher Education, and Change: The
Magazine of Higher Learning. Taking the role of scholars, they were often skeptical of
their own findings and reflected them critically. See for instance the study by Blau
and Margulies, which contains the following qualification:
“Ideally, one ought tomeasure the quality of a professional school, of course, by its
achievements—the caliber of its alumni and its contributions to the advancement
of professional knowledge. But it is difficult to measure professional accomplish-
ments. It is still more difficult to measure how much the training a school gives
60 Kenneth D. Roose/Charles J. Andersen, A Rating of Graduate Programs, Washington D.C. 1970,
2.
61 Gili S. Drori/JohnW.Meyer, Scientization. Making aworld safe for organizing, in: Marie-Laura
Djelic/Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson (eds.), Transnational governance. Institutional dynamics of reg-
ulation, Cambridge 2006, 32-52.
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contributes to the quality of its graduates, because this depends largely on the
competence and motivation of its incoming students.”62
With the advent of rankings produced by media organizations (first in the United
States and then in other Western countries), particularly America’s Best Colleges by
U.S. News & World Report (USN ranking hereafter), the 1980s were clearly a turn-
ing point, both with regard to rankings as such but also in terms of their stand-
ing in public discourse. Rankings have become increasingly popular outside aca-
demic discussions and, due to their regular publication, a newsworthy item.63 The
USN ranking in particular has been discussed intensely by journalists, students,
and academics ever since.64 The 2000s are characterized by yet another expansion
from the national to the global level with prime examples being the World Univer-
sity Ranking by Times Higher Education, the Academic Ranking of World Universities by
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and the QS World University Rankings by Quacquarelli
Symonds.65
The involvement of the mass media in the production and popularization of
rankings was accompanied by several remarkable changes in the scientific field.
First, rankers started to include nonscientific indicators such as the diversity of
the student body, job placement rates, and industry income. As a result, univer-
sity rankings now often combine the evaluation of the scientific field with broader
societal preferences. In terms of the core responsibilities of universities, research,
and teaching, national and global rankings set different priorities: Whereas rank-
ings at the national level, broadly speaking, focus on the evaluation of teaching,
their global counterparts rely more on indicators for scientific strength such as
citations, publications in peer-review journals, or Nobel prizes. Second, whereas
national rankings tend to evaluate departments or graduate schools, thus following
the trajectory started in the 1960s, global university rankings compare universities
as organizations, thus returning to Cattell’s approach of interpreting universities to
be the main determinant of scientific performance. Third, the academic discourse
on quantitative evaluations and especially on rankings underwent a noteworthy in-
tensification, because scientists now voice more praise but also channel, intensify,
and organize their criticism.
Those who praise university rankings maintain that such devices help to map
the field–that is why they should be public knowledge (i.e., made transparent), and
62 Peter M. Blau/Rebecca Zames Margulies, A Research Replication: The Reputations of Amer-
ican Professional Schools, in: Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning 6 (10/1974), 42-47, see
42.
63 Cf. Alex Usher, Short Global History of Rankings, in: EllenHazelkorn (ed.),Global Rankings and
the Geopolitics of Higher Education, London/New York 2017, 23-53.
64 Cf. Espeland/Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity.
65 Cf. Brankovic/Ringel/Werron, How rankings produce competition.
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thus have a positive impact on performances. Critical voices, on the other hand,
can be divided broadly into two categories: fundamental/normative and method-
ological:
1. Fundamental critique follows the trajectory of emphasizing the detrimental
impacts of competition such as the emergence and perpetuation of hierarchies.
Furthermore, such voices criticize the one-sided preference for articles published
in peer-reviewed journals to the disadvantage of monographs, edited volumes, or
anthologies, symbolizing the specific kind of “academic capitalism” facilitated by
rankings.66 Those lashing out against university rankings increasingly use social
media devices to voice their concern; the anonymous Twitter account University
Wankings, which often posts critical and/or satirical comments, is a prominent ex-
ample of this kind of critique.
2.The second,methodological type of criticism is muchmore frequent.67Those
criticizing rankings on the grounds of methodological concerns do not argue for
the abolition of such forms of comparison but consider them “not (yet) good
enough.” As a result, rankers are often eager to revise and reform their products68
without losing legitimacy. In fact, we might speculate that it is precisely this type
of criticism that plays a crucial role in the institutionalization of rankings in the
scientific field because it keeps the conversation going while also supporting the
belief that improvement is possible—at least in principle—as an ideal somewhere
on the horizon.
To summarize, early university rankings between 1900 and 1980 were quite well
received within the academic community as far as theirmainmotive was tomeasure
performance. Seeing universities as members of a dynamic competitive field was, how-
ever, considered detrimental to scientific work and thus contested when evoked.
This contestation made rankings an ambivalent topic in the scientific field, earn-
ing them both praise and skepticism.With the onset of media interest in the 1980s,
when rankings became published regularly for a much wider audience, they were met
with more praise and criticism, with the latter again emphasizing the detrimen-
tal impact of competitive behavior and hierarchies between universities. In other
words, rankings have been institutionalized in the university field as a topic of
conversation but remain contested, particularly as a mechanism of creating com-
petition.
66 Münch, Academic Capitalism.
67 Cf. O’Connell, Research Discourses.
68 Cf. Barron, The Berlin Principles; Lim, The Building of Weak Expertise.
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Conclusion
Tracing the prehistory of modern-day rankings is crucial to understand the long-
term causes of their rise and to answer the question why they are sometimes more
and sometimes less successful. We have suggested defining rankings as a modern
practice of comparison that, by evaluating performances quantitatively, visually,
and publicly on a continual basis, contributes to the social construction of compet-
itive fields. This definition draws particular attention to what we call the perfor-
mative dimension of rankings: the fact that they are visualized (mostly via tables)
and published regularly. We have further pointed to the long-term prerequisites
of the rise of rankings, that is, modern notions of performance, competition, and
publicity/transparency; and to the role of expert and mass publics in the process of
publication and institutionalization. Based on these insights, we have analyzed and
compared the historical trajectories of rankings in the arts, competitive sports, and
science/universities. What are the main implications of our comparative analysis?
Rankings have become institutionalized in all three fields, though to varying
degrees and in different ways. These variations seem to be contingent on (1) the
“fit” between rankings and field-specific conceptualizations of competition, per-
formance, and publicity/transparency; and (2) the ways in which rankings address
and imagine different audiences.The sports field is the only one that seems to have
achieved an almost perfect alignment of dominant ideals of performance, competi-
tion, and publicity/transparencywith the social practice of ranking. In sports, rank-
ings have become an inseparable part of a particular kind of thinking about athletic
performance—favoring long-term consistency and arguing statistically, not just
narratively—that emerged in the mid-to-late nineteenth century and is still with
us today. Competition, too, is an even more essential feature of the field. Rankings
thus have been closely aligned withmodern sports since the emergence of the latter
in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
In contrast, the reception of rankings in science and the arts appears to be
much more ambivalent. The scientific field is rooted in the illusio (Bourdieu) of a
community pursuing a selfless “quest for truth” that tends to be critical of overt
competition for status and reputation. On the other hand, making performances
visible via quantified comparisons is a practice that in many ways resembles the
logic of modern science: Collect “objective” data, process and interpret it system-
atically, publish it, and discuss it with colleagues (and perhaps the wider public).
To a certain degree, then, rankings look like science and are sometimes discussed
like the findings of scientific studies. At the same time, they are often rejected as
an antiscientific device that creates competition alien to the field.
Similarly, early experiments with protorankings in the arts, between the early
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, were rejected as alien to the ideal of l’art
pour l’art that seems to have become the dominant illusio of the field in the course
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of the nineteenth century. This points to the effective institutionalization of the
modern roles of artistic arbiters and gatekeepers such as the critic and the curator,
who have successfully claimed the authority to judge artistic talent and quality.
From the 1970s onward, however, rankings have become increasingly popular, and
are now published regularly despite all criticism levelled against them by artists and
art critics. A prominent example is the German Kunstkompass, published annually
since 1970, that aims tomake the dynamics of the artmarket transparent to a bigger
audience. However, even these rankings mostly seem to accept the main point of
the critique leveled against quantified aesthetic judgments, because they usually
do not claim to directly measure aesthetic performance but rather focus on the
artists’ reputation or the market prices of art works.
Our analysis indicates that the institutionalization of rankings in the scientific
and artistic field differs from that in competitive sports. Both fields are similar in
that there is a deeply rooted skepticism regarding the competition for reputation
suggested by rankings. And in both cases, the continual production of new rank-
ings since the 1970s and 1980s is part of an attempt to address and attract audiences
beyond expert circles. Rankings in the scientific and artistic field are thus not taken
for granted, but have become institutionalized as topics, that is, as constant objects
of debate and controversy attracting the attention of supporters and critics alike. In
other words, a growing choir of both disapproving and affirmative voices together
in both fields has effectively institutionalized rankings as an ambivalent topic of
debate that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. However, there are also impor-
tant differences between the two: In the arts, even the quantification of aesthetic
judgments is considered alien to the inner workings of the field; whereas in sci-
ence, there is no shortage of affirmative methodological contributions that believe
in the quantification of scientific performances and aim to improve rather than
criticize rankings.
On a more general note, our findings suggest that the origins of rankings can
be located in the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth century Anglo-American realm.
Whereas the protorankings of the early eighteenth to early nineteenth century were
part of a European arts discourse, the first rankings in the modern sense—quan-
tified, visualized, and regularly published comparisons of performances aiming at
the production of competition—emerged in the context of modern sports in the
United States and the United Kingdom, followed by experiments with rankings of
universities in the United States. In the case of modern sports, the standardization
of rules and the invention of new modes of competition, such as the league sys-
tem, were closely aligned with the production of rankings in the United States and
United Kingdom. Similarly, university rankings reflect a distinctly American situ-
ation in the first half of the twentieth century when there was a high demand for
mapping the complex and decentralized field of higher education organizations
in terms of the quality of science and teaching. We therefore suspect that such
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practices of comparison embody specific assumptions about performance, compe-
tition, and publicity/transparency that originated in the United States and United
Kingdom, but have since travelled around the world and become largely univer-
salized concepts. Against this background, it comes as no surprise that with the
proliferation of university rankings outside of the United States in the 1980s and
the 1990s, a very specific ideal type of university (the research-intensive American
university) became the universal model of excellence to be emulated by all other
universities in the world.69
Based on our analysis, we suspect that the concentration of these developments
in the Anglo-American world has to do with the highly developed newspaper indus-
try in the United States and United Kingdom that created demand for entertain-
ment and accelerated the constant observation and comparison of performances.
Future studies could trace the origins of rankings in other fields and thereby con-
firm or readjust our assertion that rankings originated by and large in the Anglo-
American world of the mid-nineteenth to early-twentieth century. By implication,
our analysis suggests that studies should also investigate the long-term formation
of notions of performance, competition, and publicity/transparency along with the
process of the universalization of these notions in order to explain the prolifera-
tion of rankings—rather than just focus on recent trends such as neoliberalism or
digitalization.
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The Weight of Comparing in Medieval England
David Gary Shaw
Abstract1
How important and common were the practices of comparing in medieval England (1150-
1500)? Focusing on activities that tended to have a pragmatic rather than purely logical in-
tention, this chapter first considers medieval comparing on technical matters such as weigh-
ing and measuring for the market and for agricultural efficiency. Then, however, we consider
as well the more controversial comparing of humans by examining its place in taxing and
ranking people; in assessing religious diversity; and even discerning the moralizing uses of
comparing in literature and art. As it turns out, comparing could be perilous when humans
were the subjects.
Introduction
It is possible that comparison might be everywhere in history, but we might also
suppose that comparing might matter less in some moments and places than oth-
ers. Especially given the sense that there is something distinctive and powerful
about comparison in contemporary life, it is important to try to get a sense for the
range, variety, and importance of modes of comparison in other times and places.
In this chapter, I inquire into the place and weight of comparative thinking in Eng-
land in the later medieval period.
It is not an easy task, because the definition of the comparative and of com-
parative practices is hardly settled. There is probably some amount of comparative
activity in all European societies and moments, but we can expect that the compo-
sition of the comparative practices will vary and maybe vary significantly; and that
will raise problems for making any longer-term narratives. Comparing compar-
isons might be the hardest task of all. In a specific context, the particular character
1 Research on this article has been supported by a Mercator fellowship which was granted by
the Collaborative Research Center SFB 1288 "Practices of Comparing. Changing and Order-
ing the World“, Bielefeld University, Germany, funded by the German Research Foundation
(DFG). Research was also funded by The Colonel Return Jonathan Meigs First (1740-1823)
Fund, created with the funds left by Dorothy Mix Meigs and Fielding Pope Meigs, Jr.
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of the comparative will also be affected by the degree to which comparing is self-
conscious.The benefit of thinking in terms of comparative practices is, in part, that
they can be found even where they operated quietly with less overt self-reflection.
It is even possible to imagine comparison unmediated by language. The challenge,
of course, is that it can be too easy to assume comparative practices were acting
rather than being able to demonstrate it.
On this point, however, it still seems wise to have an open-minded approach
and only a tentative commitment to the particular quality of comparison that we
might find in the Middle Ages. After all, things that are on their way to being the
most robust sort of comparison might have emerged from earlier, related forms in
the medieval period. In the area of imaginative literature, we are sure to find a vast
array of comparative techniques: the world of metaphor and allegory. As elusive as
the comparative elementsmight sometimes be, the tertiumof the comparison—the
thing by which two others things are compared—is often clear enough in literary
and imaginative texts.2 Much in mathematical reasoning also has a comparative
structure to it in terms of the logics of proportion. And geometry was a crucial
part of medieval mathematical thinking.
On the other hand, the medieval propensity for lists and hierarchies is more
challenging, and a list of ranked items might not be framed or understood with
comparative intent at all. Red, blue, and yellow are the primary colors, but saying so
and itemizing them is not necessarily to compare them. The use of categories and
concepts and subsumption was a vast and powerful mode of medieval thought. Did
it hide the comparative thinking they were using or block them from comparing?
Causing comparison in a later and unknown viewer or reader is not to compare
at the moment of creation. Then, more simply, there is juxtaposition, whether on
purpose or by accident, that might be too easily seen as evidence of comparison.
What this all suggests is that the form of evidence of comparison will often come
without certainty about comparative intent and this will properly be problematic.
By contrast, in this chapter, I look at literatures and practices that had at least a
more clearly social or pragmatic intention. To understand comparison or its close
relations probably benefits from trying to understand a wide variety of these possi-
ble practices in proximity to each other. In amore comprehensive work onmedieval
or any other regime of comparison, one would very much want to know howmuch,
how often, and how easily comparative forms jumped from their home domain to
work elsewhere—from poetry or mathematics to social commentary or legislative
agendas. While I do not have space to touch on all types of nonimaginative uses
2 Cf. Clive Staples Lewis, The Allegory of Love. A Study in Medieval Tradition, Oxford 1936; Ann R.
Meyer, Medieval Allegory and the Building of the New Jerusalem, Rochester 2003; and Maureen
Quilligan, The Languages of Allegory. Defining a Genre, Ithaca 1979; Conrad Rudolph, The Mystic
Ark: Hugh of Saint Victor, Art, and Thought in the Twelfth Century, Cambridge 2014.
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of comparison in England, even if I was assiduous enough to have tracked them
all down, I would rather like to focus on some that bent toward the social, ethi-
cal, and political. So, working within the kingdom of England after the Norman
Conquest, I want to look for comparative thinking in such diverse activities as:
weighing and measuring, baking, taxing and ranking, philosophizing, plowing,
moralizing, burying, and educating.
In other words, I would like to find the comparative wherever it lies and not
assume that the most explicit, political, or challenging sorts of comparison are
necessarily the most important. Looking even at small things, one might end up
showing comparison’s more general role in medieval England, even if that turns
out to be modest. Comparative practices in one period might be significant and
shifting with relation to each other, without being more significant in one period
than another; theymight simply be different.When I think in terms of theweight of
comparison, I am thinking of the need to take all the comparisons we can find and
try to get a sense for how much they might matter. Like other tricks of language or
mind, comparative practicesmight indeed bemore popular in some social quarters
or administrative zones than in others. Of course, all of this should contribute to
the question of what differences exist between early modern or modern ways of
thought and practice and medieval ones.
If one thinks of comparative practices as networks, as mixtures of things and
ideas and words as well as people in action, rather than as really inhering in larger
structures such as states or peoples, or countries such as England, or periods such
as the Middle Ages, one can be prepared for the way in which the comparative
might stabilize in one part of the society and then jump, translated, into another by
some other circumstance. Maybe the medieval period provides models and matter
for later comparing, for jumping. The weight of comparison then is a notion for
assessing all these different things in a given world. For later medieval England,
comparison was not that heavy, but was in some domains dynamic and pressing
forward.
Measuring and weighing
It is with the practice of weighing and measuring itself that I start, because
one of the most important and long-term comparative practices involves the
creation of measures and literal standards by which to assess, indeed to compare
things, all sorts of stuff, the world’s goods. From a certain perspective, organizing
comparative practices was a centerpiece of medieval kingdom-making and this
mainly meant establishing regimes of comparing weights and measures and
money via standards. Practices such as the comparative pricing of bread, the
relation of weight to money, and the ideas of length and their regimes continued
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in some form from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries until the nineteenth and
twentieth.3 While the extent of universalization of standards in the country was
often to be doubted in practice, the universal recourse to measuring to a standard,
often regional or local, was achieved.
“Standard of comparison” needs to be recognized as a fairly robust and pre-
cise idea. I mean the official stipulation of measures; but, unlike the more abstract
forms used today, I focus here on the tangible objects used to control other ob-
jects. Measuring to a standard is not just a sort of comparative metaphor but more
like a whole reiterative network of comparison.4 Something is stipulated as the
thing against which other things are compared directly. Its reusability and stabil-
ity means that separate acts of measuring work transitively with all the comparata.
In other words, a standard allows things to have a common denominator. Where
successful, however, the creation of standards of comparison promises an ongoing,
reproducible, comparative process.
The germ of English weights and measures seems to derive from the pre-
Norman, Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. In the tenth century already, there was an edict
of King Edgar (959–75) on “mynetum and gemetum—money and measures” that
orders that there be only one sort of money and one sort of measure of weight in
the kingdom.5What matters is that ideas of length and weight became a standard,
a pattern, and these were typically fashioned into a real object kept in the treasury
from which precise pragmatic copies were made. What is more, specific, purpose-
built standards were constructed as needed: So, for instance, in 1197, Richard II
issued an assize at the request of his bishops and barons to control the size of
woolen cloths. It was regulated to be two ells width, the royal ordinance stressing
that “the ell shall be the same in the whole realm and of the same length and the
ells shall be of iron.”6
3 On the use of standardweights andmeasures in England, see Ronald E. Zupko, BritishWeights
and Measures. A History from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, Madison 1977; for practices,
see James Davis,Medieval Market Morality: Life, Law and Ethics in the English Marketplace, Cam-
bridge 2012, see 189–95, 331–34; see also Ronald E. Zupko, Medieval English Weights and
Measures: Variation and Standardization, in: Studies in Medieval Culture 4 (1974), 238-243, see
238.
4 The standard of comparison operates as one of two comparata, the other being the object
assessed. The tertium is actually the length or weight or capacity. It seems now that the term
and concept might also have a late medieval origin, see Lei Zhu, On the Origin of the Term
Tertium Comparationis, in: Language and History 60 (2017), 35–52.
5 Agnes J. Robertson (ed.), Laws of Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I, Cambridge 1926,
28–9. For a sense of the diversity that grew up or existed, see, for instance, Sir John Miller,
Speeches in the House of Commons upon the Equalization of the Weights and Measures of Great
Britain, London 1790.
6 See William Stubbs (ed.), Roger de Hoveden, Chronica Magistri Rogeri De Houedene (Rerum
britannicarummedii aevi scriptores or chronicles andmemorials of Great Britain and Ireland
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A document that dates from some time in the thirteenth century, the Tractatus
de Ponderibus et Mensuris, was used within government and became one of a group
of official templates for a series of standard measurements. Here, the focus on the
penny should not be lost, because the currency anchored much in the system and
was most vigorously defended by law.7 Weights were effectively controlled by the
pennyweight and these could then denominate all other objects. The start is most
straightforward: “Per Ordinance of the whole realm of England the measure of the
King is composed namely of a penny, which is called a sterling, round & without
clipping, weighs thirty-two grains of wheat in the middle of the Ear. And an ounce
weight twenty pence. And twelve ounces make a pound of London. And twelve & a
half pounds make a stone of London. And eight pounds of wheat make a gallon. A
pound contains twenty shillings.” 8
Here one can see the intricate order of things.Weight starts with wheat—as did
length—the precious food, and the penny of silver is linked to wheat.There is a sort
of mediated comparison within this, but it is certainly the basis of a comparative
order and a family of comparative practices. The regulation of the sale of bread,
ale, and wine, of cloth and wool, and many other common commodities could be
regulated, calibrated, and tested by comparable schemes.
Assize of bread comparisons
The policy on bread was the most comprehensive, and it was meant to apply to all
retail baking in the kingdom. Certainly, with many local variations, the Assize of
Ale and Bread was used across the kingdom throughout the Middle Ages. It also
encouraged the incorporation of a schedule of breads that was perhaps comparative
during the Middle Ages, 51/4), London 1868, 33–34, for a reiteration of the general need for
standards. The Compositio Ulnarum et Perticarum, which apparently dates sometime prior to
Edward II and possibly as early as Henry III, provides a simple statement that an inch is three
grains of wheat and then explains feet, yards, or ells and perches as well as multiplying and
squaring these to describe the acre. My point, in part, is that there is something in arithmetic
and proportion that is itself a comparative structure or invitation. See Danby Pickering (ed.)
Statutes at Large from Magna Charta to the end of the Eleventh Parliament of Great Britain, anno
1761, volume 1, Cambridge 1762, 400. Davis, Medieval Market Morality, 192, 421. It is, as ever,
difficult to decide if accusations of evasion of the standard prove the norm or prove the law’s
failure to standardize.
7 On the money, see Martin Allen, Mints and Money in Medieval England, Cambridge 2012, see
41–72 on the twelfth and thirteenth century centralization of supply and management, and
134–70 on the physical standards.
8 John Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm. Printed by command of his majesty King George the
Third, in pursuance of an address of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From original records
and manuscripts, 1, London 1810, 204.
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in and of itself, price being the common measure, keyed to the varying sizes of the
different qualities of loaf.These regulations exist in various versions.9 An ordinance
of the reign of Henry III made clear that a baker whose bread weights varied too
much—low or high, as it turns out—would be fined and might even be punished
in the pillory.10
To take the example of Southampton, the local expectation around 1300 was
that nine kinds of bread might be offered for sale. If the cost of grain were 2s. for a
quarter, then the relative weights were as shown in parentheses, meaning the size
of loaf is proportional to the money value indicated. These details are keyed to a
farthing (quarter penny) loaf:
1. Wastel (£3 10 6)
2. Cocket, greater (£3 12 6)
3. Cocket, lesser (£3 15 6)
4. Simmel (£3 8 6)
5. French (£3 8 6)
6. Ranger (£5 5 9)
7. Whole wheat (£5 13 0)
8. Treet (£6 0 0) est.
9. Common Wheat (£7 11 0)
It would seem that this became a routine and repeated structure, reset occasionally
as prices or seasons changed. It constituted a kind of comparison among the sorts
of bread.
Whether or not it was involved in the calculations by bakers, weavers, and con-
sumers, comparison was built into the work of the officers who inspected the mar-
kets by whom those standard weights and measures would be deployed. So inspec-
tion by officers using official national and local criteria actively compared objects to
impose regimes of accountability and economy and power.The normal work of the
king’s market clerk or the local authorities who took this power was to check upon
the assize of bread, wine, and ale; bushels, gallons, and els; and other weights.11
There are very rich records of local courts in medieval England, and given any
manorial or urban monthly court record, one sees evidence of these practices of
9 See, for instance, Statutes of the Realm, 199–200. Generally, see Alan S. C. Ross, The Assize of
Bread, in: Economic History Review,N.S. 9 (1956), 332–342; but especially James Davis, Baking
for the Common Good: A Reassessment of the Assize of Bread in Medieval England, in: The
Economic History Review 57 (2004), 465-502.
10 Cf. Pickering, Statutes at Large, I, 28–29, 1266 also covers pillory construction.
11 See for instance, Francis Hill, Medieval Lincoln, Cambridge 1948, 125, 242. Most sizeable bor-
oughs andmany others, acquired the franchise for themselves and were expected to change
the personnel not the standards.
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comparison at work.12The key is that set standards of comparison were on hand to
enable later and complex comparative practices.They might be modeled for differ-
ent sorts of occasions or materials. One can then conclude that a sort of adminis-
trative comparison existed in medieval England, anchored in governmental goals
and enabled by the development of standards of money, weight, and measures.
Rating and ranking people: consumption and taxation
Comparison was certainly not a large element within the workings of English law
and legislation in the medieval period. While the Common Law’s famous reliance
on precedential reasoning might be a special form of comparing, its certain and
characteristic development awaited the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.13
An influential fourteenth-century judge favorably quoted in court an earlier judge
saying “Non exemplis sed rationibus adiudicandem est.” “Our judgements are
founded not on examples {precedents} but on reason.”14 However, an interesting
possible exception occurred in some legislation of the post-plague period. These
laws touch on consumption and taxation, and each works rather radically with
distinctions in the body politic. They have a certain structural similarity to the
assize of bread in the way that a variety of types is graded and related in terms of
an economic commonality.
Sumptuary legislation and concern for spending excessively were quite com-
mon in the later Middle Ages across Europe. Especially after the population shock
of the Black Death, significant anxiety and economic pressure built up; and so, in
1363, members of the House of Commons petitioned for an intervention to restrain
excessive consumption. Here is the gist of the petition:
“the commons declare: thatwhereas the prices of various victualswithin the realm
are greatly increased because various people of various conditions wear various
apparel not appropriate to their estate; that is to say, grooms wear the apparel of
craftsman, and craftsmen wear the apparel of gentlemen, and gentlemen wear
12 For instance, Canterbury Cathedral Archives (CCA), CC J/Q/264; and see James Davis, Market
Regulation in Fifteenth-Century England, in: Ben Dodds/Christian D. Liddy (eds.), Commercial
Activity,Markets and Entrepreneurs in theMiddle Ages: Essays in Honour of Richard Britnell, Wood-
bridge 2011, 81–106; and Judith Bennett, Ale, Beer, and Brewsters in England: Women’s Work in a
ChangingWorld, 1300–1600, Oxford 1996, 98–121 and 158–187.
13 Cf. John Baker, Case Law in Medieval England, in: John H. Baker, Collected Papers on English
LegalHistory, Cambridge 2014, 547–578; and John Baker, Case Law in England and Continental
Europe, in: John H. Baker, Collected Papers on English Legal History, Cambridge 2014, 612–620;
T. Ellis Lewis, The History of Judicial Precedent, in: Law Quarterly Review 46 (1930), 207–224,
and 48 (1932), 230–247.
14 Lewis, Judicial Precedent, vol. 46, 220.
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the apparel of esquires, and esquires wear the apparel of knights, the one and the
other wear fur which only properly belongs to lords and knights, poor and other
womenwear the dress of ladies, and poor clerks wear clothes like those of the king
and other lords. Thus the aforesaidmerchandises are at amuch greater price than
they should be, and the treasure of the land is destroyed, to the great damage of
the lords and the commonalty. Wherefore they pray remedy […].”15
The bill that was accepted as a result was very detailed. On the one hand, the late
medieval society of ranks and degrees remains fundamental. On their own, one
might not call a listing of the different ranks a comparison, because it might be
thought to be more like descriptive social anatomy. In this case, things go further:
These are hierarchically presented, and certain sorts of consumption are reserved
only to people of sufficient status. So, to take one clause from the second lowest
rank:
“that craftsmen and people called yeomen shall not take or wear cloth for their
clothing or shoes of a higher price than 40s. for thewhole cloth, byway of purchase
or otherwise; nor precious stones, cloth of silk or silver, or a belt, knife, brooch, ring,
garter, or clasps, ribbons, chains, bracelets, seals or other things of gold or silver,
or any manner of apparel embroidered, enamelled or of silk, in any way. And that
theirwives, daughters and children shall be of the same condition in their clothing
and apparel; and that they shall not wear any veil of silk, but only of yarn made
within the realm, and or anymanner of fur […] except only that of lamb, rabbit, cat
and fox.”16
Thus, it proceeds in a similar vein for seven different ranks or statuses.
In some sense, this seems an act of comparing, for the additions of the per-
mitted clothing to relate explicitly to different sorts of people, but it most certainly
inscribes the degrees by which the society at the moment saw itself. Just such a
comparing move becomes more explicit, however, when it comes to the more elite
ranks. Here, something rather novel appears. After detailing the limitations on “es-
quires and gentlemen of all sorts” who did not have land and rents of £100 a year,
the text moves on to merchants, citizens, and burgesses, artisans and craftsmen
who clearly have goods and chattels to the value of £500, and says that they “may
15 Edward III, October 1363, Item 25, in: Chris Given-Wilson et al. (eds.), Parliament Rolls
of Medieval England, Woodbridge 2005, British History Online, URL: http://www.british-his-
tory.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/october-1363 [last accessed June 10, 2018].
There are many shrewd studies of sumptuary legislation: classic in England is Frances E.
Baldwin, Sumptuary Legislation and Personal Regulation in England, Baltimore 1926; Catherine
Killerby, Sumptuary Law in Italy. 1200–1500, Oxford 2002; Martha C. Howell, Commerce Before
Capitalism in Europe. 1300–1600, Cambridge 2010, 208–260.
16 Edward III, October 1363, Item 25.
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take and wear in the same manner as the esquires and gentlemen who have land and rent to
the value of £100 a year” (my emphasis.)
The specific common denominator can be discerned, and it is one across which
there can be changes. In this case, a system of graduated wealth is linked to social
degrees, and variance on that level allows for differential assessment. The invoca-
tion of the logic of equivalence—that an urban character of a certain sort should
be treated as a country character—renders the whole thing particularly interesting
and clearly comparative.
One means by which a comparative practice might develop further and become
entrenched as a mode is by further appropriation in neighboring areas. There was
some sign of this being possible in the socially volatile period after the Black Death.
Following this comparative approach to sumptuary legislation, one comes to the
somewhat notorious poll taxes of the late 1370s and 1380s. The one that is most in-
triguing for the present purposes is the tax of 1379, a levy that one of the shrewdest
contemporary chroniclers called unprecedented; and that it might well be because of
its new relational and comparative form.17 As the law put it, “a sum of silver shall
be levied from various persons of the kingdom, in the manner which follows, both
within royal franchises as well as outside them; namely”; and then it proceeds to
list the kingdom’s people by rank-specific names in a few instances, but mainly by
type; and from each, it lists an amount of tax due.18 So, the Duke of Lancaster and
the Duke of Brittany each had to pay 10 marks. After this, a graduated scale follows
for men with equivalences for widows. So, it says, “also every widowed countess
of England, as much as earls—£4.”Then, however, as with the sumptuary legislation
one gets, somewhat unnecessarily now, urban equivalents: “Also, the mayor of Lon-
don is to pay as much as an earl—£4.” And so on. Money valuations provide the
basis of comparison along with the named description of status.
It seems indeed that one can posit a moment of more comprehensive compar-
ative thinking at work within the government, connecting to some extent with a
mood or understanding among the members of parliament, and probably espe-
cially the members of the House of Commons. Comparison, it should be stressed,
is not a method of demonstration here, but a sort of organizing principle, incor-
porated into a project with a different goal—namely, raising money. However, the
logic involved did not become popular even within government, and there are few
comparable instances in the subsequent period.This was due in part to the poll tax
being a political disaster. The 1379 tax did not raise as much money as expected,
17 Wendy R. Childs/John Taylor (eds.), Anonimalle Chronicle 1333–1381 (York: Yorkshire Archaeo-
logical Society Record Series 147), 127.
18 Richard II, April 1379, Paragraphs 13-16, in: Chris Given-Wilson et al. (eds.), Parliament Rolls
of Medieval England, Woodbridge 2005, British History Online, URL: http://www.british-his-
tory.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/april-1379. Membrane 6 [last accessed June
10, 2018].
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was evaded, and the 1381 levy led to the Peasants’ Rebellion in which the radical
leader John Ball said, apropos of status, “When Adam delved [dug] and Eve span
[wool], who was then the gentleman?”19 Comparison lost a bit of fashion as a po-
litical technique. Later sumptuary legislation was also much more simply worded,
and the explicit logic of equivalence was removed and a more traditional sense of
status preserved.20
Roger Bacon’s comparative religion
Someone who would probably have experienced the fruits and consequences of the
assize of bread and ale was Roger Bacon. It is perhaps one of the clearest signs of
the supposed limited practices of comparison that one can sometimes identify a
first use of some recognizable or contemporary practice within medieval life. From
this point of view, the quite extraordinary English Franciscan thinker Bacon is the
first to attempt a comparative account of religion. I do not claim he was inspired by
bread schedules or vice versa. He undertook his comparative analysis toward the
end of perhaps his greatest general work, the Opus Majus, written around 1267, at
the behest of Pope Clement IV.21 Bacon is perhapsmost often seriously known as an
avatar of modern science or as a practitioner of medieval magic and astrology; he
was known to some medieval people as the Doctor Mirabilis, the wonderful doctor.
The Opus Majus is an extraordinary and engaging work, wide-ranging, and some-
times surprising. In his section on moral philosophy, Bacon does not opt merely
to explain the superiority of Christianity in however much detail; he chooses first
to work from the facts as it were of the known world. This leads him to want to
understand Christianity’s superiority against the backdrop of other religions. Per-
haps as interesting are the six religions he knows. I quote him: “I shall now state
the principal nations in which the various sects are found that are now existing
19 Thomas Walsingham, The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of Thomas Walsingham, Vol-
ume I: 1376-1394, ed. by John Taylor/Wendy Childs/Leslie Watkiss, Oxford 2003, 547.
20 For later English sumptuary legislation, which is frequent till 1610, see, Baldwin, Sumptu-
ary Legislation, 144-247; and, for instance, John Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm. Printed by
command of his majesty King George the Third, in pursuance of an address of the House of Commons
of Great Britain. From original records and manuscripts, 2, 399 (1463); Statutes of the Realm 2,
468 (1483) and John Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, Printed by command of his majesty King
George the Third, in pursuance of an address of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From original
records and manuscripts, 2, 8-9 (1510); and Statutes of the Realm, 3, ch. 6, 179-82 (1515); Statutes
of the Realm, 3, 430 (1533). There were many notable changes.
21 The best place to start in understanding Bacon overall is Amanda Power, Roger Bacon and the
Defence of Christendom, Cambridge 2012, see 84-125 on the Opus Majus.
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throughout the world, namely, Saracens, Tartars, Pagans, Idolaters [Buddhists],
Jews, Christians.”22
Bacon moves through the several religions in various ways before going on to
use philosophy to show why Christianity is in fact the best one and “the only one
that should be spread throughout the world.”23 He is certainly engaged in quite
clear comparison as a mode and practice of analysis. In other words, he is not
merely listing and juxtaposing—important intellectual and artistic activities that
can encourage comparison—he is comparing.
Here’s the comparative key in this case: Invoking Al-Farabi and Aristotle, Ba-
con says that religions have aims and these provide a basis for considering them
together. The aims provide the tertium comparationis, so to speak, the things by
which they might all be assessed and considered. While he mentions several, he
goes on to stress that all religions seek “the felicity of the other life, which is sought
and striven after in different ways.”24 Again to be explicit: there is a listing of sects
and we have x, their performance, which will be determined along the access of
their “pursuit of happiness,” as one might rightly call it.
Bacon argues that some religions seek future happiness in the delights of the
body, some the delights of the soul, and others a combination of both. Tartars are
focused on a “lust for domination” and use their model of religion, a belief in one
dominant god, to guide their passion for worldwide domination.The “real Pagans,”
whom he takes the Prussians to exemplify, focus on thematerial delights of this life
and “they believe the life to come similar in every way to this. Hence at death they
have themselves burned publicly, together with their precious stones, gold, silver,
equipment, family, friends, and all their wealth and goods, hoping to enjoy all these
things after death.” As for the Idolaters, they have priests who deny themselves
worldly pleasures personally but their people are fully focused on material life and
its benefits and all are expected to share in the good afterlife regardless of their
activities in this life. 25
Bacon then sees a second grouping, and here he first discusses the Jews who
“hoped for blessings both temporal and eternal in a different way, however, since
with spiritual discernment by virtue of their law they aspired after blessings not
only of the body, but also of the soul.”26 Even their pursuit of temporal goods is
shaped by the law and God’s guidance thereby.
22 Translations are from Opus Majus, trans. Robert Belle Burke, Pennsylvania 1928, 789. The
translation is based on the edition of J. H. Bridges (ed.), Roger Bacon, Opus maius, (3 vols.
Oxford 1897–1900).
23 Opus Majus, 788.
24 Opus Majus, 788.
25 Opus Majus, 789
26 Opus Majus, 789.
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Finally, Christianity is discussed, and here there is the pursuit of “spiritual
blessings by spiritual means.” Christians are allowed material benefits from their
weakness and to enable them to work on the spiritual benefits that are alone
salvific. But in the afterlife, the material things are no longer relevant, for as
Bacon seems fond of stressing, “For the animal body will become spiritual, and
the whole [person] will be glorified, and will be with God and the angels.”27 So,
the comparison moves on the axis of the pursuit of happiness, further modulated
by the split between the spiritual and the temporal or material. Each religion is
discussed in this respect.
Bacon proceeds to a very pithy comparative divinity. The question of gods pro-
vides the comparative axis in this section, and the six sects provide the details
conforming to this comparative category. Among the pagans, each “fashions a god
to his own liking and worships whatever he pleases and sacrifices at will”; the Idol-
aters “maintain that there are many gods but none of them is omnipotent”; the
Tartars “adore and worship one God as omnipotent, but they nevertheless venerate
fire” and so on, although Muslims are skipped in this section.28
Bacon’s thought is clearly more analytically comparative than the administra-
tive materials discussed so far in this chapter, and three elements of context help
to explain his comparative turn. First, there is his knowledge of new information
about some of these peoples and religions, most of which he had from reading
first-hand accounts fresh from emissaries and missionaries in the thirteenth cen-
tury and those who were involved in the Crusades against the Prussians and in the
Levant. He knew some of the sources personally.29
Second and related, Bacon had earlier in his treatise and at surprising length,
extolled the virtues of learning foreign languages. The question of getting texts
accurate so that profitable interpretation and translation could be achieved was
large in his mind as a related issue. Connected to this was the growing interest
in editorial collation: Language moved Bacon to think about the related business
of editing manuscripts, the recognition that one is right, one wrong; one does not
have a certain section of Aristotle’s ethics, the other does—what to do and how to
do it best? There is a clear if implicit practice of comparison involved in such work,
and it might have set him up to consider comparing further.30
Last, Bacon lived in the century when the pursuit of heresy had become ad-
vanced. It was normal in manuals discussing such heretics to spend some time
27 Opus Majus, 790.
28 Opus Majus, 790.
29 See Power,Bacon and theDefence of Christendom, 213-15. A fellow FranciscanWilliamof Rubruck
travelled through the Mongol empire and wrote on this before discussing it with Roger.
30 Opus Majus, 811: “We must assume as a fundamental principle in this consideration that the
histories of all nations are to be accepted on an equal footing when we take up the form in
which the disputation is to proceed.”
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anatomizing them and detailing their errors. There is a sort of formal similarity
to Bacon’s approach, although such books were much less likely to show true com-
parison. They seem more to be giving descriptions of species within a genus, or
merely listing things like a mere juxtaposition. It is not at all easy to explain why
Bacon moved to compare; he was in many ways a bold and independent thinker.
But formally, the combination of strongly knowing which of the compared was
right and having a complex group of others formed through a strong pre-existent
category such as faithsmight open doors for a robust and to some extent safemode
of comparative reflection.
Agricultural improvement: Walter of Henley
Letme now turn to a second example, the product of a nearly exact English contem-
porary of Roger, a man called Walter of Henley, probably a minor estate-holding
landlord, in other words a knight, who wrote a book On Husbandry, completed by
the mid-1280s. Walter shows how money and even processes such as rendering a
financial account might enable a turn from juxtaposition to comparison. Notably,
he makes some distinct economic comparisons. The most striking engages a de-
bate underway over the utility of horses for plowing in lieu of the traditional oxen.
He was skeptical of the all-equine plow.31
“With a team of oxen with two horses you draw quicker than with a team of all
horses […]Why? I will tell you: the horse costs more than the ox. Besides, a plough
of oxen will go as far in the year as a plough of horses […] Further, in very hard
ground where the plough of horses will stop, the plough of oxen will pass.”
Here Walter makes several quick points on comparative efficiency, and seems to
opt for a mixed team’s advantage, but the middle point is of course shrewd. Given
a whole year, the oxen can cover as much ground. But the sharpest comparative
consideration follows:
“And will you see how the horse costs more than the ox? I will tell you. It is usual
that [the horse] should have every night at the least the sixth part of a bushel of
oats, price one halfpenny, and at the least twelve pennyworth of grass in summer.
And eachweekmore or less a penny in shoeing, if hemust be shod on all four feet.
The sum is twelve shillings and five pence in the year, without fodder and chaff.
31 Cf. Dorothea Oschinsky (ed.),Walter of Henley and other treatises on estate management and ac-
counting, Oxford 1971; Michael T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307,
Oxford/Malden, 49-50, 99-100. Elizabeth Lamond (ed.), Walter of Henley, On Husbandry, to-
gether with an anonymous Husbandry, Seneschaucie, and Robert Grosseteste’s Rules, London et al.
1890, 18.
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And if the ox is to be in a condition to do his work, then it is necessary that he
should have at least three sheaves and a half of oats in the week, price one penny,
and ten sheaves of oats should yield a bushel of oats in measure; and in summer
twelve pennyworth of grass: the sum three shillings, one penny, without fodder or
chaff. And when the horse is old and worn out then there is nothing but the skin,
andwhen the ox is old thenwith 10dworth of grass, he shall be fit for the larder.”32
The use of money operates with time as a comparative framework. It gives preci-
sion to the comparative problem of working out horses and oxen as plow animals.
Variables are resolved into money and then tallied one against the other. There
are few treatises or even comments about the horse plowing revolution. There are,
however, many estate financial accounts that show decisions made on this very
issue, and many of these must have emerged from some comparable reasoning.
This highlights of course the difficulty of the sources when it comes to recogniz-
ing where the practices of comparing actually were most important.33 By the same
token, Walter has many other reasoning moves in his arsenal.
Here is a case in Walter on rearing calves effectively that seems more like a
juxtaposition than strong comparing. “And let your cows have enough food, that
the milk may not be lessened. And when the male calf is calved, let it have all the
milk for a month; at the end of the month take away a teat, and from week to week
a teat, and then it will have suckled eight weeks, and put food before it that it may
learn to eat. And the female calf shall have all the milk for three weeks, and take
from it the teats as with the male.”34 There is none of the narrative or explanation
of benefit or doubt. This one seems less like a comparison then a juxtaposition,
possibly based on generic differences, indeed gender differences. This would not
mean that there would be no reasons to explain the differential treatment, but one
might expect them to go back to the core character or balance of the type: the bovine
version female, version male.
A third instance from Walter seems intermediary, closer to comparison espe-
cially given his clear ability to reason comparatively. Here he is juxtaposing cows
and sheep, but is also probably comparing the quality of a location, namely either
salt marsh or forest as pasture:
“If your cows were sorted out, so that the bad were taken away, and your cows fed
in pasture of salt marsh, then ought two cows to yield a wey [measure] of cheese
and half a gallon of butter a week. And if they were fed in pasture of wood, or
in meadows after mowing, or in stubble, then three cows ought to yield a wey of
32 Lamond, On Husbandry, 18.
33 See John Langdon, The Economics of Horses and Oxen in Medieval England, in: Agricultural
History Review 30 (1982), 31-40.
34 Lamond, On Husbandry, 25.
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cheese and half a gallon of butter a week between Easter andMichaelmas […] And
twenty ewes which are fed in pasture of salt marsh ought to and can yield cheese
and butter as the two cows before named. And if your sheep were fed with fresh
pasture or fallow, then ought thirty ewes to yield butter and cheese as the three
cows before named.”35
The quote manifests the fine-grained character of his thought and the narrow way
in which comparative rationalities are at play. It is worth stressing how this is again
facilitated by the mathematical and monetary that I previously showed connected
tomeasures andweights.Walter turns his thinking intomoney, and onemight then
associate it quite rightly with the notable growth of monetization across Europe
in this period. Money is a convenient method of account and facilitates compari-
son. This is especially so because in the transactions described, very little money
as object would in fact move. Workers were not paid, oxen not rented, manure not
bought. Money facilitates comparing, and hidden within the usually quiet work of
large-scale estate management, comparison probably was a significant element in
thinking and practice. Walter is probably a tip of a comparative iceberg.
Comparisons are odious
The author John Lydgate (1370–1451) has to hold pride of place in reflections on
later medieval English comparison. He after all provides us with one of the most
pregnant and quoted remarks on comparison of any age: “Comparisons are odious.”
Lydgate’s is a sort of legal account, so law or adjudication is one of the elements
within which the comparative works. In this case, we have the account of a trial
before two judges, “the hardy lyon” and the “emperial egle”—these were, Lydgate
says, “the dredful royal judges.”The issue they facedwas complex but not “too deep,”
as Lydgate put it. The judges needed to listen to the arguments of the horse, the
goose, and the sheep and to decide, and I quote, “whyche of them was to man most
profitable (v. 25):”36 To be brief, they make their cases. The horse and goose rather
confidently; the sheep sheepishly, but he makes some good points too, playing the
bashful passive soul who only inadvertently has managed to provide the vellum for
books and the wool to fend off winter.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that within this poem, in stanza 9, there is a
section on the relation of the word horse to concepts, as in cheval leads to chevalier,
or that “in Duch a rider called is knight.”37 One can point out here what might
35 Lamond, On Husbandry, 27
36 John Lydgate/Max Degenhardt (eds.), The Hors, Goos, and the Sheepe, Erlangen/Leipzig 1900,
49.
37 Lydgate/Degenhardt, Hors, Goos, and the Sheepe, 51.
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seem obvious: Language and translation or travel can be—but are not inevitably—a
great invitation to comparative thinking. Lydgate’s move is a small one, but among
Bacon’s most characteristic sections of the Opus Majus was that on the importance
and utility of learning languages.38 Forms of translation, like forms of discovery,
lurk, and their relationship to comparing is interesting because they might entice
the practice out of the woodwork, so to speak.
In the end, the judges reject all three animals’ claims of superiority, even as
the horse has challenged them as to whether, “to put it simply, whether a goose or
a sheep in any way can be likened or compared to a horse”39 (150–154). Can they
indeed? The poem proves yes, but should they be? From stanza 72, one gets the
judgment of the Lion and Eagle. They argue for calm and complacency in one’s lot;
they tell:
“The horse, be kynde to live in travaille,
Goose, with her goselynges to swymme in the lake,
The sheepe, whos wollis doth so moche availe,
In her pasture grasen and mery make.
{Their} comparisouns of one assent forsake
Allwey remembryng, howe Gode and nature
To a goode ende made evry creature. ”40
The conclusion is quite pointed, bringing both moral and social concerns to the
fore:
“Odious of olde is all comparisouns
And of comparisouns engendered is hattrede,
Al folk be not of lyke condicions
Nor lyke disposid of thought, word or deed.”41
Here we find for the first time this aphorism of considerable durability in English:
Comparisons are odious. First, the poemwould seem tomake a literary comparison
to comment on the practice of social comparison and social circumstances. One
sort of context affects another. The practice of literary comparison might have an
interesting relation to the social, and while this chapter has not tried to assess the
literary comparative tropes, here one becomes aware that there might have been an
interesting crossover. However, the key is probably Lydgate’s desire to bring social
or ethical commentary to the fore just because there were new challenges, even
anxieties about the business of comparing.
38 Opus Majus, part three, 75-115 in Burke translation.
39 Lydgate/Degenhardt, The Hors, Goos, and the Sheepe, 55.
40 Lydgate/Degenhardt, The Hors, Goos, and the Sheepe, 73-74.
41 Lydgate/Degenhardt, The Hors, Goos, and the Sheepe, 74.
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Looking back on the tensions around the legislation on consumption and tax-
ation and the resentments these both revealed and engendered, it is hard not to
see Lydgate’s work as a response. What is more, other later medieval social ex-
pression of considerable popularity would seem to be grappling with the relation
between the diversity of statuses and lives.The different sorts of people with whom
later medieval England was plainly fascinated is so clear fromThe Canterbury Tales
(1387–1400). Here Chaucer describes the 24 pilgrims “to telle yow al the condicioun
of ech of hem, so as it semed me,//And whiche they weren and of what degree” and
puts juxtaposition if not comparison to the test as to whether they are different.42
However, there is no large moralizing frame in Chaucer—this is not Dante.
Such moralizing work, however, was taking place in other areas of art at the same
time, and Lydgate knew it. There seems to be a comparing impulse at work in the
theme of the Danse Macabre or Dance of Death, for instance. This image, created
apparently in Paris in the 1420s, depicts all the sorts of people, each finding that,
in the end, notwithstanding their differences, death would unite them and find
them the same, except for their state of grace. It is not surprising to find that our
same John Lydgate provided his own English version of the Dance of Death.43 As
a comparison, the diversity of social types and the sameness of their attitude to
death are set at play.
The fifteenth century also saw, contemporary with Lydgate, the arrival of the
remarkable cadaver tombs.44 They seem to be in close connection with the Danse
Macabre.The tombs feature verisimilar carvings of the subject in his or her worldly
splendor on the top. Underneath, however, as it were in the ground,we find instead
the effects of time and corruption, the carving below the cadaver, sometimes just
a skeleton, sometimes wasted flesh, maybe with the odd worm. It would be hard
not to see here again a sort of visual comparing of before and after, very much
in line with the important point that the body’s splendor, the person’s wealth, did
not matter. The differences are underlined by the act of comparison. Chaucer’s
granddaughter Alice, Duchess of Suffolk, was a rare woman who opted for this
42 Geoffrey Chaucer/JillMann (ed.), TheCanterburyTales, HarmondsworthUK,General Prologue,
lines 38-41.
43 See Lydgate’s in Florence Warren (ed.), The Dance of Death, Early English Text Society, OS 181,
London 1931. See Sophie Oosterwijk, Of Corpses, Constables and Kings: The Danse Macabre
in Late Medieval and Renaissance Culture, in: Journal of the British Archaeological Association
157 (2004): 61-90; and Amy Appleford, The Dance of Death in London: John Carpenter, John
Lydgate, and the Daunce of Poulys, in: Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies (2008) 38,
285-314.
44 See Kathleen Cohen, Metamorphosis of a Death Symbol: The Transi Tomb in the Late Middle Ages
and the Renaissance,Berkeley/London 1973; PamelaM. King, The Iconography of theWakeman
Cenotaph in Tewkesbury Abbey, in: Transactions of the Bristol and Gloucestershire Archaeological
Society 103 (1985), 141-48; and Paul Binski, Medieval Death: Ritual and Representation, Ithaca
1996, 139-52.
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Fig. 1: Cadaver Tomb of Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury, Can-
terbury Cathedral, Kent, built circa 1443.
Fig. 2: Cadaver Tomb of Alice Chaucer, Duchess of Suffolk, Ewelme
Church, Oxforshire, built circa 1475.
tomb style. She was the tertium comparationis, her body in the middle casket, the
depiction of her social person on top, the image of her cadaver below, each brought
into relation with her true person: body for the resurrection and immortal soul.
While Lydgate’s thinking probably grew alongside these wider concerns with a
new sort of comparative or juxtaposing social vision, his statements remain virtu-
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ally the first English commentary on the practice of comparisons itself. Comparison
is criticized as tending to the unethical and the un-Christian, but it plays the role
here of supporting social norms as well. There is still a sense that people cannot,
compared to each other, improve themselves, and it is a crossover sort of perfor-
mance; medieval social complacency and religious charity pushing back against
something perhaps a bit too egotistical or simply too this-worldly.
Lydgate’s final four lines quoted above deserve attention and might be pro-
found. It is possible, on the framework that he provides, to see that comparison is
especially odious because it is futile, an operation akin to what philosophers call
a category mistake. There are places, we might imagine, where one can usefully
evaluate and compare, but there are others in which the operation is both idle and
conducive to unhappiness. It is not, on this account, possible for comparison to be
a useful practice in such human cases.
The laws
Aside from Roger Bacon, the most comprehensive use of comparison for analysis
is certainly that of Sir John Fortescue (1395–1477), one of the most notable English
jurists and political theorists of the latter parts of the Middle Ages. In his mid-40s,
he attained the position of chief justice of the King’s Bench. In the 1460s, while in
exile with the defeated Lancastrian king, Fortescue wrote a dialogue—In Praise of
the Laws of England—to educate the Lancastrian crown prince of England, who had
been raised and lived in a foreign realm and who needed some education about his
own country—just like the fictive prince and chancellor in the dialogue.
Clearly stimulated by the experience of exile and the prospects of return, Fortes-
cue opened up the logics of comparison much more than had his contemporaries.
There is certainly an argument to be made that war, the Hundred Years war, helped
to make political and national comparison more meaningful or apt. The particu-
lar facts of the book sharpen this: The Prince who planned to recover his kingdom
has focused on martial skills and the arts of war; but his interlocutor, the Chancel-
lor, wants to intervene and tell him that knowledge of and respect for the laws is
essential to successful rule.
Fortescue’s book sets out to argue for the worthy character of the laws of Eng-
land and its commitment to a certain sort of what we might call constitutional
regime, namely, a dominium politicum et regale, a political and royal realm.45 The bur-
den of this sort of state is that the laws exist by consent of the people and the king,
45 Found in John Fortescue/Shelley Lockwood (eds. and trans.),Onthe LawsandGovernance of Eng-
land, Cambridge 1997. For discussion of Fortescue additionally to Lockwood, see S. B. Chrimes,
Sir John Fortescue andHis Theory of Dominion, in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 17
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and the king is bound to the laws. For the purposes of seeking out practices of
comparison, it is clear that the two species of monarchy are being set up in paral-
lel. In the event, one is represented typically by France, one by England. However,
this is only part of the comparative story: The second framing comparison is the
contrast between the Civil Law and the English or Common Law. In Chapter 19, the
chancellor moves to answer the Prince’s question as to whether the “laws of Eng-
land deserve to be adjudged as fitting, effective, and convenient for this kingdom
of England as the civil laws are for the Empire.” Then he says an interesting thing:
“Comparisons, indeed, Prince, as I remember you said at one time, are reputedodi-
ous, and so I amnot fond ofmaking thembut youwill be able to gathermore effec-
tively whether one more richly deserves praise than the other, not from my opin-
ion, but from those points wherein they differ, the superiorities of the more ex-
cellent law will appear after due reflection. Let us, therefore, bring forward some
cases of this sort, so that you can weigh in a fair balance which of the laws shows
its superiorities better and more justly”.46
First, this maxim reveals a self-conscious reference to John Lydgate’s conclusion
about the pernicious character of comparing, but one also learns from Fortescue
the reasons why comparison is deemed valuable. He makes clear that comparison
is a form of demonstration. Certainly, on that basis, one can imagine both the
illustrations of the cadaver tombs and the discussions of Walter of Henley coming
tomind. In taking thismode, Sir John turns to the things themselves in conjunction
with each other rather than to his own “opinions.” The idea is that comparative
thinking forces a sort of discipline onto those making the judgement.
Themethod of observation via comparison would seem to be a strong tendency
of Fortescue’s thought. “In order that these things may appear more clearly to you,
consult your experience of both governments; begin with the results of only royal
government, such as that with which the king of France rules his subjects; then
examine the practical effect of the royal and political government, such as that with
which the king of England rules over his subject people.”47 His injunction here to
“consult your experience of both governments” really lays the stress on reflection
as investigation. This move has the effect of bringing things together in tandem in
order to draw out further concrete reflection. This is the cognitive and logical core
of comparison as a mode of thought.
In substance, Fortescue moves through a series of targeted examples and com-
pares the facts—as he sometimes fancifully sees them—and opens out the argu-
(4th series, 1934): 117–147 and Felix Gilbert, Sir John Fortescue’s ‘dominium regale et politicum’,
in:Medievalia et Humanistica, II (1944), 88–97.
46 Fortescue/Lockwood, On the Laws and Governance of England, 29.
47 Fortescue/Lockwood, On the Laws and Governance of England, 49.
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ments and logics that allow one law to be assessed in this limited respect against
the other.The examples are the use of juries rather than mere witnesses; the use of
torture; the different definitions of a bastard; or the question of maternal versus
paternal importance in the legal status of children. His conclusion is perhaps un-
surprising, because he finds that the civil law is deficient in justice.More important
for the dynamics of comparing, Fortescue can properly be cited as the origin for
a cluster of comparative attitudes between France and England with considerable
resonance in English national reflection.
The discussion of legal comparison can widen out to social and ethnic compar-
ison, and it did so naturally within Fortescue—in part, because his analysis of the
difference between France and England is based partly on a perception that two
very wealthy countries had, in part because of their legal constitutions, produced
very different results for their people. According to him, the French people suf-
fered arbitrary billeting of the king’s armies, they had to pay tax if they wanted an
essential such as salt, and they were so impoverished that they had to drink wa-
ter; whereas to quote him, in England, “They do not drink water, except those who
sometimes abstain from other drinks by way of devotional or penitential zeal.”48
This needs a lot more reflection and investigation, but the emergence of the
popular national kingdom especially in the context of warfare might well have pro-
vided an impetus for comparative political thinking. In that realm, as often as not,
comparison’s otiose quality was easier to overlook thanwithin the realm of personal
and moral reflection. Certain sorts of comparison tended to social disharmony, as
Lydgate argued. But comparison across national lines not only helped to inscribe
those national lines, but to give national or ethnic units their own content, and this
included validating pride or superiority. Here we can compare Bacon’s thinking on
religion and Fortescue’s on laws to see how comparison enabled sharper, more ob-
jective reflection, even as it might work to strengthen the prejudice built into the
framework.49 When it came to nations, comparison was less important, because
the odium was perhaps more acceptable.
If in personal religious or ethical life, comparison was apparently frowned
upon, its methodological powers of demonstration, with a hint of the objective,
could brush off such incivility in other quarters. War and the needs of the king-
dom wanted the truth that comparison might deliver. Other sorts of comparative
48 Fortescue/Lockwood, On the Laws and Governance of England, 52.
49 This was by no means a natural path. A work of nationalist vigour, such as George Warner
(ed.), The Libelle of Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on theUse of Sea-Power 1436, Oxford 1926, shows rel-
atively little clearly comparative thought. There is arguably even less in John Gough Nichols
(ed.),William Worcestre’s Boke of Noblesse, London 1860: for Worcestre the French might be
dishonourable but they and the English are not really compared. Indeed, if there is a com-
parative turn it comes in the guise of learning lessons from history, a potentially interesting
avenue for further reflection.
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practices, however, such as whether money was weighed correctly so that bread
could be sold honestly, became routinized practices or networks. They remained
comparisons but methodological ones. This does not mean that they might not
gather political importance later when the poor were urged to eat cake or when
the use of the metric system might have meant selling beer or milk in some size
that was not an old-fashioned pint.
Tracing the differences between one sort of comparison and another, seeing
how they worked together and worked against each other, will be the big job in un-
derstanding the dynamics of comparison in medieval England or anywhere else. It
would not be right from this selective survey to say that comparison was a common
mode of reflection in medieval England. One might argue that it was an embed-
ded form in terms ofmarket operations andmoney transactions.However, in social
and ethical life, it developed a complicated and limited place. Its disruptive charac-
ter in some social contexts was at least suspected. The religious element here was
important too. The suspicion that Lydgate brought was not isolated. One should
trust that Fortescue saw his point in earnest, even if he was willing to push care-
fully forward. It is an interesting moral turn, attempting, in the very moments
that comparison was rearing its social head, to push back against it. A sermon of
around 1400 stressed that looking at each other’s religious performance when we
hoped to be saved was pernicious. The preacher feared the logic of competition,
making people act as if it were a race to heaven; and for him, that idea was part of
what was wrong with much contemporary religion, “We shulden reste in this hope
that we shal come to hevene, and leve ich veyne comparisouns.”50 These lines come
from work associated with that proto-Protestant heresy, native to England, known
as Lollardy, initiated by the Oxford philosopher John Wyclif. Here one finds com-
parison dangerous to the soul. Vain comparisons indeed. In the end, one finds that
the tentativemedieval use of comparison examined here has turned up some rather
revolutionary comparers of law and religion, but also some strong and perhaps for-
gotten warnings about the perils of using comparison at all. Medieval ambivalence
toward comparison set limits to its use.
 
 
 
50 ThomasArnold (ed.), Select EnglishWorks of JohnWyclif, volume 1: Sermons on theGospels,Oxford
1869. Sermon XVII for the “the sevententh sondai aftir trinite”, 42. These are not now taken
to be by Wyclif but by his followers.
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The Shifting Grounds of Comparison
in the French Renaissance
The Case of Louis Le Roy
Andrea Frisch
Abstract1
Comparison between the present and what was perceived as a lost past was the bedrock of
Renaissance intellectual life. However, rather than come ever nearer, the horizon of univer-
sal—and even simply shared—values supposedly located in Greco-Roman Antiquity receded
as the past began to appear both irredeemably contingent and deeply foreign in the intense
light cast on it by the philological labor originally undertaken to restore it. Louis Le Roy’s 1575
treatiseDe la vicissitude ou variété des choses en l’univers offers a compact illustration
of the ways in which the Renaissance Humanist practice of comparison ultimately revealed
profound differences between past and present, thereby undermining its own motivating as-
sumptions.
 
As is well known, one of the primary foundations of the cultural ideology of the Eu-
ropean Renaissance was the imitation of ancient examples, a practice that involved
comparing the Greco-Roman past to the European present. There are countless
statements about the utility of Ancient history for the Renaissance reader in Hu-
manist historiography of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.2 In the preface to
1 Research on this article has been supported by a Mercator fellowship which was granted by
the Collaborative Research Center SFB 1288 “Practices of Comparing. Changing and Order-
ing the World,” Bielefeld University, Germany, funded by the German Research Foundation
(DFG).
2 The locus classicus for this desire for communion with the ancient past is Petrarch, who in
his unfinished “Letter to Posterity” wrote “Among the many subjects which interested me,
I dwelt especially upon antiquity, for our own age has always repelled me, so that, had it
not been for the love of those dear to me, I should have preferred to have been born in any
other period than our own. In order to forget my own time, I have constantly striven to place
myself in spirit in other ages, and consequently I delighted in history” (I cite fromMarkMusa’s
English translation in The Italian Renaissance Reader, New York 1987, 6. Of course, Petrarch’s
status as the “first” Humanist has been vigorously debated and his relationship to Antiquity
nuanced in specialized scholarship on the question; see, e.g., Ronald G. Witt, In the Footsteps
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his widely-circulated French translation of Plutarch’s Lives (itself a suite of com-
parisons, also known as the Parallel Lives, that juxtaposes famous figures from
Greek and Roman Antiquity), Jacques Amyot declares that History “est une règle et
instruction certaine, qui par exemples du passé nous enseigne à juger du present, & à prévoir
l’avenir” (is a certaine rule and instruction, which by examples past, teacheth us to
judge of things present, and to foresee things to come).3 The historian’s claim to
revivify the values and practices of a distant time was, moreover, hardly limited to
secular arts and letters; it was also at the core of the Protestant Reformation. In
fact, one of the few places in which the term “renaissance” is used in France during
the period itself is in Protestant Church history, such as Théodore de Bèze’s 1580
Histoire ecclésiastique or in Simon Goulart’s account of the French Wars of Religion,
which recounts the “laborieuse renaissance de l’Eglise Françoise.”4 One could therefore
say that comparison, in this case between the present and what was perceived as a
lost past, was the bedrock of Renaissance intellectual life, insofar as it was framed
in terms of Renaissance and Reformation.
Amyot explicitly stipulates that the kind of instruction he has in mind is not
based upon abstract moral precepts, which he sees as the domain of philosophy
rather than history, but rather on the record of specific actions. Examples are more
apt to teach effectively than mere precepts, he maintains, because examples are
particular, and include an account of circumstances. Implicit here, of course, is
the belief that the “circumstances” of the past and those of the present (as well
as those of the future) are comparable in all of the ways relevant to the concerns
of moral philosophy that the Humanists sought to address by turning to Greco-
Roman history. The implicit assumption of a common ground of comparison is
evident when Amyot imagines an objection to his method of teaching prudence
via history: He does not worry that past conditions might be too different from
present ones to license imitation of the Ancients as a pedagogical program, but
rather anticipates the charge that direct experience ismore effective than is reading
for this purpose. To this Amyot replies that experience is certainly a good teacher,
of the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni, Leiden 2000. For an overview of
the status of Antiquity in the Renaissance, see Georg Voigt, DieWiederbelebung des classischen
Alterthums: Oder, das erste Jahrhundert des Humanismus, Berlin 1960.
3 Amyot’s French translation of Plutarch was first published in 1559 in Paris. This French ver-
sionwas republished several times throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and
served as the basis of ThomasNorth’s Lives of theNobleGrecians andRomanes, published in Lon-
don in 1579. I cite North’s English versions here.
4 The extended title of Bèze’s History is Histoire Ecclesiastique Des Eglises Reformées Au Royaume
de France: en laquelle est descrite au vray la renaissance & accroissement d’icelles depuis l’an MDXXI
iusques en l’annee MDLXIII, leur reiglement ou discipline, Anvers 1580. Goulart uses this expres-
sion in hisMemoires de l’estat de France, sous Charles IX (“Meidelbourg” [Geneva]: “Henry Wolf”
[Eustache Vignon] 1578, 430v).
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but it carries great risks; reading history, on the other hand, allows one to acquire
prudence from the comfort of one’s study. Thus, in Amyot’s widely read text, the
past conveyed in history books is tacitly situated alongside the present (and indeed,
the future) upon a common ground of moral and political action.
In order to grasp the character of Renaissance comparison, and ultimately to
trace the effects of this particular gesture of comparison (which shall be my primary
concern here), one point is crucial: In the case of both secular Humanism and
Christian reform, the comparison between past and present proceeded in terms
that were at once figural and empirical. For the Humanists, Greco-Roman Antiq-
uity was both a quasimythical Golden Age and a set of historical phenomena that
could become the object of philological research. For the Reformers (particularly
the Calvinists in France and Switzerland), Christian doctrine was both God-given
andmanifested in the practices of the early church. In other words, the past against
which the present was to be measured functioned both as a site of universal val-
ues and as a set of contingent historical conditions that could be researched and
thereby restored.
Obviously, the assumption in both secular and religious “recovery” of the past
was that the historical moments under scrutiny were privileged manifestations of
universal values that were the ultimate telos of the undertaking. However, rather
than come ever nearer, the horizon of universal—and even simply shared—values
receded as the past began to appear both irredeemably contingent and profoundly
foreign in the intense light cast on it by the philological labor originally undertaken
to restore it.
This is a case—I say “a case,” but we are talking about a broad cultural shift—in
which the act of comparing had truly transformative effects, precisely because
those effects were completely unforeseen by those who undertook the compari-
son. In many contemporary critiques of the practice of comparison, there is either
an implicit assumption or an explicit critique that the agent of comparison holds
all the power.5 Yet here, at what can be seen as a crucial turning point in the in-
tellectual history of comparison, the practice of comparison itself destabilized the
hierarchy that it was meant to subtend. I shall sketch this process of destabiliza-
tion in broad strokes before I turn to the writings of the sixteenth-century French
Humanist Louis Le Roy for a more detailed examination of its consequences.
5 See the essays in Rita Felski/Susan Stanford Friedman (eds.), Comparison: Theories, Approaches,
Uses, Baltimore 2013, esp. Rajagopalan Radhakrishnan’s opening essay, “Why Compare?” and
the essays in Part Two, “Comparison in theWorld: Uses andAbuses”; NatalieMelas,All theDif-
ference in theWorld: Postcoloniality and theEnds of Comparison, Stanford 2007; AramA. Yengoyan
(ed.),Modes of Comparison: Theory andPractice, AnnArbor 2006. Formethodological reflections
on the problem of ethnocentric comparison in the legal context, see Günter Frankenberg,
Comparative Law as Critique, Cheltenham/Northampton 2016, esp. Chapter 8, “Thick compari-
son?”.
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As North American scholars in comparative literature have convincingly ar-
gued, Renaissance techniques developed to recover a lost historical past, and the
technologies that supported and disseminated the abundant and controversial
fruits of Renaissance historical research, eventually upset rather than consolidated
the hierarchy between an idealized past, and a degenerate present postulated
by the original comparison.6 The evidence that was assembled with the goal
of restoring Roman law, to take one of the most far-reaching examples, ended
up being read as undeniable proof of the inapplicability of Roman law to the
sixteenth-century monarchies that had sought to claim Roman heritage.7 The
more that Humanist researchers learned about Antiquity, the more difficult it
seemed to articulate the relevance of the Antique past to the antiquarian’s present.
In other words, the a priori assumption of a common ground, of a fundamental
resemblance, which implicitly legitimated the broad comparison between past and
present in the first place, did not survive the local acts of comparison that were
intended to build upon that very ground.
Michel de Montaigne was famously skeptical about the postulate of resem-
blance that implicitly motivated so much Humanist scholarship in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. In the third volume of his Essais (published in 1588), he
observed that
“La consequence que nous voulons tirer de la ressemblance des evenemens est mal seure,
d'autant qu'ils sont tousjours dissemblables: il n'est aucune qualité si universelle en cette
image des choses que la diversité et varieté”
—which Montaigne’s first English translator John Florio rendered as “The conse-
quence we seeke to draw from the conference of events is unsure, because they are
ever dissemblable. No quality is so universall in this surface of things as variety and
diversity.”8
6 The paradoxical, self-undermining quality of the project of imitating Antiquity in the Re-
naissance is highlighted in work in comparative literature by Thomas Greene, The Light in
Troy. Imitation and Discovery in Renaissance Poetry, New Haven/London 1982; David Quint, Ori-
gin andOriginality in Renaissance Literature: Versions of the Source, NewHaven/London 1983; and
Timothy Hampton, Writing from History. The Rhetoric of Exemplarity in Renaissance Literature,
Ithaca/London 1990.
7 For an account of this phenomenon in sixteenth-century France, see Donald Kelley, Founda-
tions of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance, New
York/London 1970.
8 The first two books of Michel deMontaigne’s Essaiswere published in 1580 (Bordeaux: Simon
Millanges); the essay cited here, “De l’expérience,” first appeared in the three-volume 1588
edition (Paris: Abel L’Angelier). Themodern edition of reference, which I cite, is that of Pierre
Villey and V.L. Saulnier (Paris: PUF, several printings beginning in 1965, with identical pag-
ination; available online at https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/efts/ARTFL/projects/montaigne/).
The quoted passage is on page 1065. Florio’s English translation first appeared in 1603. I cite
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In Richard Popkin’s magisterial History of Scepticism, Montaigne’s overall pos-
ture of doubt is seen as a manifestation of a loss of faith in religious authority that
spread throughout Europe in the wake of the Reformation.9 The essayist’s doubts
about resemblance, however, suggest rather a loss of faith in the quintessentially
Humanist habit of comparing the Ancient past to the present. If events are ul-
timately steeped in contingency, we cannot simply assume that history “is a cer-
taine rule and instruction, which by examples past, teacheth us to judge of things
present, and to foresee things to come.” In questioning the legitimacy of the as-
sumption of a common ground for the comparison of past to present, Montaigne
crystallizes the fundamental tension within the Renaissance Humanist practice of
comparison: Whereas the impetus for comparison was an assumed resemblance,
the effect of comparison was a heightened sense of difference.
Montaigne articulated as a philosophical principle a perspective that had be-
come increasingly apparent in French Renaissance historiography, where the Hu-
manist practice of comparison endorsed by Amyot was applied to an ever greater
variety of material. Over a decade before Montaigne published the third volume of
his essays, the Humanist Louis Le Roy had attempted to come to terms with the
cultural variety and diversity that Renaissance philology (and European expansion)
had revealed. Le Roy’s treatise De la vicissitude ou variété des choses en l’univers (1575),
a wide-ranging survey of human activity across time and space encompassing all
the known regions of the globe from the beginning of recorded time, was reprinted
six times at Paris between 1575 and 1584, was translated into Italian in 1585 (this
was reprinted in 1592), and translated into English in 1594.10 Le Roy wrote a good
generation after the advent of Humanist education and the rise of Reformation
polemics in France under François I. His career was largely concerned with the re-
ception of Greek and Latin texts, and especially with configuring the relation of
Greek political thought to contemporary France (he translated into French, among
others, works by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plato, all with extensive prefaces and
copious glosses that struggle to articulate the relationship between Greek wisdom
and current French affairs). Le Roy’s book on vicissitude is in many ways a compact
from the 1613 edition (Essays written in French by Michael Lord of Montaigne, Knight of the Order
of S. Michael, gentleman of the French Kings chamber: done into English, according to the last French
edition, by John Florio reader of the Italian tongue, London 1613, 600).
9 TheHistory of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (third edition, Oxford University Press, 2003).
Earlier editions published as The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1960) and The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (University of California
Press, 1979).
10 Loys Le Roy,De la Vicissitude ou Varieté des choses en l’univers et concurrence des armes et des lettres
par les premieres et plus illustres du monde, depuis le temps où à commencé la civilité, & memoire
humaine jusques à present, Paris 1575. French citations are to this edition. For longer passages,
I give the 1594 English translation by Robert Ashley (London, 1594).
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illustration of the way in which the Renaissance Humanist practice of comparison
ultimately undermined its own motivating assumptions.
In the summary titles of the Vicissitude’s twelve “books” or chapters, one can see
that Le Roy’s treatise is made up of comparisons between various aspects of the
civilizations of what he calls “les plus célébres peuples du monde.” As we might
expect, the Ancient Greeks emerge as a privileged term of comparison, as one can
see in the full title of Book V: Of the Learning, Poesie, Eloquence, Power, and other Excel-
lencie of the Greekes. A Comparison of themwith the Egiptians, Assyrians, Persians, Indians.
The Empire of Greece. A Comparison of Alexander the great, with Cyrus, Agesilaus, Themis-
tocles, Pericles, Achilles, Vlysses, Diomedes, Bacchus, Hercules, and others. A Comparison of
the Grecian Philosophers, with the Chaldees of Babylon, and the Priestes of Egipt. The Nobil-
itie of auncient Greece.The Artisans and workes of the Grecians.The Ancient Romans take
over this role from the Greeks in Books VI and VII (in which “militie” or warfare is
added to the list of Rome’s qualities along with those that had been attributed to
Greece). One can already get a sense of how Humanist research into the ancient
world has expanded the field of play to include, among others, the Assyrians, the
Egyptians, and the Chaldeans as candidates for comparison with Greece and Rome
and thereby with the European present. However, it is essential to recall here that
Le Roy’s sources of information about these civilizations were Ancient Greek and
Roman historians, sowe have not yet got to the point whereGreco-RomanAntiquity
has lost its privilege as that which delineates the very ground of Renaissance com-
parison. Indeed, this chapter ends with comparisons “of the Latin Authors with
the Greek; namely of Cicero with Demosthenes” and “a Comparison of the Latin
tongue with the Greek.”
Book IX, by contrast, is one place where we might locate a real shift in the
framework of Le Roy’s enterprise of comparison.The civilization under considera-
tion in this chapter is that of what Le Roy calls the Arabs or Sarrasins, about whom
there are obviously no ancient sources. Now at first, in Book VIII, the Arabs are
compared, perhaps inevitably, to the Greeks and the Romans, as well as to the other
ancient civilizations that had already appeared in the previous book (the summary
of this book ends with “A Comparison of the Arabian learning with the Greek, Egip-
tian, Chaldean, Persian, Romain, or Latin: Of the Arabian tongue, with the Greek,
Latin, and Hebrew”). But in its companion Book IX, we get a chapter devoted ex-
clusively to what we could here call a “post-Ancient” civilization, one that does not
(indeed, cannot) depend on Ancient Greco-Roman sources. And it turns out that
Le Roy does not frame this chapter in terms of comparison at all: It is an account
of the spread of Islam. Le Roy effectively abandons comparison in his narrative of
Islamic expansion, which thereby serves as a turning point, a hinge between an
account of history in which “the most celebrated peoples in the world” supply both
the grounds and the privileged term of comparison, on the one hand, and an ac-
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count of history structured by a chronological narrative whose ground repeatedly
shifts, on the other.
In the latter part of Le Roy’s treatise, in the absence of a common ground, peo-
ple and events are not so much compared as they are juxtaposed. This change in
approach is not immediately apparent: Having arrived at the present in his ac-
count of global history, Le Roy trumpets in the summary title to his Book X the
technological advances of his own age that were unknown to Greco-Roman Antiq-
uity, namely, printing, the nautical compass, and gunpowder. 11 We may note that
Montaigne made fun of European self-congratulation on that score:
“Nous escriïons dumiracle de l’invention de nostre artillerie, de nostre impression; d'autres
hommes, un autre bout du monde à la Chine, en jouyssoit mille ans auparavant” (908)—
“Wemake amighty business of the invention of artillery and printing, which other
men at the other end of the world, in China, had a thousand years ago” (510).
Next to Montaigne’s cosmopolitan skepticism, Le Roy’s European claim on these
inventions initially appears merely to invert the past-over-present hierarchy of Re-
naissance comparison while retaining its implicit grounding in Greco-Roman An-
tiquity. But the rest of Le Roy’s tenth book suggests that like Montaigne, he has, in
fact, broken with the Renaissance practice of comparison.
Le Roy is frequently invoked as an early exponent of the rhetoric of progress
that would be taken up and turned into a research program by the likes of Bacon
and Descartes.12 Yet it becomes clear that this chapter of the treatise on vicissi-
11 Robert Ashley’s 1594 English translation of the full title, nearly as long as the chapter itself,
and to whose highlighted passages I shall refer inmymain text, is “How that in this age haue
bin restored the tongues, and knowledges, after they had surceased about almost twelue
hundred yeres, hauing newly receaued great light, and increase; where are considered, the
meruailes of this present age, thorough Europe, Asia, Africke, The new-found lands, in the
East,West, North, and South: beginning at the great,& inuincible Tamberlan, whose power,
valiancy, and felicity is briefly represented. During whose raign began the restitution of
Learning & of Arts: By what persons & means it hath bin continued in diuers nations: The
Princes that most haue fauoured it. Moreouer how that many goodly things vnknowen to
antiquity haue bin newly found out, especially Printing, The direction to sayle by the nee-
dle of steele rubbed on the Lode-stone, carying alwaies the point answerable to the place
where we imagine the pole Artique, by means whereof the whole Sea hath bin sayled ouer,
and thewhole world knowne thorough out. Then the skill of Ordinance, andArtillery, which
hath made all other auncient military instruments to cease, which by this one are all sur-
passed in impetuosity, swiftnes, and violence. Also how amongst themeruailes of this age
haue risen new and strange Diseases vnknowen heretofore, and diuers Sects haue sprong
vp in all countries, which haue much altered the common quiet, and weakned the mutual
charitie of men.”
12 A recent intervention in this direction (which includes a survey of previous arguments by
Hans Baron, Anthony Grafton, andMarc Fumaroli for Le Roy’s modernity), is Emma Claussen,
A Sixteenth-Century Modern? Ancients and Moderns in Loys Le Roy’s De la vicissitude, in:
206 Andrea Frisch
tude is not at all a simple hierarchical inversion according to which the European
present is seen as superior to the Ancient past, and the future as potentially better
than the present. Rather than situate the beginning of the “restitution of learning
and the arts”—that is, the Renaissance—in Europe, Le Roy locates this moment in
the reign of Tamerlane, the fourteenth-century Turko-Mongol military leader who
conquered most of the Muslim world, central Asia, and parts of India.13
After an extended account of Tamerlane’s conquests, Le Roy explains that
“During the raigne of TAMBERLAN, began the restitution of the tongues; and of all
sciences. The first that applyed himselfe to this worke was Franciscus Petrarcha,
opening the Libraries which til then were shut vp; and beating away the dust and
filth, from the good bookes of auncient authours” (108–9).
The third term of comparison represented by the narrative of Islamic history here
disrupts a practice of comparison between (Greco-Roman) past and (European)
present, creating a genealogy for the Renaissance that abandons the implicit pos-
tulate of resemblance that subtended the more static comparisons between Greco-
Roman excellence and the rest of the world.The narrative of Islamic expansion has
not merely shaken the ground upon which Renaissance Humanist comparisons
were made; it has effected a qualitative shift in the terrain upon which civiliza-
tions are compared.
Early Modern French Studies 37 (2/2015), 76-92. Such readings privilege the work’s final chap-
ter, in which Le Roy more or less throws up his hands in the face of the contradictions his
analysis has revealed, and retreats to an invocation of Divine Providence as the only stable
point of reference in human history. And because God’s will is unknowable, Le Roy suggests
that we might consider believing that perhaps things will get better after all. I tend to agree
with the assessment of John B. Bury, who notes that “having conducted us to this pessimistic
conclusion Le Roy finds it repugnant, and is unwilling to acquiesce in it. Like an embarrassed
dramatist he escapes from the knot which he has tied by introducing the deus ex machina.
Philosophically, Le Roy’s conclusion is lame enough.We are asked to set aside the data of ex-
perience and act on an off-chance” (The Idea of Progress: An Enquiry Into its Origin and Growth,
New York 1932, 34). Bury, however, ultimately finds in this gesture “the determination of the
optimist to escape from the logic of his own argument” (ibid.). I find more desperation than
optimism in Le Roy’s conclusion.
13 This aspect of Le Roy’s account of history was highlighted by Eric Voegelin in “Political Theory
and the Pattern of General History”, in: American Political Science Review 38 (1944); repr. in The
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin vol. 10, Columbia, Missouri 2000, 157-167. It has also received
attention from scholars of the English Renaissance working with the 1594 English transla-
tion of Le Roy’s treatise, such as Mary Floyd-Wilson, English Ethnicity and Race in Early Modern
Drama, New York 2003. For amore detailed account of Tamerlane’s fortunes in Humanist let-
ters as they informed Le Roy’s portrait here, see Maria Elena Severini, Tamerlan vs. Bajazet:
L’origine de la modernité chez Loys Le Roy lecteur de Machiavel, in: Bibliothèque d’Humanisme
et Renaissance 76 (1/2014), 55-72.
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This shift profoundly changes the complexion of the remark about printing and
the compass, because it completely explodes the binary terms of the dominant com-
parison between Greco-Roman Antiquity and Renaissance Europe with which Le
Roy’s treatise begins. Not surprisingly, then, the thesis of a simple hierarchical in-
version on the old grounds of comparison runs into further obstacles in Book X. It
is indeed remarkable how quickly the celebratory tone of the opening lines of the
chapter summary, announcing the “marvels of the present time,” turns gloomy.
Le Roy is clearly not a fan of the third great “modern” invention, heavy artillery,
which he characterizes as more impetuous, swifter, and more violent than ancient
weapons. It is unambiguous here that Le Roy sees these “improvements” in a nega-
tive light. This pessimistic tone is amplified by the implicit irony of the concluding
lines of the title, which state that one of the “marvels” of the present age is the
appearance of new and strange diseases (the chapter itself suggests he is talking
about syphilis), and which further report that there has been an increase in reli-
gious strife, which has, as the English translation puts it, “weakened the mutual
charity of men.”
I want to take a closer look at how Le Roy characterizes the era of religious strife
in Book X because this is where one can most easily grasp the complex relationship
between “variety” and “vicissitude,” and understand their power to destabilize the
postulates of Renaissance Humanist practices of comparison. In the very same
chapter in which he celebrates a widespread revival of devotion to learning and the
arts, listing such quintessential “Renaissance” figures as Petrarch, Ficino, Budé,
Erasmus, Sleidan, and More, Le Roy deplores the utter depravity of his age in every
corner of the globe:
“Every where the publike estates have bin afflicted, changed, or destroied; and
every where the Religion troubled with heresies. Not only all Europe, but also the
farthest regions of Asia, and Africk; the inhabitants of the new found lands, and
of the East and West Indies being innumerable in multitude, and dispersed into
infinite places, have bin troubled with foreine and civile warres, long continued:
wherehence hath followed the excessive price of all things, with often famines
and pestilences. We must think that God being angrie with men, sendeth such
calamities generally, and particularly, to correct our vices; and to bring us to a
greater knowledge, and reverence of him: For there was never in the world more
wickednes, more impietie, or more disloialtie; Devocion is quenched; simplicitie
and innocencie mocked at; and there remayneth but a shadow of Iustice. All is
turned upside downe, nothing goeth as it ought.”14
14 The quote is on an unnumbered page between pages 112 and 113 in Ashley’s 1594 English
translation.
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Le Roy’s apocalyptic rhetoric enlists recognized topoi in the literature of the French
Wars of Religion, and it is clear that the experience of those conflicts is coloring his
view here.15 The larger point, however, is that Le Roy’s postulate of “variety,” origi-
nally enunciated to account for the increasingly complex and multifaceted view of
the past that emerged fromHumanist research in Greco-Roman sources, leads him
to paint an equally complex picture of the present, one in which it is hard to iden-
tify any dominant characteristic. Yes, we have compasses and gunpowder, but we
are also spreading disease with the help of our compasses and blasting each other
to bits with our new artillery. The postulate of variety, not just among different
entities, but within them, ultimately makes it impossible to create any sort of hier-
archy among the civilizations Le Roy considers in this volume; it also makes variety
(cultural difference) increasingly difficult to distinguish from vicissitude (changes
over timewithin a single culture). Both the terms and the criteria of comparison are
continually shifting, and as we see in the remarks on war and disease, individual
comparanda are portrayed as multifaceted and thus impossible to characterize in
any definitive way. In a universe of vicissitude, every possible term of comparison
is a moving target.
Throughout the work, Le Roy has chronicled how the “ordre & perfection” of
Antiquity had fallen into confusion. Looking back at Le Roy’s Book VI, one sees
that the account of Rome’s excellence has to share the same space with the account
of Rome’s decadence. Here, the complexity of the comparandum is less a function
of the level of detail in the portrait than it is due to the factoring in of time un-
derstood as an agent of inevitable change. Once “perfection” is conceived of as a
historical process rather than as a state of affairs, the “perfection” of Antiquity no
longer figures as a still point of comparison, but rather becomes simply one point in
time among others. It may still be “supérieure” to the present in some ways and “in-
férieure” in others, depending on the terms of comparison, but now its outstanding
feature is simply its historical difference, another cog in the wheel of variety and
vicissitude. The Ancient past as term of comparison goes from being a putatively
stable, self-situating object of nostalgia and a perfect model to be imitated, to an
imperfect object of imperfect knowledge that must continually be resituated.
Thus, in Le Roy’s eleventh chapter (of twelve), in which he attempts an overall
comparison between Greco-Roman Antiquity and his present day, the results are
mixed. Whereas at the outset of his treatise, Le Roy assumed Greek and Roman
excellence as the ground upon which civilizations could be compared, here, he per-
forms an analysis that posits excellence (and a series of other terms) as the tertium
15 I discuss inmore detail the relationship between Le Roy’s writings on the FrenchWars of Reli-
gion and his view of history in “Le Dissensus et l’exception française: Louis Le Roy, les guerres
de religion, et la politique internationale”, in: Paul-Alexis Mellet/Laurent Gerbier (eds.), Dis-
sensus: Pratiques et représentations de la diversité des opinions 1500–1650, Paris 2016, 127-140.
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comparationis according to which civilizations, including Ancient Greece and Rome,
can be evaluated. Moreover, rather than presume or establish a hierarchy between
the past and the present en bloc, Le Roy uses the principle of variety—a principle
originally articulated to manage the surfeit of information Humanist research into
the Greco-Roman past had yielded—to undertake a series of subcomparisons be-
tween different aspects of each civilization. Under this new framework, we are no
longer limited to contests whose finish line has been set a priori in Greco-Roman
Antiquity. Compared with a standard exterior to Antiquity, the best philosophers
still turn out to be those who lived in Ancient Greece; Demosthenes and Cicero are
still considered the best orators; the best historians are Herodotus, Thucydides,
Tacitus, and Livy. Yet Renaissance mathematicians are approaching the heights of
Euclid and Archimedes, and astrology and cosmography are undeniably more ad-
vanced than they were in Ptolemy’s time: “Cosmographie, and Astrologie, are so
beautified [illustrées], that if Ptolomey the father of them both were alive againe, he
would scarce know them [il lesmecognoistroit], being increased [augmentées] in such
sort by the late observations, and navigations” (126).
The (quite hazy) criteria of excellence, eminence, illustriousness, and so forth
ground acts of comparison whose results do not tally with those obtained via the
practice of comparison that assimilates excellence to the Antique past. Nor, as we
have just seen, does Le Roy’s penultimate chapter simply establish a new hierarchy
on the same ground by relocating excellence in the present (or the future). We have
already seen Le Roy’s ambivalence in the face of the technological advances of his
day; with this ambivalence in mind, we can better grasp the import of Le Roy’s use
of the verb “méconnaître” to describe what he imagines would be Ptolemy’s reac-
tion to Renaissance astrology and cosmography. Rather than see them as advanced
forms of the sciences he fathered, Le Roy suggests that he would simply not recog-
nize them as versions of the “same thing.” This is evidence of the difficulty Le Roy
has in making a theoretical distinction between progress and difference: At what
point does change within a single entity (vicissitude) produce something that is not
a subsequent development (whether seen as progress or degeneration), but rather
a different entity entirely (variety)? If Ptolemy, the father of cosmography, does not
recognize something as cosmography, can we still speak in terms of a common
ground of genealogical affiliation? If we cannot, on what grounds can we compare
them?
If Le Roy does in fact judge that progress has been made in astrology and cos-
mography—papering over the hint of incommensurability contained in his image
of a Ptolemy who does not recognize what is supposed to be his own intellectual
progeny—he privileges the lack of common ground between the European present
and the Ancient past in a remarkable passage in his final chapter. Here, he cat-
alogs that which distinguishes Antiquity from “our” present without reference to
any hierarchy between them:
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“Many things invented by theAncients, are lost. Thewisdomeof the Egiptians, Per-
sians, Indians, and Bactrians, hath not come unto us; many good Greek and Latine
Authours are not found; And amongst those that remayne, there are few agreable
to the present maners, and affaires. We do not build now adaies after the fashion
of Vitruuius; neither tyl the ground, nor plant, according to Varro, or Columella;
nor take foode or physick after the ordinance of Hippocrates, and Galen:We iudge
not according to the Ciuil Law of the Romaines; neither plead we as did Demos-
thenes, and Cicero; or gouerne our common wealthes, by the Lawes of Solon, and
Lycurgus; or following the politicke precepts of Plato, and Aristotle. We sing not
as did the Auncients.”(128)
This is neither a nostalgic lament nor a pitch for the latest fashion; it is simply
a recognition of difference. There is no “increase”; nothing has been “beautified”
(or disfigured). By virtue of having been “lost,” the Ancients have gone from be-
ing “excellent” to being simply “not agreable to the present maners, and affaires.”
“We sing not as did the Auncients”: neither better nor worse. The intersection of
variety and vicissitude in Le Roy’s treatise configures “cultures” and “civilizations”
as polyvalent and unstable, like Heraclitus’s river. His work suggests that a truly
comparative history would be infinite, ranging over time and space, and enlisting
varying criteria on ever-shifting grounds.
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Comparison and East-West Encounter
The Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries
Zhang Longxi
Abstract
East and West, as cultures and traditions, become possible to conceptualize only in compar-
ison and in the encounters of trade, travel, and other kinds of interactions. If Marco Polo in
the thirteenth century represented an early stage of the East-West encounter in trade and the
expansion of geographical knowledge in Europe, the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries
became the important time of intellectual contact in East-West encounters through the medi-
ation of Jesuit missionaries and because of the internal development of European culture and
society during the time of the Enlightenment. Not only did the trend of chinoiserie changed
European taste and aesthetics inmaterial life, but philosophers like Leibniz andVoltaire found
in China what they were seeking for a state and society, built on reason rather than religious
belief . To revisit the East-West encounters of that timemayhelp us attain a better understand-
ing of comparison and difference in cross-cultural interrelations, which remains an issue of
particular relevance and importance for our time today.
 
As Benedict de Spinoza famously put it: “determination is negation.”1 Things are
defined not in and of themselves, but they become definite and recognizable al-
ways in comparison and differentiation, and it is by negating or differentiating
from something else that we may determine what it is that we are contemplating.
Comparison, in other words, is ontologically and epistemologically necessary and
methodologically useful in our understanding and interpretation. “To compare or
not to compare, unlike to be or not to be: that is not the question,” as I have argued
elsewhere. “On a most basic level, ontologically speaking, we cannot but compare,
and we compare all the time in order to differentiate, recognize, understand, make
judgments or decisions, and act upon our decisions. All our actions in cognitive and
physical terms depend on making comparisons, and we have no other alternative
but to compare.”2 The one and the many, unity and diversity, the yin and the yang
1 Benedict de Spinoza, Correspondence, in: Benedict de Spinoza, The Chief Works of Benedict de
Spinoza, trans. by R. A. M. Elwes, 2 vols., New York 1951, 2:370.
2 Zhang Longxi, From Comparison to World Literature, Albany 2015, see 11.
214 Zhang Longxi
or the feminine and the masculine, such basic ideas are all clearly articulated in the
wisdom of both the East and the West. “All under heaven knows beauty and how it
is beautiful, and ugliness is generated; and they all know good and how it is good,
and the no-good is generated,” says the ancient Chinese philosopher Laozi in the
famous Tao te ching or the Classic of the Dao. Everything is differentiated from its op-
posite and also gives rise to its counterpart. “Having and not-having generate one
another; difficulty and easiness complement one another,” Laozi continues; “long
and short are formed in comparison; high and low are mutually defined; different
sounds come together to harmonize; before and after follow one another.”3 Like all
such fundamental concepts and terms in binary opposition, “east” and “west” also
form a pair of basic notions to orientate ourselves in comparison to acquire a sense
of direction. When we speak of the East and the West as geographical regions and
cultural systems on a global scale, however, that sense of direction is extraordinarily
enlarged to refer roughly to the continents of Asia and Europe, and their different
cultures, histories, and traditions. East and West in this sense first became pos-
sible to conceptualize only when routes of travel and trade, like the ancient Silk
Road, brought peoples together from the world’s far ends, and comparison of the
East and the West naturally arose to give articulation to both their differences and
affinities. The Silk Road was, however, so remote in time that we can hardly relate
it to a particular name, a living person with a story that may reveal what life was
like in its vividness and credibility.
That was the significance of Marco Polo (1254—1324), the first European well-
known for his travel to the East, which came to us in a narrative with some degree
of details that may give us the feel of a lived experience. Marco Polo, a Venetian,
was able to travel to China when the invincible Mongol army led by Genghis Khan
conquered large areas by sheer military force and opened up routes across the huge
landmass of Eurasia from Siberia all the way to Eastern Europe, cutting through
Central and Western Asia that used to form a barrier between East Asia and Chris-
tian Europe. Through adventurous roads and long voyages, Marco Polo went to
China with his father and uncle when Kublai Khan, a grandson of Genghis Khan,
ascended the imperial throne and started the Mongolian dynasty of Yuan in Chi-
nese history. As John Larner argues, the important contribution of Marco Polo is
the expansion of geographical knowledge in Europe. “The truth is that in the geo-
graphical culture of theMiddle Ages from Solinus, to Isidore, to Gossuin, there is to
be found nothing like the Book of Marco Polo,” says Larner.4 “Never before or since
has one man given such an immense body of new geographical knowledge to the
3 Laozi dao de jing (Laozi’s Classic of theDaowithAnnotations), annotated byWangBi, Beijing 1985,
chap. 2, 2.
4 John Larner,Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World, New Haven 2001, 77.
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West.”5 An indication of this new knowledge in Europe is the fact that many place
names in Asia in the Catalan Atlas, which gave Europe one of the earliest glances at
the vast world outside, were evidently taken from the descriptions in Marco Polo’s
Travels.
Marco Polo was not an intellectual type, however, and he went to China at the
time when Kublai Khan set up the Mongol dynasty of Yuan in Chinese history,
which did not provide him with much opportunity to get in touch with the Han
Chinese majority and to observe traditional Chinese culture. That is part of the
reason why the veracity of Marco Polo’s travel to China has been questioned from
time to time.6 In my view, however, it was the high praise of the Mongol emperor
in Marco’s book, more than anything else, that had made his fellow Europeans
uncomfortable and doubtful. In speaking of wealth, power and prosperity, Marco
compared Asia and Europe and presented a picture of Cathay or China in a very
different light from what most Europeans could have imagined. For example, in
commenting on Kublai Khan, he claimed that “all the emperors of the world and all
the kings of Christians and of Saracens combined would not possess such power or
be able to accomplish so much as this same Kubilai, the Great Khan.”7 Statements
like this sounded incredible to European readers at the time and even long after,
but Marco’s narrative nonetheless left a deep impression on the European mind
and stimulated the imagination of a fabulously rich East. The fact that so many il-
luminated manuscripts of Marco Polo’s Travels in various European languages still
exist today in various libraries and museums testifies to his “considerable contem-
porary fame,” which, as Larner remarks, was “an unparalleled record in the Middle
Ages for translations effected during the life of the author.”8 From a historical per-
spective, particularly looking back today with a postcolonial sensibility, we may see
the importance of Marco Polo as a predecessor of East-West encounter, and wemay
appreciate the significance of his travels and adventures to the East as offering a
way of conceptualizing East-West encounter entirely different from what has be-
come quite dominant in the discourse on the East as Orientalism. Very different
from the influential theoretical models of Orientalism and postcolonialism, Marco
Polo’s medieval travelogue before European colonial expansion in the nineteenth
century offers a different model of East-West encounter based, as I have argued
elsewhere, not on the desire “to conquer or to take possession,” but “to know and
5 Larner,Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World, 97.
6 There are quite a few debunkers ofMarco Polo’s travels, amongwhomperhaps FrancesWood
is most well-known for her book with a rhetorical title: Did Marco Polo Go to China?, London
1995.
7 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. by Ronald Latham, London 1968, 78.
8 Larner,Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World, 44.
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to understand,” an alternative model of East-West encounter that is especially valu-
able for our world today.9
During the Renaissance of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, Marco’s
Travels became more popular and was, together with Dante’s Comedia and Thomas
Aquinas’s Summa theologica, one of the most important books widely read by the
humanists. Its fame went beyond the scholarly circles, however, and when Colum-
bus sailed out to reach Asia, he carried a copy ofMarco’s Travels, which, says Larner,
served as “a useful textbook.”10 Modern historians see China as an inspiring goal
for not only Columbus, but many other aspiring adventurers and explorers at the
time. Because of Marco’s book, Timothy Brook argues, “China held a powerful place
in the popular imagination. Europeans thought of it as a place of power and wealth
beyond any known scale,” and the quest to get to China became “a relentless force
that did much to shape the history of the seventeenth century, not just within Eu-
rope and China, but in most of the places in between.”11 Chinese porcelain, silk,
tea, wall paper, and other material goods stimulated European artists in the sev-
enteenth and the eighteenth centuries to create innovative and decorative works
of the chinoiserie and the Rococo styles, while blue and white Chinese porcelain and
other oriental motifs were frequently featured in Dutch still life paintings and Ver-
meer’s interiors. Great French painters like AntoineWatteau and François Boucher
all painted imaginary Chinese figures and contributed to the popularity of the chi-
noiserie. “What appears in Boucher’s paintings, drawings and tapestries is the life
of the Chinese as he imagined it,” as I have argued in discussing the image of China
in the Western mind, “joyful, peaceful, harmonious, and strange at the same time,
a happy land of bright colors and fascinating details depicted with a typical gaiety
and suave that are the signature of Boucher’s art.”12 The image of China in the sev-
enteenth and the eighteenth centuries in Europe was very different from that in
the more recent history of the last two hundred years.
The seventeenth century was the time when images of China, fantastic and
imaginary, started to emerge in poetry as well as in popular imagination. John
Milton, the most learned English poet of his time, mentioned
9 Zhang Longxi, Marco Polo, Chinese Cultural Identity, and an Alternative Model of East-West
Encounter, in: Suzanne Conklin Akbari/Amilcare A. Lannucci (eds.), Marco Polo and the En-
counter of East andWest, Toronto 2008, 295.
10 Larner,Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World, 140.
11 Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World, Lon-
don 2008, 19.
12 Zhang Longxi, The Myth of the Other, in: Zhang Longxi,Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to
Differences in the Comparative Study of China, Stanford 1998, 32.
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“the barren plains
Of Sericana, where Chinese drive
With sails and wind their cany wagons light.”13
Such images of Chinese wagons with sails can still be found in some European
mappa mundi, and China became associated with the change of aesthetic sensi-
bilities in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. The “cany wagons light”
with sails driven by wind suit perfectly the image of things Chinese as light, deli-
cate, dexterous, and also fragile. In Alexander Pope’s mock-heroic poem,The Rape
of the Lock, for example, the breaking of a “fragile China jar” marks an ominous mo-
ment foreboding the comic and melodramatic main action.14 A hauntingly beau-
tiful poem by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in which he dreamed of Kublai Khan and
his “stately pleasure-dome,” shows how powerfully Marco’s description of the Mon-
gol emperor could still evoke the imagination of a romantic poet in the nineteenth
century.15 And Italo Calvino’s novel, Invisible Cities, first published in 1972 in Italian
and became widely known in numerous translations ever since, in which Kublai
Khan and Marco Polo converse on Marco’s journey and the many cities he had vis-
ited, provides a wonderful example of twentieth-century relevance of Marco Polo’s
travels in imagining the world in a time of global connectedness of peoples and
cities.
For the European imagination of China or the East in the seventeenth and the
eighteenth centuries, however, it was not Marco Polo, but more importantly the Je-
suit missionaries, who played a central role. If Marco Polo in the thirteenth century
represented an early stage of East-West encounters mainly in trade and the expan-
sion of European geographical knowledge, for significant cultural encounters and
interactions we had to wait for several more hundred years till Christianmissionar-
ies in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries—Alessandro Vilignano
(1539—1606), Michele Ruggieri (1543—1607), and Matteo Ricci (1552—1610), just to
mention three famous Italian Jesuits—came to the East andmade the first substan-
tive intellectual and cultural contact with China and the whole of East Asia. It was
this wave of cultural and religious encounters between the East and the West that
brought intercultural comparison to the fore.WhenMatteo Ricci arrived in Beijing
of the Ming dynasty in 1601 with Emperor Wanli’s (reigned 1572—1620) special per-
mission, the China he found was a society and a culture very different from that
of Europe, but affluent and well organized with a history dating back long before
13 John Milton, Paradise Lost, III, 437-39, in: Scott Elledge (ed.), John Milton: Paradise Lost: an au-
thoritative text; backgrounds and sources; criticism, 2nd ed., New York 1993, 76.
14 Alexander Pope, The Rape of the Lock, in: Alexander Pope, Selected Poetry and Prose, ed.
William K. Wimsatt, 2nd ed., New York 1972, 110.
15 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Kubla Khan: Or, A Vision in a Dream, a Fragment, in: Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, The Complete Poems, ed. William Keach, London 1997, 250.
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Christ. China at that time made a deep impression on Ricci and the other Chris-
tian missionaries. Taking the Jesuit accommodation approach, Ricci learned the
Chinese language and wrote his treatise on Christian doctrine in Chinese, pub-
lished as Tian zhu shi yi [The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven] in 1604. The
Jesuits thought that the Chinese had developed such a sophisticated civilization
that it was desirable to find similarities between Chinese and Christian traditions
so as to achieve the ultimate purpose of converting the Chinese to Christianity.
Missionaries are compulsory comparatists. Comparing Chinese with European
cultures, Ricci argued that therewere “traces of Christianity” in Chinese culture and
customs, including “evidences of the cross among the Chinese.”16 He also made use
of his reading of Chinese classics and found in ancient Chinese texts the ideas and
terms of tian (Heaven), zhu (Lord), and shangdi (Lord on High) as appropriate words
for translating God and the other Christian concepts into Chinese. Of the Chinse
word tianzhu (Lord of Heaven) to translate God, Ricci wrote in his diary that the
missionaries “could hardly have chosen a more appropriate expression.”17 For him,
Chinese and European civilizations were perfectly comparable and compatible de-
spite obvious differences in language, culture, and history. He discussed Christian
doctrine by using ancient Chinese concepts and terms and writing in the Chinese
language as a fully appropriate medium.His book Tian zhu shi yi [The TrueMeaning
of the Lord of Heaven] “consisted entirely of arguments drawn from the natural
light of reason, rather than such as are based upon the authority of Holy Scrip-
ture,” says Ricci, and it “contained citations serving its purpose and taken from the
ancient Chinese writers; passages which were not merely ornamental, but served
to promote the acceptance of this work by the inquiring readers of other Chinese
books.”18 In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, what Ricci and the other
Jesuits described as the “natural light of reason” in China had a remarkable reso-
nance with the intellectual ambience in Europe when many of the Enlightenment
philosophers were seeking to establish reason as the way to organize social life out
of the shadow of the Catholic Church. With confidence in the efficacy of compar-
ison as a way to understand different cultures and traditions, Ricci was another
pioneer in East-West cross-cultural understanding, who greatly contributed to the
intercultural relations of Asia and Europe.
Ricci and the other Jesuit missionaries were remarkably successful in the China
mission, because they had some of the high-ranking officials and even members of
the royal family converted to Christianity. One prominent example was XuGuangqi
(1562—1633), an important official baptized as Paul, with whom Ricci collaborated
16 Matteo Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century: the Journal of Matthew Ricci: 1583-1610, trans. by
Louis J. Gallagher, New York 1953, 110, 111.
17 Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, 154.
18 Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, 448.
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in translating the first six books of Euclid’s Elements. Two other eminent figures
were Li Zhizao (1565—1630) and Yang Tingyun (1557—1627), together with Xu, they
were known as the three pillars of Chinese Catholicism, who made their home
region of Shanghai and Hangzhou a center of missionary activities in late Ming
China.Thatwas already at the end of theMing dynasty, and soon therewas a tumul-
tuous dynastic change from the Ming to the Qing in the late seventeenth century,
but the new Manchu Emperors of the Qing dynasty, Shunzhi (reigned 1643—1661)
and Kangxi (reigned 1662—1722), continued to befriend the Jesuit missionaries and
were keenly interested in the European knowledge they brought to China.With his
interest in mathematics and geometry and his friendly relations with some Je-
suit fathers at the time, Emperor Kangxi in particular encouraged a hopeful vision
among some Christian missionaries and their correspondents in Europe for the
conversion of China into a Christian country, seeing Kangxi as potentially another
Constantine the Great.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646—1716), for example, wrote with enthusiasm
about Kangxi. “Who indeed does not marvel at the monarch of such an empire?”
says Leibniz. “Yet he is educated according to custom in virtue and wisdom and
rules his subjects with an extraordinary respect for the laws and with a reverence
for the advice of wise men. Endowed with such eminence he seems fit indeed
to judge.”19 Leibniz’s follower Christian Wolff (1679—1754) was even more enthu-
siastic, and he considered Emperor Kangxi and Chinese rulers in general as ex-
emplary sovereigns who had realized Plato’s ideal of “philosopher-kings.” To rule
with the natural light of reason, the monarch should have a philosophical mind,
Wolff argues. “This is the case of the Chinese, among whom kings were philoso-
phers and philosophers kings.”20 This idea came from earlier influential works
by European travelers and Jesuit missionaries, such as Juan González de Men-
doza (1545—1618), Louis Daniel Le Comte (1655—1728), and Jean-Baptiste Du Halde
(1674—1743), which were instrumental in presenting China as a kind of ideal polity
for European scholars of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. “China was
the realization of Plato’s dream—a state ruled by ‘philosophers’,” says Arthur Love-
joy in a learned and important essay, and he quoted Athanasius Kircher’s China
illustrate (1670) as an example, in which Kircher described the Chinese emperor as
“un Roy qui peut philosopher ou qui souffre du moins qu’un philosophe le gouverne et le con-
duit [a king who can philosophize or at least allow a philosopher to teach and guide
19 GottfriedWilhelm Leibniz, Preface to theNovissima Sinica (1697 /1699), in: GottfriedWilhelm
Leibniz,Writings on China, trans. by Daniel J. Cook/Henry Rosemond, Jr., Chicago 1994, 48.
20 Christian Wolff, On the Philosopher King and the Ruling Philosopher (1730), in: Julia
Ching/Willard G. Oxtoby (eds. and trans.), Moral Enlightenment: Leibniz and Wolff on China,
Nettetal 1992, 193.
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him].”21 An important factor in creating this positive image of Chinese ruler as
philosopher-king came from Jesuit reports about the traditional Chinese examina-
tion system,which recruited ruling elites from scholars on the basis of their knowl-
edge as testified in the scores of their civil examinations. Without considerations
of family background, wealth, or social status, the Chinese examination system,
which had started in the Sui dynasty in the seventh century and was normalized in
the Tang dynasty in the ninth century, did provide scholars opportunities to change
their lives and use their knowledge to serve in the imperial bureaucratic system.
The imperial civil examination system thus gave rise to two important concepts for
European modernity, namely, meritocracy and social mobility.
Leibniz compared Europe with China and saw them as complementary to one
another. In his letter to the superior of the Jesuit mission in China, Father Claude
Philip Grimaldi, he proposed that “a new exchange of knowledge should take place
between distant peoples”; while the Jesuits brought to the Chinese “a compendium
of European knowledge,” he would like to see that “the secret knowledge of the Chi-
nese concerning the physical [world], which has been preserved and augmented
through the tradition of a people who have prospered so many centuries, should
also be made known to us.” Leibniz thus calls for a mutual enlightenment: “let
us exchange gifts and enkindle light from light!”22 In the preface to the Novissima
Sinica (1697/1699), he rearticulated the same idea: “Certainly the condition of our
affairs, slipping as we are into ever greater corruption, seems to be such that we
need missionaries from the Chinese who might teach us the use and practice of
natural religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology.”23 Seven-
teenth-century Europe, as Timothy Brook argues, was looking toward China with
respect and aspiration, and this can be seen clearly in many aspects of European
life. “Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Chinese already figured
in European eyes as, above all, masters in the great practical art of government,”
says Arthur Lovejoy. “And as such they continued to figure for nearly two hundred
years.”24 Soon the Chinese were also praised for their perfection of morality. “By
the end of the century, then,” Lovejoy continues to say, “it had come to be widely
accepted that the Chinese—by the light of nature alone—had surpassed Christian
Europe both in the art of government and in ethics.”25 And that, as we shall see, was
the main idea about China in Europe during the seventeenth and the eighteenth
centuries.
21 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, in: Arthur O. Lovejoy, Essays in the
History of Ideas, Baltimore 1948, 104; quoting from a French translation of Kircher’s work.
22 GottfriedWilhelm Leibniz, Letter to Father Grimaldi (1692), in: Julia Ching/Willard G. Oxtoby
(eds. and trans.),Moral Enlightenment: Leibniz andWolff on China,Nettetal 1992, 64.
23 Leibniz, Preface to the Novissima Sinica (1697/1699),Writings on China, 51.
24 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 103-04.
25 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 105.
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Lovejoy’s main point, however, is to examine the Chinese influence on Euro-
pean aesthetic sensibilities and artistic practice in the late seventeenth and the
eighteenth centuries, when an incipient romanticism emerged with several phe-
nomena, including “the admiration for the Chinese garden and, in a less degree, for
the architecture and other artistic achievements of the Chinese.”26 He commented
on Sir William Temple as “the earliest, and certainly the most zealous enthusiast
for the Chinese” in England, who thought the Chinese in political theory and prac-
tice excelled “all those imaginary schemes of the European wits, the Institutions of
Xenophon, the Republic of Plato, the Utopias and Oceanas of our modern writers.”27
When Temple in his essay Upon the Gardens of Epicurus (1685) praised the Chinese
idea of beauty as a natural one without the imposition of artificial order and reg-
ularity, he did not know he was, says Lovejoy, “laying down the principles of the
future jardin anglais.”28Through eighteenth-century English writers and poets such
as William Mason, Joseph Addison, Alexander Pope and many others, the idea of
natural beauty, and in particular that of the “picturesque,” constituted “a prelude to
Romanticism.”29 The strange word Temple used, sharawadgi, supposedly from the
Chinese, was understood as a term conveying the Chinese idea of beauty, a kind of
“natural wildness,” to borrow Addison’s phrase. In writing to a friend in 1750, Ho-
race Walpole said that he was “almost as fond of the Sharawadgi, or Chinese want
of symmetry, in buildings as in grounds and gardens.”30 Lovejoy cited many other
writers, including Sir William Chambers, “the chief enthusiast and propagandist
for Chinese gardens in the second half of the eighteenth century.”31 In all these
we can see a change of taste, a rebellion against the aesthetic standards of neo-
classicism, and therefore a prelude to romanticism in the late eighteenth and the
nineteenth centuries. “A turning point in the history of modern taste was reached
when the ideals of regularity, simplicity, uniformity, and easy logical intelligibility,
were first openly impugned, when the assumption that true beauty is ‘geometrical’
ceased to be one to which ‘all consented, as to a Law of Nature,’” says Lovejoy. “And
in England, at all events, the rejection of this assumption seems, throughout most
of the eighteenth century, to have been commonly recognized as initially due to
the influence and the example of Chinese art.”32 Even though the idealization of
the Chinese gardening eventually turned sour in England towards the latter half of
26 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 101.
27 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 110, quoting William Temple, Upon Heroick
Virtue (1683).
28 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 111.
29 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 114.
30 Quoted Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 120.
31 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 122.
32 Lovejoy, The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism, 135.
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the eighteenth century, as an important episode in the history of ideas, the “Chi-
nese origin” of a romanticism, as Lovejoy emphasizes, may still be valuable for us
to recognize and appreciate in our own time.
In France, Voltaire’s admiration of Confucius and of Chinese culture is well-
known. He not only wrote a dramatic work L’Orphelin de la Chine (1753), based on
a thirteenth-century Chinese play, but also wrote the famous Essai sur les moeurs
(1760), in which he praised China as “le plus sage empire de l’univers.”33 The Chinese
might not be as advanced as the Europeans of his time in mechanics or physical
sciences, but, says Voltaire, “they have perfected morality, which is the first of the
sciences.”34 He greatly admired Confucius for teaching virtue in absolute clarity, in
“pure maxims in which you find nothing trivial and no ridiculous allegory.”35 For
Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, China was not only a model of wealth as in Marco
Polo’s description, but a model of political state built on the foundation of rational
thinking. “With Voltaire’s Essai sure les moeurs of the year 1760 admiration of China
reached its zenith,” argues Adolf Reichwein in his seminal study of the intellectual
and artistic encounters of China and Europe.36 Reichwein even considered Confu-
cius as “the patron saint of eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Only through him
could it find a connection link with China.”37
China andConfucius thus had a very positive image and influence in Enlighten-
ment European moral and political philosophy. In material life, China was already
known for such imported goods as silk, porcelain, wall paper, lacquer and many
other merchandise that influenced the European taste and created the fashion of
chinoiserie, which, as HughHonour argues, “may be defined as the expression of the
European vison of Cathay.”38 “Sublimated in the delicate tints of fragile porcelain,
in the vaporous hues of shimmering Chinese silks,” as Reichwein also remarks,
“there revealed itself to the minds of that gracious eighteenth-century society in
Europe a vision of happy living such as their own optimism had already dreamed
of.”39 The positive images of China and Confucius in Voltaire and the other En-
lightenment philosophers were constructed partly on Jesuit reports sent back from
China, and partly on the basis of their own social imagination. Without a predom-
inant church and with an examination system that recruited officials and ruling
33 François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations et sur les principaux
faits de l’histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu’à Louis XIII, ed. René Pomeau, vol. 1, Paris 1963, 224.
34 Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 68.
35 Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 70.
36 Adolf Reichwein, China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic Contacts in the Eighteenth Century,
trans. by J. C. Powell, New York 1925, 79.
37 Reichwein, China and Europe, 77.
38 Hugh Honour, Chinoiserie: The Vision of Cathay, New York 1961, 7-8.
39 Reichwein, China and Europe, 25-26.
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elites from learned scholars regardless of their family backgrounds or social sta-
tus, China seemed to offer amodel of secular and rational life and of social mobility
based on learning and knowledge, just the kind of life the Enlightenment philoso-
phers envisioned for Europe at a time when European society was still heavily in-
fluenced by the Church and socially stratified as ruled over by a rigid hereditary
system of aristocracy. As amethodology, then, comparison with China in the works
of many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers seemed to be used more for
the social critique of European life than for the understanding of a different and
distant culture and society. Very much in the same way Michel de Montaigne used
Brazilian cannibals to criticize the corruption of seemingly civilized Europeans,
or Montesquieu’s commentaries on French society through the mouthpiece of two
Persian noblemen, Oliver Goldsmith in The Citizen of the World also satirized the
British by writing from the outsider’s perspective of an imagined Chinese philoso-
pher.
The use of China as a tool for self-critique had a most curious manifestation in
An Historical Essay Endeavoring a Probability That the Language Of the Empire of China is
the Primitive Language, written by JohnWebb and published in 1669. As Umberto Eco
observes, many European theologians, philosophers, writers and scholars were all
obsessed with “the story of the confusion of tongues, and of the attempt to redeem
its loss through the rediscovery or invention of a language common to all human-
ity.”40The search for the perfect language had as its background the biblical story of
the confusion of tongues at Babel, which put all European languages out of the pool
of candidacy as they were all cursed by God to be mutually incomprehensible, and
the search was motivated by the idea that humanity might find a way back to inno-
cence and paradise if men could rediscover the primitive (in the sense of the first,
primary or première) language created by God and spoken by Adam in the Garden
of Eden before the fall. In the seventeen century, Jesuit missionaries’ reports about
China and its ancient history dating back far beyond biblical chronology made it
possible to think of the Adamic language outside Hebrew, Egyptian, and Greek. In
his dedicatory epistle to Charles II, dated 29 May 1668,Webb presented his essay as
an effort to “advance the DISCOVERY of that GOLDEN-MINE of Learning, which
from all ANTIQUITY hath lain concealed in the PRIMITIVE TONGUE” or “the First
Speech.”41 With his syllogistic argument firmly grounded on the authority of the
Holy Scripture and “credible History,” Webb’s argument must have impressed his
contemporaries as logically simple and forceful when he says:
“Scripture teacheth, that the whole Earth was of one Language until the Conspir-
acy at BABEL; History informs that CHINA was peopled, whilst the Earth was so
40 Umberto Eco, The Search for the Perfect Language, trans. by James Fentress, Oxford 1994, 1.
41 JohnWebb, AnHistorical Essay Endeavoring a Probability That the LanguageOf the Empire of China
is the Primitive Language, London 1669, ii, iii.
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of one Language, and before that Conspiracy. Scripture teacheth that the Judg-
ment of Confusion of Tongues, fell upon those only that were at BABEL; History
informs, that the CHINOIS being fully setled before,were not there; Andmoreover
that the same LANGUAGEandCHARACTERSwhich long preceding that Confusion
they used, are in use with them at this very DAY; whether the Hebrew, or Greek
Chronology be consulted.”42
Webb did not know any Chinese, but drawing on Jesuit missionaries’ reports and
other materials available at the time and relying on the authority of the Bible, he
was able to argue that “China was after the Flood first planted either by Noah him-
self, or some of the sons of Sem, before they remove to Shinaar,” and that “it may
with much probability be asserted,That the Language of the Empire of CHINA, is, the
PRIMITIVE Tongue, which was common to the whole World before the Flood.”43 Like Wolff
and other writers at the time, Webb also declares that the Chinese are “de civitate
Dei, of the City of God,” and “their Kings may be said to be Philosophers, and their
Philosophers, Kings.”44 In the modern time, all these claims may sound strange
and absurd, littlemore than the fantasies of an uninformed Sinophile, but as Rachel
Ramsey points out,Webb was a royalist and architect bitterly disappointed for fail-
ing to secure the position of the Surveyor he was hoping for and thought himself
well deserved after the Restoration, and therefore, put in the context of the political
reality of Restoration England and Webb’s personal history, his strange argument
becomes understandable as a disguised critique of the English society and the pa-
tronage system of his time as well as an expression of his personal grudges. More-
over, as an interesting episode in the seventeenth-century history of ideas, Webb’s
Essay “demonstrates how China served as an effective means for political conserva-
tives wishing to launch a mediated critique in the erosion of their hopes for the re-
stored monarchy,” as Ramsey argues. “Perhaps more importantly, a seemingly off-
beat treatise such as AnHistorical Essay suggests that China’s influence on European
conceptions of history, government, and patronage in the seventeenth century is
more complex and nuanced than evenmost sinologists have recognized.”45 Indeed,
the general perception of China in the West today, which tends to be negative, has
been so much shaped and influenced by the more recent and very different history
of the era of European colonialism and imperialism that it would take a sort of his-
torical archeology to rediscover the image of China and the East as conceptualized
in the European mind in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.
42 Webb, An Historical Essay, iii-iv.
43 Webb, An Historical Essay, 31-32, 44.
44 Webb, An Historical Essay, 32, 93.
45 Rachel Ramsey, China and the Ideal of Order, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (3/2001),
483-503, see 503.
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Of course, like any complex phenomenon, interactions of peoples and cultures,
and the encounter between the East and the West have always been multifaceted,
and there has never been a moment in European history when the image of China
is a single and unified one. In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, while
Leibniz and Voltaire may represent a more positive and enthusiastic view of China
and Confucianism, there are other philosophers, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Montesquieu, and François Fénelon, who remained skeptical and critical of the
Chinese political system and cultural influence. In the eighteenth century, English
writers like Daniel Defoe already started to disparage the Chinese from the point
of view of a militant imperialist. Generally speaking, however, we may conclude
that China in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries stood as a foil to Eu-
rope by and large in a rather positive light, offering a model of social imaginary in
ethical and political terms that fit well with what the Enlightenment philosophers
were looking for—a society built on the basis of reason rather than religious faith,
with social mobility for scholars who participated in governance through knowl-
edge and learning rather than by right of inheritance of an aristocratic lineage. In
comparison with Europe, China appeared attractive because of its difference, and
when that different image, either authentic or distorted in idealization, suited the
social and political imagination of the Enlightenment, it produced a very positive
effect.
In today’s world, China is emerging as an old civilization on the rise again af-
ter a long slumber and spiritual torpor in the past two hundred years. Particularly
in the last forty years since the end of the disastrous ten-year-long Cultural Rev-
olution (1966—1976), China has completely changed itself, and the rapid economic
growth and quick raise of living conditions of a very large population in a big coun-
try prove to be one of the most remarkable events in world affairs that astonishes
all, including the Chinese themselves. At the same time, as a country still ruled
by one communist party with tight ideological control, China’s rise is perceived by
most Europeans and the Americans to be a challenge and even a threat to Western
democracies. How to understand China as a country and a nation both old and
new seems to become an intriguing and important question today. Therefore, it is
far more than just to satisfy an antiquarian interest for us to look back at earlier
periods of East-West encounters, and at the image of China in Europe before the
age of imperialism and colonialism, an image very different from that of a weak
and benighted people in decline and lethargy. Isn’t history a mirror for the purpose
of looking at the present? Isn’t it a helpful way to make sense of our world today to
revisit the world of a very different time in the spirit of equality and sympathetic
understanding, the spirit of an open-minded cosmopolitanism? The future of our
world will in very large ways depend on such cross-cultural understanding and bet-
ter relationships between the East and the West, and for that reason comparison,
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particularly in terms of East-West comparative studies, has a social and political
relevance to our world today as it does to its future.
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Japan as the Absolute ‘Other’
Genealogy and Variations of a Topos
Emmanuel Lozerand
Abstract
Japan has been the subject of a comparative discourse since the Portuguese first broached it
in the sixteenth century. One of the most constant motifs of this comparative discourse is the
notion of Japan as the “absolute other”, an extremely alien culture, a perfect antithesis. This
motive emerged early in a text written in 1585 by Jesuit Luis Frois. It has undergone sev-
eral variations, like that of the “topsy-turvydom”, and has recently resurfaced among several
contemporary thinkers who never tire of brooding on this apparently inexhaustible topos.
 
If, to “compare comparisons”1, we analyze the words that mean “compare” or “com-
parison” in Chinese or Japanese, we immediately notice the following: As we try
to connect the Western (?) notion of the word “comparison” with its Chinese or
Japanese equivalents, we do find translations quite easily; by doing so, we are cre-
ating what I would like to call a “space of translatability”, between Chinese and
Japanese on the one hand, and between each of these languages and our European
languages on the other. So there is the notion of “comparison” both in China and
Japan as well as in Europe.
Aswe examine theway comparisons aremade in these languages,we realize the
importance of its concrete dimensions, whether we compare side-by-side or cross-
reference; as well as of location in space; reducing the distance between distant
objects. We immediately begin to ask for the possible purposes of the comparison,
whether they are cognitive (identify differences and similarities, highlight one as-
pect or another) or practical (identify merits and defects, make elements compete
to find out which one is better, but also simply to have a relationship with and
appreciate one another).
Especially in moments of historical transformation, when a given world order
is disrupted by a new development, comparison can thus be a particularly effective
1 Emmanuel Lozerand, Comparer les comparaisons. Parcours buissonnier, in: Socio-anthro-
pologie 36 (2017), 43-58 (26.11.2017), URL: http://socio-anthropologie.revues.org/3095, DOI:
10.4000/socio-anthropologie.3095.
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method to face this change, diminish differences, tame strangeness, or welcome
something alien; but it can also be a formidable weapon to keep the ‘other’ firmly
at bay by pinning it down in a position from which it can not easily escape. To the
actors of the day, comparison always seems to be an instrument to get a grip on the
world and to organize their activities. In this respect, Japan is a remarkable case in
point since it has been the subject of a comparative discourse since the Portuguese
first broached it in the sixteenth century. It is a discourse led by Westerners who
use interpretations of the Japanese archipelago as a benchmark for their own ac-
tions. One of the most constant motifs of this comparative discourse is the notion
of Japan as the “absolute other”, an extremely alien culture, a perfect antithesis.
This motive emerged early on in the phrase “our moral antipodes” (“nos antipodes en
morale”), which has undergone several variations, like that of the “topsy-turvydom”,
and has recently resurfaced among several contemporary thinkers who never tire
of brooding on this apparently inexhaustible topos.
Comparison as a tool of proselytism: Luis Frois’s “Contradictions and
differences of customs”
One sixteenth century text plays a fundamental and emblematic role in the history
ofWestern representations of Japan. It was first published by a German and accom-
panied by a German translation in the mid-twentieth century, yet I don’t know if it
is even known in Germany today.Written in Portuguese in 1585 by Jesuit Luis Frois,
the text is entitled Tratado em que se contemmuito susinta e abreviadamente algumas con-
tradições e diferenças de custumes antre a gente de Europa e esta provincia de Japão, which
means “A very succinct and abridged treatise on some contradictions and differ-
ences in customs between Europeans and the inhabitants of the province of Japan”.
This manuscript remained unpublished and unknown for a long time, until Jesuit
Josef Franz Schütte discovered it in a Madrid library in 1946. In 1955, Schütte pub-
lished an annotated edition of the Portuguese text in Japan with the title Kulturge-
gensätze Europa-Japan (1585), accompanied by a translation into his mother tongue2.
A Japanese translation appeared in 1965 with the title Nichiô bunka hikaku, which
means “A comparison of Japanese and European cultures”3. A French translation
appeared in 1993, entitled Traité de Luís Fróis, S.J. (1585) sur les contradictions de mœurs
2 Luís Fróis,Kulturgegensätze Europa-Japan [1585]. Tratado em que se contemmuito susinta e abrevi-
adamente algumas contradições e diferenças de custumes antre a gente de Europa e esta provincia de
Japão, ed. by Josef Franz Schütte, Tokyo 1955.
3 Akio Okada, Nichiô bunka hikaku (Daikôkai jidai sôsho [Great Voyage Series] 11), Tokyo 1965,
495-636. Republished as a paperback version (Iwanami bunko) in 1991 entitled Yôroppa bunka
to Nihon bunka [The cultures of Europe and Japan]. There is another translation by Matsuda
Kiichi and Engelbert Jorissen entitled Furoisu no Nihon oboegaki: Nihon to Yôroppa no fûshû no
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entre Européens et Japonais (republished as a paperback in 1998 with a preface by
Claude Lévi-Strauss4); a new Portuguese edition in 2001 under the title Tratado das
Contradições e Diferenças de Costumes entre a Europa e o Japão, a Spanish one in 2003,
Tratado sobre las contradicciones y diferencias de costumbres entre los europeos y japoneses
(1585), an English one in 2004 entitled Topsy-turvy 1585, by Robin D. Gill (reissued in
2014 under the titleThe First European Description of Japan), an Italian one in 2017: Il
“Trattato” di Luís Fróis: Europa e Giappone. Due culture a confronto nel secolo XVI. I haven’t
found any trace of a current edition in German since Schütte’s first edition in Japan
in 1955, which might be an error on my part.
As we know, since the end of the thirteenth century, Marco Polo’s reports have
fueled the Western notion of the existence of land called “Cipango” (or Zipangu,
or Zipangri; spellings vary according to manuscripts and editions), brimming with
gold, located in eastern China. “Cipango” is a distortion of the Chinese rìběnguó,
which literally means “the land where the day begins”, “the land of the rising sun”
(Land der aufgehenden Sonne), which was the Chinese name for Japan, but today,
is the country’s official Japanese name (Nihonkoku). It is this imaginary region of
Cipango—as represented, for example, on Paolo Toscanelli’s fantastical map of
1463—that drove Christopher Columbus and his successors to take to the seas.
Upon his return to Lisbon in March 1493, Columbus is purported to have said that
he had just returned “from discovering the islands of Cipango”5. But it was not until
1542 or 1543, half a century later, that the Portuguese actually landed on what they
called “Japão” (after a Malaysian name “Japang” found in Malacca), a land they then
identified as Marco Polo’s “Cipango”. The missionaries followed the adventurers
on the heels. François Xavier arrived in Kagoshima on August 15, 1549. The Jesuits
were highly successful in their efforts to convert nonbelievers, and Japan seemed a
particularly fertile ground for Christianization.
One of the great figures of this astounding missionary endeavor was Luis
Frois6, author of the Tratado that is the subject of our study, alongside Alessandro
chigai [Notes by Fróis on Japan: Differences in customs between Japan and Europe], Tôkyô,
Chûô kôron-sha, 1983.
4 A French translation appeared in 1993, entitled Traité de Luís Fróis, S.J. (1585) sur les contra-
dictions de mœurs entre Européens et Japonais, republished as a paperback in 1998 entitled Eu-
ropéens et Japonais – traité sur les contradictions et différences de mœurs, with a preface by Claude
Lévi-Strauss. All our quotations of the Traité come from the first french edition. Cf. Luís Fróis,
Traité de Luís Fróis, S.J. [1585] sur les contradictions de mœurs entre Européens et Japonais, ed. by
Xavier de Castro/Robert Schrimpf/José Manuel Garcia, Paris 1993; Luis Fróis, Européens et
Japonais – traité sur les contradictions et différences de mœurs, ed. by Xavier de Castro/Claude
Levi-Strauss, Paris 1998.
5 Cf. José Manuel Garcia, Préface, in: Luís Fróis, Traité de Luís Fróis, S.J. [1585] sur les contradictions
de mœurs entre Européens et Japonais, ed. by Xavier de Castro/Robert Schrimpf/José Manuel
Garcia, Paris 1993, 7-39, see 7.
6 Cf. Garcia, Préface, 19-21.
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Valignano (1539-1606) and João Rodrigues (1562-1633), and after François Xavier,
who died in 1552. Born in Lisbon in 1532, he was raised at the court of King John
III. In February 1548, he joined the Jesuit Order, and a few weeks later, at the age
of only 16, embarked on a voyage to India. Arriving in Goa in October 1548, he met
François Xavier. As soon as he was ordained for priesthood in 1561, he was sent
to Japan where he landed on July 6, 1563. Except for a three-year stint in Macau,
he spent the rest of his life in Japan and never returned to Europe. During this
long period spanning more than three decades, he was immersed in the country
and became an accomplished expert on Japanese language and culture, which
made him indispensable to all his superiors, who, in 1579, asked him to write a
“Commentary on the progress of the Faith in Japan, the composition of this land,
its rulers, its inhabitants, and the wars that hindered the spread of the Gospel,
as well as other details about its history”7. This task was the origin of his History
of Japan—which has to be read as a history of the Christianization of Japan by
the Jesuits; “the Japanese matter”, as François Xavier called it. A first volume was
completed in 1586, a second one in 1594. Frois arrived in Japan at a time when
Christianity had its first remarkable successes in the country with the 1563 conver-
sion of the lord (daimyo) of Omura, who came to be known as Bartholomew and
died in Nagasaki in 1597, a few months after twenty-six Japanese and European
clergy members were crucified in that city8. The event marked the beginning of
a period of persecution that is echoed in Martin Scorcese’s 2016 movie Silence.
While Frois’s letters were widely distributed in handwritten or printed form in the
West “where they found an eager readership”9, two other works of his met a more
complicated fate.
Although his monumental History of Japan informed the writings of other
Jesuits, such as those of Valignano, it never evolved beyond the state of a mere
manuscript. It was only in 1894 that a copy was found; the first full edition was not
completed until 1984.
The Tratado is evenmoremysterious, because the exact purpose of this singular,
likely unfinished text of 40 sheets of 16 x 22 cm Japanese paper, dated June 14, 1585,
remains unclear.
The treatise consists of 611 comparisons formulated in a few lines following a
simple model—“we” (nos) or “people of Europe” (gente or homens de Europa) do it this
way; “they” (elles), the Japanese (Os Japões) do it differently. For example: VI.15. We
smell the melon at its head; the Japanese smell it at its tail. Our cheiramos o melão
pola cabeça; elles polo pé.
7 Cf. Garcia, Préface, 29.
8 Cf. Fróis, Traité de Luís Fróis, 129.
9 Cf. Garcia, Préface, 23-29.
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These comparisons are grouped by topics, because, as the author explains, “so
as not to confuse certain things with others, we have ordered all this in chapters
with the grace of Our Lord10”. The Tratado is thus composed of thirteen thematic
chapters, plus a complementary one, each containing 19 to 68 comparisons:
Chapter I. Men, their personality & their clothes.
Chapter II. Women, their personality & their customs (the longest with 68)
Chapter III. Children & their customs.
Chapter IV. Monks & their customs.
Chapter V. Temples, icons, and matters relating to the exercise of their religion.
Chapter VI. The way Japanese people drink & eat.
Chapter VII. Offensive & defensive weapons of the Japanese & warcraft.
Chapter VIII. Horses.
Chapter IX. Diseases, doctors & medicines. (the shortest chapter with 19)
Chapter X. Japanese writing, their books, paper, ink & letters.
Chapter XI. Houses, workshops, gardens & fruits
Chapter XII. Boats, their uses & “dogus” [ship equipment]
Chapter XIII. Plays, farces, dances, songs & musical instruments of Japan.
Chapter XIV. Somemiscellaneous items & extraordinary things that would not fit
in any of the previous chapters.
Comparisons were very popular in the Renaissance, in particular comparisons be-
tween Antiquity and the Modern Age, as is evident, from works such as Nicolas
Machiavel’s 1531 Discourses upon the First Decade of Titus Livius; but also, thanks to the
expansion of their world, between indigenous peoples and Europeans, as in Jean
de Léry’s 1578 History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil. The Jesuits in Japan were
just as prolific, such as Valignano who, immediately upon his 1579 arrival on the
archipelago, drew up an inventory of the differences between the Chinese and the
Japanese11.
It should be noted, however, that it was not at all a foregone conclusion that
such a text would have to be a survey of differences, since the very first descriptions
of Japan in Western languages focused more on similarities than on differences.
This is the case for José Alvares’s Information on Matters of Japan12. The navigator was
in Japan in 1547 and wrote this text upon his return to Malacca at the request of
François Xavier; it is also true for a letter from Father Nicolas Lanzillotto, written
in Goa in 1548, probably based on a report by Anjirô, a Japanese man who fled his
10 Fróis, Traité de Luís Fróis, 41.
11 Cf. Robert Schrimpf, Commentaire, in: Luís Fróis, Traité de Luís Fróis, S.J. [1585] sur les contra-
dictions de mœurs entre Européens et Japonais, ed. by Xavier de Castro/Robert Schrimpf/José
Manuel Garcia, Paris 1993, 119-180, see 136.
12 Cf. Schrimpf, Commentaire, 163-172.
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country aboard Alvares’s ship13. But what is the logic behind Frois’s comparisons,
given that never expressly stated the purpose of his comparative endeavor? First of
all, let’s point out that there is something paradoxical about it. While the pattern
of comparison might seem simplistic, even primordial, in its plain binarism, all
commentators nevertheless agree on the high quality of its observations, to the
point that historians of sixteenth century Japan consider the work as quality source
of the utmost importance. Admittedly, some of his observations are stunningly
accurate:
XIV, 48:We clean our nostrils with our thumb or index finger; they, whose nostrils
are very narrow, do it with their little finger.
Or:
I, 10. Because of our buttons and laces, we cannot easily lay our hands on our bod-
ies; Japanese men and women do not have this problem: in every season, and
especially in winter, they wear wide, hanging sleeves, holding their hands right
up against their bodies.
As for his approach per se, the very title of his manuscript already suggests that
Frois was aware that not all of his comparisons are of the same nature, since he
speaks of “contradictions and differences” (contradições e diferenças). He takes obvious
pleasure in spotting genuine opposites or symmetries—is that what he means by
“contradictions” (contradições)?
For example:
I.11.Wewear the best clothing on top and the poorest underneath; theywear their
best clothes underneath and the poorest on top.
III.1 In Europe, we regularly cut our children’s hair; in Japan, they let it grow until
the age of fifteen.
III.9. Our children learn to read first and then write; children in Japan start writing
first, and then learn to read.
VI.41. We are reluctant to eat dog meat, but we do eat beef; they are reluctant to
eat beef, but quite like to eat dog meat for medical purposes.
VI.26. In Europe, we cool the wine; in Japan, they heat it before they drink it in
almost every season.
VI.55. In Europe, we eat wild boar cooked; the Japanese eat it in thin, uncooked
slices.
XI.22. In Europe, horse manure is spread in the gardens and human excrements
are thrown on the streets. In Japan, horse manure is thrown on the street, and
human excrements are used in the gardens.
13 Cf. Schrimpf, Commentaire, 173-180.
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Not to mention two other peculiarities to which we have become accustomed in
the age of mangas and futons:
X.4. Where the last pages of our books end, theirs begin.
XI.14. Our mattresses always stay in place on our beds; Japanese mattresses are
rolled up and stored away, hidden from view.
But often, the comparisons seem to be mere “differences” (the diferençasmentioned
in the title?). The boundary between the two categories contradições and diferenças is
not always very clear:
I.30. For us, black is the color of mourning; for the Japanese, it is white.
I.49. We wash our clothes by rubbing them with our hands; they do it by treading
them with their feet.
The following examples, however, can hardly be called “contradictions”. They are
simple “differences”:
I.6. The honor and elegance that Europeans put in their beards, the Japanese put
in their hair, which they wear tied in the neck.
VI.2 Our everyday food is wheat bread; the Japanese staple is boiled unsalted rice.
VI.24. Europeans enjoy chickens, partridges, pâtés and white meats; the Japanese
love to eat jackals, cranes, monkeys, cats, and raw seaweed.
VI.27. Our wine is made of grapes; theirs is made of rice.
IX.15. We pull out teeth with forceps, pincers, parrot beaks [a kind of shoe strip-
per], etc.; the Japanesedo itwith a chisel andamallet, or a bowandarrowattached
to the tooth, or even forge hooks.
XIV.21. We emphasize nouns; the Japanese verbs.
Another type of opposite that Frois highlights is that of presence and absence.What
one people does, the other just doesn’t do:
VI.21. We wash our hands before and after meals; the Japanese, who do not eat
with their fingers, have no need to wash their hands.
II.22. Women in Europe wear rings with gems and other jewels; Japanese women
do not use ornaments, neither gold nor silver jewelry.
Japanese customs can sometimes seem really strange (from a Western point of
view):
VI.14. We count the hours from 1, 2, 3 to 12, the Japanese count them this way: 6,
5, 4, 4, 9, 8, 7, 6, etc.
XIV.3 In our country, when a fire breaks out, everyone comes running with water
and demolishes the neighboring houses, the Japanese get on the other roofs, wav-
ing straw fans and shouting at the wind to go away.
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II.47. In our country, female first names are inspired by saints; Japanese women
are named after pots, cranes, water turtles, sandals, tea, reeds, etc.
But the most striking aspects are variances judgments of decorum or tact:
I.45. In Europe, it is inappropriate to get undressed, even to bare just the bottom
of one’s feet, to warm oneself at the hearth; in Japan, someone standing by the
fire is not ashamed to get naked for the same purpose.
VI.60. In our country, burping at the table in front of guests is very rude; in Japan,
it is very common and no one takes offence.
To be more precise, when the Japanese act differently from “us” Europeans in a way
that may seem shocking to us, they too have their own point of view, and therefore
their own sense of what is right or wrong, good or bad:
I.29.We find it discourteous if a servant does not standwhile themaster is seated;
in their case, it is wrong not to have the servant sit down.
VI.39.We like dishesmadewithmilk, cheese, butter or bonemarrow; the Japanese
abhor all that and it smells very bad to them.
When it comes to value judgments, they also interpret things their own way:
I.27. We consider walking to be pleasant, healthy and recreational; the Japanese
never go for walks and are very surprised to see us do something they consider a
chore or a penance.
A modern reader will also be surprised by the fact that Frois does not express any
clear hierarchy in his listing of differences between Europeans and the Japanese. In
general, Frois does not seem to have any sense of superiority or feel any contempt
for the Japanese.
Certainly, Japan does not seem perfect to him in all respects. For instance, he
seems to find it hard to appreciate Japanese theater and music:
XIII.9. In our country, masks go down all the way to the tip of the beard; Japanese
masks are so small that you can see the beard of the actors who play women.
XIII.15. In our country, choral music is resonant and soft; that of Japan, where they
all blare out with one voice, is the most horrible music you’ll ever hear.
It also seems to him that European men are generally better built than Japanese
men, and he considers European horses to be far better.
I.1 Most Europeans are of tall stature and well built; the Japanese are usually
smaller in body and stature than we are.
I.5. Most Europeans have a thick beard; most Japanese have sparse and very
untidy beards.
I.11. In our country, it is considered a blemish to have scars on your face; the
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Japanese pride themselves on them, and as the scars are poorly cared for, they
are even more unsightly.
VIII.1 Our horses are very beautiful, those of Japan are much inferior to them.
VIII.2 Ours stop immediately while in full stride, their horses are less docile.
But the domain where he loses all equanimity and becomes outright hostile and
unilateral is the subject of religion, or more precisely that of the Japanese Buddhist
clergy, the monks, of whom he paints a ferocious picture, particularly in chapters
IV and V of his Tratado:
IV.1 In our country,menenter the clergy todopenance andfind salvation; Japanese
monks do so to escape work and live a life of idle pleasures.
IV.25. In all things, we hate and abhor the demon; Japanese monks worship and
adore him, build temples and make great sacrifices to him.
III. 10 Our teachers teach the children doctrine and holy and virtuous manners;
Japanese monks teach them music, singing, games, fencing, and do their abom-
inable things with them.
V.8. [Our religious imagery] is beautiful and inspires devotion; theirs is horrible
and terrifying with devilish figures raging in the flames.
Frois also makes several observations to highlight a particular cruelty of the
Japanese:
I.24. We practice sword fighting on poles or animals; the Japanese do it on human
corpses.
IV.41. In Europe, upon the death of their master, his servants escort the deceased
to the tomb and mourn him; in Japan, some open their own bellies and others
slice off their fingertips and throw them into pyre where the body is burned.
VII. 41. It is a grave sin for us to kill; when the Japanese are at war and can no longer
go on, they open their bellies, which is considered a sign of great valor.
XIV. 6. In our country, killing a man is shocking, while killing cattle, chickens, or
dogs is not shocking at all; the Japanese are shocked to see us kill animals, but in
their country killing people is commonplace.
XIV.9. We do not have crucifixion; in Japan, it is a very common punishment.
XIV.10. In our country, servants are punished and slaves are whipped; in Japan,
punishment and chastisement is beheading.
And even:
XIV.24. In our country, killing flies with one’s hand is considered dirty, in Japan
princes and lords do it, tearing off the wings before throwing them away.
Another very interesting chapter is the one on women, which begins as follows:
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II.1 In Europe, the honor and greatest asset of a young woman is her modesty and
the unviolated sanctuary of her purity; the women of Japan do not care about vir-
gin purity at all; and losing it does not dishonor them or prevent them frommar-
rying.
In this vein, some of their behaviors seem downright criminal to him:
II.38. In Europe, abortion, as far as it even exists, is not frequent; in Japan, it is so
common that some women have up to twenty abortions.
II.39. In Europe, killing a newborn is a rare occurrence that almost never happens;
Japanese women smother their babies by stepping on their necks, killing almost
everyone they think they can’t feed.
Generally, Japanese women seem very indecent to him:
II.54. In Europe, it is very inappropriate for awoman todrinkwine; in Japan it is very
common; on holidays, they sometimes drink until they are rolling on the ground.
He doesn’t, however, seem sensitive to their charm:
II.16. European women find ways and means to whiten their teeth; Japanese
women use iron and vinegar to make their mouths and teeth as black as coal.
II. 4 European women scent their hair with pleasant essences; Japanese women
always smell bad from the oil they grease themselves with.
However, he is able to see the positive aspects of what he encounters:
II.13. Europeans very quickly get white hair; Japanese women can reach sixty years
of age without a single white hair, because they grease it with oil.
Beyond that, however, Frois paints a portrait of the women’s situation in Japan
that might perhaps even have appealed to European women of his time (even if he
himself did not necessarily think well of what he described):
II.32. In our country, according to their corrupt nature, it is men who reject their
wives; in Japan, it is often women who reject the men.
II.34. In Europe, young girls and maidens are confined constantly and very rigor-
ously; in Japan, girls go wherever they want by themselves, for one or more days,
without having to account to their parents for it.
II.35. Women in Europe do not leave the home without their husbands’ consent;
Japanese women have the freedom to go anywhere they want, without their hus-
bands knowing anything about it.
II.45. In our country, women rarely know how to write; an honorable woman in
Japan would be held in low esteem if she did not know how to do so.
II.51. In Europe, it is usually women who prepare food; in Japan, men and even
gentlemen take pride in cooking.
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One area where Frois seems to consider the Japanese to be clearly superior is that
of childrearing.
III. 6 In our country, a four-year-old child does not yet know how to eat with his
hands, while in Japan, children from the age of three eat on their own using faxis
[chopsticks].
III.11. Children in Europe reach adolescence before they even know how to write
a note; in Japan, children seem to have written fifty of them by the age of ten,
judging by the intelligence and judgment they exhibit.
III.12. In our country, a young man barely knows how to handle the sword before
he reaches twenty years of age; Japanese boys from twelve or thirteen years of
age carry catanas and vaqizaxis.
III.13. Our children show little judgment and refinement in their manners; those
in Japan do it so early that one must admire them.
III.14. Our children are mostly shy and reserved when they go to the theater,
Japanese children are uninhibited, free, graceful, and lively in their roleplay.
Each comparison gives the advantage to Japanese children. Sometimes it is unclear
why, because while Frois notes:
III.7. We whip and punish our boys; in Japan, they rarely do that or even just rep-
rimand them.he also adds:
III.15. Europeans are raised with lots of hugs and sweetness, good food and good
clothes; Japanese children are half naked and almost deprived of tenderness and
attention.
There are other areas in which he considers Japan to be superior:
I.33. We spit all the time and anywhere; the Japanese usually swallow their saliva.
VI.1 We eat everything with our fingers; Japanese men and women use two chop-
sticks from childhood.
IX.8. The flesh of the Europeans, which is delicate, heals very slowly; that of the
Japanese, which is very robust, healsmuch better and faster from serious wounds,
lacerations, pustules [abscesses], or accidents.
So what are we tomake of this, what are the intentions or effects of this remarkable
comparative system set up by Frois? Of course, his careful, almost obsessive align-
ment of a very large number of precise and varied observations (more than 600,
let’s recall) must, at least at first sight, give the impression of strong otherness, even
bizarreness. The mechanical repetition of the binary difference “us versus them” −
never relieved by the slightest statement of even the smallest similarity − seems to
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create a spectacular, impassable cultural gap. As Valignano said in his Summario,
“everything is so different and contrary that they are almost nothing like us”14.
While this sentiment is undeniable, the effects of Frois’s system are more com-
plex and subtle than it seems. Another effect of this enumeration of differences
is to put a crack into European ethnocentrism, to limit its universalist claims, to
introduce a form of relativism: Overall, by their sheer number and variety, Frois’s
observations prove that one can live quite well with a lifestyle that is starkly differ-
ent from the European way of life.
Even more importantly, the systematic nature of the differences rouses a no-
tion that the apparent oddness of the Japanese is perhaps more reasonable than
it seems, that their behaviors, however amazing and confusing they may be, have
their own inherent logic.
On January 14, 1549, even before he landed in Japan, François Xavier wrote to
Ignatius of Loyola:
“I’m sending you the Japanese alphabet. Japanese writing differs greatly from
others because the Japanese start from the top and go down. I asked Paul, the
Japaneseman,why they don’t write ourway.He answeredme:Whydon’t youwrite
our way?... And he gave me the reason that, just as a man has his head up in the
air and his feet down on the ground, hemust write from top to bottom, as well. ”15
What can one reply to that? What Xavier implies here was expressed bluntly in 1588
by another Jesuit, Maffei, just three years after Frois’s Tratado:
They have their reasons to act the way they do [...] Europeans can only seem
ridiculous to them, for the same reason that they seem ridiculous to Europeans.16
Not only does Frois often mention that the Japanese find us as different from
them as we find them different from ourselves, but reading his text, one gets the
notion that the Japanese are in a way symmetrical or inverted European figures,
and thus resembling them.All of a sudden, the apparent differences no longer seem
so fundamental. In many areas, in fact, the Japanese share the same fundamental
values and principles as we do, but they apply them differently. To return to the
first example we mentioned, it does not matter that they smell a melon at its tail
and we at the top; ultimately, we both just want to pick a good melon by its smell.
How exactly we achieve that does not really matter. As Lévi-Strauss pointed out
in his 1998 preface, Frois really just repeated an argument by Herodotus from the
5th century BC according to which the Egyptians “in all things behave the opposite
way from other peoples”. As Lévi-Strauss explains, “the symmetry we recognize
14 Cf. Schrimpf, Commentaire, 157.
15 Cf. Frédéric Tinguely, Lemondemultipolaire desmissionnaires Jésuites, in: Frédéric Tinguely
(ed.), La Renaissance décentrée. Actes du colloque de Genève, Genève 2008, 67.
16 Cf. Frédéric Tinguely, La Lecture complice. Culture libertine et geste critique, Genève 2016, 49-63.
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between two cultures unites them by their very contrast”. As Plato says in Lysis,
“it is the most opposite that is the closest friend of its opposite”. In his search
for symmetry, the traveler equips himself with “the means to tame strangeness, to
make it familiar”17.
Thus, we can hypothesize that one of the purposes of Frois’s comparative sys-
temwas to describe a people ideally suited to be converted to Christianity, because,
despite its apparent otherness, it seems to be much closer to European Christians
than one first imagined.Their shortcomings, the immorality ofmonks andwomen,
are presented as mere obstacles to be overcome, and compensated by the quali-
ties of Japanese children that are assets, if not a great promise. This analysis is, of
course, consistent with the assumption that the Tratado may have served as an in-
troduction toHistory of Japan.This assumption finds further support in this remark
in Frois’s preface:
And many of their customs are so foreign & distant from ours that it seems
almost incredible that there can be so many opposites in a people of such great
policy, alertness of mind, and natural wisdom as they possess18.
Valignano developed a similar analysis two years earlier in his Sumario of 1583:
“Andwhat I admire is that in everything, they govern themselves as a prudent and
policed nation, while it would not be surprising if they behaved like barbarians.
But to see that everything is the reverse from the way it is in Europe (todo van al
revés de Europa) and that they have been able to organize their rites and customs in
such a regulated and reasonable way (tan políticas y puestas en razón) for those who
understand them well (para quien bien las entiende), is cause for great admiration
(es cosa que puede causar no pequeña admiració).”19
We can thus understand François Xavier’s enthusiasm,which resonates in the com-
ments later reported by Frois: All the way from Rome to Japan, there is no people
more predisposed to embrace Christianity than the Japanese (letter dated October
25, 1564). 20
One can easily guess the exaltation that this promise immediately aroused in
Europe. For example, in Marvels of the world and mainly about admirable things about
India and the NewWorld, published in 1553, Guillaume Postel, based on the very first
letters of Francis Xavier, described “Giapan” as the “sovereign point of the East”,
and the “Giapangians” as “the most perfect humans in the world”: “Thus it pleased
God[to] to make them long ago.”21
17 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Préface, in: Luís Fróis, Européens et Japonais – traité sur les contradictions et
différences de mœurs, ed. by Xavier de Castro/Claude Levi-Strauss, Paris 1998, see 7-11.
18 Fróis, Traité de Luís Fróis, 41.
19 Cf. Tinguely, La Lecture complice, 49-63.
20 Cf. Schrimpf, Commentaire, 123.
21 Cf. Bernard Frank, Dieux et bouddhas au Japon, Paris 2000, 36.
242 Emmanuel Lozerand
Other classical comparisons: our “moral antipodes”?
In certain ways, Frois’s comparative work has remained unparalleled. Even though
the text as such was not published or widely distributed before the second half
of the twentieth century, the mindset it represents has doubtlessly been exerting a
strong subliminal influence onWestern representations of Japan.In order to better
grasp the impact of this inspiration and understand which types of variations have
emanated from it, we must compare it to other takes on Japan. As we will see, they
also addressed the question of Japan’s alterity, or otherness, albeit in a distinctly
different way. We find a first interesting variation in Frois’s own environment, for
example in a letter by Valignano dated 25 July 1579:
“When it comes to attire and food, and in almost all their demeanor, they are so
different from European or other races that one almost thinks they are making
a deliberate effort to act the opposite way from everyone else, in particular from
the Chinese, to whom they trace back their origins. In every way, they are trying
to do just the opposite. […] Japan is a world apart and the people there behave in
a thousand original ways that are novel to the rest of humanity.”22
In his Summario of 1583, he writes: “One might say that they have done all they can
in order not to resemble any other nation.”23
This notion, a fleeting idea amongst themissionaries, that Japanwas notmerely
different, but that there was a distinct intention and will to be different, was elo-
quently expressed by major seventeenth century Jesuit priest François Garasse. In
his Curious doctrine of the beaux esprits of our times, or those who pretend to be, written
between 1623 and 1624, he harnesses the Japanese argument to attack libertines.
When he calls the Japanese “true idiots”, “extravagant in their actions […] and con-
sequently quite foolish”, it is precisely because they “purposefully” seek to be dif-
ferent, just like the libertines. The same desire to stand out, to distinguish oneself
by being the opposite of the ordinary, he argues, is the basis of the moral affin-
ity between these strong-minded esprits forts24. As Garasse puts it, “Thank God that
we in Paris have Japanese folks who wallow in fanciful extravagance in order to be
taken for more artful people and join the ranks of the Beaux Esprits”.
Garasse was, in fact, influenced by the History of Navigation by Jan Huygen van
Linschoten (1563-1611), which was published in Dutch in 1596 and in French in 1610,
resuming the Jesuit practice of contrasting the Japanese with other peoples, yet
putting them in a conceptual framework taken from Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza’s
1585 History of the Great Kingdom of China. This work elaborates on the theme of
22 Cf. Schrimpf, Commentaire, 136-137.
23 Cf. Schrimpf, Commentaire, 157.
24 Cf. Tinguely, La Lecture complice, 49-63.
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the Japanese people’s “extreme resentment” towards the Chinese, thus making the
Japanese cultural difference, in the words of Frédéric Tinguely, a “vindictive com-
memoration, by their very customs, of a break with the legitimate powers25”. The
philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment were to engage in a different type of in-
strumentalization. For example, in his 1748 work The Spirit of the Laws, in chapter
13 of book 6, entitled “The Powerlessness of Japanese Laws”, Montesquieu cites the
case of Japan to illustrate his notion of despotism (and, in doing so, reactivating
Aristotle’s ancient theme of “oriental despotism”).
“Extravagant penalties can corrupt despotism itself. Let us look at Japan. In Japan,
almost all crimes are punished by death because disobedience to so such a great
emperor as Japan’s is an enormous crime. It is not a question of correcting the
guilty man, but of avenging the prince. These ideas are drawn from servitude and
derive chiefly from the fact that the emperor is the owner of all the goods and so
almost all crimes are committed directly against his interests. […] It is true that
the astonishing character of these opinionated, capricious, determined eccentric
people who brave every peril and every misfortune seems at first sight to absolve
their legislators for their atrocious laws.”26
Here, the bizarre nature of the Japanese people serves to explain the severity of
their laws. In contrast, Voltaire highlighting only similarities in chapter CXLII of
his 1756 work “About Japan” in his Essay on theManners and Spirit of Nations, assuming
the view that “at its core, human nature is the same everywhere”:
“Of all the countries of India, Japan is not the one that deserves the least attention
from a philosopher. […] This kingdom borders on our continent, as we delimit it
on the opposite side. I don’t know why the Japanese have been called our moral
antipodes, there are no such antipodes amongst peoples who cultivate reason.
The dominating religion in Japan allows for rewards and penalties beyond death.
Their principal commandments, which they call divine, are exactly like ours. Lies,
impudence, theft,murder, are also forbidden, it is natural law condensed into con-
crete principles. […] Their customs may be different from ours, but so are those of
all the oriental nations, from the Dardanelles all the way to Korea.”27
Let’s briefly turn our attention to the expression he cites: “our moral antipodes”.
Even though it seems to echo Frois’s contradictions and differences in customs, its ex-
act origin is difficult to determine. In his Curious doctrine, Garasse attributed it to
Mafffei, who supposedly spoke of “antipodas morum” in his 1588 Historiarum Indi-
carum. Garasse paraphrases the expression by saying “they are so extravagant that
25 Tinguely, La Lecture complice, 49-63.
26 Montesquieu, L’Esprit des lois, Paris 1817, 73.
27 Voltaire, Essai sur les mœurs (Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, 18), Paris 1784, 277.
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they are antipodes in manners and customs”, but researcher Frédéric Tinguely re-
ports not having found the expression in the cited source28.
Whatever the exact origin of the expression, it was quite popular. In a descrip-
tion of Japan from 1600, Joao de Lucena,whose observations follow Frois’s narrative
about starkly different manners, points out that Japanese customs “are remarkable
only because of the great difference from our own”, adding: “It is safe to say that the
Japanese are our antipodes even more by their manners than by their location.”29
In 1626, François Solier proposed explanations that resemble those of Luis
Frois. He, too, uses the formula:
“Because in all their ways, they do things so differently from us that it seems as
if they purposefully want to do everything reversely from Europe. This is what
caused a very erudite and eloquent figure of our time to describe them as our
antipodes, both in temperament and in a location and country. It would take too
long to note all the particularities. I will list only a few here.”30
While this discourse on the Japanese as “antipodes” echoed throughout the seven-
teenth century, the notion was refuted by several eighteenth century authors, from
Father Charlevoix in his History of Japan, first published in 1715, to Voltaire in 1756,
as we have seen, but also Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet in his 1768 Impartial History
of the Jesuits. Charlevoix wrote:
“It may not be a bad idea for me to now elaborate a little on this parallel, certainly
muchmore suitable to get to know the Japanese than to point out some contrasts
between their customs and ours, which have been eagerly collected, and that led
us to the conclusion that they shouldbe called ourmoral antipodes. Toquote some
examples, they use white as their color of mourning, and black as an expression
of joy [...]; they wear ceremonial clothes inside the house, and take them off when
they go out; in Japan, they greet with their feet instead of their hands or heads.
These things have nothing to do with one’s way of thinking, let alone one’s feel-
ings of the heart, which truly constitute the character of the mind; they are pure
customs, which may have been born from a simple whim, or something even less
significant.”31
Linguet wrote:
28 Tinguely, La Lecture complice, 49-63.
29 Cf. Garcia, Préface, 39.
30 François Solier, Histoire ecclésiastique des isles et royaumes du Japon (Ecclesiastical History of the
Islands and Kingdoms of Japan). Collected by Father F. Solier, monk of the Jesuit Order, Paris, ed. by
Sébastien Cramoisy, 1627-1629, 2 volumes, Bordeaux 1628, 66.
31 Père Charlevoix, Histoire et description du Japon, Tours 1842, 20.
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“The Japanese have customs that many of our Europeans have found extraordi-
nary. They mourn in white; they greet each other by wiggling their shoes. This led
travelers with little common sense to call them our moral antipodes, as if it were
morality that governs the color of our clothes and our forms of salutation. Rather,
we should have admired the similarity between somany of our own practices and
those of these islanders, whom nature placed at the bottom of Asia.”32
While Charlevoix minimizes the differences in Japanese customs by attributing
them to the simple effect of their long isolation, Linguet, in a Voltairean tradition,
laments that we have not been more sensitive to the similarities between them and
us.As we can see, there are varying motives for the “difference and contrast of cus-
toms”. Garasse leverages these differences to vilify both Libertines and Japanese in
one fell swoop by insinuating malicious intentions.Montesquieu uses the Japanese
otherness as the very picture of despotism. While Garasse considers the notion of
“moral antipodes” a sign of reprehensible extravagance, those who believe in reli-
gious conversion, like Charlevoix, contest it, as do thosewho insist on the proximity
between the Japanese and the Europeans, like Voltaire.
Modern variations: Japan as the topsy-turvydom
In the nineteenth century, the discourse on Japanese otherness took a sharp turn,
influenced by several factors, including the rise of a racial discourse. Without
dwelling on a subject that would take us too far, let’s just point out that from the
10th edition of Linné’s Systema Naturae in 1758, then in Blumenbach’s De Generis
Humani Varietate Nativa in 1775, or in Gobineau’s Essay on the Inequality of Human
Races from 1853 onwards, these discourses profoundly changed descriptions of
human diversity.
While Frois, in the tradition of Marco Polo, considered the skin of the Japanese
as white:
I.8 In our country, there are many men and women with freckles on their skin;
there are very few in Japan, although they are white.
Nineteenth century writings placed the Japanese in the category of the “yellow
race”, as is the case with Gobineau: “Japan therefore seems to have tend in the
direction of Chinese civilization as a result of many yellow immigrants.”The yellow
race is defined as follows:
“In terms of their customs, none of these strange excesses that are so common
among dark-skinned people. Weak desires, a will that is rather obstinate than ex-
32 Simon Linguet, Histoire impartiale des Jésuites, Paris 1768, 360.
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treme, a perpetual but quiet taste for material pleasures; gluttony is rare, more
variety than the negroes have in the dishes tended to satisfy it. In all things, ten-
dencies towardsmediocrity; fairly good comprehension of allmatters that are nei-
ther too sublime nor too profound; love for what is useful, respect for rules, aware-
ness of the advantages of a certain measure of freedom. The yellows are practical
people in the narrow sense of theword. They do not dream, do not appreciate the-
ories, they invent little, but are able to appreciate and adopt what is useful. Their
desires are limited to living as gently and comfortably as possible. It is obvious that
they are superior to the negroes. They are a population and petty bourgeoisie that
any civilizer would love to choose as the basis of his society: there is not, however,
anything to create this society or to give it spirit, beauty and action.”33
We have left the realm of concrete, reasonable, and localized observations, of dif-
ferences in customs. Instead, we are seeing a globalizing, abstract, and general
discourse on a psychological and moral disposition.
In particular, the new opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century follow-
ing the expedition of Commodore Perry in 1853 revived the discourse on Japanese
particularities, now gradually giving rise to the English adjective topsy-turvy.
Rutherford Alcock, the first diplomat deployed to in Japan in 1858, explains in
his 1863The Capital of the Tycoon:
“Japan is essentially a country of paradoxes and anomalies, where all—even familiar
things—put on new faces and are curiously reversed. Except that they do not walk
on their heads instead on their feet, there are few things in which they do not
by some occult law, to have been impelled in a perfectly opposite manner and a
reversed order. […] The course of all sublunary things appears reversed. Their day
is for the most part our night, and this principle of antagonism crops out in the
most unexpected an bizarre way in all their moral being, customs and habits.”34
The word topsy-turvy appears in his book, but in a concrete sense, to describe in-
verted furniture.
Topsy-turvy was first used in 1888 to characterize Japan in Percival Lowell’s in-
fluential workThe Soul of The Far East. For Lowell, Japan’s “antipodal situation” causes
the Japanese to “see everything topsy-turvy”. This work has never been translated
into French (it was translated into German in 1911 under the title Die Seele des Fernen
Ostens), but it has nevertheless had a significant influence in France, since it is at
the root of an inexhaustible theme, namely the absence of personality, individual-
ity, or subject in Japan. It can be found in the works of Alexandre Kojève, Jacques
33 Joseph Arthur Gobineau (Comte de), Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, vol. I, Paris 1853,
215.
34 Robin D. Gill, Topsy-turvy 1585, Key Biscayne 2004, 38-39.
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Lacan, and Roland Barthes35, and it is also, as we will see, at the root of Augustin
Berque’s theses on the Japanese milieu36. Lowell writes:
“If we take, through the earth’s temperate zone, a belt of country whose northern
and southern edges are determined by certain limiting isotherms, not more than
half the width of the zone apart, we shall find that we have included in a rela-
tively small extent of surface almost all the nations of note in the world, past or
present. Now if we examine this belt, and compare the different parts of it with
one another, we shall be struck by a remarkable fact. The peoples inhabiting it
grow steadily more personal as we go west. So unmistakable is this gradation of
spirit, that one is tempted to ascribe it to cosmic rather than to human causes. It
is as marked as the change in color of the human complexion observable along
any meridian, which ranges from black at the equator to blonde toward the pole.
In like manner, the sense of self grows more intense as we follow in the wake of
the setting sun, and fades steadily as we advance into the dawn. America, Europe,
the Levant, India, Japan, each is less personal than the one before. We stand at
the nearer end of the scale, the Far Orientals at the other. If with us the I seems to
be of the very essence of the soul, then the soul of the Far East may be said to be
Impersonality.”37
Without relying on racial considerations, Lowell searches different “cultural” do-
mains—family, the Japanese language, art, relationship to nature, religion—for
certain psychological features, or a specifically Japanese mindset”.
It was the great British Japanologist Basil H. Chamberlain who coined the term
“Topsy-turvydom” for Japan by using it as a section title in Things Japanese, which
appeared in six editions between 1890 and 1936. Taking up several of Frois’s argu-
ments (although they had not been published at the time), it goes like this:
“It has often been remarked that the Japanese do many things in a way that runs
directly counter to European ideas of what is natural and proper. To the Japanese
themselves our ways appear equally unaccountable. It was only the other day that
a Tōkyō lady asked the present writer why foreigners did so many things topsy-
turvy, instead of doing them naturally, after the manner of her country-people.
Here are a few instances of this contrariety:—
Japanese books begin at what we should call the end, the word finis (終) coming
35 Cf. Emmanuel Lozerand, La dilution du sujet japonais chez les intellectuels français au tour-
nant des années 1970. Avatars d’un stéréotype, in: Fabien Arribert-Narce/Kôhei Kuwada/Lucy
O’Meara (eds.), Réceptions de la culture japonaise en France depuis 1945. Paris-Tôkyô-Paris: détours
par le Japon, Paris 2016, 51-70.
36 Cf. Augustin Berque, Poétique de la Terre: histoire naturelle et histoire humaine: essai de mésologie,
Paris 2014, 29-58.
37 Percival Lowell, The Soul of The Far East, Boston/New York 1888, 15.
248 Emmanuel Lozerand
where we put the title-page. The foot-notes are printed at the top of the page, and
the reader inserts his marker at the bottom. In newspaper paragraphs, a large full
stop is put at the beginning of each.
Men make themselves merry with wine, not after dinner, but before. Sweets also
comebefore the pièces de résistance. Thewholemethod of treating horses is the op-
posite of ours. A Japanese (of the old school) mounts his horse on the right side,
all parts of the harness are fastened on the right side, the mane is made to hang
on the left side; and when the horse is brought home, its head is placed where its
tail ought to be, and the animal is fed from a tub at the stable door.
Boats are hauled up on the beach stern first.
On leaving an inn, you fee not the waiter, but the proprietor.
The Japanese do not say “north-east,” “south-west,” but “east-north,” “west-south.“
They carry babies, not in their arms, but on their backs.Many tools and imple-
ments are used in a way which is contrary to ours. For example, Japanese keys
turn in instead of out, and Japanese carpenters saw and plane towards, instead of
away from, themselves. The best rooms in a house are at the back; the garden, too,
is at the back. When building a house, the Japanese construct the roof first; then,
having numbered the pieces, they break it up again, and keep it until the sub-
structure is finished. In making up accounts, they write down the figures first, the
corresponding items next. Politeness prompts them to remove, not their head-
gear, but their foot-gear. Their needle-work sometimes curiously reverses Euro-
pean methods. Belonging as he does to the inferior sex, the present writer can
only speak hesitatingly on such a point. But a lady of his acquaintance informs
him that Japanese women needle their thread instead of threading their needle,
and that instead of running the needle through the cloth, they hold it still and
run the cloth upon it. Another lady, long resident in Tōkyō, says that the impulse
of her Japanese maids is always to sew on cuffs, frills, and other similar things,
topsy-turvy and inside out. If that is not the nec plus ultra of contrariety, what is?
Men in Japan are most emphatically not the inferior sex. When (which does not
often happen) a husband condescends to take his wife out with him, it is my lord’s
jinrikisha that bowls off first. The woman gets into hers as best she can, and trun-
dles along behind. Still, women have some few consolations. In Europe, gay bach-
elors are apt to be captivated by the charms of actresses. In Japan, where there are
no actresses to speak of, it is the women who fall in love with fashionable actors.
Strangest of all, after a bath the Japanese dry themselves with a damp towel!”38
It is difficult to discern the deeper logic of Chamberlain’s remarks, but it seems to
me that he is simply highlighting a curious, picturesque aspect of Japan (the word
38 Basil H. Chamberlain, Things Japanese, London 1905, 480-482.
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“picturesque” is frequently associated with Japan in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries).
While the theme, even the form, of radical Japanese otherness represented in
Chamberlain’s topsy-turvydom seems to go back to Frois, albeit via rather complex,
meandering paths, including the notion of the “moral antipodes” 39, the two au-
thors do, however, pursue different objectives. Chamberlain, who, by the way, also
acquired scientific expertise about Japan, no longer uses the logic of topsy-turvy as
a means of taming strangeness, but on the contrary, to lock the Japanese in a per-
sistent state of weirdness, of turning them into “curiosities”. Let’s not forget that
what became the “West” in the nineteenth century, especially according to Hegel
(das Abendland) was a concept that went beyond Europe and probably cultivated a
stronger sense of superiority over non-Western peoples, a stronger feeling of be-
ing at the forefront of civilization, than what sixteenth-centurymissionaries would
have felt, who were, of course, buttressed by their Christian faith, but at the same
time very fragile and isolated, thousands of miles from their native land.
The theme of Japan as the opposite of the West is also found in two books
from 1896.The first one, Feudal andModern Japanwas written by Arthur May Knapp,
a Unitarian pastor from Massachusetts who led a mission to Japan in 1889. In the
book, he develops his idea of a “principle of inversion” that governs Japanese customs:
“Inversion is the confirmed habit of the far Oriental. It characterizes, not only the
general mode as well as every detail of his outward life, but also his intellectual
andmoral being. It is not simply that his ways and thoughts differ from ours. They
are the total reversal of ours. In our childhood we were accustomed to picture the
inhabitants of the antipodes as standing upron their heads. We were so far right
in our imaginings that that is really the oly thing the oriental does not to do in the
inversion of our ways.”40
In the same year, 1896, Englishwoman Emily Patton published a very nice work
entitled Japanese Topsyturvy-Dom in Japan, this time, however, with the intent to
fight, as she wrote, against narrow-minded anti-Japanese prejudice.
After World War II, Martin Heidegger saw in Japan the possibility of a com-
pletely different “House of Being”41, and Alexandre Kojève viewed it as an alterna-
tive to the triumph of the “American Way of Life”42. However, it was undoubtedly
Roland Barthes who, in his 1970 Empire of Signs,most clearly put Japan in this role of
39 Chamberlain states: “Japanese logic is the very antipodes of European logic”. Quoted by Gill,
Topsy-turvy 1585, 43.
40 Gill, Topsy-turvy 1585, 47-48.
41 Martin Heidegger, Aus einemGespräch von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem
Fragenden, in: Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann (ed.), Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-1959),
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 12, Frankfurt a. M. 1985.
42 Cf. Lozerand, La dilution du sujet japonais.
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the great “Other” of theWest, a fascinating “empire of empty signs” to oppose to the
horrible “Western Semiocracy”, fantasizing about finding a language abounding in
“irreducible differences” that would “make the entire West crumble”.43
In his lectures held in Japan during his travels to the country in the late 1980s,
Claude Lévi-Strauss revived this theme once again, but in a more subtle way
and making a better case. In his 1986 “A Recognition of Cultural Diversity: What
Japanese Culture Can Teach Us”, he lists some oppositions lifted from, or in the
vein of, Frois and Chamberlain:
“One certainly does not have to be an anthropologist to notice that a Japanese
carpenter uses the saw and the plane the opposite way his Western colleagues
do: He saws and planes towards himself, not by pushing the tool away from him-
self. At the end of the 19th century, this observation had already been made by
Basil Hall Chamberlain, professor at the University of Tokyo, an astute observer of
Japanese life and culture and an eminent philologist.In his famous book “Things
Japanese”, under the heading Topsy-turvidom, he records this and other facts as
oddities of no particular significance. In short, he goes no further than Herodotus
more than twenty-four centuries ago, who noticed that the ancient Egyptians did
everything the opposite way from his Greek compatriots. On the other hand, ex-
perts in Japanese linguistics have noted the curiosity that a Japanese person who
needs go to away for a moment (to post a letter, or buy a newspaper or a pack of
cigarettes) will often say something like “Itte mairimásu”; to which the other will
reply “Itte irasshai”. The emphasis is thus not placed on the decision to leave, as a
Westernerwould put it, but on the intention of coming right back. Similarly, a spe-
cialist in ancient Japanese literature will point out that a journey is experienced
as painful, uprooting, and haunted by an obsession to return home. Finally, on a
more prosaic level, a Japanese cook doesn’t throw food into the fryer, but rather
lifts it out (ageru)...”44
He goes on:
“An anthropologist will refuse to consider these petty facts as independent vari-
ables, as isolated particularities. On the contrary, he will be struck by what they
have in common. Across a variety of fields and under differentmodalities, there is
always this theme of bringing back to oneself, or of returning to oneself inwardly.
Instead of departing from the “self” as an autonomous and already constituted
entity, everything happens as if the Japanese were constructing their “self” from
the outside. The Japanese “self” thus appears, not as a primitive predetermined
43 Cf. Lozerand, La dilution du sujet japonais.
44 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle: ce que nous apprend la civili-
sation japonaise, in: Claude Lévi-Strauss, L’Anthropologie face aux problèmes dumondemoderne,
Paris 2011, 101-142.
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parameter, but as a result towards which one strives without any certainty to ever
reach it. I am not surprised when people tell me that Descartes’s famous adage: “I
think, therefore I am” is absolutely untranslatable into Japanese! In fields as varied
as spoken language, craftsmanship, culinary arts, history of ideas [...], a very pro-
found difference, or more precisely, a system of invariable differences, manifests
itself between what I would simply call the Western soul and the Japanese soul.
This difference can be summarized as the opposition between a centripetalmove-
ment and a centrifugal movement. An anthropologist can use this dichotomy as a
working hypothesis to try to better understand the relationship between the two
civilizations.”45
Lévi-Strauss developed his point evenmore clearly in his 1988 “The place of Japanese
culture in the world”, showing how Japan, differently from the rest of the East, is a
sort of an inverted symmetrical image of theWest that shows us our own reflection
like a mirror. “Protected from the metaphysical resignation of Eastern religions” as
well as from the “static sociology of Confucianism”, Japan has “inverted” its rejec-
tion of the centrifugal Western subject “the way you invert a glove”, creating a cen-
tripetal subject. The rhetoric of inversion allows Lévi-Strauss to elegantly navigate
around a thorny dilemma. Bymaking Japan a pure symmetry of theWest, it retains
its particularity, but at the same time he places the two extremes of the Eurasian
continent in the same category, completely distinct from that of the continental
empires.46
It is therefore not surprising that Lévi-Strauss clearly expressed his admiration
for Frois and Chamberlain, whose method and observations he adopts, even men-
tioning them on the same breath in a laudatory preface to the 1998 pocket edition
of Frois’s Tratado47.
Frois does not seem to have had any major emulators since Lévi-Strauss, but it
must be said that bestsellers on this topic continue to flourish. The latest one by a
certain Elena Janvier was published in France in 2011 under the title In Japan, lovers
don’t say ‘I love you’. It goes like this:
“This book is an attempt to draw a lighthearted inventory of the thousand and
one differences between our civilizations. From small details of everyday life to
the more intimate universe of emotions, it offers its readers an unexpected and
humorous key to deciphering Japanese mysteries and to understand the ways we
live and love.”48
45 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Reconnaissance de la diversité culturelle.
46 Cf. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Place de la culture japonaise dans le monde, in: Claude Lévi-Strauss,
L’Autre face de la lune, Paris 2011, 49-55.
47 Cf. Lévi-Strauss, Préface.
48 Elena Janvier, Au Japon ceux qui s’aiment ne disent pas je t’aime, Paris 2012.
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It aptly illustrates one of the latest avatars of how the French view Japan: As a gently
exotic country, a great change of scenery, and... a new tourist destination.
But when it comes to instrumentalizing Japan to construct fake “mirrors”,
philosophers are not to be outdone. In Cosmos in 2015, where he presented a
“philosophy of nature” as part of his “Brief Encyclopedia of the World”, Michel
Onfray took his turn to sing the tune of a “West formatted by Judeo-Christianity,
which implies the separation between a Creator and his creature, a subject before
everything else, and objects after this subject”. This he contrasts with the charms
of a Japanese haiku:The thought that exists before a haiku is written does not
suffer from this damaging separation: no “I” or “me” that pre-exists in the world,
no dualism that would oppose a celestial world and an earthly world, no separation
between self and nature.49
Onfray is not afraid to summarize his analysis with a stone-cold: “Christianity
has damaged humankind, Shintoism has upheld it”, before he goes on, still on the
subject of the haiku:
“There is no exposed ‘I’, no exhibited ‘me’, no lyrical expansion, no schizophrenic
dualism, no self that is separate from the world, no consciousness that is dis-
tinct from nature, no creator opposed to creation, no verbal religion, no concept
of temptation, no literary formalism, no obscuration of the world. On the con-
trary, there is a body that feels, looks, tastes, enjoys the world, experiences reality,
grasps both the detail and the universality of nature, of the cosmos, the word at
the service of empirical life, a minimal phenomenology for maximal poetry, a tiny
stylistic proposal capable of producing the sensation of the sublime, a clarification
of what truly is.”50
Augustin Berque’s analyses are hardly any different. One year prior, in his 2014
Poetry of the Land, he invites his readers to Touraine to meet a person who says: “My
name is René Descartes”. Then he goes on to pursue the tracks of Percival Lowell,
towards Levant, and after a long walk through the Hercynian forest he ends up in a
country, Japan, where there is “no I”, where the “subject” gives way to an “ambient”,
where a philosophy emerges “antipodally” that is “diametrically opposed” to that of
the West and its “modern ontological topos”51.
While raciological discourses have obstinately provided a baseline for the dis-
course on Japan since the nineteenth century, they are often supplemented, or re-
placed, by the equally insistent motif of the “country where everything is turned
upside down” (topsy-turvydom), or by that of the “Great Other” of the West, from
Marin Heidegger or Alexandre Kojève to Michel Onfray, and Augustin Berque via
49 Cf. Michel Onfray, Cosmos, Paris 2015, 560.
50 Onfray, Cosmos, 569.
51 Berque, Poétique de la Terre, 29-58.
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Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, or Claude Lévi-Strauss.This discourse never ceases
to nourish “anti-modern” discourses that are critical of what the contemporary
West has become, especially after World War II.
Conclusions
The theme and rhetoric of Japan’s absolute otherness therefore have had a long his-
tory. Born from a Jesuit worldview, which leveraged the method of comparison to
diminish the strangeness of the Japanesewithout denying it,while at the same time
making them targets of their missionary enterprise, this discourse has produced a
long series of avatars spanning four centuries until today. Since Marco Polo, Japan
tends to be a fantastical and inaccessible country, an embodiment of a utopia. Yet
since Luis Frois in the sixteenth century, and since the revival of Herodotus’s ap-
proach towards the Egyptians, it also tends to occupy the spot of the “ideal oppo-
site”.
Despite the profound inertia of this veritable wrinkle in European and then
Western thought, it has nevertheless undergone some variations. The phraseol-
ogy of the “contradiction of customs” has thus been transformed into that of “an-
tipodes”, then of “topsy-turvydom”, to mention only the most striking catchphrases.
There even seems to have been some sort of alternation between periods that
liked to inventory differences—the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries—and those periods that sought to diminish
their importance in order to better highlight similarities (the eighteenth century).It
should be noted, however, that the meaning and function of a model can change,
even if its form suggests a sense of continuity. The pattern of the “contradiction of
customs” does not serve the same purpose when Frois uses it in the sixteenth cen-
tury as when the Anglo-Saxons propagated the topsy-turvydom in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries; the vision of Japan as “extremely foreign” does not
have the samemeaning for French (and German?) intellectuals in the second half of
the twentieth century as it does for French philosophers who dabble in Japanology
in the early twentyfirst century.Let’s admit for our part that, with all due respect for
the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, we find it deeply regrettable that he has chosen
to follow in the footsteps of Frois and Chamberlain, because—does it have to be
pointed out?—Japan is not the absolute Other of the West, but just another world
among the many that inhabit our planet, without any exceptional glory nor indig-
nity, with many similarities to other cultures, and of course, with certain singular-
ities. There is no case to portray Japan as an inverted mirror of a vilified West.So
how do we escape this discourse of absolute otherness in the twentyfirst century,
which is now well underway? Probably by continuing to compare, but in a more
flexible, agile way, from varying the angles and using multiple levels of compari-
254 Emmanuel Lozerand
son. Because a critical moment in any comparative endeavor that does not want to
be comparatistical is the moment we leave the details to see the big picture, rise
beyond the treetops to see the woods. It is the moment when observation becomes
systematic and tends to thicken, or concentrate, those differences into a sort of
essence. The issue here is not to refuse systematization, because then we would
refuse to think and go back to wandering amongst the trees; it is to use multi-
ple systematizations to make sure no single system becomes dominant, to avoid
that the merry-go-round of comparisons, of “strangeness” and/or “familiarization”
grinds to a stop. This might be the key to a proper use of comparisons in our age,
a time torn between universalism and relativism, to ensure that the comparisons
themselves are also objects of comparison, or, to put it another way, that they con-
tain a meta-comparative dimension.This is an essential condition for them to stay
agile, subtle, and open, to maintain “the humor and alacrity” that constitute their
real merit.
In “Killing a Chinese Mandarin”, Carlo Ginzburg reflects on the “moral implica-
tions of distance” which, in various contexts, tends to numb our sense of human-
ity.52 The question of what is near or far goes beyond that of mere geographical
proximity, and perhaps the true purpose of comparison is to keep us from killing
“Chinese mandarins”, because, to put it another way, our moral imagination is not
disconnected from our intellectual imagination.
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“Goût de Comparaison”
Practices of Comparative Viewing in Eighteenth-Century
Connoisseurship
Joris Corin Heyder
Abstract
In 1719, Jean-Baptiste Dubos described the connoisseurial judgement as a veritable “goût de
comparaison,” literally, a taste of comparison. This early reflection on the importance of prac-
tices of comparing is surprising, and can serve as the starting point for investigating its fun-
damental role in art connoisseurship. What kind of preconditions, merits, implications, and
limits can be connected to comparative arrangements in the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries? Is it even possible to ascertain a change of comparative practices within the history
of connoisseurship? Connoisseurs—so the argument—expanded specific skills by means of
increasingly efficient comparisons that enabled them to systematize and categorize the vast
heritage of artistic artifacts.
Introduction
“Connoisseurship can […] be presented quite differently in terms of a range of vi-
sual skills that are cultivated with a high level of self-awareness. Frequently these
are put to commercial ends, which does not render the skills themselves any less
valuable. Because connoisseurship is fundamentally comparative, it provides a
possible model for historians who seek to develop their ability to make precise
discriminations based on close visual inspection.”1
1 Ludmilla J. Jordanova, The Look of the Past: Visual and Material Evidence in Historical Practice,
Cambridge 2012, 212.
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By linking practices of connoisseurship2 to both reflective visual skills and a nec-
essarily comparative approach, Ludmilla Jordanova has accentuated two aspects
whose relationship has so far remained largely unconsidered. Certainly, in accor-
dance with the powerful modernism narrative, many studies have been written on
a new organization of the visual in the nineteenth century.3This applies equally for
the importance of the comparative stimulus in art history at the latest when the
double slide projection4 gained significant importance in academic lecture halls.5
However, the shift to an entirely new visuality as well as its interrelation with doing
comparisons did not come out of nowhere. On the contrary, already in the late sev-
enteenth and early eighteenth centuries, in a time when objectivity was emerging
more and more as a scientific ideal and practice,6 the connoisseurs’ discourses and
evolving working routines indicated an increasing sensitivity toward visual phe-
nomena in general, and toward the treatment of a growing number of images in
particular. “Seeing as a way of knowing,” to borrow the words of Lorraine Daston
in her explanation of the “epistemic image,” is a skill required explicitly in scien-
tific circles from the mid-sixteenth century onward.7 Whereas the use of images
in scientific illustrations often obeys the premise of offering the reader/observer
an idealized “stand-in for the too plentiful and too various objects,”8 art connois-
2 In this contribution, “practices” are principally understood from the perspective of re-
cent practice theories as “a routinized way in which bodies are moved, objects are
handled, subjects are treated, things are described and the world is understood.” See
Andreas Reckwitz, Toward a Theory of Social Practices. A Development in Cultural-
ist Theorizing, in: European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2/2002), 243–263, see 250, URL:
https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310222225432 [last accessed: August 12, 2018]. A concise and re-
cent summary on the use of practice theory in art historical research subjects can be found in
Johannes Grave et. al. (eds.), The Agency of Display. Objects, Framings and Parerga—Intro-
ductory Thoughts, in: TheAgency ofDisplay.Objects, Framings andParerga,Parerga andParatexts.
How Things Enter Language. Practices and Forms of Representation in Goethe’s Collections, Dresden
2018, 7–19, see 10–11.
3 A brief and succinct criticism of this master narrative has been formulated in, for instance:
Jonathan Crary, Techniques of theObserver: OnVision andModernity in theNineteenth Century (An
October Book), Cambridge 1991, 3–4.
4 For a short insight into the conditions and problems of art historical slide lectures, see Robert
S. Nelson, The Slide Lecture, or the Work of Art ‘History’ in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion, in: Critical Inquiry 26 (3/2000), 414–434.
5 It is only very recently that art history and cultural studies have rediscovered their familiar
interest in phenomena of comparison, see Matthias Bruhn/Gerhard Scholtz (eds.), Der ver-
gleichende Blick: Formanalyse in Natur- und Kulturwissenschaften, Berlin 2017; Jaś Elsner (ed.),
Comparativism in Art History, London 2017.
6 On objectivity in the history of science, see Lorraine Daston/Peter Galison, Objectivity, New
York 2010.
7 Lorraine Daston, Epistemic Images, in: Alina A. Payne (ed.), Vision and Its Instruments: Art,
Science, and Technology in Early Modern Europe, University Park, Penn. 2015, 13–35, see 17.
8 Daston, Epistemic Images, 18.
“Goût de Comparaison” 259
seurship, in contrast, had to circle around every single image and could not simply
merge results in an idealized illustration.9 Consequently, other strategies were in-
dispensable for achieving knowledge on art objects, and comparative viewing oc-
curred as one of the most important, but hitherto neglected approaches. This is all
the more astonishing when looking at the three central domains of connoisseur-
ship formulated by Roger de Piles (1635–1709) as early as 1677 in his Conversations sur
la Connoissance,10 that have been regarded as valid ever since. These domains are,
first, the judgment of quality; second, the attribution of the art work; and, third,
the differentiation between original and copy.11 All three domains are undoubtedly
based on doing comparisons.
The main objective of this chapter is, first, to show that comparative viewing
became a significant characteristic in the judgment of art long before the institu-
tionalization of academic art history; second, to exemplify different levels of prac-
tices of the “comparative imperative” in connoisseurship; and, third, to ask whether
those practices themselves were distinct from earlier habits of comparative view-
ing. De Piles’ three domains serve here as a point of departure for structuring the
following considerations.
1. The judgment of quality or the “Taste of comparison”
Eighteenth-century scholarship on art and literature circled to a great extent
around the question of taste.12 Treatises on aesthetic phenomena had already been
9 It is doubtfulwhether themanipulation of an art object ranges on the same level as idealizing
an illustration as proposed by Kristel Smentek with reference to practices of mounting and
changing drawings known from the connoisseur Pierre-JeanMariette (1694–1774). See Kristel
Smentek,Mariette and the Science of the Connoisseur in the Eighteenth-Century Europe, Farnham
et al. 2014, 9.
10 Roger de Piles, Conversations sur la connoissance de la peinture, et sur le jugement qu’on doit faire
des tableaux. Où par occasion il est parlé de la vie de Rubens, & de quelques-uns de ses plus beaux
ouvrages, Paris 1677.
11 De Piles, Conversations, 3–4, 7.
12 The literature on the “era of taste”—“Zeitalter des Geschmacks”—is so vast that I shall men-
tion only those titles that are useful for the following reasoning: Raymond Keller, ‘à la mode
française’: Geschmack und ästhetische Urteile als Grundlage für Kennerschaft, in: Stephan
Brakensiek/Anne-Katrin Sors (eds.), Copy.Right Adam von Bartsch. Kunst, Kommerz, Kenner-
schaft, Petersberg 2016, 20–29; Susan Bracken, Collectors in England: Evolutions in Taste
1580–1630, in: Tarnya Cooper/Aviva Burnstock/Maurice Howard (eds.), Painting in Britain, Ox-
ford 2015, 384–391; Aaron Meskin/Jon Robson, Taste and Acquaintance, in: The Journal of Aes-
thetics and Art Criticism (2015), 127–139; Johannes Grave, Das Jahrhundert des Geschmacks.
Zur Kultur des Sinnlichen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, in: Monika Bachtler (ed.), Wie es
uns gefällt. Kostbarkeiten aus der Sammlung Rudolf-August Oetker, München 2014, 15–29; Char-
lotte Guichard, Taste Communities: The Rise of the Amateur in Eighteenth-Century Paris, in:
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grapplingwith this central philosophical concept decades before Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten’s (1714–1762) Aesthetica13 was published in 1750/58; and in Immanuel
Kant’s (1724–1804) Critique of Judgment from 1790,14 taste still played a central role
as the “sensus communis”15 for the conceptualization of two subjective universal
judgments: the beautiful and the sublime. Almost seventy years earlier, in 1719,
the Abbé Jean-Bapiste Dubos (1670–1742) had put forward a popular eighteenth-
century treatise on art called Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture.16 In this
programmatic work, Dubos is particularly interested in two main concepts: the
sentiment (“sentiment”) and the taste (“goût”). Human intellectual formation should
always pursue good taste, and even though sentiment is explicitly subjective, the
author argues for the possibility of an agreement on a common taste. This raises
the question of how such common taste can be acquired. Following Dubos’s ideal-
typical program, circles of “curieux” or amateurs—the public—are able to value
and judge a poem or a picture ‘correctly’ in terms of its quality, if those circles are:
“limited to persons that read, and have a knowledge of theatrical entertainments,
who see or hear people talk of pictures, and who have acquired by somemeans or
other, that discernment which is called the Taste of Comparison [...]”. 17
Dubos’s “public” is what Charlotte Guichard has characterized as a taste com-
munity, as “small societies, structured by interpersonal relationships, civility,
Eighteenth-Century Studies (2012), 519–547; PatrickMichel, Peinture et plaisir: les goûts picturaux
des collectionneurs parisiens au XVIIIe siècle, Rennes 2010;Maurice Rheims, Les collectionneurs: de
la curiosité, de la beauté, du goût, de lamode et de la spéculation, Paris 2002; Hans-Joachim Pieper,
Geschmacksurteil und ästhetische Einstellung: eine Untersuchung zur Grundlegung transzendental-
philosophischer Ästhetik bei Kant und ein Entwurf zur Phänomenologie der ästhetischen Erfahrung,
Würzburg 2001; Fabienne Brugère, Le goût: art, passions et société, (Philosophies, 130), Paris
2000; Yves Michaud, Critères esthétiques et jugement de goût, Nîmes 1999; Luc Ferry, Homo aes-
theticus: l’invention du goût à l’âge démocratique (Le collège de philosophie), Paris 1990; RémyG.
Saisselin, Taste in Eighteenth Century France: Critical Reflections on the Origins of Aesthetics or an
Apology for Amateurs, Syracuse 1965; Samuel-Élie Rocheblave, L’art et le goût en France de 1600
à 1900 (Nouvelle édition), Paris 1923.
13 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Ästhetik. Übersetzt, mit einer Einführung, Anmerkungen und
Registern von der Herausgeberin, ed. by Dagmar Mirbach, Hamburg 2007.
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, ed. by Nicholas Walker, trans. by James Creed Mered-
ith, Oxford 1989 [1952]. See also the rich commentary by Manfred Frank and Véronique
Zanetti: Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Ästhetik und Naturphilosophie, Text und Kommentar, ed.
by Manfred Frank/Véronique Zanetti, 2 vols., Frankfurt a. M. 2001.
15 Kant, Critique of Judgement, part 1, §20, 92–93 and part 1, §40, 169–173.
16 Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture, 2 vols., Paris 1719. All fol-
lowing text passages are cited according to the translation by Thomas Nugent: Jean-Baptiste
Dubos, Critical reflections on poetry, painting, and music, trans. by Thomas Nugent, 3 vols., Lon-
don 1748.
17 Dubos, Critical reflections, vol. 2, chap. XXII, 245 [my italics].
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and forms of sociability, within which artistic and erudite judgments could be
exchanged and discussed.”18 A few chapters after first mentioning the “taste of
comparison,” Dubos at last explains both the meaning of this utterance as well as
how taste communities achieve good taste:
“but to acquire this comparative taste, which inables [sic] us to judge of a present
by an absent picture, a person must have been in the very center of painting. He
must have frequent opportunities, especially in his younger days, of beholding
several excellent pictures in perfect ease and tranquility. Liberty of mind is as nec-
essary, in order to be sensible of the intire beauty of a work, as to compose it. To
be a good spectator, one must have that peace of soul, which rises not from the
exhausting, but from the serenity of the imagination.”19
On the one hand, these passages are valuable because they describe contemporary
practices or at least instructions for such practices that should enable the reader to
acquire a good taste, too.On the other hand,we can learn from them that, in Dubos’
explanation, at least two steps are necessary to arrive at the “comparative taste” that
is required for every judgment: first, the repeated contemplation of excellent pic-
tures; second, a certain degree of knowledge as well as a performative participation
in discussions about and in the physical presence of art. Those who shaped public
opinion the most were the “connoisseurs” who, according to Dubos: “have studied
painting as much as the artists themselves.”20 In a drawing (Fig. 1)21 by Gabriel
Jacques de Saint-Aubin (1724–1780)22—an obsessive observer and draftsman in the
times of Louis XV who seismographically sketched public life—two connoisseurs
are immersed in conversation in front of a wall full of paintings and sculptures.
The subjects of the sketched pictures are executed only in part, but we can say
with some certainty that the bulk of them represent history paintings, regarded as
18 Guichard, Taste Communities, 532.
19 Dubos, Critical reflections, vol. 2, chap. XXIX, 293.
20 Dubos, Critical reflections, vol. 2, chap. XXII, 249.
21 Gabriel de Saint-Aubin, Carnet Groult, Sketch page for the Salon of 1765, Paris, Musée du
Louvre, département des arts graphiques, fol. 43v.
22 Cf. Xavier Salmon, Gabriel de Saint-Aubin. Le Livre de croquis de Gabriel Saint-Aubin (Carnets et
albums), Paris 2017; Kim de Beaumont, Les Salons de Gabriel de Saint-Aubin (1724–1780),
in: Le Salon de l’Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture, ed. by Isabelle Pichet, Paris 2014,
9–32. Pierre Rosenberg/Sue Welsh Reed/François Basan (eds.), La vente Mariette: le catalogue
illustré par Gabriel de Saint-Aubin. Catalogue raisonné des différens objets de curiosités dans les sci-
ences et arts, qui composoient le cabinet de feuMrMariette, controleur général de la Grande Chancel-
lerie de France, honoraire amateur de l’Académie Rle. de Peinture, et de celle de Florence, Milan 2011;
Pierre Rosenberg, Quelques bien modestes observations sur les estampes de la collection
Mariette et sur leurs catalogues de vente illustrés par Gabriel de Saint-Aubin, in: Nouvelles
de l’estampe, 230 (2010), 8–15. Pierre Rosenberg/Colin B. Bailey (eds.), Gabriel de Saint-Aubin
1724–1780, Paris 2007.
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Fig. 1: Sketch page for the Salon of 1765, Gabriel de Saint-Aubin,
Carnet Groult, Paris, Musée du Louvre, département des arts
graphiques, fol. 43v
the highest form of painting since Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472)23 and hang-
ing closely next to each other, as was fashionable at the time.24 It is not without
23 See Anthony Blunt, Artistic Theory in Italy, 1450–1660, Oxford 1985, 11–12.
24 In the German-speaking context, this form of gallery presentation is known as the ‘Pe-
tersburger Hängung’ or the ‘pendant principle.’ In our subproject C 01, “Comparative View-
ing. Forms, Functions and Limits of Comparing Images”, Robert Eberhardt works on a doc-
toral thesis that focuses particularly on practices of comparing image pairs. See also: Ganz,
David/Thürlemann, Felix (eds.), Das Bild im Plural. Mehrteilige Bildformen zwischen Mittelalter
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irony that de Saint-Aubin shows us bothmen absorbed by the conversation without
paying any attention to the paintings, although one of them even points in their
direction. However, the sketch demonstrates a culture of discussion in the pres-
ence of artworks that was propagated by Dubos and others; and the venue for this
practice is a room full of art that invites the spectator to at least compare those
pictures that are hanging in close proximity to each other.25
Why could this kind of presentation be important for an understanding of the
connoisseurs’ work, and what does the tiny sketch tell us about their habits? The
draftsman is certainly referring to a complex system of images of different sizes
and various degrees of legibility, and even different genres; he is presenting not only
a fashionable eighteenth-century salon situation, but also two people entangled in
a plurality of images. The contrast between clearly distinct pictures and those that
have been reduced to their mere outlines could be regarded as an imitation of the
blurring effect that results from the searching of the eyes in such a setting. The
beholder’s eyes cannot focus on the entire wall at once, but only on individual pic-
tures one at a time; and, moreover, not even the entire picture, but actually only
certain parts of these pictures. Just how much the drawing is evidence of a ver-
itable “taste of comparison” becomes clearer when we remember de Piles’s three
central domains of connoisseurship: the judgment of quality, the attribution of the
art work, and the distinction between original and copy.26The two connoisseurs are
immersed in a discussion; they are judging ormaybe even attributing the picture(s)
to which they are pointing. It is one characteristic way to represent connoisseurs;
the other would have been to show them—as many caricatures did—with mag-
nifiers standing closely in front of a painting or a print while studying details.27
und Gegenwart, Berlin 2010; Gerd Blum et al. (eds.), Pendant plus. Praktiken der Bildkombina-
torik, Berlin 2012.
25 Since the growing interest in phenomena of reception aesthetics, the ‘public’ has constantly
attracted the attention of the scholarly debate. Two positions with a particular interest in the
eighteenth-century connoisseurial ‘public’ have been submitted by: Eva Kernbauer, Der Platz
des Publikums: Modelle für Kunstöffentlichkeit im 18. Jahrhundert (Studien zur Kunst, 19), Köln
2011; Anja-IsabelleWeisenseel, Bildbetrachtung in Bewegung: der Rezipient in Texten und Bildern
zur Pariser Salonausstellung des 18. Jahrhunderts (Ars et Scientia, 14), Berlin 2017. See also the
reviews onWeisenseel’s book by: Britta Hochkirchen, Rev. of: Bildbetrachtung in Bewegung.
Der Rezipient in Texten und Bildern zur Pariser Salonausstellung des 18. Jahrhunderts (Ars et
Scientia, 14), by Anja Weisenseel, in: Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 82 (2019), 138–143; Valérie
Kobi, Rev. of: Bildbetrachtung in Bewegung. Der Rezipient in Texten und Bildern zur Pariser
Salonausstellung des 18. Jahrhunderts, by AnjaWeisenseel, in:Regards croisés. Deutsch-franzö-
sisches Rezensionsjournal zur Kunstgeschichte und Ästhetik 8 (2019), 150–152.
26 De Piles, Conversations, 3–4, 7.
27 Some rough caricatures have been published in an article by: Nina Christine Dusartz de Vi-
gneulle, Das Sehende Auge. Die Kunstkennerschaft seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, in: Stephan
Brakensiek/Anne-Katrin Sors (eds.), Copy.Right Adam von Bartsch. Kunst, Kommerz, Kenner-
schaft, Petersberg 2016, 305–319.
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Obviously, there are different kinds of looking at a picture. Every reader will con-
firm that it makes a difference to see a painting on a wall or to study it from a close
distance. De Saint-Aubin’s drawing seems to invite the beholder to reflect on the
viewing experience of the two connoisseurs. How does it differ from our own way
of approaching an art work? Howmeaningful is it to believe that connoisseurs had
a particular way of looking at a painting? Anja Weisenseel seeks to describe the act
of seeing in the eighteenth century as a perceptivemovement between near and far.
Pursuant to that, it is particularly the performative quality of the visus that appears
to be characteristic for an eighteenth-century approach. Additionally, the author
underlines the fact that visus also had a connotation of tactus.28 As a matter of fact,
from Roger de Piles’s time onward, the reception process between artwork and
beholder has been described and conceptualized repeatedly as an act of penetra-
tion (“pénétration”).29 Studying auction catalogues from that time shows that it was
common to outline seeing as a visual touch (“toucher”).30 Therefore, the question
stands whether the work of the connoisseur has to be understood as being much
more corporal than the work of an art historian today. Not much is known about
the relevance of involving the artwork’s material quality in processes of judging. In
a timewhen a living presence was attributed to sculptures, and, as Caroline van Eck
could demonstrate,31 the practice of touching objects was quite common. It can-
not be ruled out that connoisseurs would have touched, for instance, the painting’s
surfaces not only with their eyes, but also with their hands to compare qualities.
At least, it is known that such tactile-based comparisons played a crucial role in
the judgment of prints in order, for example, to be able to differentiate between
various paper qualities.
Weisenseel’s description of a movement between near and far also becomes
another facet with regard to the working routines of connoisseurs. It could be said
that the ‘connoisseurial vista’ should be understood not only corporally but also, fig-
uratively speaking, as a movement between ‘completeness’ (the far) and ‘fragmen-
tation’ (the near).32 The epistemological impact of such a description is twofold: By
collecting and ordering artifacts, connoisseurs aim at a certain completeness. This
process of assembling a high number of artifacts is accompanied by practices such
as comparing, classifying, or judging. Close observations, on the other hand, were
28 Weisenseel, Bildbetrachtung, 93–212.
29 Weisenseel, Bildbetrachtung, 253–258.
30 JérômeDelaplanche,Untableaun’est pas qu’une image (Collection “Art& société”), Rennes 2016,
154–158.
31 Caroline Van Eck (ed.), Introduction, in: Art, Agency and Living Presence: From the Animated Im-
age to the Excessive Object (Studien aus demWarburg-Haus), Boston 2015, 11–28.
32 I first conceptualized this auxiliary dichotomy in the context of the conference “Vistas” orga-
nized by the Nineteenth Century Studies Association (NCSA), Philadelphia, in March 2018.
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as important as gaining an overview over a broad stock of art objects. By analyz-
ing the details of single art works, the connoisseur was pretending to make their
inner structure ‘legible.’ The ‘secret science’ of ‘reading’ the fragment claims to de-
cipher meaning by pure sight penetration of the painting’s surface. This sorcery
might have provoked representations of connoisseurs as donkeys or apes armed
with magnifiers in the first place. But how did they actually ‘read’ single artworks?
They were thrown back upon appearances such as hatches, light, the structure of a
brush stroke, the material quality of the surface, and so forth. De Piles had already
emphasized that ‘reading’ meant ‘comparing’ the findings with those in other art
in 1708: “All objects that enter a painting, all lines, & all colors, all lights & all the
shadows are not big or small, strong or faint, other than by comparison.” 33 Such rou-
tinely implemented, unuttered comparative practices, however, usually remain in a
prediscursive midpoint. The connoisseur34 is studying details, and, for instance, is
looking for a treatment that is characteristic for a particular painter. But to be able
to judge about certain characteristics and qualities, he is forced to know enough
other relevant comparative material in which these specific features are present as
well. Therefore, I would argue that connoisseurial practices cannot escape a ‘com-
parative imperative,’ given that these practices typically also comprise operations
such as balancing and/or subsuming.
The question stands whether or not a ‘comparative imperative’ in de Piles’s
sense of the perception of a picture as set out above is what Dubos had in mind
by introducing the “goût de comparaison.” At least, de Piles’s and Dubos’s utterances
seem to reflect an awareness of the fact that practices of comparing on different
levels determine the work of a connoisseur in manifold ways. That, in the age of
enlightenment, comparisons generally could enfold a dynamizing potential in the
emerging sciences—including natural sciences aswell as the humanities—becomes
a more and more probable assumption; corresponding arguments can be found
in different disciplines such as the history of science or in historiographical ap-
proaches in history, literature, and philosophy.35 It is astonishing to realize that in
the eighteenth century, sometimes one person was involved in both natural history
33 [My translation and emphasis]. Original quote: “Tous les objets qui entrent dans le Tableau, toutes
les lignes& toutes les couleurs, toutes les lumieres& toutes les ombres ne sont grandes oupetites, fortes
ou foibles que par comparaison.” See Roger De Piles, Cours de peinture par principes, Paris 1708,
105.
34 The masculine form used in this text for ‘connoisseur’ reflects the fact that hardly any female
connoisseurs are known.However, themasculine form ismeant to include all possible gender
and sexual identities.
35 I refer only to the most recent positions: Michael Eggers, Vergleichendes Erkennen: zur Wis-
senschaftsgeschichte und Epistemologie des Vergleichs und zur Genealogie der Komparatistik (Ger-
manisch-romanische Monatsschrift), Heidelberg 2016; Epple, Angelika/Walter Erhard, Die
Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhard (eds.), Die
Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 7–31; Andreas
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and art connoisseurship at the same time.36 In both fields, scholars proceeded in
a very similar manner, namely, by collecting objects and/or artifacts and by trying
to categorize these items taxonomically. However, what distinguished both worlds,
the natural science and art connoisseurship, is beyond others the ‘aesthetic surplus’
of art works.Whereas it was a relevant category in the judgment of art, it soon lost
its significance for the natural sciences. The judgment of art cannot be limited to
the morphological formalism alone present in taxonomic methods; it goes far be-
yond such practices.37 I shall come back to the question of the ‘aesthetic surplus’ in
the final part of this chapter.
Other practices of comparing within art connoisseurship were perhaps as im-
portant as the comparative viewing itself, but they concerned different types of
comparisons. Early art connoisseurship was not limited to methodological instru-
ments such as classification and/or visual juxtaposition alone: In 1708, de Piles,who
so precisely defined the connoisseur’s endeavors, invented one of the first known
ratings. This special type of comparison was quickly assimilated and evolved in,
for example, the fields of sports and economics.38 A closer look at the phenomenon
Mauz/Hartmut von Sass (eds.),Hermeneutik des Vergleichs: Strukturen, Anwendungen und Gren-
zen komparativer Verfahren (Interpretation interdisziplinär), Würzburg 2011.
36 It would be worth also examining the juxtapositions to morphological approaches in the
history of art. Starting from the collection and the illustrious life of the erudite Antoine-
Joseph Dezallier d’Argenville (1680–1765), Daniela Bleichmar argues toward an inextricable
entanglement of natural science and connoisseurship in art in early and mid-eighteenth-
century France, including the level of the actors as well as the level of collecting and ex-
hibiting objects. In her argument, the connoisseur’s eyes even become a “taxonomical in-
strument” (p. 89). See Daniela Bleichmar, Learning to Look: Visual Expertise across Art
and Science in Eighteenth-Century France, in: Eighteenth-Century Studies 46 (1/2012), 85–111,
https://doi.org/10.1353/ecs.2012.0084 [last accessed April 19, 2018]. In a historical overview,
Karin Leonhard demonstrates the interfaces between art production, social networks, and
collecting shells: Karin Leonhard, Shell Collecting: On 17th-Century Conchology, Curiosity
Cabinets and Still Life Painting, in: Karl A. E. Enenkel/Paul J. Smith (eds.), EarlyModern Zoology
(Intersections, 7), Leiden 2007, 177–214. It is also remarkable to note the common disinterest
in the reasons why the once shared way went on to develop in distinct directions.
37 Insight into the relationship between a taxonomic natural history and practices of comparing
can be found in, for instance: Thomas Stach, Anmerkungen zur Rolle des Vergleichs in der
Morphologie, in: Matthias Bruhn/Gerhard Scholtz (eds.), Der vergleichende Blick. Formanalyse
in Natur- und Kulturwissenschaft, Berlin 2017, 41–53.
38 De Piles’s contribution has been emphasized as one of the first Western rankings/ratings
by: Victor Ginsburgh/Sheila Weyers, On the contemporaneity of Roger de Piles’ Balance des
peintres, in: Jack Amariglio (ed.), Sublime economy: on the intersection of art and economics, Lon-
don, 2009, 112–123; Kathryn Graddy, Taste Endures! The Rankings of Roger de Piles (†1709)
and Three Centuries of Art Prices, in: The Journal of Economic History 73 (3/2013), 766–791,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050713000600 [last accessed May 23, 2018]; Carlos Spoerhase,
Das Maß der Potsdamer Garde: die ästhetische Vorgeschichte des Rankings in der europäis-
chen Literatur- und Kunstkritik des 18. Jahrhunderts, in: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft (ed.),
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of art criticism, however, reveals that it was perhaps particularly the difficult-to-
describe stubbornness of art that predestinated the aesthetic field to be the birth-
place of systematic ratings/rankings. With the help of ratings, authors such as de
Piles were able to clarify their judgments in terms of an ideal-typical system of
values. De Piles analyzed art by referring to the categories composition (“composi-
tion”), drawing (“dessein”), coloring (“coloris”) and expression (“expression”).39 These
categories were extracted from earlier art theory treatises and had to persist in a
field in which normative rules tended every now and then to be thrown overboard.
The invention of the “balance of painters” is a new way to offer not only complex
comparisons but also concrete visualizations of the author’s ‘taste of comparing.’ Of
course, the complexity is accessible only to those who are familiar with the kind of
values, ideas, preliminary decisions, and—most important for this context—chains
of comparisons hidden behind certain numeral values. De Piles uses numbers be-
tween zero and twenty to evaluate the performance of the artists in each category.
Sometimes, he even turns entire scholarly disputes into good or bad notes, as in
for instance, the famous “querelle du coloris.”40 This becomes obvious by considering
names such as “Rubens” and “Poussin” (Fig. 2).41
The painters indicate opposite poles of the famous “querelle”: Whereas Rubens
stood for a preference for ‘color,’ Poussin, on the other hand, exemplified a pref-
erence for ‘drawing.’ De Piles’s leading role in the debate and his positioning for
the colorists has been made available in a painstakingly rich volume by Bernard
Teyssèdre,42 so that it comes as no surprise to find again the author’s predilection
for the colorists in his table. With the exception of the category drawing (13), Peter
Paul Rubens (1577–1640) reaches high numbers only in composition (18), coloring
(17), and expression (17), whereas de Piles conceded Nicholas Poussin (1594–1665)
Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft, internationales Organ für neuere deutsche Literatur 58
(2014), 90–126.
39 SeeDePiles, Cours de peinture, 489–498. Instead of the “balance of painters,” the English trans-
lation offers at the end of the volume a brief summary of the then famous British artists, see
Roger de Piles, The art of painting, with the lives and characters of above 300 of the most eminent
painters: containing a complete treatise of painting,designing,and the use of prints […]. London 1754.
40 On the “Querelle de coloris,” see Daniel Dauvois, Les armes de la philosophie dans la Querelle
du coloris, in: Frédéric Cousinié (ed.), L’ artiste et le philosophe (Aesthetica), Rennes 2011,
303–320; Emmanuelle Delapierre, Rubens contre Poussin: la querelle du coloris dans la peinture
française à la fin du XVIIe siècle; Musée des Beaux-Arts d’Arras, 6 mars au 14 juin 2004, Amsterdam
2004; Jacqueline Lichtenstein, La Couleur éloquente: rhétorique et peinture à l’âge classique, Paris
1989; Thomas Puttfarken, Roger de Piles’ Theory of Art, New Haven 1985; Bernard Teyssèdre,
Roger de Piles et les débats sur le coloris au siècle de Louis XIV (Bibliothèque des Arts, 13), Paris
1965.
41 Page from Roger de Piles’s “Balance of painters” in: De Piles, Cours de peinture, without page
number.
42 Teyssèdre, Roger de Piles.
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Fig. 2: Page from Roger de Piles’s “Balance of painters”, in: Cours
de peinture par principes. Paris 1708, without page number.
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certainly high numbers in the first two categories composition (15) and drawing
(17), but gave him poor marks for color (6) and expression (5). De Piles’s evalua-
tion diverges enormously from the high esteem that Poussin enjoyed at that time
in the vicinity of the French royal academy that was still influenced by the classi-
cist position of Charles Le Brun (1619–1690), André Félibien (1619–1695), and others.
However, as Victor Ginsburg and SheilaWeyers have pointed out, de Piles was care-
ful enough to not define the weight of each category so that it remains unclear if
one has to compute all scores equally or if certain categories are, for example, three
times as important as others.43This can lead to concurring readings and it may well
explain why de Piles thought about the “balance of painters” rather as a game than as
a helpful working tool.44 However, in the most obvious calculation that sums up all
four categorieswith a similar value of twenty—whichmeans eighty all together—de
Piles’s most important artists would have been Raphael and Rubens (65), the Car-
raci (58), as well as Domenichino and Le Brun (56), whereas Michelangelo (37), for
example, ranks toward the bottom of the field.45
2. The Attribution of the art work or
practices of connoisseurial comparative viewing
Numbers are one way of comparing things with each other, but as de Piles’s eval-
uations have shown, they are already the result of prior comparative operations.
Analytically speaking, they represent complex forms of clustered comparisons that
were used quantitatively in the evaluation of art. However, as results of previous
qualitative judgments, it could be said that they can always be traced back to de
Piles’s second domain, the attribution of art works that was itself the result of
practices of comparative vision. In fact, neither collecting art nor the practice of
arranging images next to each other were eighteenth-century innovations. We can
find, for instance, countless examples of juxtaposed images in the typological ar-
rangements of medieval altarpieces or reliquary caskets.46What, then,makes com-
parative viewing in art connoisseurship most remarkable? Put in a nutshell, con-
noisseurs developed a particular interest in a plurality of images neither because
43 Ginsburgh/Weyers, On the contemporaneity, 116.
44 “J’ay fait cet essai plutôt pour me divertir que pour attirer les autres dans mon sentiment”, see De
Piles, Cours de peinture, 489 [my italics].
45 See Nikolaus Pevsner, Die Geschichte der Kunstakademien, München 1986, 103, 336, note 111.
46 For the biblical ‘typology’ as a visual system founded in comparisons, see, for instance: Ar-
wed Arnulf, Studien zum Klosterneuburger Ambo und den theologischen Quellen bildlicher
Typologien von der Spätantike bis 1200, in:Wiener Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte, vol. 48, 1995,
19–23; Marek T. Kretschmer, La typologie biblique comme forme de pensée dans l’historiographie
médiévale (Textes et études du Moyen Âge), Turnhout 2014.
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of certain religious, political, or aesthetical functions, nor because of an artistic
interest in specific techniques, motifs, and so forth. Rather, it allowed them to
systematize artifacts taxonomically, and, as a consequence, to (re-)construct their
position within an art historical narrative of whatsoever nature. Even if many of the
first art connoisseurs were artists themselves,47 their interests shifted little by lit-
tle toward the relevance, the history, and the intellectual contexts of the art works,
their provenance, and their artistic origin. In the beginning, such a curiosity may
have been driven by the wish to formulate a normative canon in art schools provid-
ing an orientation for younger art students. But later, the intellectualization and
assimilation of connoisseurial knowledge would become a main strategy within
an institutionalizing academic art history. At the moment, it can be nothing other
than a hypothesis that refunctionalized comparative viewing made a major con-
tribution in the process of this ‘scientification’ process. While comparative viewing
always formed part of the reception of artifacts, it first became an explicit method-
ical analyzing tool in the eighteenth century.
Such an analyzing way of comparative viewing in connoisseurship could profit
from different impulses. Those worth mentioning are circles of early experts such
as the one around Pierre Crozat (1661/1665–1740),48 in which knowledge was accu-
mulated and discussed starting from amagnificent private collection. Another, but
overlapping field in which comparative viewing played a crucial role was the blos-
soming art market. Particularly the market for prints offered connoisseurs such as
Michel deMarolles (1600–1681), Pierre-JeanMariette (1694–1774), or Edme-François
Gersaint (1694–1750) opportunities to try out and establish different practices of
comparative viewing. Personal overlaps to the French Académie existed, where com-
parative approaches to images, as well, played a predominant role. In lectures, bet-
ter known as the conférences,49 the members of the Académie sought to theorize and
systemize artistic and aesthetic rules.50 When analyzing those lectures, it is not
47 Johannes Rößler has emphasized that until the 1870s, key positions in Germanmuseums re-
mained in the hands of trained artists, see Johannes Rößler, Das Notizbuch alsWerkzeug des
Kunsthistorikers: Schrift undZeichnung inden Forschungen vonWilhelmBodeundCarl Justi,
in: Christoph Hoffmann (ed.), Daten sichern. Schreiben und Zeichnen als Verfahren der Aufzeich-
nung, Zürich 2008, 73–102, see 75, note 10.
48 See for instance: Cordélia Hattori, The Drawings Collection of Pierre Crozat (1665–1740), in:
Collecting Prints and Drawings in Europe, c. 1500–1750, Farnham et al. 2003, 173–181.
49 For the edited volumes of the conferences of the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture
held between 1648–1793, see https://www.perspectivia.net/publikationen/conference [last
accessed May 16, 2018].
50 A good example for the rule-and-canon-oriented approach has been brought together by the
secretary of the Royal Academy in a volume demonstrating all contemporary academic rules
in texts and tables, see Henri Testelin, Sentimens des plus habiles peintres du tems, sur la pratique
de la peinture et sculpture: recueillis & mis en tables de preceptes, avec six discours academiques, ex-
traits des conferences tenuës en l’Academie Royale desdits arts ... par Henry Testelin, peintre du roi,
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difficult to see that many of them cannot be imagined without prior practices of
comparisons. It is, moreover, important to emphasize that judging the quality be-
tween two artworks/artists, attributing the responsible masters, or distinguishing
between the original work and the copies were also crucial for the academical dis-
course.The everyday connoisseurial practices entered the academic efforts from its
very beginnings.
To become more concrete and to distinguish between the different practices of
comparing, connoisseurs, first and foremost, experimented with different systems
of ordering art in albums.They arranged prints and drawings according to a relative
subject (e.g., jesters), a certain narrative (e.g., a passion sequence), the alphabetic
order of the artist’s names, the artist’s reputation, the affiliation to an artistic pro-
fession (e.g., painters, engravers, etc.), according to chronological or topographical
aspects, or even artistic techniques (e.g., engravings, colored woodcuts).51 Those
and other criteria are present in the structure of all broader eighteenth-century
collections of engravings. It is important to emphasize that different principles of
ordering were sometimes used synchronically by one and the same connoisseur. It
would, therefore, be reductive to imagine a straightforward development of certain
ordering principles in a connoisseur’s collection. The famous art collector Michel
de Marolles52 offers a good example for someone who is analogously realizing dif-
ferent structures in his collection(s). Not only did he hold the largest collection of
prints in France at the time of Louis XIV (1638–1715), but he also sold it to the king
in 1667, and—in a very short span of time—was able to bring together a second
print collection of fairly the same extent of circa one hundred and twenty thou-
sand leaves.53 His methods of collecting exemplify an early degree of professional-
ized connoisseurship that found its successors with a particular interest in those
albums that were arranged according to artists, schools, regions, and fame. Two-
professeur & secretaire en ladite Academie, ed. by Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture,
La Hague 1680.
51 A meticulous analysis of the different order structures of Michel de Marolles’s albums has
been presented by Brakensiek, Stephan, Vom ‘Theatrum mundi’ zum ‘Cabinet des Estampes’:
das Sammeln von Druckgraphik in Deutschland 1565–1821 (Studien zur Kunstgeschichte, 150),
Hildesheim 2003, 17–39.
52 Cf. Jean Jouberton, Une relecture du Livre des peintres et graveurs de Michel de Marolles,
in: Nouvelles de l’estampe 249 (2014), 4–15; Véronique Meyer, Marolles illustré: Chauveau,
Mellan, Nanteuil et les autres, in: Peter Fuhring/Barbara Brejon de Lavergnée/Marianne
Grivel (eds.), L’estampe au grand siècle, Paris 2010, 277–291; Stephan Brakensiek, Sammeln,
Ordnen und Erkennen: frühneuzeitliche Druckgraphiksammlungen und ihre Funktion als
Studien- und Erkenntnisorte; das Beispiel der Sammlung Michel de Marolles’ (1600–1681),
in: Robert Felfe/Angelika Lozar (eds.), Frühneuzeitliche Sammlungspraxis und Literatur, Berlin
2006, 130–162.
53 Brakensiek, Theatrummundi, 18, 22–23.
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Fig. 3: Album double page from the Michel de Marolles print collection, Paris, Bibliothèque
nationale de France, Estampes et photographie, Reserve EC-37-Boite Fol 1, fol. 82v–83.
thirds of his collection, however, were systematized according to an older prin-
ciple that is reminiscent of Samuel Quicchelberg’s (1529–1567) universal approach
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of gathering all phenomena known to humankind.54 In altogether seventy cate-
54 Cf. Brakensiek, Sammeln, Ordnen und Erkennen, 136. This claim is already present in
Quicchelberg’s title “rerum universitatis singulas materias et imagines”: Samuel Quicchel-
berg, Inscriptiones vel tituli Theatri amplissimi, complectentis rerum universitatis singulas ma-
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gories,Marolles organized prints with respect to the Artes liberales,55 conceding that
one of the main objectives of his albums was educational.56 However, the question
arises how well Marolles’s albums satisfy the demand to acquire universal knowl-
edge from the gathered engravings, given that not only the different order struc-
tures within his collection but also the side-by-side confrontations of engravings
point to very different levels of comparisons. Stephan Brakensiek has underlined
how difficult it sometimes is to ascertain the underlying order principle of an al-
bum double page. In Brakensiek’s opinion, Marolles sticks with the principles of
curiositas and varietas57 that were central epistemic strategies in early modern cu-
riosity cabinets. Yet, the different levels of comparison also result, amongst others,
from particular conditions of visual comparisons themselves—that is, for instance,
the almost endless possibilities of identifying tertia comparationis and assumptions
of comparability (“Gleichartigkeitsannahmen”). What is meant by that? Analytically
speaking, by doing comparisons, one is juxtaposing at least two comparata and is
relating both to one or more tertia comparationis. It is useful to understand compar-
isons as practices that are performed by at least one actor and are always situated
in a particular context. Moreover, one could say that every comparison is based on
an implicit or explicit assumption of comparability.
How crucial is it to knowmore about the ‘intended’ tertium comperationis, if any?
It seems to be worth raising this question with regard to a characteristic relict of
Marolles’s connoisseurial activities: By applying the definition to the arrangement
of a double page (Fig. 3)58 from one of Marolles’s albums with prints by Hendrick
Goltzius (1558–1617), it rapidly comes to the point at which it is difficult to precisely
specify the historical intention of the presented comparison of prints.
It is vital to note that the following considerations are not intended to describe
a historical practice of comparing, but, first of all, the difficulties that generally
accompany practices of comparing images. The two Goltzius albums form part of
terias et imagines eximias etc, München 1565, URL: http://www.europeana.eu/portal/record-
ABO/%2BZ178696704.html [last accessed July 16, 2018].
55 Cf. Brakensiek, Sammeln, Ordnen und Erkennen, 135; Michel de Marolles, Catalogue de livres
d’estampes et de figures en taille douce: avec un dénombrement des pieces qui y sont contenuës; fait à
Paris en l’anneé 1666, Paris 1666, 9–14.
56 Cf. Brakensiek, Sammeln, Ordnen und Erkennen, 144; Marolles, Catalogue, 9: “Cependant s’il
faut parler de leur [i.e., prints] utilité pour l’instruction de ceux qui les aiment, ou pour for-
mer l’esprit d’un jeune Prince, il est certain que les Estampes bien choisies & bien disposées
donnent agreablement la connoissance, non seulement de toutes les Sciences, & de tous les
beaux Arts, mais encore de toutes les choses imaginables.”
57 Cf. Brakensiek, Sammeln, Ordnen und Erkennen, 139.
58 Album double page from the Michel de Marolles print collection, Paris, Bibliothèques na-
tionale de France, Estampes et photographie, Reserve EC-37-Boite Fol 1, fol. 82v–83, URL:
http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb43601416n [last accessed July 18, 2018].
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a comprehensive collection that was sold to King Louis XIV and rearranged com-
pletely by Marolles before it entered the royal collection.59 Hence, in all probability,
the two albums represent a structure that had been set carefully.The double page60
shows on the left side the second state of the famous Apollo Belevedere executed by
Goltzius,61 whereas on the right side, four leaves are placed next to each other,
that is, first, the Unequal couple by Claes Jansz. Visscher (1587–1652), on which both
Goltzius’s family armor and the monogram “HG” imply his authorship; 62 second,
the Hercules Boarium executed by an anonymous artist and signed on the pedestal
with “HGoltzius fecit”;63 third, the engraving Death surprising a young man by Jan
Saenredam (1565–1607) after a design by Goltzius;64 and fourth, Judith with the head
of Holofernes by Goltzius after a design by Bartholomeus Spranger (1546–1611).65This
complex combination of engravings demonstrates the general ambiguity of images
in accounting for a certain tertium comparationis; this is aggravated by the fact that
the comparata as well as the assumption of comparability are not defined either. It
is, thus, not perfectly clear whether the combination of engravings bears a deeper
significance or not, because, thematically, they vary widely. The Apollo Belvedere is
one of the most famous Roman sculptures that became a prototype for ‘perfect an-
tiquity’ in neoclassical times.The engraving represents not only the Palatine sculp-
ture but also the moment when young artist takes a sketch of it in chalk. Also,
the Hercules Boarium represents a Roman sculpture, now, however, a sculpture that
has been made in bronze and not in marble. Just like the Apollo Belvedere, the Ro-
man demigod is executed in a sharp view from below. Therefore, the perspective
on the sculpture could be the requested tertium that sets the comparison between
the two prints. Another of the prints, Judith with the head of Holofernes, is also com-
posed from a worm’s eye perspective that increases its dramatic effect. However,
59 Album double page from the Michel de Marolles print collection, Paris, Bibliothèques na-
tionale de France, Estampes et photographie, Reserve EC-37-Boite Fol 1, fol. 82v–83.
60 Album double page from the Michel de Marolles print collection, Paris, Bibliothèques na-
tionale de France, Estampes et photographie, Reserve EC-37-Boite Fol 1, fol. 82v–83.
61 Marjolein Leesberg/Huigen Leeflang (eds.), The New Hollstein Dutch & Flemish Etchings, En-
gravings andWoodcuts 1450-1700 –Hendrick Goltzius, part ii, Amsterdam 2012, NH 380/II, 370.
62 Leesberg/Leeflang,NewHollsteinHendrickGoltzius, part iv, NHD9, 253. The inscription is: “De-
crepitus juvenem lepidamquemovere Puellam /Conatur, turpi victus amore senex /Cascus ait,
cascam: corpucula digna patula /Quaero: conjugii spes tibi nullamei.” (Translation: “Taken by
shameful love the decrepit oldman tries to persuade the jolly girl. But she says: Old goeswith
old, I look for a lid that fits my jug. I think you do not match me”).
63 Leesberg/Leeflang, New Hollstein Hendrick Goltzius, part iv, NH D9, 253.
64 Leesberg/Leeflang, New Hollstein Hendrick Goltzius, part iii, NH 530, 222. The inscription is:
“FVI, NON SVM. ES, NON ERIS” (Translation: “What I was, I am not; what you are, you will not
be”).
65 Leesberg/Leeflang, New Hollstein Hendrick Goltzius, part ii, NH 336/I, 298. The inscription is:
“Nemo suis nimium confidat viribus, ausis Nemo suis temerè; Docet hoc Holophernis amarus Exitus
[...].” A translation is given in the text.
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different kinds of heroism could also be the subject of the juxtaposition that link
the three prints. Neither the one nor the other tertium appear to be addressed in the
two prints hitherto not mentioned. Whereas the first one takes into consideration
the inappropriate desire of an old man and a young woman’s refusal, the second
shows a young man strolling through a graveyard with an Egyptian pyramid in the
background. He bumps into a skeleton that reminds him of his own mortal condi-
tion. Apparently, in this case, the experience of time or an idea of vanitas may have
been the tertium, and one could ask whether or not this is also true for the other
three prints. Given the inscription present in the Judith print that clearly points to
the transience of forceful men (“No one should trust its own forces too much, nor
its reckless boldness; this teaches the bitter end of Holofernes [...]”),the other two
effigies of god and demigod are also nomore than a distant echo of a time in which
the histories and legends connected with the two protagonists were still commonly
known. Finally, it is also conceivable that Marolles had just one detail in mind that
serves him as comparatum, for example, the figures’ hands. Consequently, the per-
spective changes once again because the tertium may now be a particular gesture
of the hand.
What becomes obvious from a brief analysis of the double page is that the his-
torical practice of connoisseurial comparative viewing is far from being one that
discloses its secrets unequivocally. On the contrary, more than in the polysemy of
texts, images withdraw themselves from an unequivocal ‘readability.’ If, further-
more, a paratext on the image always creates a new visibility that stands against
the visible as such—as can be argued with Michel Foucault (1926–1984)—then the
ambiguity of the dispositive will increase even further.66 Connoisseurial practices
of arranging images in albums are pre-textual, but they nevertheless might aim to-
ward a certain goal. Insofar we have to assume that they are intentional to a certain
degree. They create—so the hypothesis—a hiatus comparable to the one between
the visible and the sayable. The medial and material quality of ‘the things visible’
are obvious focal points for this underestimated effect. For instance, by arranging
prints with different paper qualities, by juxtaposing an original with a copy—both
distinguishable only through minor differences between lines, hatches, shadows,
and so forth—the connoisseur nails down a particular but unuttered relationship
between the chosen prints. This parapractice that comprises, for instance, the se-
lection process, the differentiation between material qualities, or the alignment of
prints in the portfolio might enfold the same impact as a paratext.
66 Falk Wolf describes the gap between the visible and the sayable as one that has determined
art historical writing from the beginning, see Falk Wolf, Kunstgeschichte als Bild. Medien- und
Wissenschaftstheoretische Positionen der Kunstgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, Doctoral disserta-
tion, University of Basel, Switzerland, 2017, 4–7.
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It is important to emphasize that the connoisseurial arrangementsmust not al-
ways have pursued a specific meaning or goal. On the contrary, it appears probable
that, for example, formalistic reasons could likewise have been decisive elements
that dominated the everyday experience of the connoisseur. Certain aspects can
be recognized in the blink of an eye or a ‘coup d’œil.’67 Marolles might have chosen
the five prints on the double page (Fig. 3) because all of them show freestanding
figures. This formalistic similarity68 is perhaps trivial, but it brings to the fore a
general phenomenon present in images: On the one hand, it is much easier to
perceive the content of one or more images—as opposed to that of a text—in a
very short span of time. In the case of the double page, this might be the topic
‘freestanding figure.’ In that sense, as some forms of comparisons—metaphors for
instance—can be understood as a shorthand method, image arrangements could
also present certain aspects instantly. On the other hand, a detailed picture anal-
ysis might require much more time and prerequisites than every thorough textual
analysis, as has been shown by the arduous search for a tertium or the assumption
of comparability on only one double page of Marolles’ Goltzius album. Of course,
comparing images can be a particularly effective way to grasp a certain topic, but
it does not guarantee a mutual understanding of the intention of the comparative
arrangement. Such arrangements may allow us to make an argument beyond any
textual dimension, but that provides both clearly highlighted tertia and assump-
tions of comparability. For the moment, we have to assume that for Marolles, the
initiator of the comparative arrangement, the latent openness of his ‘composition’
with respect to the tertia and the assumption of comparability poses no problem
at all. The context—a portfolio with works by Goltzius—clarifies the most impor-
tant task of such juxtapositions, namely the attribution to a particular artist. In the
eyes of the author of the comparative arrangement, the decision for a topic such
as ‘freestanding figure’ might have facilitated statements on how Goltzius solved
certain artistic tasks. This raises, however, the question whether or not practices
of comparing in the eighteenth century are in any way new or distinct from those
already common two or more centuries earlier.
67 The term ‘coup d’œil’ is connected to the request of eighteenth-century theorists that a
‘tableau’ has to be apprehensible in a single glance of an eye, see Smentek, Mariette and the
Science of the Connoisseur, 149–151. How complex the interplay between contemplative and
cursory sight can be has been discussed vividly by Norman Bryson who differentiates be-
tween the concepts “gaze” (“regard”) and “glance” (“coup d’œil”), see Norman Bryson, Vision
and painting: the logic of the gaze (Language, discourse, society), London 1988, 87–133.
68 Dorothee Kimmich has emphasized the relationship between similarity as a theoretical
paradigm and comparison in a lecture within the framework of the Collaborative Research
Center SFB 1288 “Practices of Comparing. Changing and Ordering the World”, Bielefeld Uni-
versity, in July 2018. She stressed that—as with comparisons—similarities are always con-
text-related. See also: Anil Bhatti/Dorothee Kimmich (eds.), Similarities, Tulika 2018.
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3. Differentiating between original and copy or
distinct practices of comparing in connoisseurship
An early example of connoisseurship and art expertise is Giorgio Vasari’s private
collection of drawings. Parallel to his famous Lives of the most eminent painters, sculp-
tors and architects,69 first published in 1550 and then in an expanded version in 1568,
the painter-author, sometimes called the ‘father of art history’, assembled a vast
collection of original drawings on approximately five hundred to seven hundred
sheets that he referred to as his “libro de’ disegni”—his book of drawings.70 Unfor-
tunately, none of the ten to twelve original volumes has been preserved. However,
single sheets survived and their discovery, such as that of the one kept in the Na-
tional Gallery in Washington attracted the attention of art historians (Fig. 4).71
The album page represents a composition of four single metal point drawings
on the recto from which—in reference to the large size of the album page of 56.7 x
45.7 cm—every drawing could have stood alone for itself. However, Vasari appar-
ently invested much effort in pasting them together in one arrangement. He not
only ordered them symmetrically, but also invented an architectural framework.72
The viewer is invited to perceive them as parts of a sixteenth-century palazzo wall
decoration.73 One of the purposes of such an arrangement might have been the
creation of a visual argument by comparing drawing styles with each other and
establishing an artistic identity. This can be deduced from the two cartouches at
the bottom of the two central drawings with the head of a young boy above and
different body studies below. Whereas the sepia rendered drawing below has been
attributed by Vasari to the artist Filippo Lippi (1406–1469), the cartouche of the head
study remained empty. Today, both drawings have been reattributed, the different
body studies to Filippo Lippi’s son Filippino (1457–1504), the young man’s head to
Sandro Botticelli (1445–1510), but it is not clear whether or not Vasari knew that
the head is not from Filippo Lippi’s hand. Whatever the reason, the author of the
69 Giorgio Vasari, Le vite de’ piv eccellenti pittori, scvltori, et architettori, 3 vols., 2nd & expanded ed.,
Fiorenza 1568.
70 Cf. Anna Forlani Tempesti, Giorgio Vasari and the ‘Libro de’ Disegni’: A Paper Museum or
Portable Gallery, in: Maia Wellington Gahtan (ed.), Giorgo Vasari and the Birth of the Museum,
Farnham et al. 2014, 31–52; Kimberly Schenck, A Page fromGiorgio Vasari’s ‘Libro de’ Disegni’
as Composite Object, in: Facture. National Gallery of Art 1 (2013), 2–31.
71 Album page from Libro de’ Disegni; sheets probably 1480–1504; mounting and framework by
Giorgio Vasari, after 1524; 56,7 x 45,7 cm, Washington, National Gallery of Art, Woodner Col-
lection, Patrons’ Permanent Fund 1991.190.1.
72 As far as we can say, Giorgio Vasari was the first to introduce such architectural frames, see
Catherine Monbeig-Goguel, Le dessin encadré, in: Revue de l’art 76 (1987), 25–31.
73 Kimberly Schenck has further specified that the “wall” resembles the “frescoes in the Cham-
ber of Fortune (1548) at his [Vasari’s] home (Casa Vasari) in Arrezo [...]”, see Schenck, A Page
from Giorgio Vasari’s ‘Libro de’ Disegni’, 11.
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Fig. 4: Album page from “Libro de’ Disegni”; sheets probably
1480–1504; mounting and framework by Giorgio Vasari, after
1524; Washington, National Gallery of Art, Woodner Collection,
Patrons’ Permanent Fund 1991.190.1.
album collage has worked toward a stylistic correspondence and interrelationship.
He thereby involved himself artistically by creating an architectural frame. Such
a supplementary structure should not be underestimated given that “parerga [...]
can have a decisive impact on the question of which agency may be produced in
a given situation,”74 and that “parerga may be understood as a hinge or a thresh-
old between object und subject.”75 Moreover, in this example, the parerga perform
an obvious function because they bring together more than one ergon and, there-
fore, aim to represent an aesthetic unity. The empty cartouche under the study of
a young man’s head might epitomize Vasari’s doubts about the attribution of this
74 Grave et al., Agency of Display, 11 [italics in original].
75 Grave et al., Agency of Display, 14 [italics in original].
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very drawing, but the entire page enshrines Filippo Lippi’s authorship or at least it
insinuates the execution in the same workshop. Likewise, the verso of the album
leaf with altogether six mounted drawings in different techniques appears to prove
Vasari’s intention to establish the full range of Filippo’s drawing style: a rare colored
drawing with Saint Roch between Saints Anthony Abbot andCatherine of Alexandria today
attributed to Raffaellino del Garbo (1466–1527) is—once again—(erroneously) iden-
tified in the cartouche as a work by Filippo Lippi.76 As early as 1930, Erwin Panofsky
stressed the didactic impact of Vasari’s framings that provided initial evidence for
the practice of evaluating objects from an indisputable art historical perspective.77
As Vasari understood the “arte del disegno” as the “Urkunst”78 (original art) for all
three spatial arts (architecture, sculpture, painting), the comparative arrangement
of his libro di disegni might have had the aim to extract a certain summa of every
master present in his collection. However, his treatment prevents beholders from
reformulating any attribution. On the contrary, they are fixed in individual but
normative solutions in which the drawings are often enough even trimmed to fit
into a certain composition.
One of the principal connoisseurs of the eighteenth century, Pierre-Jean Mari-
ette,79 knew Vasari’s individualizing approach because he could buy not just some
sheets but a complete volume of Vasari’s libro de’ disegni on the French art market.80
This chance discovery prompted him to discuss the function of Vasari’s collection
of drawings for the conception of his Vite. Thus, in his posthumously published
Abcedario, Mariette assumes that: “one would have no doubt that this discussion
cannot be done but through comparison. Vasari’s album would have been a perpet-
ual and unquestionable school of critique.”81 Mariette’s remarkable historicizing
76 Colored illustrations of the Washington recto and verso as well as many details are repro-
duced in Schenck, A Page from Giorgio Vasari’s ‘Libro de’ Disegni’, 2–31.
77 Cf. Erwin Panofsky, Das erste Blatt aus dem ‘Libro’ Giorgio Vasaris: eine Studie über die
Beurteilung der Gotik in der italienischen Renaissance; mit einem Exkurs über zwei Fas-
sadenprojekte Domenico Beccafumis, in: Städel-Jahrbuch 6, Frankfurt a. M. 1930, 25–72, see
63; see also Monbeig-Goguel, Le dessin encadré, 26.
78 Panofsky, Das erste Blatt, 58.
79 For the most recent monographic volumes on Pierre-Jean Mariette and his drawing collec-
tion, see Valérie Kobi, Dans l’œil du connaisseur. Pierre-Jean Mariette (1694–1774) et la construc-
tion des savoirs en histoire de l’art (Collection “Art & société”), Rennes 2017; Smentek, Mariette
and the Science of the Connoisseur; Pierre Rosenberg/Laure Barthélemy-Labeeuw, Les dessins de
la collection Mariette: école française, vol. 1 A–E, vol. 2 F–W, Milan 2011.
80 The information is given in: Pierre-Jean Mariette, Abecedario de P. J. Mariette et autres notes
inédites de cet amateur sur les arts et les artists. Ouvrage publié d’apès les manuscrits autographes
conservés au cabinet des estampes de la Bibliothèque impériale, vol. 3, Paris 1851–1860, 160–161,
note 1.
81 [My translation and emphasis]. Original quote: “[…] on n’auroit eu aucun doute; cette discussion
ne se pouvant bien faire que par comparaison, le recueil du Vasari auroit été une perpétuelle et une
sûre école de critique.”, see Mariette, Abecedario, vol. 3, 160, note 1.
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classification should, however, be treated with some caution, because what he sug-
gests for Vasari’s practice describes rather his own “goût de comparaison.” Without
question, Mariette imitated some of Vasari’s most obvious idiosyncrasies: A good
example is Vasari’s effort to painstakingly repair Botticelli’s drawing with the head
of a young man in the lower right corner by carefully using a wash of almost the
same color.Mariette, too, executed innumerable repairs and also followed Vasari by
integrating his drawings into illusionistic arrangements such as frames or reticent
architectures as can be seen in the example with the drawing of a putto bending
down that is now attributed to Giorgione (1477/78–1510) (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5: Giorgione (attributed), Putto bending down, mounting
and framing by Pierre-Jean Mariette: New York, Metropolitan
Museum, Rogers Fund, 1911, acc. no. 11.66.5.
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However, while Vasari took an artistic approach with individual solutions for
his arrangements, Mariette established a rather systematic way to frame his draw-
ings—and what is even more important—he preferred mats for every single draw-
ing as far as they were medium sized. One could argue that Mariette was fully
aware of the fact that “material and performative interventions of isolation, focus-
ing, framing and staging make the object addressable as a single object.”82 Indeed,
they underline the visual integrity of the drawing and force the viewer to examine
it with the same attention as a framed painting. Appropriately, Mariette character-
ized his framings as a way of bringing drawings “back to life,”83 giving his framing
practice a “museum effect.”84 It is true that the decision for more or less unified
(characteristic blue) mats of medium size as well as the adoption of Vasari’s system
of cartouches for the artists’ names are strategies still used today in drawing collec-
tions.85 With regard to conservation and presentation, the connoisseur anticipates
museum principles that expose the particular quality of every single drawing.86
Consequently, in most cases, Mariette avoided doing precisely what this chapter is
primarily about, namely a comparative arrangement of drawings. It would be pre-
mature to conclude that Mariette—similarly to the romantic tendency present, for
example, in the writings of Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder (1773–1798) and Lud-
wig Tieck (1773–1853)—thought that “comparison is a serious impediment to any
appreciation.”87 On the contrary, as indicated in his writings, the advantage of his
82 Grave et al., Agency of Display, 13.
83 Smentek,Mariette and the Science of the Connoisseur, 145. French original: “les avois fait revivre
les tira du rebut”, see Pierre-Jean Mariette, Lettre sur Léonard de Vinci, Peintre Florentin. A
Monsieur le C: de C., in: Recueil de testes de caractère & de charges dessinées par Léonard de Vinci
Florentin & gravées par M. le C de C, Paris 1730, 19.
84 However, hewas not the first to use bluemats for framing his drawing collection: “Que penser
en fin de compte de l’appellation ‘Bleu Mariette’? Il faut observer que Mariette n’en fut pas
l’inventeur et qu’il semble s’être inspure de ses prédécesseurs immédiats. On sait, par exam-
ple. qu’un Antoine Coypel rhabilla de bandes bleues les dessins issus de la collection Jabach
achetés par Louis XIV”, see Dominique Le Marois, Les montages de dessins au XVIIIe siècle: l’
exemple de Mariette, in: Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de l’Art Français, 1982, 87–96, see 90.
85 Interestingly, Le Marois has differentiated between three categories of blue “Mariette mats”
fromwhichnot all had a cartouchewith the artist’s namebeneath thedrawing; consequently,
the author categorizes thesemats as “Montages de ‘recherche’”, see LeMarois, Lesmontages,
94.
86 Smentek,Mariette and the Science of the Connoisseur, 149; see Svetlana Alpers, The Museum as
a Way of Seeing, in: Ivan Karp/Steven D. Lavine, Exhibiting cultures: the poetics and politics of
museum display, Washington D.C. 1991, 25–32, see 27.
87 Romantic reasoning calls for an emotional rather than a rational approach, and in the case
ofWackenroder and Tieck, it comes with a reevaluation of northern art and architecture. The
full quote is: “But now I will turn my attention exclusively to you, my dear Albrecht [Dürer].
Comparison is a serious impediment to any appreciation, and even the most sublime beauty
in art makes its full and proper impact on us only when our gaze is not distracted by other
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system lies in its high degree of flexibility: “je ne suis pas étonné que celui qui est
parvenu au point de connoissance dont je parle, se voïe le plus souvent obligé de
quitter ses premiers sentimens, ou du moins de rectifier les idées qu’il avoit prises
de certains Maistres.”88 Mounting the greater part of his collected drawings inde-
pendently was the only way to ensure that all could be compared to each other at
any given moment, and that attributions could be changed if necessary.89 As has
been shown by Kristel Smentek, Mariette himself, of course, also experimented
with concrete juxtapositions in which the comparative quality is even reflected in
captions such as “Achetypon [...] Apographum” or “juxta methodum.”90 Another modus
operandi is present in an albumwithout anymats that is preserved in theMetropoli-
tan Museum, New York.91 Here, different stages and variants of prints were glued
only selectively onto the support, so that Mariette and probably also his father Jean
Mariette (1660–1742) would have the opportunity to rearrange the entire page if
new findings were to require any corrections.92 It is no coincidence that the ar-
rangement of the Metropolitan Mariette album is reminiscent of Marolles’s album
pages discussed in the second section of this chapter.TheMetropolitan album con-
tinues a systematic approach established between 1717 and 1719 by Mariette and his
father JeanMariette for the print collection of Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663–1736).93
beauties. Heaven has so distributed its gifts among the great artists of the world that we
must pause before each one and pay to each his fair share of our respect. Genuine art may
flourish not only under Italian skies or under majestic domes and Corinthian columns, but
under pointed arches, fantastically ornamented buildings, and Gothic spires.”, see Wilhelm
HeinrichWackenroder/Ludwig Tieck,Outpourings of an Art-Loving Friar, New York 1975, 58 [my
italics].
88 Mariette, Lettre sur Léonard de Vinci, 2; see also: Smentek,Mariette and the Science of the Con-
noisseur, 157.
89 This practice has been mentioned by De Piles already in 1699: “Ils en jugeront promptement
par la facilité de feüilleter quelques papiers, & de comparer ainsi les Productions d’un Maître
avec celles d’un autre [...]”, see Roger de Piles, Abregé de la vie des peintres , avec des reflexions
sur leurs ouvrages, et un Traité du peintre parfait, de la connoissance des desseins, & de l’utilité des
estampes, Paris 1699, 83 [my italics], URL: http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6568782t [last
accessed August 27, 2018].
90 Smentek,Mariette and the Science of the Connoisseur, 156–157.
91 Album Mariette, New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund,
1927, 27.78.2, URL: https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/361938 [last accessed
August 27, 2018].
92 To my knowledge, Michel de Marolles has first underlined that it is useful to fix prints and
drawings only on the four, reinforced corners, see Marolles, Catalogue, 9: “Il n’est pourtant pas
necessaire de les y coller à plat,& sur tout, les pieces rares& precieuses des grandsMaistres, qui se trou-
vent quelquesfois si malaisément, À quoy peu de colle de farine ou d’amidon, peut suffire aux quatre
coins sur de beau papier, dont la dépence aussi bien que de la Relieure des Livres est assez considerable.”
93 Chiara Gauna has highlighted the comparability of the Metropolitan Mariette album and
the project executed for Prince Eugene, see Chiara Gauna, Pierre-Jean Mariette e le ‘con-
noissances multipliées’: classificazioni, gerarchie, valori, in: Chiara Gauna (ed.), La sfida delle
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Of course, the value and uniqueness of prints is different from that of drawings,
and heremay lie a convincing explanation for the distinct organization of an album
page with multiple prints on the one hand and the preference for single drawings
under blue mats on the other. However, in both cases, it can be said that Mariette
did not just continue Vasari’s practice of creating intentionally normative collages,
but instead incorporated a skepticism into his system of attribution. Comparisons
are crucial for every aesthetic judgment, but they are rather unable to yield norma-
tive results. Accordingly, the comparative quality in Vasari’s libro de’ disegni is not
very pronounced—on the contrary, lots of his attributions could not withstand a
refined connoisseurial practice. One could think of Charles Coypel’s critic of the
“pêle-mêle dans de vieux portefeuilles,”94 where still at the beginning of the eighteenth
century, a differentiation between original and copy existed only very rarely. But
the differentiation between original and copy became the most important task of
all for the decades to come.
A productivemisreading of Coypel’s phrase “est sans nule comparaison” as “use-
less comparison”95 in Esther Bell’s article points to a remarkable question:96 Is the
change of connoisseurial practices possibly present in the increasing efficiency of
comparative doing itself? Mariette’s practice-oriented work stands as an example
for the connoisseur’s specific skills that, besides the development of a particular
vocabulary in the sense of the “sciences des mots,”97 enabled them to systematize
and categorize the vast heritage of artistic artifacts. This also implied the exclu-
sion of once admired art pieces and a strict culture of separating and dismissing
even helpful copies. It “was inseparable from a massive reorganization of knowl-
edge and social practices that modified in myriad ways the productive, cognitive,
and desiring capacities of the human subject.”98 The reorganization of knowledge
again, as has already been recognized critically by Antoine Quatremère de Quincy
stampe. Parigi Torino 1650–1906, Torino 2017, 7–31, see 10. Consistent with this observation,
Valérie Kobi enfolds the crucial formative impact of theViennese project for the youngPierre-
Jean Mariette, see Kobi, Dans l’œil du connaisseur, 61–94.
94 “Les desseins du Roi sont aujourd’hui dans un ordre très different de celui où ils étoient lorsque ce depôt
fut reunis a la garde desmon Père… Les desseins originaux et les copies étoient pêle-mêle dans de vieux
portefeuilles et malheureusement le nombre des copies est sans nule comparaison plus considerable
que celui des originaux.”, Paris, Institut Custodia, inv. no. 9555, see Esther Bell, A Curator at the
Louvre: Charles Coypel and the Royal Collections, in: Journal18: a journal of eighteenth-century
art and culture 2 (2016), 1–16 [13–14], URL: https://doi.org/10.30610/2.2016.6 [last accessed Au-
gust 27, 2018].
95 Amore precise translation reads as following: “[...] the number of copies is without any com-
parison more considerable than [...]”.
96 Bell, Curator at the Louvre, 5.
97 Marc-Antoine Laugier,Maniere de bien juger des ouvrages de peinture, Paris 1771, 8.
98 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century,
Cambridge 1991, 3.
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(1755–1849), is accompanied by some sort of manipulation: “You know that in every
part of human knowledge there exists a sort of manipulation that makes every sci-
entific department resemble a workshop [“espèce d’attélier”] in which every worker
has his part and deals only with his part.”99 And, truly, the new “Übersichtlichkeit’ des
Zuhandenseins,”100 the clarity of the present-to-hand, not only often upholds a sur-
prising lack of systematization as Hans Christian Hönes has pointed out, but it is
won at the price of an artificial, manipulating specialism. The connoisseur’s visual
experiences gained in life-long comparative practices are gained in the “espèce d’at-
télier,” and, generally, they almost never find their way ‘out’ into the art discourse.
A first outlook
Connoisseurial knowledge results more from the doing than from the application
of contemporary theories.This is why a practice-theoretical approach is able to en-
fold in a particular way those types of questions that are focusing on, for example,
the routinization of practices, the treatment of artifacts, and the interrelating of
social networks. That the “taste of comparison,” first described by Dubos, played a
crucial role in the wide range of connoisseurial practices but also in further strate-
gies of a developing academic art history becomes obvious in many of the exam-
ples discussed above. Two last cases may illustrate on very different levels why the
‘aesthetic surplus’—namely the artwork’s infinite and unclosed potential to create
meaning101—is maybe the reason for comparative connoisseurial practices being
discredited increasingly in the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries. In one plate
from Jean Baptiste Seroux d’Agincourt’s (1730–1814) Histoire de l’art par monumens102
(Fig. 6), the observer is invited to compare drawings by Raphael (1483–1520) with
antique fragments of sarcophagi in order to understand in a glance the principles
of the ‘Re-naissance’ of the Antique in sixteenth-century art.
99 [My translation]. Original quote: “Vous savez qu’il existe, dans chaque partie des connois-
sances humaines, une sorte de manipulation qui fait ressembler chaque département de la
science, à une espèce d’attélier, dans lequel chaque ouvrier a sa partie, et ne s’occupe qu’elle.”,
see Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy, Lettres sur le préjudice qu’occasionnerait aux
arts et à la science, le déplacement des monuments de lart de l’Italie, Paris 1796, 27. See also: Pascal
Griener, La République de l’oeil: l’expérience de l’art au siècle des Lumières (Collection du Collège
de France), Paris 2010, 12.
100 Hans C. Hönes, Kunst am Ursprung: das Nachleben der Bilder und die Souveränität des Antiquars
(Image, 69), Bielefeld 2014, 236.
101 This concept forms a crucial part of Gottfried Boehm’s conceptualization of the ‘iconic differ-
ence’, see Gottfried Boehm, Die Wiederkehr der Bilder, in: Gottfried Boehm (ed.),Was ist ein
Bild? (Bild und Text), München 1994, 11–38.
102 Jean Baptiste Seroux D’Agincourt, Histoire de l’art par les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe
siècle jusqu’à son renouvellement au XVIe: ouvrage enrichi de 325 pl., 6 vols., Paris 1823.
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Fig. 6: Jean Baptiste Louis Georges Seroux d’Agincourt, Histoire de
l’art par les monumens, depuis sa décadence au IVe siècle jusqu’à
son renouvellement au XVIe: Planches. Peinture; deuxième et
troisième parties. Tables générales des matières, vol. 6, Paris 1823,
plate 183.
The book project concentrates on the illustrative power of hundreds of plates,
but this example is particularly astonishing, because it nonverbally encapsules a
complex argument: Raphael’s putti are oriented toward the representational mode
of antique art (here: sculptural design), as can be said for Renaissance art in gen-
eral. Not coincidentally, it seems to me, Seroux d’Agincourt chose drawings for this
evocative comparison, because they can stand for the concept of Vasari’s disegno
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Fig. 7: Adam Bartsch, Catalogue raisonne de toutes les estampes
qui forment l’oeuvre de Rembrandt, Vienna 1797, plate 1.
that marks a genuine shift in sixteenth-century art theory to something entirely
new. However, as convincing as the visual juxtaposition might be, if it is to become
comprehensible, it not only needs the contextualizing caption “Esquisses et dessins de
Raphael comparés avec l’Antique. XVIe. Siécle”, but also presumes the Vasarian narra-
tive of the decline of arts in the Middle Ages. Without text, the visual argument is
at risk of ending up in a direction that is altogether different.This is also because of
the ‘aesthetic surplus’ that offers more than one loose end to interpret the illustra-
tion’s meaning. The visual argument together with its paratext, therefore, exposes
itself to being highly manipulative and still allows enough room for just another
‘reading.’ In order to escape such an interpretative scope, connoisseurs such as
Adam von Bartsch (1757–1821) started to fragment their examples in comparisons
up to single lines (Fig. 7).
The aim of these ‘micro-comparisons’ was to differentiate very precisely be-
tween original and copy or first and second state of a print and so forth. However,
von Bartsch’s plate is far from being instantaneously legible. It remains abstract
without textual description and without the background knowledge on what
the prints in the comparison look like entirely. Long before Giovanni Morelli’s
(1816–1891) famous method of a quasimedical examination of art, von Bartsch’s
attempt fails to make things more objective. By reducing the artwork to pure
formalistic details, he artificially ignores the ‘aesthetic surplus’ and initiates a
tendency for the “taste of comparison,” whose protagonists were later denigrated
as ‘Faltenzähler,’ that is, counters of pleats or nitpickers. Both Seroux d’Agincourt
and von Bartsch started to fix their comparative practice into illustrative juxtapo-
sitions, the one by propagating an epochal development, the other by pointing to
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minimal morphological differences. These examples demonstrate the continuous
actualization of methods of comparing. They underline the different interests
that can be brought together from diverse visual types of juxtapositions. Most
and foremost, they mark a switch from an atelier practice of the visual “taste
of comparison” to a practice that more and more exhibits its institutionalized
research results.
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Inventing White Beauty and Fighting Black Slavery
How Blumenbach, Humboldt, and Arango y Parreño
Contributed to Cuban Race Comparisons in the Long
Nineteenth Century
Angelika Epple
Abstract
Humboldt’s essay on Cuba is famous for his realistic description of the atrocities of the Cuban
slave regime. A convinced abolitionist, Humboldt denied the comparability of slavery with
feudal serfdom, because these comparisons would only play down the inhumanity of slavery.
At the same time, Humboldt compared different slave regimes arguing that there are better
and worse types of slavery. He concluded that slavery should only be overcome step by step.
The contribution shows that these two standpoints can be traced back to two different sources:
first, the Göttingen comparative anatomist and abolitionist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach,
and second the Cuban economist and defender of slavery Francisco de Arango y Parreño. Even
though, until today, Blumenbach might be known for the invention of the beauty of the so-
called “Caucasian race,” his main aim was to prove that all people belonged to just one species
and that consequently, all forms of slavery were inhuman. Arango y Parreño, in contrast, was
of the opinion that a lesson learned from the Haitian revolution was that white supremacy
was in danger when either slavery was too cruel or when black slaves outnumbered the white
population. He—in his eyes!—helped to establish a slavery regime that made Cuban slaves
“the happiest in the world.” The contribution shows how these two standpoints differently ne-
gotiate racial equality and racial differences and how Blumenbach, Humboldt, and Arango
y Parreño shaped race comparisons in Cuba until the end of the long 19th century. However
important the idea of human equality, the invention of the Caucasian race and the pater-
nalistic approach to ending slavery also opened the door for a long-lasting tradition of racist
comparisons.
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In the last chapter of his famous “Essai politique sur l’île de Cuba” (1826),1 Alexander
von Humboldt recalls an answer given by a slave trader during an investigation by
the British parliament in 1789. Asked about the treatment of African slaves on board
(during the terrifying “middle passage”), the slave trader justified whipping slaves
to make them dance and force them to sing, because it showed that living among
Whites was fun. His explanation was simple: “This only proves the care we show
for their health.”2 This short quotation contains the meaning of the slave trade in
a nutshell: transforming human beings into a trading product—not only to exploit
their labor but also to dominate and eventually destroy their bodies and minds.
“Slaving,” the very process of dehumanizing, follows a specific schema that can be
observed historically in all parts of the world.3 However, every slave regime works
along different lines. In contrast to Haiti where the slave revolution 1791–1804 led
to a republic, the neighboring island of Cuba experienced an epoch of ever-growing
slave trade in the nineteenth century. Thanks to the exploitation of an increasing
number of enslaved Africans within sugar, coffee, and tobacco production, Cuba
became Spain’s wealthiest colony between 1780 and 1840.4 Michael Zeuske con-
1 Alexander von Humboldt, Essai politique sur l’île de Cuba (T. 1), Paris 1826, 310. The first com-
plete French edition of Humboldt’s sociopolitical essay on Cuba containing all appendices
is entitled: “Essai politique sur l’île de Cuba, in: Relation Historique du voyage aux regions
équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent fait en 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803 et 1804 par Al[exan-
dre]. de Humboldt et A[imé]. Bonpland. Rédigé par Alexandre de Humboldt. Band III (J.
Smith et Gide Fils), Paris 1825.” However, in reality, it appeared only in 1831, see: commen-
tary to the German edition by Hanno Beck, in: Alexander von Humboldt/Hanno Beck (ed.),
Cuba-Werk, Darmstädter Ausgabe Vol. 3., Darmstadt 2008, 231).
2 [My translation]. Original quote: “Si l’on fouette les esclaves […] cela ne prouve que les soins que nous
prenons pour la santé des hommes.” Humboldt, Essai politique, 310; Alexander von Humboldt,
Political Essay on the Island Cuba: A Critical Edition, Alexander von Humboldt in English,
Vol. 2, Chicago 2011, 144.
3 The term was coined by Joseph C. Miller. See for instance, Joseph Miller, Slaving as historical
process: Examples from the ancient Mediterranean and the modern Atlantic, in: Enrico Dal
Lago/Constantina Katsari (eds.), Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern, 70–102, Cambridge 2008;
as to different world regions, see the impressive recent books by Michael Zeuske, Handbuch
Geschichte der Sklaverei. Eine Globalgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Berlin/Boston
2013; Michael Zeuske, Sklaverei. Eine Menschheitsgeschichte von der Steinzeit bis heute, Stuttgart
2018.
4 Cf. Aline Helg, Slave but not Citizen. Free people of color and blood purity in Colonial Spanish Amer-
ican Legislation, URL: http://http//dx.doi.org/10.6035/Millars.2017.42.4, 2017, 76–99, see 92
[last accessed May 25, 2019]. Helg also has the numbers on Cuban slave trade (Helg, Slave
but not Citizen, 96): “Between 1791 and 1866, the total number of Africans deported to Cuba
reached 752,000—and additional slaves were imported from the Caribbean and continental
America. Out of these, 620,000 were illegally imported after 1817, when Spain signed with
Great Britain a first treaty prohibiting the slave trade”. VOYAGES Database (2010), Voyages:
The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, URL: http://www.slavevoyages.org, [last accessedMay
25, 2019].
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vincingly divides Cuban slave history into four phases, each with its own specific
features when it came to bodily treatments such as branding.5 Slavery eventually
came to an end in Cuba in 1886.
The justification given by the perpetrator before the British parliament also
harbors another interesting point: Without any self-criticism, the slave trader as-
sumes that living among (what he calls) Whites must be something appealing. It
goes without saying that for him, slaves as such were non-Whites.Humboldt, while
telling this justification story to his readers at the time, profiled his own position:
Slavery for him was a most cruel and disgusting sign of barbarism, a disaster for
humankind. Even though his paternalistic standpoint runs throughout his descrip-
tions and does not allow for the inside perspective of a slave, he characterized the
Cuban slave regime more realistically and as being more violent than any German
scholar had done before.The above-mentioned last chapter even went beyond this.
The empirical sociopolitical part of the “essai” had already shown Humboldt as a
convinced abolitionist; the last chapter, which deals mainly with slavery, however,
had a different tone. It was basically a manifesto against any kind of slavery—slav-
ery for him being something even more inhumane than other unjust societal or-
ders. He even criticizes all comparisons between slavery and other forms of vio-
lent labor force oppression such as Leibeigene (literally body ownership) or serfs in
European feudalism for downplaying the cruelty of slavery.6 For him, slavery was
incomparable in this sense. However, what was important to him, in contrast, was
comparing different slave regimes. The first French version of the “essai” came out
already in 1826—however, without the appendices. This version became seminal
not only in Europe but also in Cuba and other American countries.7
Ramón de la Sagra, for instance, born in Spain, immigrated to Cuba and mar-
ried a Cuban. He was professor of natural history in Havana, Venezuelan consul in
Paris, and later anarchist. His history of Cuba published in 1831 included references
to Humboldt’s 1826 version of the “essai.”8 He self-confidentially located himself in
5 Cf. Michael Zeuske, Die Nicht-Geschichte von Versklavten als Archiv-Geschichte von “Stim-
men” und Körpern, in: Jahrbuch für Europäische Überseegeschichte 16, Wiesbaden 2016, 65–114.
6 Cf. Humboldt, Political Essay, 143. Humboldt, Essai politique, 308: “des serfs moyen âge [sic!].”
7 Despite the Spanish translation being banned in Cuba immediately after its appearance in
1827, the “essai” became a point of reference in official Cuban documents (see: Humboldt, ap-
pendix II., German edition, 178) but also in other books such as Anastasio Carrillo y Arango,
Elógico histórico del excelentísmo Sr. D. Francisco de Arango y Parreño, first published in 1837,
reprinted in: Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Obras del Excmo. Señor D. Francisco de Arango y
Parreño vol. I, Habana 1888, XLVIII.
8 Cf. Ramón de la Sagra, Historia económico-politica y estadística de la isla de Cuba ó sea de sus pro-
gresos en la población, la agricultura, el comercio y las rentas, LaHabana 1831, 8. It seems probable
that de la Sagra did not know the complete Humboldt edition that also appeared in 1831. On
page 8 of his “Historia,” de la Sagra refers to an edition of Humboldt’s work of Cuba that had
appeared in 1826 without considering the censuses of 1817 and 1827. De la Sagra gives only
298 Angelika Epple
the tradition of “Sr. Baron deHumboldt” and his “highly appreciated and well-known
work” on Cuba.9 De la Sagra first lamented that Humboldt, unfortunately, not had
enough time to study the Cuban population inmore depth, before addingmodestly
that he himself has sorted out new documents, arranging them as “this wise man”
would have done, so that his findings could be considered as complementing those
of Humboldt.10 In his opinion, the careful study of data is even more important “in
a century in which everything is subject to calculation and observation.”11 Accord-
ing to de la Sagra, Humboldt’s chapter on the Cuban population is based on official
investigations and comparisons between “the classesWhite, free of Color, slave and
general of Color.”12 And indeed, at first sight, these are the categories employed in
the official Cuban censuses since 1774. However, it is part of “census policy,” so to
say, that the categories applied in the respective census could be traced back to
older censuses in order to make temporal comparisons possible.13 I shall show that
the categories also changed slightly, but significantly over time.
When it came to comparisons of population by numbers, Humboldt obviously
relied on official documents. This should not hide the fact that he, at the time,
helped to establish racial categories that evolved alongside the growing unease
among White Cuban elites caused by growing numbers of free born or freed peo-
ple of Color. Humboldt himself did not make this connection. Instead, he seems to
have been proud of his influence on demographic government. In his Appendix II,
for instance, he underlines that the introduction to the official Cuban census car-
ried out in 1827 had used and also praised the first edition of his “essai” (Paris 1826).14
the Spanish title without mentioning whether this was a Spanish edition or his own transla-
tion. There is much to suggest that he might have been referring to the French two-volume
publication by J. Smith et Gide Fils in Paris that actually appeared in 1826—five years earlier
than the complete Humboldtian original edition including all appendices and also five years
earlier than de la Sagra’s own history of Cuba.
9 Sagra, Historia, IV/VI. He erroneously also thanks the translator into French named “Sr. Hu-
ber”: “El Sr. Baron deHumboldt en su apreciabilísima y bien conocida obra” /“y á su traduccion
francesa por el Sr. Huber.”
10 Sagra, Historia, 8: “Refiriéndome al trabajo de este sábio.”
11 Sagra, Historia, V: “Por otra parte, en un siglo en que todo se somete al cálculo y á la observacion.”
12 [My translation]. Original quote: “Las clases blanca, libre de color, esclava y general de color.” Sagra,
Historia, 8.
13 It is not just de la Sagrawhomentions and uses the census of 1774 (Sagra,Historia, 2); the 1774
census became a topos. The official census of 1907, for instance, traces the augmentation of
the population back to the first census in 1774 without any criticism of the numbers (301).
This is interesting, because in the first pages, the director of the census gives information
about their own difficulties in getting the numbers right and how to instruct the supervisors
to ask the right questions (9–19). Censo de la República de Cuba bajo de la administración
provisional de los Estados Unidos 1907, Washington 1908.
14 Cf. Alexander von Humboldt, Tableau Statistique de l’île de Cuba pour les années 1825–1829, Paris
1831, 6. According to Humboldt, the official census appeared with the title “Cuatro estatístico
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In addition to official statistical documents, Humboldt also had other informative
sources for population comparisons. One of the most important was Francisco de
Arango y Parreño, a Cuban economist, Criollo bourgeois, slave trader, slaveholder,
and an eloquent though also enlightened defender of the slave system. In 1795, only
four years after the Haitian revolution had begun, Arango wrote about the impor-
tance of “census figures in hand” when importing slaves. For him a lesson learned
was that Blacks should never outnumber the Whites in the population.15
I shall come back to this argument later. Arango did not just help Humboldt
with additional information, he also helped him judge the reliability of existing
official statistics such as the census of 1791—in Arango’s words, the first and, until
1810, the only reliable one.16 Arango did not just have close contacts with Humboldt
during his stay in Cuba; the two men also had a lively correspondence over several
years after Humboldt left the island.17 Arango’s close reading and his thoughtful
comments on Humboldt’s “essai” were published in his obras completas in 1837.18 Up
to now, the subtle but fundamental influence of Arango y Parreños on Humboldt’s
ambivalent perspective on Cuban slavery has been underestimated.19
What de la Sagra also did not mention (and probably did not know) was that
Humboldt’s racial comparisons were also influenced by a completely different
de la siempre fiel Isla de Cuba, correspondiente al año 1827, formado por una Comisión de jefes y of-
ficiales de orden y bajo la dirección de Escelentisimo Señor Capitán General Don Francisco Dionisio
Vivés, precedido de una descripción histórica, física, geográfica, y acompañada de quantas notas son
conducentes para la ilustración del cuadro, Havanna 1829.”
15 Helg, Slave but not Citizen, 76–99, see 93. Arango y Parreño points repeatedly to the fact that
the relation of slaves and free people of Color to Whites is crucial for preventing rebellions.
See, for example, Arango y Parreño, Obras, Vol. 2, 339.
16 In this context, Humboldt quotes Don Francisco de Arango y Parreño, “one of the most pro-
gressive and best-informed statesmen” who had told him that the census of 1791 was the first
(and until 1810 the last) reliable census. Following de Arango y Parreño, it was carried out un-
der the administration of Don Luis de las Casas. See Humboldt, Political Essay, 73, Humboldt,
Essai politique, 133: “un des hommes d’état les plus éclairés et les plus profondément instruit de la
position de sa patrie.”
17 Humboldt also mentions Arango y Parreño in his diaries. See, for more details, the informa-
tive commentary on Humboldt’s Havanna diary: Michael Zeuske, Alexander von Humboldt,
die Sklavereien in den Amerikas und das “Tagebuch von Havanna 1804”. Zur Edition von “Isle
de Cube”, in: Ottmar Ette (ed.), edition humboldt digital, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie
der Wissenschaften, Berlin. Version 1 from May 10, 2017. For further information, see the
helpful online series by VeraM. Kutzinsky and Ottmar Ette, Alexander vonHumboldt in English,
see: Francisco de Arango y Parreño, in: press.uchicago.edu, [last accessed April 26, 2019].
18 Arango y Parreño, Francisco de, Observaciónes al “Ensayo politico sobre la isla de Cuba”, es-
critas en 1827, in: Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Obras completas, vol. I, 1837, 533–546 (as it
reads in the second footnote, he commented on the French edition of 1826).
19 There is one exception: Michael Zeuske points to the fundamental importance of Arango for
Humboldt. See the excellent comment on Humboldt’s diaries in Zeuske, Sklavereien in den
Amerikas.
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source: Before starting his journey to Latin America, Humboldt had studied,
among other subjects, comparative anatomy with the German professor of an-
thropology Johann Friedrich Blumenbach at the University of Göttingen. Until
today, Blumenbach, above all in US-American literature, counts as the founder of
anthropology and as an important promoter of racial hierarchies.20 Even though
this judgment might not be completely accurate, his writings are one of the most
prominent sources suggesting that the “Caucasian race” is the most beautiful,
especially in its female version. The proverbial beauty of Caucasian women had
also been disseminated by Christoph Meiners, a self-confessing anti-Semite,
misogynist, racist, and colleague of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach at Göttingen.
“Caucasian” became a synonym in the United States (and some other countries)
for White people. In contrast to Meiners, who’s main endeavor was illustrating
White supremacy over the course of history, Blumenbach’s intention was to show
race equality through the similarities between all human variations. Drawing on
countless comparisons in his huge skull collection, he tried to prove scientifically
that behind all varieties, there was but one human species tracing back to Adam
and Eve. Even though Blumenbach might have taken the term “Caucasian” from
Meiners, he did not argue along the same lines.21 Things were more complicated.
Like his famous pupil Alexander von Humboldt, Blumenbach was a highly com-
mitted abolitionist. Fighting slavery was an important issue in his comparative
anatomy. Inventing White beauty and fighting Black slavery were but two sides of
a single coin.
In the following, I shall show that analyses of comparative practices can give
us new insights into how scholars such as Blumenbach and Humboldt, but also de
la Sagra or Cuban historians such as the historians Villanova and Morales in the
1880s and 1890s or the sociologist Ortíz in the early twentieth century, negotiated
race equality and racial differences.However important the idea of human equality,
the invention of the “Caucasian race” also opened the door for a long-lasting tradi-
tion of racist comparisons. A close reading of Humboldt’s comparisons including
an analysis of his teacher’s comparing practices reveals that his plea for abolition
and his humanitarian approach in the Cuban context were accompanied by racial
discrimination of people of Color. Whereas Blumenbach inserted an aesthetic dif-
ference between Whites and non-Whites, Humboldt transferred the aesthetic dif-
ference into what could be called a “paternalistic difference.” Francisco de Arango
y Parreño seems to have played a major role in this.
Of course, there were also other voices in Cuba. In the 1880s, the Cuban
politician and poet, José Martí, dreamt of overcoming races in the future: Mixed
20 See, for instance, Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, New York/London 1981.
21 Keel exaggerates the influence of Meiners on Blumenbach, see, Terence Keel, Divine Varia-
tions. How Christian Thought became Racial Science, Stanford 2018, 23.
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races would eventually blur all race differences. Historical reality was different: The
Cuban “guerra de razas” in 1912 became a massacre of approximately 5,000 to 6,000
non-White Cubans.22 The legitimation was that the leaders and also the objectives
of the rebellion were themselves racist.23 White supremacy and a language of race
equality were not contradictory.
Race and limpieza de sangre: Fluid concepts that shaped history
The history of White and Black people has a long tradition. In her seminal book
on the history of Whites, Nell Painter writes that White people did not exist in
Greek Antiquity.24 The assumed “nonexistence” of White people points to the fact
that in Greek Antiquity, membership of human groups was marked differently. Al-
though ethnographic thinking dates back to Ancient history,25 the term “race” was
not used to distinguish different human groups before the end of the Middle Ages.
It was only in the era of the Spanish reconquista that the term “raza” began to dis-
tinguish not only different species of horses but also human groups. In contrast
to the social hierarchy within a stratified order, the term raza introduced a crite-
rion allowing a horizontal classification that ran through different social estates.26
The term showed up together with a new classification along the line of geneal-
ogy: “limpieza de sangre.”27 It translates literarily into “cleanliness of the blood” and
asks for confirmation of so-called “blood purity” for Christian officials. Christians
could demonstrate their “blood purity” within the metropole by proving that they
22 Cf. AlineHelg, Race in Argentina and Cuba, in: RichardGraham (ed.), The Idea of Race in Latin
America, 1870-1940, Austin 1990, 55. Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share, The Afro-Cuban Struggle
for Equality, 1886–1912, Chapel Hill 1995, 225. The Cuban government puts the figure at 2,000
killed, whereas American figures go up to 5,000 to 6,000.
23 The Cuban race war has a very complex background, and further investigation is needed to
sort out all the conflict lines. However, the tensions between racial segregation practices in-
fluenced by the United States and the Cuban myth of racial integration have been discussed
broadly. Here are just some basic recommendations for further reading: The excellent anal-
ysis of Alejandro de la Fuente starts with the decade before the race war, see Alejandro de la
Fuente, UnaNación para todos. Raza, desigualdad y política en Cuba 1900–2000, La Habana 2014;
Ada Ferrer was one of the first to give a detailed insight into the last third of the nineteenth
century, see Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, Race, Nation, and Revolution in Cuba 1868–1898, Chapel
Hill 1999; and, of course, the seminal book by Aline Helg, Our rightful share.
24 Cf. Nell Irvin Painter, The History of White People, New York/London 2010, 1.
25 See subproject of the SFB 1288 on “Practices of Comparing” at Bielefeld University headed by
Raimund Schulz (https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/sfb1288/projekte/b04.html).
26 Cf. Christian Geulen, Geschichte des Rassismus, München 2007, 14.
27 Helg, Slave but not Citizen; Stefan Rinke/Andrea Riedemann, Chile, in: Wolfgang Benz (ed.),
Handbuch des Antisemitismus. Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart Vol. 1, München
2008, 71.
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had no Muslim or Jewish ancestry. The proof of “blood purity” became compulsory
for access to nonmanual professions as well as to positions within the militia, the
church, or state administration. Within the Spanish colonies, “blood purity” was
adopted and modified. This changed by 1570, when eventually after a long discus-
sion including the famous controversy of Valladolid (1550/1), the conquistawas declared
to not fit into the legal concept of a “just war” against heretics. That the conquista
was not classified a just war was most important for the few native Americans who
had survived not only slavery but also the new diseases imported by the Spaniards.
The classification implied that Amerindians had the chance to become Christians
and prove “blood purity,” because they were not thought to be contaminated by the
Muslim or Jewish religions or by heresy. Even though native Americans could no
longer be enslaved legally, their fate did not change for many years to come.The sit-
uation changed only toward the end of colonialism when the White elites realized
that they needed soldiers for their wars of independence.
For Afro-Americans the negative classification of the conquista had severe impli-
cations. As Aline Helg puts it, “Blacks ended up being the only legal slaves, because
they were implicitly captured in just wars against Muslims in Africa.”28 Limpieza
de sangre helped order the world both at home in Spain and in the colonies. At
first glance, it might seem as if the limpieza de sangre and also race provided a
clear classification system that, once implemented,wouldmake all comparisons ei-
ther obsolete or very easy. Reality was different. Spaniards, Indians, and Africans
mixed, often as a result of rape by Spaniards.29 As a result, the distinction be-
tween different people of Color such as Blacks, Mestizos (Indian–White), Mulattos
(Black–White), Zumbas (Indian–Black), Castizo (Mestizo–White), Cuarterón (Mu-
latto–White), Quinterón (Cuarterón–White), and different kinds of Whites (Euro-
peans, Spaniards, and Criollos) led to ever new contestations of respective privi-
leges and prohibitions. Not to mention Asian migrants and all possible combina-
tions. All legitimizations and all contestations relied on comparisons. As Fernando
Ortíz stated correctly in 1911 shortly before the race war began, race is such a fluid
category that it can be used for any kind of argument that always ends up in se-
vere conflicts.30 In Latin America, the Christian background of limpieza of sangre
faded out over the centuries and the racial component with its bodily character-
istics (such as skin color) and social implication (such as manual work and slave
history) became most prominent.
28 Helg, Slave but not Citizen, 80.
29 Cf. Helg, Slave but not Citizen, 82.
30 Cf. Fernando Ortíz, Los dos racismos, in: Ortíz, Fernando, La reconquista de America. Reflexiones
sobre el panhispanismo, Paris 1911, 42–48.
Inventing White Beauty and Fighting Black Slavery 303
European discussions on race and slavery:
The Göttingen setting around 1800
In Europe, in contrast, the Christian background of race concepts became even
more important, when during the Enlightenment, race concepts were combined
with theories of human development. Already before George-Louis Leclerc, Comte
de Buffon brought out his theory of monogenesis embedded in his environmental
explanation of human development in 1749,31 European scholars had struggledwith
the question of how the sameness and difference of human people came about over
time, given that they all had a common origin in Adam and Eve. The French au-
thor L’Abbé Prévost, for instance, evaluated human groups in general and Africans
in particular in terms of “the possibility of moral progress or regression” ending
with the speculation that Africans, these “machines animales were perhaps ‘a differ-
ent species.’”32 Polygenity, the idea that different species had different origins, was
of course a heretic position at the time. Many intellectuals such as Prévost only
“played” ambivalently with the idea.The polygenity–monogenity question came up
again in the ardent dispute of the New World, a discussion that fascinated scholars,
explorers, intellectuals, writers, philosophers such as Voltaire and de Pauw, the
German historian Christoph Meiners, Alexander von Humboldt, or the German
poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.33
In the meantime, American voices fromThomas Jefferson to the Jesuit Clavier,
who had lived inMexico for years,were setting other priorities. For European schol-
ars, what was most important was whether or not different human races “really”
existed.This question was far from being sophisticated. It had an everyday impact:
If all humans are of equal origin, does that imply that all humans are also equal
when it comes to, for instance, human rights? If so, how then could varieties and
existing hierarchies in humankind be explained? Christoph Meiners is a good ex-
ample showing that “race” comparisons not only helped to hierarchize people of
the globe when he put White people on the top of all humankind, but that “race”
31 Cf. George-Louis (Comte de) Leclerc, Histoire naturelle de l’Homme, in: Histoire naturelle,
générale et particulière Tome II, Paris 1749–1788, 157–228.
32 Andrew S. Curran, The Anatomy of Blackness. Science and Slavery in an Age of Enlightenment, Bal-
timore 2011, 80–81. Curran in the following points out how Abbé Prévost retracted the idea
of polygenesis, and mused instead about the degeneration of Africans as compared to Euro-
peans.
33 Cf. Angelika Epple, Comparing Europe and the Americas: The Dispute of the NewWorld be-
tween the Sixteenth andNineteenth Centuries, in:Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), The Force of Com-
parison, Oxford/ New York 2019, 137-163. For an enlightening insight into the debate at the
end of the eighteenth century, see Ottmar Ette, ‘Die ‚Berliner Debatte’ um die Neue Welt.
Globalisierung aus der Perspektive der europäischen Aufklärung’, in: Vicente Bernaschino et
al. (eds.), Globalisierung in Zeiten der Aufklärung. Texte und Kontexte zur ‚Berliner Debatte’ um die
NeueWelt (17./18. Jh.), vol. 1, Frankfurt a. M. 2015, 27–55.
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comparisons also helped to hierarchize local societies. In an article on the nature of
the Africans that appeared in 1790, he parallelized Jews and Africans, saying that as
long as they stayed Jews and Africans, they just could not have the same rights and
the same freedom as Christians and Whites. Even a shared origin, he continues,
would never legitimize equality in respect to human rights.34
Christoph Meiners was not just contradicting Buffon or Blumenbach in an
academic dispute. It has to be borne in mind that even in Europe, criticism of
slavery was becoming more forceful at the time.The Haitian revolution (1791–1804)
also scared other slaveholder states as well as slavery profiteers all over the world.
Hence, the Haitian revolution made the circum-Caribbean an iconic region in
which all conflict lines met: from the quest for universal human rights to the
questioning of colonial dominance and rule, to global economic and political
entanglements.
TheEuropean bourgeois public observed these eventswith great attention.Nar-
rations, novels, dramas, newspaper articles, the slave issue, and the abolitionmove-
ment were discussed broadly.35 The conflict lines were difficult to spot both locally
(in the Caribbean multiethnic societies or in the rural East-Prussian region with
its Leibeigene) and globally (in the interplay of universal and particular interests as
well as in the development of humanitarian discourse).
Interestingly enough, within these discussions, the term “race” became one of
the most influential categories for sorting things out. But what did “race” mean?
Race categories in enlightenment discourse were far from fixed or clear-cut. They
were subject to dispute and these disputes were carried out more often than not on
the ground of comparisons. Race comparisons at the time came within a semantic
net of a bundle of categories such as skin color, other bodily characteristics, sexual-
ity, gender, religion, social status, or class. In addition, climatic conditions seemed
to influence all categories in particular and their interplay in general.
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach: Forerunner of later racism or
enlightened abolitionist?
This was the setting in which Johann Friedrich Blumenbach started his research.
Until today, he is seen as a forerunner for so-called “modern” racism that claims to
34 Cf. Christoph Meiners, Über die Natur der afrikanischen Neger, und die davon abhangende Be-
freyung, oder Einschränkung der Schwarzen, Hannover 1790, 6, 17.
35 Sibylle Fischler already showed in 2004 it is only in the twentieth century that theHaitian rev-
olution has been neglected. The events in the Caribewere present and also discussed broadly
in Europe among intellectuals but also in popular forms throughout the nineteenth century
right from the beginning. See Sibylle Fischler, Modernity Disavowed. Haiti and the Cultures of
Slavery, Durham 2004.
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rely on scientific, mere secular findings and rational, objective arguments.36This is
right in one sense, but, at the time,misleading. Blumenbach was indeed one of the
most prominent points of reference for later racists.Hewas a highly influential and
controversial anatomist in Göttingen from the 1770s onward until his death in 1840.
His main research interests were evolution theory, epigenesis, and the varieties of
humankind—research questions that also drove the aforementioned dispute of the
NewWorld.
On the other hand, Blumenbach fought slavery. When the debate on polyge-
nesis versus monogenesis came up again, he ardently argued for the latter. As a
supporter of monogenesis theory, he considered that all humans were equal in
respect of most human qualities and especially in terms of mental capacities. In
contrast to scholars such as Samuel Thomas Soemmerring or Christoph Meiners,
he argued that the cultural and intellectual talents of Africans could be seen every-
where.37 Blumenbach collected books written by Black authors to illustrate their
intellectual talent.38 Nevertheless, he was intrigued by the idea of substantiating
varieties within the single species of human beings; and, what is more, in the end,
he also found an “evident” hierarchy. In his seminal book on “The Anatomy of Black-
ness,” Andrew S. Curran underlined convincingly the ambivalence of Blumenbach’s
endeavor. In the first place, Blumenbach used his comparative studies to refute
substantial differences between different human groups while simultaneously in-
troducing the means to measure difference.39 It is this ambivalence that is at the
very center of the practices of comparing.
Let me take a closer look at Blumenbach’s arguments. In the preface of his doc-
toral thesis, first published in Latin in 1775, Blumenbach underlined that Linné’s
classification system has two disadvantages: First, it is artificial and does not grasp
the underlying natural order; and second, it is not appropriate, because too many
mammals do not fit into it.40 With all the new species discovered recently, the
36 Already in the early 1980s when Stephen J. Gould published his classical if controversial book
“The Mismeasure of Man,” the origin of modern racism was traced back to Johann Friedrich
Blumenbach. See Gould, Mismeasure of Man, 32; also Painter, History of White People, 86; Cur-
ran, Anatomy of Blackness 75, 173; Keel, Divine Variations, 23; Terence Keel, Blumenbach’s race
science in the light of Christian supersessionism, in: Nicolaas Rupke/Gerhard Lauer (eds.),
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Race and Natural History, 1750–1850, London 2018, 123–141, see
123.
37 Blumenbach also explained his conviction in letters to Soemmerring. See for an excerpt from
their correspondence: Samuel Thomas Soemmerring Anthropologie. Über die körperliche
Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer (1785), rev. and ed. by Sigrid Oehler-Klein, Vol. 15,
Stuttgart et al. 1998, 263 (footnote 4, 15); Curran, Anatomy of Blackness, 172–173.
38 Cf. Gould,Mismeasure of Man, 36.
39 Cf. Curran, Anatomy of Blackness, 171–173.
40 Cf. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, sec. I, Of the difference
of man from other animals, in: The Anthropological Society (ed.), The Anthropological
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classification would have to accept too many exceptions to maintain an added ex-
planatory value.
Apart from Linné’s classification system, Buffon’s theory of development was
also on offer. Blumenbach prefers, however, to ascribe central thoughts not to Buf-
fon, but to John Ray, a naturalist in seventeenth century England. John Ray was
among the first to define a species—“long before Buffon”41 as Blumenbach point-
edly remarks—in the following way: “One species never springs from the seed of
another nor vice versa”.42 This means, in other words, that animals belong to the
same species when they can mate. Even though Blumenbach sticks to this defi-
nition, he finds it difficult to prove. He asks doubtfully: “How void is the hope to
motivate wild animals to prove such a unification? […] especially if their native
countries are widely apart?”43 With an ironic undertone, Blumenbach muses about
the chimpanzees of Angola and the orangutans of Borneo. If empirical proofs are
difficult, what can science offer, though? His conclusion is the following: “So that I
almost despair of being able to deduce any notion of species in the study of zoology,
except from analogy and resemblance.”44
For Blumenbach, analogy, a term that at the time was not yet completely fixed
in its meaning,45 signified the comparison between two relations. Analogy, and
with it also comparing, became the very center of his scientific methodology. For
him, comparing was the very basis of all anatomic investigations. Comparing had
a productive effect: It made ordering his findings possible. Comparisons helped
to finally find the distinctive features for humans as an own species: distinctive
features were among others, their upright position, relative defenselessness, and
Treatises of Blumenbach and Hunter, London 1865, 163, URL: http://www.blumenbach-
online.de/Einzelseiten/HTML-Texte/Texte/000010/000010.html?q=on%20the%20natu-
ral#pbtitlePage_0003 [last accessed April 9, 2020].
41 Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, sec. II, § 23 What is species?, in: The
Anthropological Society of London (ed.), The Anthropological Treatises of Blumenbach and
Hunter, London 1865, 188, URL: http://www.blumenbach-online.de/Einzelseiten/HTML
Texte/Texte/000010/000010.html?q=on%20the%20natural#pbtitlePage_0003 [last ac-
cessed April 9, 2020] ; Blumenbach, De Generis Humani varietate nativa, 3rd ed., Göttingen
1795, 67, “Raius quidem, vir immortalis praeterito seculo, adeoque diu ante Buffonium ea animantia
ad eandem speciem referenda esse censuit, quae invicem coëant et foecundam prolem gignant, […]“.
42 John Ray, Historia plantarum generalis, London 1686, “neque haec ab illius semine oritur, aut vice
versa,” 40, (Translation: Edmund Silk, cited by: Barbara G. Beddall, Historical Notes on Avian
Classification, in: Systematic Biology 6 (1957), 134).
43 Blumenbach, Natural Variety, 189; Blumenbach, De Generis humani, 69, “praesertim si longe di-
versa ipsis patria fuerit.”
44 Blumenbach, Natural Variety, 190; Blumenbach, De Generis humani, 70, “Adeo ut fere desperem
posse aliunde quam ex analogia et verisimilitudine notionem speciei in zoologiae studio depromi.”
45 Cf. Willibald Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’ – eine begriffsgeschichtliche Skizze, in: Angelika Ep-
ple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New
York 2015, 85–134, see 100–103.
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the hymen of women.46 Taking the hypothesis that all humans belong to just one
species as a starting point, Blumenbach looked at the differences between mam-
mals in respect to five categories: color, hair, physical size, shape of the body, and,
most importantly, skulls.
Blumenbach’s skull collection
Blumenbach’s interest in comparing different skulls is not singular. It is no exag-
geration that from the Enlightenment until the mid-twentieth century, collecting,
measuring, and comparing skulls was a widespread obsession. Comparing also
became part of what could been called a collecting mania of the time.47 Blumen-
bach’s main sources were not just descriptions of skulls in travelogues but mainly
real skulls. The common interest in skulls was impressive, and had a lot to do with
anthropological appropriation within the colonial project.48 Georg Gliddon, for in-
stance, an English-born American Consul in Cairo and trained Egyptologist, sent
more than 100 skulls he had taken out of Ancient Egyptian tombs back to Philadel-
phia.49
Whatever Blumenbach tried to prove, however high his (or his pupils’) respect
for cultural diversity was, the collection of human bodies, bones, and skulls cannot
be seen outside the system of coloniality50 and more concretely, outside the Royal
Navy. Blumenbach’s network was impressive. He used his connections to scholars
46 See, for instance, Blumenbach,Natural Variety, 107.
47 See, on the fascination with collecting things, Anne Mariss, Globalisierung der
Naturgeschichte im 18. Jahrhundert. Die Mobilität der Dinge und ihr materieller Eigensinn,
in: Debora Gerstenberger/Joël Glasman (eds.), Techniken der Globalisierung. Globalgeschichte
meets Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie (Histoire Band 78), Bielefeld 2016, 67–93, see 92.
48 Cf. Malin Wilckens, Aus aller Welt – Die Schädel-Korrespondenz des Johann Friedrich Blumen-
bach. Unpublished MA-Thesis, Bielefeld 2018; Bettina Brockmeyer, Menschliche Gebeine
als Glaubensobjekte. Koloniale Kriegsbeutenahme, Vergleichspraktiken und Erinnerung seit
dem späten 19. Jahrhundert, in:WERKSTATT Geschichte 77 (2017), 47–64. For a profound anal-
ysis of the influence of German science and comparable practices, see Moritz von Brescius,
German Science in the Age of Empire: Enterprise, Opportunity and the Schlagintweit Brothers, Cam-
bridge 2018.
49 Gould,Mismeasure of Man, 61.
50 Even thoughWalterMignolo’s understandingof power structures and their persistencebased
on what he calls the “colonial matrix” is not completely convincing, the term “coloniality” is
very useful. It points to the fact that people such as Blumenbach, Humboldt, or many others
could not have collected seemingly neutral information about other world regions without
the asymmetrical relations between colonizers and colonized. Alexander vonHumboldt also
relied heavily on recommendations by slave trade promoters or even slaveholders to get per-
mission fromSpanish officials to travel through theAmericas, see: Zeuske, Sklavereien in den
Amerikas.
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all over the world to gain possession of more than 200 skulls. Sir Joseph Banks,
for instance, a British naturalist who had already accompanied James Cook on his
first voyage,was not only the director of the African Association in London, but also
sent Blumenbachmany skulls, old and new,male and female, of children and adults
from all over the world. Craniology was not only an innocent scientific affair. It was
a colonial practice and still has its aftermath today in the institutes or museums of
anatomy.51
Blumenbach’s practice of comparing: The making of white beauty
What Blumenbach actually did after the skulls came into his possession can be
surmised roughly via another genre of sources. Famous students of Blumenbach
such as Arthur Schopenhauer wrote vividly about his lectures to which he attracted
young men such as the Humboldt brothers from many German-speaking states.
Following Schopenhauer, Blumenbach was not only a good entertainer, he also per-
formed autopsies on animals and vivisections in front of his students. He reported
on curiosa from natural history and commented on the works of other scholars
with decisive opinions. The title of Schopenhauer scripts is telling: “… die Kunst zu
sehen”—the art of seeing.52 Blumenbach’s “art of seeing” influenced not only schol-
ars such as Schopenhauer but also many explorers such as zu Wied or Humboldt.
From Schopenhauer’s script of the lectures in comparative anatomy, we can
deduce that Blumenbach’s main activity was describing. After describing, he mea-
sured the skulls or bones in question, and then he started comparing. The mea-
surement obviously predefined the subsequently applied tertia and vice versa. In
his doctoral thesis on “the natural varieties of mankind,” he had written how dif-
ficult it was to find adequate tertia. Of course, he did not use the term. When he
complained, however, about the difficulty in translating a “sensible impression” into
a linguistic expression, it was nothing else than naming the difficulty in finding an
adequate tertium:
that it is much easier to distinguish any species from its congeners at the first
glance by a sort of divination of the senses, than to give an account of, or express
in words those distinctive characters themselves.53
51 Cf. Wilckens, Aus aller Welt.
52 See Jochen Stollberg/Wolfgang Böker (eds.), “… die Kunst zu sehn.” Arthur Schopenhauers
Mitschriften der Vorlesungen Johann Friedrich Blumenbachs (1809–1811), Schriften zur Göttinger
Universitätsgeschichte 3, Göttingen 2013.
53 Blumenbach, Natural Variety, 163; Blumenbach, De Generis Humani, 2, “ubi subinde longe fa-
cilius aliquam speciem a congeneribus primo intuitu et sensuali quadam perceptione dis-
tinguere, quam ipsos istos characteres disctinctivos enarrare et verbis exprimere valemus.”
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In contrast to amere subsumption, the quote shows that Blumenbachwas in search
of the criteria for the commonalty of humans as a single species.54 Hence, he was
searching for adequate tertia. Only by finding the tertia, could he find words to de-
scribe the specificity of the respective comparata and then decide whether they
belonged to the same species (genus proximum).The “art of seeing” in Blumenbach’s
world is nothing other than explaining how to be able to “see” tertia and the differ-
ences between at least two entities. It is, in other words, comparing. One can, at a
glance, understand why the making of a classification system is based on compar-
isons and how, at the time, the tertia and the comparata shape themselves respec-
tively.
With his suggestions, Blumenbach argued against two contemporary positions
that worked with different classification systems: On the one hand, there was Linné
who understood apes and humans as just one species, because he never found a
diferentia specifica. In contrast to Linné, Blumenbach was of the opinion that there
were specific differences between apes and human beings (upright position, de-
fenselessness, hymen) and that they did not belong to just one species.
On the other hand, there were those whowere in favor of the plurality of human
species (e.g., Voltaire) or, like Meiners, were reluctant to accept the common origin
of all humans. Blumenbach, in contrast, argued that there is no specific difference
between human races. What he found instead was “an almost insensible and inde-
finable transition from the pure white skin of the German lady through the yellow,
the red, and the dark nations, to the Ethiopian of the very deepest black.” 55
The “insensible transition” between human varieties is Blumenbach’s answer to
the Black-and-White discourse of his time. Even though he overcomes the binary
system, his take remains ambivalent. Humans belong to just one species (assump-
tion of similarity), they share commonalities, but they are different; and between
both difference and similarity, there are many transitions.
This conviction did not prevent him from continuing his comparing of skulls.
Today, Blumenbach is less well known for his proof of a unique species of humans
in contrast to apes, but for the varieties of human “races” within that single species.
The most famous finding is the one you can see in figure 1.
Where his scientifically based arguments came to an end, his presumably aes-
thetic considerations began. If no diferentia specifica in the strict sense could be de-
tected between the variants of human beings, for him one difference remained: the
54 Blumenbach refers here to the classical Aristotelian distinction of genus proximumanddifer-
entia specifica. In practice, the Aristotelian distinction does not necessarily involve compar-
ing. The diferentia specifica ismainly about subsumption. Put simply, if “quadruped” is defined
as a species and I want to know if an animal belongs to this very species, I just have to count
its feet. Comparing does not have to be involved. In Blumenbach’s case, thingswere different.
The genus proximum was not given; instead, it was in question.
55 Blumenbach, Natural Variety, 107.
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Fig. 1: On the Natural Variety of Mankind
The picture reads: Plate III., which represents, by way of specimen, three
skulls disposed in the order mentioned. The middle one (fig. 2) is a very
symmetrical and beautiful one of a Georgian female; on either side are two
skulls differing from it in the most opposite way. The one (fig. 3) elongated
in front, and as it were keeled, is that of an Ethiopian female of Guinea;
the other (fig. 4) dilated outwardly toward the sides, and as it were flat-
tened, is that of a Reindeer Tungus. (Blumenbach, On the Natural Variety of
Mankind, 1795, 237)
beauty of the Georgian female. One has to know that Georgian females belong to
the Caucasian people.
With this observation, Blumenbach again underlined his systematic approach:
With his concentration on identifying different types of skulls, he did not bother
about their age. He compared skulls from Ancient Egypt with skulls of only re-
cently deceased Indians. Via comparisons, he hoped to refute the popular argu-
ments of his time, one of which was Buffon’s, de Pauw’s, and Meiners’ ideas on
the climatic degeneration of non-White people. Neither Blumenbach’s interven-
tion against clear-cut differences between human varieties nor his term “insensible
transition” prevented him from stereotyping the varieties of humankind into ini-
tially four (1775) and later five (1781) different types. Comparison-based, this typ-
ing was not innocent from its beginning. Caucasian women, such as the Geor-
gians, were already famous for their beauty in Antiquity. Ironically, it is these very
same people, says Nell Painter, especially their women,who have also been enslaved
since Antiquity.56 It is interesting to note that Blumenbach’s intention was to ar-
gue against the assumption of a negative development provoked by environmental
56 Cf. Painter, History of White People, 36, 84.
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conditions such as a humid and hot climate. He contrasted degeneration with a
typology based on comparisons.
Blumenbach and his talented pupil Alexander von Humboldt
Alexander von Humboldt visited Blumenbach’s lectures in Göttingen for only two
terms, in winter and summer (April 1789–March 1790).57 However, correspondence
between the two intensified after Humboldt left Göttingen.58They stayed in contact
even when Humboldt accompanied by Bonpland took off for his great journey to
the Americas. Changing plans on the spot, they decided to first travel through the
Venezuelan region before exploring Cuba (and thus by accident escaped the yellow
fever epidemic on Cuba at the time).59
An entry inHumboldt’s diary shows how effectively Blumenbach’s skull network
was:
“We searched for particularly characteristic skulls for [Johann Friedrich] Blumen-
bach and to this end opened many mapire [baskets]. Poor wretches! Even in your
graves your peace andquiet is disturbed! The Indians observed this operationwith
great reluctance, especially a few Indians fromGuaiciawhohadknownWhite peo-
ple for hardly four months. We collected skulls, a child´s skeleton and two skele-
tons of adults. [...] Night fell while we were rummaging about among the bones.
The expressions of our Indian guides told us that we had desecrated the burial
ground enough and should at last bring the sacrilege to an end. […].
[...] We dragged our skeletons by water to Angostura and from there by land to
[Nueva] Barcelona through the Caribbean missions. Nothing escapes the Indian
sensitivity. The bones were in double mapire and seemed completely invisible to
us. But as soon as we arrived in a Caribbean village, and as soon as the Indians
gathered to see our animals (capuchin and tiger monkeys), the bones were dis-
covered immediately. They refused to give us mulas [mules] because the carcass
would kill them.”60
57 Cf. Fernando Ortíz, Introducción, in: Alejandro de Humboldt: Ensayo político sobre la isla de
Cuba por Alejandro de Humboldt, con un mapa de Cuba. Introducción por Fernando Ortíz y correc-
ciones, notas y appendices por Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Tomo I, LaHabana 1930, XVI; Norbert
Klatt, Kleine Beiträge zur Blumenbach-Forschung, vol. 1, Göttingen 2008, 12.
58 Klatt, Kleine Beiträge, 17.
59 Cf. Ortíz, Introducción.
60 [My translation]. Original quote: “Wir suchten recht charakteristische Schädel für [Johann
Friedrich] Blumenbach und öffneten daher viele Mapire [Körbe]. Armes Volk, selbst in den Gräbern
stört man deine Ruhe! Die Indianer sahen diese Operation mit großem Unwillen an, besonders ein
paar Indianer von Guaicia, welche kaum vier Monate lang weißeMenschen kannten.Wir sammelten
Schädel, ein Kinderskelett und zwei Skelette erwachsener Personen. […] Die Nacht brach ein, indem
312 Angelika Epple
I have quoted this entry at some length, because it is telling in different respects.
First, Humboldt names only one skin color: “white.”This is astonishing because the
description as “Whites” for Europeans usually emerges only when someone under-
lines the civilizing mission. A good example is the justification of the slave trader
mentioned at the beginning of this contribution.One could even askwhetherHum-
boldt’s quote is a random change of perspective: A European explorer looks at his
European peer group through the eyes of the American (in this case: Venezuelan)
inhabitants. This change of perspective is not taken up in the “essai” and it is also,
second, framed within that very quote in a way that undermines it. Humboldt feels
pity for the locals (“poor wretches”) and he knows that he is disturbing their peace.
“Poor wretches” (“Armes Volk”) frames the change of perspective insofar as it shows
the narrator as a person standing above the observed scene, because he is from a
higher social level. It is the tone of an aristocrat. Third, Humboldt’s commitment
to skull collecting is so strong that he continues digging until late, despite realizing
that the surrounding “Indians” did not feel comfortable about it. He probably was
aware of the fact that back home in Europe, this activity would count as desecration
of a grave, an activity he presumably would never have carried out in Berlin.61
Humboldt’s “essai,” its translations,
and the Thrasher controversy in 1856
Humboldt stayed in Cuba twice (19.12.1800–15.3.1801 and 19.3.–29.4.1804). During
his stays, he resided in the house of a Mr. Cuesta, who owned one of the biggest
trading houses in America, and in the house of Duke O’Reilly, both belonging to the
ruling classes.62 What is more, he was also familiar with the aforementioned Fran-
wir noch unter den Knochen wühlten. Die Mienen unserer indianischen Führer sagten uns, dass wir
diese Grabstätte genug entheiligt hätten und den Frevel endlich endigen sollten. […]Wir schleppten
unsere Skelette zuWasser bis Angostura und von da zu Lande bis [Nueva]Barcelona durch dieMissio-
nen der Cariben. Dem Spurgeist der Indianer entgeht nichts. Die Knochen waren in doppelten Mapire
und schienen uns völlig unsichtbar. Kaum aber kamen wir in einem Caribischen Dorfe an, und kaum
versammelten sich die Indianer,umunsere Tiere (Kapuziner-undTigeraffen) zu sehen, sowaren sogle-
ich die Knochen ausgespürt. Man weigerte sich, uns mulas [Maultiere] zu geben, weil der Kadaver
sie töte.” Margot Faak, (ed.), Alexander von Humboldt: Reise durch Venezuela. Auswahl aus den
amerikanischen Reisetagebüchern, Berlin 2000, 324–325.
61 Of course, the prohibition of opening graves did not prevent all researchers in Europe from
doing so, but Humboldt would still have preferred not to be such an extreme researcher in
Prussia.
62 Humboldt, Essai politique, 36, “Nous trouvâmes, dans la famille deM. Cuesta, qui formoit alors avec
M. Santa Maria une des plus grandes maisons de commerce de l’Amérique.”
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cisco de Arango y Parreño, who lived close by63 and took him to see his “ingenios”
(sugar plantations): La Ninfa, Río Blanco, and La Holanda.64 As Humboldt points out
in his “essai,” Arango seemed to him to have the utmost experience when it came
to economic questions, statistical data, and understanding the specificity of the
slavery regime in Cuba.
Comparisons run through the whole essay including general observations, ego-
istic considerations, and respective chapters on climate, population, agriculture
(mainly sugar, coffee, tobacco, and wax), trading, and slavery.65 In the following,
I shall focus only on Humboldt’s comparisons concerning the population and his
considerations on races or slavery.66
More than 20 years had passed between Humboldt’s last visit of the island and
the appearance of his study. Unfortunately, he did not use the time to turn it into
a systematic study. The “essai” is full of interesting insights and good observations,
but it is also redundant, and a leitmotiv is sometimes difficult to spot. During this
period, Humboldt corresponded with Cuban officials and scholars, one of whom
was Francisco de Arango y Parreño. Humboldt continuously added to his extensive
data collection on flora, fauna, natural resources, and,most importantly, the Cuban
population. As already mentioned, the compendium of the “essai” with its ardent
plea for abolition was rounded off by an appendix with statistics.
After the seminal work on Cuba had appeared in French, it was soon translated
into other European languages. Humboldt had been a presence in the French- and
Spanish-speaking world since the late 1820s.The “essai” was omnipresent in Cuban
statistical works as well as in the official census, reports, and publications,67 even
63 In today’s Havanna, the so-called “casa de Humboldt” is a small museum, and the casa de
Arango y Parreño is a medical institution. A small information board fixed outside the house
does not mention that Francisco de Arango y Parreño was one of the most important slave
traders and slavery defenders of the time. This can be read only between the lines: The in-
formation reads “Doctor en leyes, humanista, economista, orador y hacendado azucarero,” private
photo April 24, 2019.
64 Ortíz mentions that Arango showed Humboldt and Bonpland his “ingenios.” Ortíz, Introduc-
ción, XXXIII.
65 This does not just hold for the essay. See on the importance of comparing inHumboldt’s trav-
elogues, Christine Peters, Reisen und Vergleichen. Praktiken des Vergleichens in Alexander
von Humboldts Reise in die Äquinoktial-Gegenden des Neuen Kontinents und Adam Johann
von Krusensterns Reise um die Welt, in: Internationales Archiv für die Sozialgeschichte der Liter-
atur (IASL) 42 (2/2017), 441–465.
66 Oliver Lubrich is completely right when he says Humboldt should be read as a literary au-
thor. He convincingly shows the double-coded discourse on slavery and also the construction
of Cuba as an in-between space. See the inspiring analysis of Humboldt’s “essai”: Oliver Lu-
brich, In theRealmofAmbivalence: Alexander vonHumboldt’sDiscourse onCuba, in:German
Studies Review 26 (1/2003), 63–80.
67 It was probably the French version of 1826 that gained most attention in France. Francisco de
Arango y Parreño even commented on it in 1827. See Francisco Arango y Parreño, Observa-
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though the Spanish edition of the “ensayo” had been banned by the local government
in Havana in its session on 27 November in 1827 due to its “observations in respect
to slavery.”68
The German translation by Theresa Huber-Forster and her son Victor Aimé did
not get asmuch attention.69TheEnglish translation by John SidneyThrasher, Amer-
ican Consul in Cuba and supporter of an annexation of the Cuban island, even
became part of a controversy during the 1856 US presidential election. Thrasher’s
intention was certainly to back the Democrat’s candidate and later president James
Buchanan (a supporter of Cuban annexation as well as of slavery) with a publication
by the renowned German scholar. Voters with a German background were decisive
in the election. However, Thrasher left out Humboldt’s criticism of slavery while
nonetheless suggesting that he had made a complete translation.70
Underestimating how Humboldt would react, Thrasher sent him a letter say-
ing “I have taken the liberty to differ with you on some of the general principles
of social economy in this continent, but I have endeavored to do so with a proper
diffidence to your great attainments and eminent powers.”71 Humboldt, though
already very old, was furious and did not just answer personally. In July 1856, he
published an article in a German newspaper in which he attackedThrasher severely
for having omitted the chapter on slavery: “I assign far greater importance to this
part of my text than to the arduous work on determining astronomic positions, ex-
ploring magnetic intensity, or [compiling] statistical data.”72 This article was taken
up by several newspapers in the United States such as the New York Herald, and the
ciones al “Ensayo politico sobre la isla de Cuba”, escritas en 1827, in: Francisco de Arango y
Parreño, Obras completas, vol. II, 1889, 533–546, see 533.
68 José L. Franco, Prólogo, in: Cuadernos de Historia Haberna 69 (1960), 20. Franco assumes that
even some Afro-Cubans felt insulted by Humboldt’s “ensayo.” To the best of my knowledge,
Franco is the only source that mentions this assumption.
69 Therese Heyne-Forster-Huber (1754–1829), whose first marriage had been to Georg Forster,
together with her son Victor Aimé, translated Humboldt’s “essai” including the appendices
into German in 1829–1832, cf. Beck, commentary to the German edition, 240–241.
70 Cf. John S. Thrasher, preface, in: Alexander von Humboldt, The Island of Cuba [1827], New York
1856.
71 Quoted in German by Beck, commentary to the German edition, 254. It is uncertain whether
Thrasher knew about the English translation (without the appendices) by Helen Maria
Williams published in London in 1829.
72 [My translation]. Original quote: “Auf diesen Teil meiner Schrift lege ich eine weit größere
Wichtigkeit als auf die mühevollen Arbeiten astronomischer Ortsbestimmungen, magnetischer In-
tensitätsversuche oder statistischer Angaben”. The German quote is cited in Beck, commentary
on the German edition, 256–257.The article appeared in the Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats-
und gelehrten Sachen on July 25, 1856. For more details, see Beck, commentary to the German
edition, 252–260.
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New York Daily Times in mid-August 1856.73 Thrasher felt obliged to respond to the
editors and justify his approach. His reply was published twice on August 13 and
17, 1856.74 He defended himself by assuming that the chapter on slavery was an ad-
dition to the “essai” and not really part of it—an interpretation that contradicts the
first sentences of Humboldt’s chapter. This controversy was first taken up at the
end of the 1880s in the Cuban journal La Semana by the Cuban journalist and his-
torian Manuel Villanova.75 This led to Humboldt’s chapter on slavery experiencing
a second phase of reception in Cuba.76
At the time, the New York Tribune, the leading journal of the young Republican
party, did not intervene in this controversy directly, but also tried to win voters
throughHumboldt’s authority.They supported their candidate, John C. Frémont by
publishing another letter byHumboldt from the early 1850s in which he had praised
the merits of Frémont. Despite all efforts, the convinced abolitionist Frémont lost
the election.Only in 1930when FernandoOrtíz editedHumboldt’s “essai” in Spanish
again and when he wrote a laudatory introduction of roughly 80 pages did the
controversy over Humboldt and Thrasher gain some international attention.77
73 See the very informative and helpful online series by Vera M. Kutzinsky and Ottmar Ette:
Alexander von Humboldt in English, see: Humboldt-Thrasher-controversy, in: press.uchica-
go.edu [last accessed April 26, 2019].
74 The New York Daily Times referred to the article as published in Spenersche Zeitung. See New
York Daily Times, August 17, 1856. Thrasher’s article also appeared in The New York Herald on
August 13, 1856.
75 In September 1887, the Cuban journalist Manuel Villanova published a series of articles on
Humboldt and Thrasher in the Cuban weekly journal La Semana. It started on September 5,
1887 with a publication of Humboldt’s article and Thrasher’s answer together with a criti-
cal commentary on Thrasher. In the following weeks, Villanova commented on it broadly.
Villanova read Humboldt with a lot of admiration, and also discussed the passages in which
Humboldt comparedCubandomestic slaves to Jamaicandomestic slaves. In the following, he
criticized the Cuban slave regime in far more detail than Humboldt. The whole series includ-
ing the translation of Humboldt’s article and Thrasher’s response were reproduced in 1960.
See for the letters, Manuel Villanova, Humboldt y Trasher, in: Cuadernos de Historia Haberna
69 (1960), 32–34; for the criticism of the Cuban slave regime, 46–52.
76 A decade later, the historian Vidal Morales y Morales also wrote an article in three parts that
appeared in the journal El Figaro under the title “El Barón de Humboldt an las Isla de Cuba:
1800–1801–1804” (El Figaro 1897, June n. 21, 23, 24). See Kutzinsky/Ette, Humboldt in English,
“Brief Timeline: The Political Essay in Cuba”, press.uchicago.edu [last accessed April 26, 2019].
77 Cf. Alejandro de Humboldt, Ensayo político sobre la isla de Cuba por Alejandro de Humboldt, con
unmapa de Cuba. Introducción por Fernando Ortíz y correcciones, notas y appendices por Francisco de
Arango y Parreño, J.S. Thrasher y otros, Tomo I, La Habana 1930.
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The objectivity of the numbers: Censuses in Cuba
But it was not just Humboldt’s elaborations on slavery that became influential. Un-
til today, Humboldt is more famous for his comparative methodology than for his
criticism of slavery. Even if Blumenbach is not mentioned in the “essai,” and even if
Humboldt does not carry out anatomic comparisons, Blumenbach’s approach and
his understanding of both scientific objectivity and neutrality are omnipresent.
When Humboldt reflected on his methodology, he was of the opinion that he only
clarified facts: “As a historian of America, I wanted to clarify facts and specify ideas
by means of comparisons and statistical data.”78 This is something he might have
learned from Blumenbach: observing, describing, translating into numbers (mea-
suring), and comparing. In his view, his meticulously detailed investigation into
the facts seemed necessary to fight both benevolent gullibility and hateful pas-
sions. Both feelings, so his conviction, had led to the most erratic and erroneous
data. Criticizing earlier narrations and descriptions of the island was simply an
effective tool for framing his study as scientific, objective, and politically neutral.
Already in the introduction to his “essai,” Humboldt cites the official censuses
of 1791, 1810, and other statistical data until 1824. In the specific chapter on popu-
lation, he elaborates on this in more detail. What are his population comparisons
about? Different types of comparisons are involved: The statistical data are com-
parisons between people from the countryside and those living in Havana, com-
parisons between people living in different Cuban provinces, and comparisons
between Cuban inhabitants and those living in Jamaica, the Antilles, the United
States, Brazil, or even other Latin-American countries. He usually distinguishes
different “classes” in the graphs: “White,” “free Colored” (including Mulatto and
African), and “slaves”; and he then compares these with the same group of people
in, for instance, different regions. In the text, he is more precise and also distin-
guishes between Mulattos and Negros, both free and enslaved, or, what is more
unusual at the time, between different Whites: White inhabitants and strangers
from different European countries. The strangers never make it into the graphs,
whereas the “Mulattos” are included. In the text, he prefers the term “Pardos” for
people of mixed White–African origin. However, the term “Pardo” never shows up
in the graphs.
Reading the graphs and the text is a challenging task, because different lines of
argumentation run through the chapter. On the surface, he gives only the numbers
of people in each group as if they could speak for themselves. Usually, Humboldt
78 Humboldt, Political Essay, 142. Humboldt, Essai politique, 305–306, “Historien de l’Amérique,
j’ai voulu éclaircir les faits et préciser les idées, à l’aide de comparaisons et de tableaux statis-
tiques.”
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repeats in the text only what can also be seen at first glance in the graphs. Some-
times he adds calculations about the different groups and their respectivemortality
rate, how they are increasing or diminishing. Meanwhile, the graphs are an alleged
proof of high scientific standards. In the text, he puts their reliability into perspec-
tive. To express this frankly: The graphs hide the fact that they are not objective.
With reference to Arango y Parreño, he concludes that they are more often than
not the result of only estimated calculations.79
The interplay of text and graphs is interesting, especially when he accumulates
the outcomes of the graphs, for instance, when explaining: “The relationship of the
different classes of inhabitants grouped according to their origin and their state of
civil liberty offers the most striking contrasts in those countries in which slavery
has established very deep roots.”80Thegraph showsWhites and free people of Color
in different columns. Only in the main text can one find a reduced graph that sums
up Whites and free people so that they appear as a single group of free people (of
Color and White). On the same page, he concludes that free people make up 64%
of the whole population of Cuba but only 19% in the British Antilles. Already in
the next phrase, he returns to his usual practice of assembling instead all people
of Color into one group, be they free or slaves: “In the whole archipelago of the
Antilles, the people of Color (Negros and Mulattos, free and slave) make a mass of
2,360,000 or 83/100 of the whole population.”81
That for a moment, Humboldt had assembled all free people (White and of
Color) in just one group suits his humanitarian endeavor of abolition. Sharing the
results of Blumenbach’s investigation, he believed that all people were of the same
kind. A closer reading shows that this endeavor, as serious as he might have been
about pursuing it, was contaminated by a second line of argumentation, a line that
is not so obvious at first glance. In contrast to Blumenbach who implemented an
aesthetic argument for making a difference between “Caucasian”White people and
all other people, Humboldt implements what could be called the “paternalistic dif-
ference.” This line of argumentation is certainly also based on comparing “classes”
of people in different settings, but it goes beyond this: It is, as I will show, also
based on a comparison of slave regimes, some of which are better than others. The
79 According to Humboldt, the numbers from the censuses of 1791 and 1811, for instance, draw
only on incomplete data. See Humboldt, Political Essay, 73. Humboldt, Essai politique, 133, “Les
résultats, publiées en 1811, ne se fondent donc que sur ces données incomplètes et sur les évaluations
approximatives de l’augmentation de 1791 à 1811.”
80 [My translation]. Original quote: “Le rapport des diverses classes d’habitants groupés d’après leur
origine et l’état de leur liberté civile, offre les contrastes les plus frappants dans les pays dans lesquels
l’esclavage a jeté des racines très-profondes.” Humboldt, Essai politique, 115.
81 [My translation]. Original quote: “Dans tout l’archipel des Antilles, les hommes de couleur (nègres
etmulâtres, libres et esclaves) forment unemasse de 2,360,000 ou de 83/100 de la population totale.”
Humboldt, Essai politique, 118.
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existence of “better” slave regimes than others opens the door for his “paternal-
istic difference”: The baseline of this argumentation is that White people who do
not fight the cruel system of slavery do not acknowledge enlightenment’s human-
itarian mission. They are the cause of all evil. People of Color who fight the cruel
system of slavery for understandable reasons tend to rebel. Rebellion, however, is
never a solution for humanitarian challenges. It only provokes violence.The “essai,”
though, is written for enlightened elites, to make them aware of the fact that their
task is to find a way out. These are imagined to be White. If White elites do not
find a solution, a rebellion of people of Color cannot be prevented. Humankind
depends on White enlightened elites fighting Black slavery.
Comparing slave regimes:
The manipulating influence of Arango y Parreños
It comes as no surprise that Humboldt was not in favor of the Haitian revolution.
Preventing a rebellion of people of Color was an objective he shared withmany oth-
ers, one of whomwas Francisco de Arango y Parreño.However, regarding what that
prevention could mean, they all had different things in mind: Humboldt’s interest
was humanitarian with a European background. Arango was primarily a business-
man with a Cuban background. He had travelled through Europe to collect infor-
mation on industrialization processes such as refining sugar. He became a leading
figure in transforming Cuba’s sugar plantations into sugar factories that refined
the sugar on the spot before exporting it. In other words, he was one of the en-
gineers of “slaving modernity.”82 Whenever Humboldt quotes Arango, he praises
him as an expert in economics, as an impressive statesman, and also as an enlight-
ened intellectual.What he does not mention in his “essai” is that they jointly visited
Arango’s ingenios that had become factories thanks to the labor of slaves.83
Arango was indeed a highly talented economist, politician and, I would like
to add, an extremely successful manipulative lobbyist. Reading his obras completas,
one quickly understands that his main goal was to combine personal with Cuban
interests. The key to doing this was to make a profit with Cuba’s main agricul-
tural products such as sugar, cocoa, and tobacco. Three examples might suffice to
underline this: In 1791 and again in 1803 when he travelled to St. Domingue as a
82 See Michael Zeuske, Die Nicht-Geschichte von Versklavten als Archiv-Geschichte von “Stim-
men” und Körpern, in: Jahrbuch für Europäische Überseegeschichte 16, Wiesbaden 2016, 2; Dale
W. Tomich/Michael Zeuske, The Second Slavery.Mass Slavery,World-Economy, andCompara-
tive Microhistories, in: Review: Fernand Braudel Center XXXI, (2/2008) 91-100; Michael Zeuske,
Out of the Americas. Slave traders and the Hidden Atlantic in the nineteenth century, in:
Atlantic Studies 15, (1/2018), 103-135.
83 Cf. Ortíz, Introducción, XXXIII.
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member of a royal commission, he stated very openly that Cuba should take advan-
tage of the unfortunateHaitian situation. Cuba depended on the labor of slaves and
Spain took advantage of a prospering Cuban economy. To secure the slave regime
in Cuba, he recommended not to “import” too many Africans, because they should
never outnumber theWhites in the population. In his analysis of the Haitian catas-
trophe, he mentions three reasons why a similar upheaval in Cuba would be rather
improbable: the fierce loyalty of the elites to the King of Spain, more soldiers than
the French had in Haiti, and most important, better legislation on the treatment
of slaves. Slaves in Cuba, he was convinced, “are the happiest of the world.”84 The
already mentioned phrase that Cubans should import slaves only with “census fig-
ures in hand” reveals his pragmatic approach. For him, humanitarian reasons did
not matter in 1791. From his perspective, the censuses seemed to be a helpful tool
for controlling the number of slaves and thus preventing rebellions.
Arango’s influence became even more important when he became a member
of the Consejo de India roughly twenty years later. Cuban delegates had already pre-
vented abolition from also being implemented in the Americas (as it was in Spain)
in the Cádiz constitution of 181285—a step recommended by Arango.86 As a mem-
ber of the Consejo de India, he also convinced the respective commission to not help
the “race in chains” because it would do injustice to Cuban White elites. In the in-
troductory “Historical Elegy” to Arango’s obras completas in 1837, Arango is honored
for having at the last moment prevented “African blood” from being preferred to
“European blood.”87 His basic theorems that he was still repeating in his publica-
tions in the 1820s are as follows: Production should meet the growing demand. To
achieve this, Cuban agriculture would need, first, to industrialize its sugar industry
and, second, to also strengthen its labor force. Only free trade in general including
slaves in particular guaranteed the prosperity of Cuban welfare. Welfare could be
guaranteed only if a rebellion could be prevented. Preventing rebellion is easy to
achieve by first treating slaves well and second getting the numbers right and not
importing more people of African descent than there are White people living in
the country. Censuses are an important tool for guaranteeing the right mix of the
population.
In 1832, he seems, at first glance, to have changed his mind and to now favor
abolition. However, he is simply arguing more subtly. He no longer doubts that
abolition would be a good thing. For him, the remaining question is how to achieve
84 Francisco de Arango y Parreño, Representación hecha á S.M. conmotivo do la sublevación de
esclavos en los dominios franceses de la isla de Santo Domingo (1791), in: Obras completas,
vol. I, 1888, 49.
85 Helg, Slave but not Citizen, 94.
86 Arango y Parreño, Obras completas, vol. II.
87 Anastasio Carillo yArango, Elogio histórico, in: Francisco deArango yParreño,Obras del Excmo.
Señor D. Francisco de Arango y Parreño vol. I, La Habana 1888, XLII.
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it. His arguments are still based on a comparative history of slave regimes that
shows why the French system, in contrast to the Spanish, became so cruel in the
eighteenth century.He repeats that notmuch needed to be done for slaves in Cuban
towns, because “in general, they are happy with their status.”88
Nonetheless, the categories change slightly in his later publications. He now
distinguishes members of the free elite (including people of Color and White peo-
ple) from less privileged free people of Color and from slaves.This is a group forma-
tion found previously only in Humboldt’s “essai.” Now, Arango is also arguing that
it is quite “natural” for people to mix. He even quotes Humboldt’s “essai,” saying
that no one should envy another person for being “whiter.” Surprisingly enough,
it is not only the skin color he is referring to. In his view, “blancura” (whitening),
which means nothing other than gaining limpieza de sangre, should not be most im-
portant, because what should be most important is becoming a free person.89 For
him, it seems impertinent to force persons to prove that they “have not a drop of
Black blood.”
It is important to note that his main arguments in favor of slavery remain un-
touched by this. He still believes that Cuba’s agriculture needs the labor of slaves.90
He still believes that if slaves are well treated, they are better off than freed non-
elite people of Color.The bright businessmen Arango had realized in the 1820s that
it might be a good idea to have Pardo and Mulatto elites as allies and not as ene-
mies. This is an interesting move, because even if it might not alter his arguments
in favor of slavery completely, it does, so to say, change their color. If he accepts
people of Color as fellow elites, then slavery no longer appears racist in a narrower
sense.
Thewritings of Arango areworth studying for their own sake. It is fascinating to
see how Arango manages to adapt his enthusiasm for slavery from the 1790s to the
1820s in an ever-changing discursive environment, and, what is more, in a period
of historical transition on a global level. In 1832, even an Arango finds it better to
hide his economic arguments and clothe them in a humanitarian sounding pater-
nalistic discourse. Even though still polemicizing against “filantropic positions,” he
underlines that all he wants is societal progress. According to Arango in 1791, slaves
in Cuba were already the happiest in the world; and forty years later, he was still
doing everything to ensure that this situation would never change.
88 Arango, Representación al Rey sobre la exstinción de tráfico de negros y medios de mojorar
la suerte do los esclavos coloniales (28.5.1832), in: Obras completas, vol. II, 649–659, see 657.
89 Arango, Carta al Secretario del Supremo Consejo de Indias en que el autor avisa estar
traduciendo una “Memoria sobre la Abolición de la Esclavidud en las Colonias europeas”
(24.8.1831), in: Obras completas, vol. II, 659–741, see 722.
90 Maybe even more so, because one of his own ingenio, la Ninfa, which he had also shown to
Humboldt and had always served as “best practice,” had failed in 1819. Zeuske, Sklavereien in
den Amerikas.
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One could ask why Humboldt was so fascinated by him. The texts of both men
influenced each other in subtle but profound ways. When comparing the Spanish
with the French, British, or American slave regime, Humboldt concludes that the
“terrifying catastrophe of Santo Domingo” was the outcome of an ignorant ruling
dynasty.Humboldt was convinced that legislation in the Antilles and the civil status
of the people of Color had to change for the better—otherwise a “bloody catastro-
phe”91 would be unavoidable. Maybe not as empathically, but these arguments can
also be found in Arango’s writings. When expressing his disgust at slavery, Hum-
boldt’s quotes refer more often than not to slave regimes outside Cuba. Actually,
he could be seen as a forerunner of the “Tannenbaum thesis”. In 1946, the sociol-
ogist Frank Tannenbaum published a book on the comparative history of slavery
saying that Anglo- and Latin-American slave regimes differed insofar as they either
impeded or facilitated the transition from bondage to citizenship. In Latin Amer-
ica, Tannenbaum argued, the slave could, once freed from bondage, even purchase
whiteness; in the United States, in contrast, a Black could never do this. The thesis
has provoked heated discussions until today.92
Humboldt’s sympathy for the Cuban situation becomes most evident when he
speaks about Arango’s concept of the “cuatro consuelos” (four consents) of 1796 in
which Arango explains in detail that four rights should be guaranteed for slaves
(“choice of a less severe master, the right to marry whom he pleases, and the possi-
bility of working to purchase his freedom, […] the right to own property and to pay
for his wife and children’s freedom”).93 Compared to Arango’s suggestions of 1832,
his arguments over slavery have hardly changed as such.What has changed instead
is the call for an alliance with free people of Color among the elites. Arango’s ratio-
nal argumentation, his (verbal) engagement for the rights of slaves, his good ed-
ucation, his worldliness, and noble background—all of this might have impressed
Humboldt and it might have also fostered his belief that slavery should be trans-
formed only gradually and slowly under the careful guidance of enlightened and
also noble intellectuals.
91 Humboldt, Political Essay, 68. Humboldt, Essai politique, 118, “cette catastrophe sanglante.”
92 Cf. Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen, New York 1947; Ann Twinam, Purchasing Whiteness,
Stanford 2015, 9; Helg, Slave but not Citizen, 2017, 76. This discussion about “whitening” as a
process of manumission and overcoming limpieza de sangre (“gracias al sacar” as Tannenbaum
and Twinam would call it) should not be confused with the practice of “whitening” in the
sense of attracting White European immigrants to make Cuba “whiter.” Arango and Hum-
boldt use the terms in both contexts. Humboldt explicitly refers to official whitenings in his
“essai” (Humboldt, Essai politique, 144, “blanchîment officiel”). Arango’s and Humboldt’s argu-
ment that people of Color should not outnumber theWhite population had a long aftermath.
93 Humboldt, Political Essay, 150. Humboldt, Essai politique, 326, “M. d’Arango […] accorde à l’esclave
quatre droits (quatro consuelos).”
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Main findings
Blumenbach played an important role in introducing comparisons as a keymethod-
ology in academia. One of his most famous investigations was his comparisons of
skulls in search of commonalties. He could do this only in a negative mode: He
had to deny the existence of a diferentia specifica. Only then could he argue that all
human beings belong to just one species.
Blumenbach did not leave it at that. After having identified the species, he used
species as a category and as a starting point for further comparisons. As a result,
he determined that female Caucasian skulls, in respect to their symmetry, were
the most beautiful. I have called this the “aesthetic difference.” He can be labeled the
inventor of White beauty.
Humboldt, of course, was not just influenced by Blumenbach when it comes to
comparisons.94 But he definitely shared his approach in many respects. For both
scholars, the activity of comparing began with thick descriptions of the respective
comparata. Like Blumenbach, Humboldt was also often searching for a tertium com-
parationis, and this provoked endless descriptions.This makes Humboldt’s writings
on Cuba such heavy reading. Once he has identified comparata and tertia, compar-
isons seem to be the best way to prove scientific objectivity and personal neutrality
in contrast to the irrational, invented, speculative findings of earlier scholars. This
is most evident in Humboldt’s considerations on flora, fauna, climate, and geolog-
ical questions, but it is also true for his investigation of population numbers.
When it comes to comparing with numbers, all uncertainties about their relia-
bility were hidden. Although Humboldt (and also official censuses such as the 1909
census) is often skeptical about numbers, graphs represent comparisons as objec-
tive and thus help to naturalize the categories (people of Color, Blacks, Whites)
employed.
Like Blumenbach, Humboldt is also generally interested in finding common-
alties within all differences. This is closely connected to their shared humanitarian
endeavor. Both argue against slavery and racial hierarchies. At the same time, both
also introduce evaluative differences between races. Humboldt does not do this as
explicitly as Blumenbach does. Humboldt does not investigate the making of race
categories himself (in contrast to his investigations of different slave regimes). He
just takes the race categories from the official censuses and from Arango’s data col-
lections. However, a close reading reveals that Humboldt prefers a transformation
94 It has been shown only recently that Humboldt employed global comparisons throughout
his work as powerful epistemological devices that more often than not fall back upon “Eu-
rocentric ideas of art, politics, society, and beauty.” Blumenbach was just one of many other
Eurocentric influences on Humboldt. See, Peters’ chapter on travels and comparisons in this
book.
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of Cuban society under the guidance of careful elites. In a society in which limpieza
de sangre still reserves higher societal positions for White people alone, this atti-
tude has a racial undertone, even if Humboldt might not have thought about it.
I have called this the “paternalistic difference.” Fighting black slavery, though, in
this world view, was the task of onlyWhite people. Roughly fifty years later, Kipling
spoke of the “White man’s burden.”
Comparing—and this cannot be underlined often enough—is an ambivalent
activity. Comparing simultaneously creates similarities and differences in respect
to a tertium (such as race). Overcoming racial discrimination in everyday life would
mean overcoming discourses on racial comparisons.
Humboldt’s comparisons of slave regimes place his general disgust of slavery
in perspective. His arguments tie in with the so-called “Tannenbaum thesis” of
the mid-twentieth century. The controversy centers on the question whether or
not former slaves could become the equals of Whites (in other words, could they
overcome limpieza de sangre). Interestingly enough, it is the slaveholder Arango who
in his writings of 1832 refers to the impertinence of blood purity (mainly because
Whites also had to prove it when applying for certain higher positions) and suggests
that elites of African descent should gain the same rights as all Whites have. This
shift in his argument can help him save his defense of the slave regime as not being
based on racial categories.
The passion with censuses for proving howmany people of Color live in a region
is not as innocent, neutral, or objective as Humboldt implies. For Arango, the main
objective of official censuses is to control people of Color so that they do not out-
number Whites. For him, this is essential to prevent rebellions. Having Arango in
mind, it becomes even clearer that Humboldt also believes that there should never
be too many people of Color, either free or slave.
Humboldt’s and Arango’s comparisons are most telling when it comes to differ-
ent slave regimes. Humboldt adopts Arango’s vision of a “good” slave regime that
he had explained already in 1796 in his cuatro consuelos (four consents). Within this
context of slave regime comparisons,Humboldt is looking only for differences.This
is in contrast to his comparisons in other contexts in which the objective is finding
commonalties. Until his writings in 1832, Arango remained a defender of (pater-
nalistic) slave regimes, arguing that Cuban slaves have always been “the happiest
of the world.” Arango’s influence on Humboldt was fundamental. His analyses, his
visions, his evaluations of numbers, and probably also their personal discussions
as well as their joint trips to the countryside and the ingenios (sugar plantations) led
Humboldt to believe that there could be such a thing as an acceptable slave system.
Blumenbach, Humboldt, Arango, and other scholars of the time established
discourses on both humanitarian progress and White supremacy. Comparing was
a way of combining both. We can also find the aftermath of their comparisons in
324 Angelika Epple
the works of scholars during the long nineteenth century until Fernando Ortíz and
his writings on Cuban racism in 1911 or even on Humboldt in 1930.
When it comes to the practices of comparing, one finding is most telling: Hum-
boldt underlines that slavery should not be compared to other systems of violence.
What follows, however, are comparisons—comparisons of different slave regimes.
These comparisons have the effect of undermining his main argument that slavery
was always and with no exception a threat to humanity.
Blumenbach, Humboldt, Arango together with others shaped how slavery his-
tory was written for many years to come. They obviously excluded the voices of
slaves, freed slaves, and other people with an Afro-Cuban background. Instead,
they dealt with what they believed to be bigger questions: Humboldt contributed to
the humanitarian discourse on slavery and abolition; Arango to the economic dis-
course on free trade—including the commodity “human beings from Africa.” How-
ever, discourses and practices have different velocities of change.Maybe Humboldt
and Arango would have been more controversial if they had talked about whether
or not Arango should free his own slaves. For the sake of the equality of all humans,
Carlos Manuel de Céspedes did this in 1868. This was the beginning of the thirty-
year-long war of Cuban independence.
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The Politicisation of Comparisons
The East-West Dispute over Military Force Comparisons
in the Cold War
Thomas Müller
Abstract
In the wake of NATO’s Double-Track Decision in 1979, East and West engaged in a propa-
ganda battle over the assessment of the conventional and nuclear balances in Europe. Both
sides published special booklets that substantiated the respective balance assessments through
detailed comparisons of the military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The chapter re-
constructs this propaganda battle as an exploratory case study of how comparisons are politi-
cized—that is, become matters of political and public disputes—in situations of competition
and conflict such as the Cold War. It shows that the arms control negotiations between East
and West were not only key factors driving the politicization of military force comparisons
but also crucial forums for the development of a shared comparative framework, and thus the
depoliticization of these comparisons.
1. Introduction1
One central characteristic as well as driver of the Cold War was the military com-
petition and arms race between the two superpowers and their respective military
alliances. Comparisons were integral to how the superpowers and their alliances
assessed the distribution of military capabilities, publicly legitimised their own ar-
mament efforts and sought to curb and de-escalate the military competition and
arms race through arms control negotiations. This chapter analyses the political
disputes over military force comparisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in
the 1980s as an exploratory case study of the politicisation of comparisons that,
1 I would like to thank Mathias Albert and Kerrin Langer for the productive discussions in our
SFB project on military force comparisons. This chapter benefited greatly from these discus-
sions. I am also grateful to Angelika Epple and the audience at the SFB conference for their
valuable feedback on my presentation and draft chapter.
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under certain conditions, arises from and shapes situations of competition and
conflict such as the Cold War.
Existing research shows that East andWest perceived the balance of power dif-
ferently during the Cold War.2 This research, however, focuses mostly on national
debates over the state of the balance of power and has not yet systematically anal-
ysed the international disputes that took place between East and West over their
diverging interpretations of the balance of power.3 Moreover, research on power
comparisons is generally more interested in whether the power comparisons were
accurate4 than in the ‘power politics of power analysis’ through which various ac-
tors seek to establish their preferred comparisons as ‘social facts’.5 By focusing
on the politicisation of comparisons in the interaction between East andWest, this
chapter aims to contribute to a better understanding of international disputes over
the distribution of power.
In particular, this chapter makes two contributions: First, it develops a frame-
work for analysing the politicisation and depoliticisation of comparisons. This
(de)politicisation of comparisons constitutes a special case of the ‘politics of
comparison’.6 The chapter conceptualises the politics of comparison more broadly
than Ann Stoler, who views it as the attempts of various actors to make their
preferred comparisons socially and politically relevant. Comparisons become
politicised when these attempts clash—the result being public disputes and
political struggles over which forms of comparisons are to be used and which not.
Second, the chapter explores how the (de)politicisation is shaped by, and
shapes, situations of competition and conflict. It shows that the politicisation of
military force comparisons was closely related to attempts to regulate the military
competition via conventional and nuclear arms control negotiations between East
and West. Whereas the politicisation of force comparisons already began with
conventional arms control negotiations in the 1970s, it reached a new level in the
2 SeeWilliam C.Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the ColdWar, Ithaca
1993.
3 Debates within the Soviet elite have been reconstructed by Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance.
The political debates in the USA have been analysed by, for instance, David M. Walsh, The
Military Balance in the Cold War: US Perceptions and Policy, 1976–85, London 2008. For a partial
exception, see Timothy Barney,Mapping the ColdWar: Cartography and the Framing of America’s
International Power, Chapel Hill 2015, 183–192 who covers the use of geographical represen-
tations in the East–West dispute of the 1980s.
4 For an overview, see Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Compe-
tition and Cooperation, Princeton 2010, 194–200.
5 StefanoGuzzini,On theMeasure of Power and thePower ofMeasure in International Relations (DIIS
Working Paper, 28), Copenhagen 2009, 10, 15.
6 Ann Laura Stoler, Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American His-
tory and (Post) Colonial Studies, in: The Journal of American History 88 (2001), 829–865, see
861–864.
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early 1980s when both sides started to publish special booklets to legitimise their
respective balance interpretations in the context of the public disputes over the
deployment and control of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.Moreover,
the disputes over military force comparisons were resolved through the develop-
ment of joint comparative frameworks at the end of the eventually successful arms
control negotiations that, in turn, helped to stabilise and de-escalate the Cold War
conflict.
The chapter is structured in the following way:The second section discusses the
politicisation of comparisons—and, in particular, military force comparisons—in
situations of competition and conflict.The third section reconstructs how the book-
lets restaged for a broader public the disputes over comparisons that hampered the
arms control negotiations. The fourth section analyses how the balance disputes
were gradually depoliticised and resolved in the second half of the 1980s. The fifth
section then shows that shared repertoires are not only the result of negotiations
that depoliticise comparisons but may also be fostered through dynamics related
to the politicisation of comparisons.The conclusion finally reflects on how peculiar
the described patterns and dynamics are to situations of competition and conflict.
2. The politicisation and depoliticisation of comparisons
The Cold War can be described as a multi-layered situation of competition and
conflict between East and West.7 Situations of competition and conflict are char-
acterised by the contest ensuing from two or more actors striving for superior shares of some
socially valued goods of which only a limited afmount exists.8 In the Cold War, these so-
cially valued goods included both ‘hard’ goods such as economicwealth andmilitary
capabilities as well as ‘soft’ goods such as status and political legitimacy.The contest
amounts to a conflict when the actors conceive their respective aims as opposing or
incompatible and accordingly engage in moves and countermoves through which
they seek to prevail over the other(s).The ColdWar, notably, was fuelled by an ideo-
logical conflict between capitalism and communism. In the military dimension of
the Cold War, some phases of the competition were more conflictive than others.
After a phase of détente, the military competition between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact entered a new phase of conflict in the late 1970s driven by a renewed conven-
tional and nuclear arms race.9
7 For histories of the Cold War, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War, London 2005, and Odd
Arne Westad, The Cold War: AWorld History, New York 2017.
8 For a discussion of the competition for ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ goods in international politics, see To-
bias Werron, Worum konkurrieren Nationalstaaten? Zu Begriff und Geschichte der Konkur-
renz um ‘weiche’ globale Güter, in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 41 (2012), 338–355.
9 For a general account of this last phase of the Cold War, see Westad, The Cold War, 475–616.
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Military force comparisons can be defined as the set of practices through which actors
assemble, assess, and disseminate information about differentials between two or more armed
forces—for example regarding their expenditures, capabilities, performances, or power.10 It is
possible to compare themilitary capabilities of states that are not in competition or
conflict with one another. However, power is context-dependent: states—or, more
precisely, the institutions states task withmonitoring and assessing differentials in
military capabilities and power—therefore usually make force comparisons not in
the abstract.11 Rather, their comparative assessments are informed by assumptions
and background knowledge about given or expected situations that they deem to
affect their security and in which they anticipate having to (potentially having to)
use their armed forces.
During the ColdWar, states shared a certain repertoire of semantics andmodes
of comparing military power and power more broadly. This shared repertoire no-
tably included classificatory concepts such as ‘great powers’ or ‘superpowers’ and
the assessment and representation of the distribution of (military) power in terms
of a ‘balance of power’. Yet, the fact that states share a certain repertoire of se-
mantics and modes of comparison does not mean that they apply this repertoire in
the same way or arrive at the same conclusions about the differentials in military
capabilities and power. A shared repertoire often ‘remains inherently ambiguous’,
even in communities of practice, and subject to constant renegotiation.12 Indeed,
as studies on power perceptions emphasise, the balance of power was somehow
‘elusive’ in the Cold War, and East and West differed in how they interpreted it.13
Not all of these interpretational differences lead to, or are signs of, the politici-
sation of comparisons. The politicisation of comparisons can be conceptualised as the
emergence (or intensification) of political disputes and struggles over which comparisons are
to be used as base for the interpretation and/or regulation of a given situation.The literature
highlights several indicators of processes of politicisation: disagreements over an
issue became more salient, the prevalent opinions on this issue become more po-
larised, and the group of actors involved in the debate on the issue widens.14 For
10 For useful discussions of the practice — and limits — of force comparisons, see John M.
Collins/Anthony H. Cordesman, Imbalance of Power: An Analysis of Shifting U.S.–Soviet Military
Strength, San Rafael 1978; Dieter S. Lutz, Towards a Methodology of Military Force Comparison,
Baden-Baden 1986; and Simon Lunn, The East–West Military Balance: Assessing Change, in:
Adelphi Papers 236 (1989), 49–71.
11 See David Baldwin, Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach, Princeton 2016,
114–122.
12 Cf. Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity, Cambridge 1998,
82–85 (see 82 for the quote).
13 Cf. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance. See also William C. Wohlforth, The Perception of Power:
Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance, in:World Politics 39 (1987), 353–381.
14 Cf. Michael Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy and Contestation, Oxford
2018, 139–142; Edgar Grande/Swen Hutter, Beyond Authority Transfer: Explaining the Politi-
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instance, the publication of the booklets was part of a broader process in which
force comparisons became a matter of public dispute rather than simply a matter
of dispute among a small circle of military analysts and diplomats.
The likelihood of the politicisation of power comparisons increases when two
conditions are met: The first condition is that the interpretational differences stem
from the use and promotion of different comparisons that result in diverging as-
sessments of the given situation. The second condition is that the interpretational
differences have to be perceived to matter in terms of how the competition and/or
conflict play(s) out. When different comparisons imply different distributional ef-
fects, then actors are likely to prefer and promote those comparisons thatmaximise
their shares of the socially valued good(s) for which they are competing.
The question of distributional effects often arises in the context of governance
practices that seek to organise, regulate, and order a social domain. Arms control
negotiations and treaties are an example for such practices, because they serve to
impose rules and limits on the military competition among states. Whereas the
characteristics of certain types of comparisons can facilitate the politicisation of
comparisons,15 it is, in this sense, themobilisation and contestation of comparisons
in the context of governance practices that causes the respective comparisons to
become politicised—that is, to become a matter of political and public dispute.16
This politicisation is particularly likely to occur if the underlying issue is already
contested, which is often the case in situations of competition and conflict that
are per definition characterised by competing preferences (though not necessarily
always competing political preferences).
The politicisation of comparisons overlays and intertwines the existing situ-
ation of competition/conflict with an additional layer of competition/conflict. To
take the example of military force comparisons in the Cold War, the first layer con-
sists in the competition between West and East over superior military capabilities
and power. The additional layer created by the politicisation of comparisons, in
turn, is a conflict about whose measures of military capabilities and power are to
be used to interpret the distribution of military capabilities and power. Whereas
the first layer is thus about a competition over hard goods, namely superior mil-
cisation of Europe, in: West European Politics 39 (2016), 23–43, see 25–26; and Stephane J.
Baele/Thierry Balzacq/Philippe Bourbeau, Numbers in Global Security Governance, in: Eu-
ropean Journal of International Security, 3 (2018), 22–44, see 25, 34–37.
15 For instance, the ‘mobility’ and ‘combinality’ of numbers implies that the mobilisation of
numbers for political purposes can be countered by ‘producing rival numbers’, as Baele et
al., Numbers, 35 highlight.
16 The literature on politicisation in world politics often focuses on a special type of regulatory
practices, namely authority-based modes of governance of international organisations. See
Zürn, Global Governance; and Grande/Hutter, Beyond Authority Transfer.
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itary capabilities, the second layer is about a soft good: the social power to shape
and determine how the situation is (to be) assessed.
Comparisons can become depoliticised—that is, cease to be matters of public and po-
litical disputes and struggles—in several ways. First, the differences over the compar-
isons could persist, but the political significance ascribed to them could decrease,
so that these differences cease to be matters of public political disputes and strug-
gles. Second, the actors could fail to agree on a common set of comparisons, but,
in parallel, one of the actors could succeed in convincing the relevant audience that
its comparisons are the best and most pertinent for assessing the issue or situa-
tion in question, thus effectively deciding the public contest over the comparisons.
Third, the actors could agree, through persuasion and negotiations, on a common
set of comparisons, thus resolving their contest over the comparisons. These ways
are not mutually exclusive and may also influence each other. For instance, if one
of the actors wins the support of the relevant audience for its comparisons and
interpretations, then this support will probably also strengthen its position in the
negotiations.
3. A new level of politicisation in the first half of the 1980s
The politicisation of force comparisons happened in two interrelated arenas: First,
the conventional and nuclear arms control negotiations between East and West made
the interpretational differences over the state of the East–West military balance
diplomatically and politically salient. Second, the politicisation reached a new level
with a novel form of public propaganda battle in the early 1980s.The increased public
contestation of NATO’s Double-Track decision in Western societies, especially in
Europe, led to a ‘War of Facts’ (as the US chief negotiator termed it17) in which both
the West and the East published special booklets to promote their interpretations
of the arms race, the military balance, and the most appropriate forms of arms
control vis-à-vis Western publics.18
The two arenas were intertwined through disputes over the conventional and
the intermediate nuclear balance. Chronologically, the conventional arms control
negotiations had started well before the propaganda battle, whereas the intermedi-
ate nuclear arms control negotiations started concurrently. The conventional arms
control negotiations were conducted in the form of the Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction (MBFR) talks from 1973 to 1989 and then in the form of the negotiations
17 Cf. Maynard W. Glitman, The Last Battle of the Cold War: An Inside Account of Negotiating the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Houndmills 2006, 133–134.
18 On the public debates, see Leopoldo Nuti et al. (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the
Cold War, Washington D.C. 2015.
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on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty from 1989 to 1990.19 The MBFR
talks were hampered by the dispute over whether the conventional balance in Eu-
rope was, as the East maintained, characterised by a rough equality between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact; or whether, as the West insisted, the Warsaw Pact enjoyed
a conventional superiority over NATO. The dispute over the intermediate nuclear
balance, in turn, complicated the negotiations on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty that took place formally from 1981 to 1983 and from 1985 to 1987.20
NATO argued that the Soviet deployment of new intermediate nuclear missiles
(SS-20) created an imbalance. NATO sought to remedy this with its Double-Track
decision of 1979, which stipulated the US deployment of intermediate nuclear mis-
siles to Europe should intermediate nuclear arms control negotiations between the
US and the Soviet Union fail. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, maintained that,
all things considered, a rough balance existed and accused NATO of upsetting this
balance.
These balance disputes involved high stakes for the outcomes of the arms con-
trol negotiations, because they were tied to divergent preferences regarding the
arms control measures and formats. In the case of conventional arms control, the
West argued for asymmetrical reductions that would transform the existing imbal-
ance into a balance by removing the Soviet superiority, whereas the East insisted on
symmetrical reductions based on its interpretation of an already existing conven-
tional balance. In the case of INF, the Soviet Union criticised the US position of in-
cluding only Soviet and US intermediate land-basedmissiles. For the Soviet Union,
the calculation of the intermediate nuclear balance also had to include other nu-
clear delivery systems (e.g. nuclear-delivery-capable aircraft) as well as the nuclear
forces of the two other European nuclear powers (i.e. Great Britain and France) and
consequently demanded that these nuclear delivery systems and nuclear powers be
likewise considered in the intermediate nuclear arms control negotiations.
The propaganda battle consisted in a sequence of official publications in which
both sides substantiated their respective balance interpretations. It revolved
around three main series of publications: ‘Soviet Military Power’, published by the
USA in ten editions between 1981 and 1991; ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’, published
by the Soviet Union in four editions between 1982 and 1987; and NATO’s ‘Force
Comparisons’ booklets, published in 1982 and 1984. The booklets were widely dis-
19 For overviews over these two conventional arms control negotiations, see Christoph Bluth,
Arms Control as a Part of Strategy: The Warsaw Pact in MBFR Negotiations, in: Cold War His-
tory 12 (2012), 245–268 and Rüdiger Hartmann/Wolfgang Heydrich/Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut,
Der Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa: Vertragswerk, Verhandlungsgeschichte,
Kommentar, Dokumentation, Baden-Baden 1994.
20 For a discussion of the INF negotiations, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Did ‘Peace Through
Strength’ End the Cold War? Lessons from INF, in: International Security, 16 (1991), 162–188.
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tributed and addressed not only the respective domestic public but also a broader
transnational public and were for that purpose translated in several languages.
Whereas the balance disputes had been publicly addressed before, the propa-
ganda battle marked a new, unprecedented stage in the politicisation of military
force comparisons in the relations between West and East. The booklets were a re-
action to the growing public protests in Europe against the planned deployment
of US intermediate range nuclear missiles to Europe. The beginning of the propa-
ganda battle, though, was also closely linked to the start of the INF negotiations.
Each side had concluded that ‘a successful conclusion to the INF issue would re-
quire the support’ of Western publics.21 The INF negotiations formally started in
November 1981 and the first editions of the three mentioned booklet series ap-
peared around the same time: ‘Soviet Military Power’ in September 1981, ‘Whence
theThreat to Peace’ in February 1982, and NATO’s ‘Force Comparisons’ in May 1982.
In order to substantiate the balance interpretations, the booklets employed
both qualitative and quantitative comparisons of the military forces and capabili-
ties of the two alliances. However, whereas the NATO booklets were—as their title
suggests—purposively designed as comparative assessments of the military bal-
ance, ‘Soviet Military Power’ and ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’ contained not only
sections comparing the two alliances but also sections depicting only the military
forces of the respectively other side.That said, comparisons played a prominent role
in the argumentation of both the West and the East, and each side foregrounded
the comparisons that best suited its balance arguments.
The differences between the comparisons stemmed partly from disparate data
and partly from incongruent measures of relative capabilities. The conventional
balance in Europe, for instance, was presented in different numbers by both sides.
Among the most controversial figures was the number of tanks: in the respective
1982 editions, ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’ spoke about a rough parity of 24,000
NATO tanks versus 25,000 Warsaw Pact tanks in Europe, whereas NATO’s ‘Force
Comparisons’ counted 13,000 NATO tanks versus 42,500Warsaw Pact tanks.22 Two
years later, NATO revised its figures for the conventional balance between NATO
and theWarsaw Pact and now differentiated between forces already in place (13,470
vs 26,900 tanks) and ‘fully reinforced forces’ (17,730 vs 46,230 tanks).23 ‘Whence the
Threat to Peace’more or less repeated its previous account, this time counting about
25,000 tanks on each side.24
21 Glitman, Last Battle, 142.
22 Cf. Soviet Union, Whence the Threat to Peace, 1st edition, Moscow 1982, 69 and NATO, Force
Comparisons, 1982, 11.
23 Cf. NATO, NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, Brussels 1984, 8.
24 Cf. Soviet Union,Whence the Threat to Peace 1984, 78. Of the 25,000 NATO tanks, 17,000 were
described as being in active service and 8,000 as being in storage.
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The non-strategic nuclear balance in Europe was assessed by East and West
with different measures. In accordance with the Soviet INF position, ‘Whence the
Threat to Peace’ framed it as a balance of ‘medium-range nuclear weapon systems
in Europe’; that is, the medium-range missiles and bombers of the Soviet Union on
the one side and those of the USA, Great Britain, and France on the other side. It
claimed that their number had ‘for years remained at roughly the same level—some
1,000 units on either side’.25 Moreover, even with the SS-20 deployment factored
in, NATO was said to ‘enjoy an advantage of some 50 percent’ in the total ‘num-
ber of warheads on medium-range missiles and aircrafts’.26 The Western booklets
acknowledged that the balance of ‘intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces’
comprised missiles, aircraft, and tube artillery; but argued that, on the whole, ‘the
Warsaw Pact has a substantial numerical advantage’.27 The booklets pointed par-
ticularly to the imbalance in land-based missiles. Shortly after the US deployment
of its Pershing II and GLCM missiles to Europe began in late 1983, ‘Soviet Military
Power’ contrasted the then 25 deployed Pershing II and GLCM missiles on NATO’s
side with the 602 deployed SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 on the Soviet side.28 NATO’s sec-
ond booklet, moreover, argued in a graph that even after the full deployment of all
108 Pershing II and 464 GLCM missiles, NATO would have fewer than 600 nuclear
warheads on longer-range INF missiles, whereas the Soviet missiles were said to
already have about 1,400 warheads on their launchers in late 1983.29
Each side accused the other of seeking superiority instead of balance and of
being the driving force behind the arms race. Both sides produced graphs that
compared the evolution of weapon systems in order to substantiate these claims.
Notably, the very first comparative graph in ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’ was an
overview showing that the USAwas consistently the first mover in the development
of the following six weapon systems: nuclear weapons, intercontinental strategic
bombers, nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, multi-
ple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), and the neutron bomb.30
Two years later, the second NATO booklet responded with two graphs comparing
the nuclear modernisation programmes of both sides for strategic nuclear forces
as well as short- and middle-range delivery systems. The two graphs stressed that
25 Soviet Union,Whence the Threat to Peace, 1984, 71.
26 Soviet Union,Whence the Threat to Peace, 1984, 72.
27 NATO, Force Comparisons, 1984, 30. The INF balance is discussed on pp. 30–43.
28 USDepartment of State, SovietMilitary Power, 1984, p. 51. NATO’s ‘Force Comparisons’ booklet
of the same year spoke of 224 SS-4 and 378 SS-20 on the Soviet side and 9 Pershing II as well
as 32 GLCMmissiles on NATO’s side. See NATO, Force Comparisons, 1984, 34.
29 Cf. NATO, Force Comparisons, 1984, 35.
30 Cf. Soviet Union,Whence the Threat to Peace, 1982 (1st edition), 7.
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the Soviet Union had developed and deployed a considerably larger number of new
nuclear weapon systems than the West in the 1970s.31
On the whole, the propaganda battle broadened the balance dispute. As dis-
cussed above, the arms control negotiations politicised two balances: the conven-
tional balance in Europe as well as the intermediate nuclear balance in Europe. Al-
though these two balances featured prominently in the propaganda battle, the bal-
ance discussions in the booklets were not limited to them. In fact, two of the booklet
series—‘Whence theThreat to Peace’ and the NATO booklets—advanced systematic
assessments of the state of the balance that discussed all relevant (sub-)balances
step by step.32 This broader approach also brought other balances into play. For in-
stance, whereas the Soviet booklets insisted that a rough parity still existed in the
strategic balance, the Western booklets argued that key indicators showed a shift
in the strategic balance in the second half of the 1970s that gave the Warsaw Pact
‘relative advantages’.33
At the same time, the propaganda battle continued a trend that had emerged in
the conventional arms control negotiations in the 1970s: the politicisation of force
comparisons played out to a considerable degree as a dispute over numbers (as the
examples above illustrate).This trend was driven by two features of the dispute: On
the one hand, the debate about the balance(s) was dominated by a relatively small
set of numerical indicators.34 This set notably included manpower and tank num-
bers for the conventional balance and missile, bomber, and warhead numbers for
the intermediate nuclear balance. What was probably the most important factor
for this salience was that the arms control negotiations—that is, the relevant gov-
ernance practice to which the politicisation was related—essentially defined the
balance(s) in terms of numerical parity. The visualisation strategy underpinning
the booklets added a second factor. Whereas the booklets contained both qualita-
tive and quantitative assessments of the various balances, these assessments were
usually summarised and visualised through tables and graphs that were based on
static, quantitative comparisons.
31 Cf. NATO, Force Comparisons, 1984, 27, 32.
32 The ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’ editions discussed all sub-balances in a special chapter on
the East–West balance, whereas the NATO booklets discussed the conventional and nuclear
balances in separate chapters. ‘Soviet Military Power’ did not feature a special chapter on the
balance until 1988.
33 See for example Soviet Union,Whence the Threat to Peace, 1984, 69–71 and NATO, Force Com-
parisons, 1984, 29.
34 This feature fits with Aaron Friedberg’s observation that the late nineteenth-century British
debates on its changing international standing were characterised by the ‘widespread use of
a handful of simple, compact indicators’. See Aaron Friedberg, TheWeary Titan: Britain and the
Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, Princeton 1988, 283.
The Politicisation of Comparisons 339
On the other hand, the West and the East pursued different data strategies
in the propaganda battle. Whereas the Western booklets were revised versions of
Western intelligence assessments that were declassified for the publication, the
East remained—as in the arms control negotiations—reluctant to fully divulge its
own data. The Western booklets—and especially the two NATO booklets—conse-
quently featured more detailed and more comprehensive quantitative data on the
balance(s) than the ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’ series.35 In particular, whereas
the NATO booklets presented data on the number of divisions and several major
weapon systems in their assessment of the conventional balance, the respective
sections of ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’ included only select comparative num-
bers (notably for divisions and tanks) and additionally sometimes posited ratios
for some weapon systems without backing them up with concrete numbers.36 The
comparison of Western and Eastern booklets thus strengthened NATO’s argument
that is wasmore transparent about its military forces than theWarsaw Pact, which,
in turn, supported NATO’s broader arms control strategy of engaging the Warsaw
Pact to disclose and share more quantitative data on its military forces.
4. Gradual depoliticisation in the second half of the 1980s
In the second half of the 1980s, the politicisation of force comparisons gradually
eased off and gave way to a joint agreement on rules and limits for the arms race
based on a shared comparative framework. These rules and limits were enshrined
in two arms control agreements: first the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) signed by the USA and the Soviet Union in December 198737 and then
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) signed by 22 members of NATO
and the Warsaw Pact in November 1990.38
This section analyses how the politics of comparison shifted from the con-
frontational style of the propaganda battle to amore constructive style that resulted
in the two arms control agreements. The first sub-section highlights that the INF
treaty marked a watershed after which two of the three booklet series were no
longer published; and the new round of booklets issued by the two alliances was
characterised by a different, more constructive style. The second sub-section then
35 See Richard J. Herzog/John K.Wildgen, Tactics inMilitary PropagandaDocuments: A Content
Analysis of Illustrations, in: Defense Analysis, 2 (1/1986), 35–46.
36 See for example NATO, Force Comparisons, 1982, 11 and 1984, 8 as well as Soviet Union,Whence
the Threat to Peace, 1984, 76–69 and 1987, 74–76.
37 For the text of the treaty, see https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm [last accessedMay
19, 2019].
38 For the text of the treaty, see https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/108185.htm [last accessedMay
19, 2019].
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identifies the arms control negotiations as the decisive arena in which the balance
disputes were overcome and discusses how this depoliticisation of force compar-
isons was related to the broader de-escalation and end of the Cold War conflict.
The new character of the booklets
The booklets represent an example for a practice that emerges in reaction to a con-
flict and then disappears again once the conflict ends. As highlighted above, the
booklets were first published in 1981/82 as new propaganda tools for the contest
over transnational public opinion with regard to the INF missiles crisis in particu-
lar and the renewed West–East arms race more generally. Their publication ended
when the arms race abated. The last edition of NATO’s ‘Force Comparisons’ ap-
peared in 1984; the last edition of ‘Whence the Threat to Peace’, in 1987. Two of the
three booklet series were, in other words, no longer published once the INF treaty
had been concluded. Only ‘Soviet Military Power’ continued to be published until
1991 when the dissolution of the Soviet Union signified the end of the Cold War
competition between the two superpowers.
The two alliances issued a last round of force comparisons in November
1988 (NATO) and January 1989 (Warsaw Pact).39 These two booklets, though,
differed strikingly from the booklets published before. They assessed only one
balance—namely, the balance of conventional forces between the two alliances in
Europe. Moreover, they were designed as compilations of quantitative data that
assembled the relevant figures for the categories of forces and weapon systems
under consideration in the conventional arms control negotiations. Apart from
the forewords, the two booklets accordingly contained only quantitative tables and
graphs with some explanatory notes, but, in contrast to the previous booklets,
neither qualitative balance assessments nor pictures of the weapon systems.
The two booklets symbolised a new, less polarised, and more constructive char-
acter of the politics of comparison. At the time of their publication, the two al-
liances were in the final stage of their negotiations for a follow-up format to the
failed MBFR talks, and the new format, the CFE negotiations, was soon to be for-
mally opened (in March 1989). As a mutual gesture of military transparency, each
alliance issued a booklet that assembled and displayed the figures on those conven-
tional forces of both alliances that it considered to be pertinent for the upcoming
CFE negotiations. The Warsaw Pact’s booklet for the first time presented substan-
tial Eastern data on the conventional balance, thus departing from the East’s pre-
39 Cf. NATO, Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts, Brussels 1988 and Soviet Union,Warschauer
Pakt – NATO: Kräfteverhältnis in Europa, Moskau 1989.
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vious restrictive data strategy.40 Although differences in the data and definitions
still persisted, the Warsaw Pact furthermore contributed to a convergence of the
arms control positions of the two alliances. Its booklet acknowledged that the con-
ventional balance was characterised by certain imbalances and asymmetries, and
pointed to the Warsaw Pact’s already initiated unilateral reduction of troops and
weapon systems as a signal that the Warsaw Pact members were willing to address
and remedy these imbalances.41
The continuing publication of ‘Soviet Military Power’ stood in some contrast
to the changing character of the other booklets. The new editions of ‘Soviet Mili-
tary Power’ acknowledged that profound changes were happening, but argued that
these changes had so far related to Soviet intentions rather than Soviet capabili-
ties—which were still deemed a ‘threat’ in September 199042—and that it was con-
sequently still uncertain how the military competition would evolve in the future.43
Interestingly, ‘Soviet Military Power’ became more comparative once the politics of
comparison betweenWest and East were depoliticised. In fact, the 1988 edition was
the first to feature special chapters dedicated to the assessment of the military bal-
ance and competition.44 The analysis of the ‘technological competition’, moreover,
moved partially beyond East–West comparisons and started to compare US tech-
nologies not only with those of the Warsaw Pact but also with those of ‘Non-US
NATO’, Japan and—depending on the technology—select additional countries,45
thus implying a changing competitive environment.
Arms control and the end of the Cold War conflict
The changes in the character of the booklets indicate a gradual depoliticisation of
force comparisons in the second half of the 1980s. How was this depoliticisation
related to the end of the underlying Cold War conflict? Or, to put it differently, was
the depoliticisation of force comparisons just a function of the more general de-
escalation of the ColdWar conflict or did it, at least to some degree, also contribute
to the de-escalation of the Cold War conflict?
Three aspects are relevant for answering these questions: First, regarding the
interplay between the two arenas of the politicisation of force comparisons, the
40 Cf. Anton Krakau/Ole Diehl, 1989: ‘Annähernde Parität’ der Streitkräfte in Europa? Eine kritische
Analyse des östlichen Streitkräftevergleichs (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftli-
che und internationale Studien), Köln 1989, 1, 32.
41 See Soviet Union,Warschauer Pakt – NATO, 4–5.
42 US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1990, 4.
43 Soviet intentions were said to be both ‘debatable’ and ‘changeable’. US Department of De-
fense, Soviet Military Power, 1989, 9.
44 Cf. US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1988, chap. 6 and 7.
45 See, in particular, US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1989, 137.
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evolution of the propaganda battle seems to have largely followed the evolution of
the arms control negotiations. As highlighted above, two of the three booklet series
were published only during the time of the INF negotiations between 1981 and 1987.
The negotiated resolution of one of the two balance disputes—the dispute over the
intermediate nuclear balance—through an arms control agreement (the INF treaty)
thus eased off the propaganda battle. Moreover, the new impulses and progress in
the conventional arms control negotiations—that is, the shift from theMBFR to the
CFE format—were mirrored by a more constructive and technical style of the last
round of NATO andWarsaw Pact booklets in late 1988 and early 1989. Furthermore,
the arms control negotiations were the sites at which the balance disputes were
overcome through a jointly agreed framework for the assessment and regulation
of the two balances—and in this sense, the more important of the two arenas for
ending the politicisation of comparisons.
Second, the breakthroughs in the arms control negotiations, in turn, were ini-
tiated and made possible through the parallel reorientation of the foreign policy of
the two superpowers. Both the US government under President Ronald Reagan and
the new Soviet government led by Mikhail Gorbachev now more actively sought to
curb the nuclear arms race through arms control measures.46 In the resumed INF
negotiations, the Soviet Union abandoned its earlier demand to include the British
and French nuclear forces, and eventually agreed with the USA to eliminate all their
intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles with a range between 500
and 5,500 km. As a result, the INF treaty of December 1987 essentially reflected the
comparative approach promoted by the West: a bilateral regulation of the interme-
diate nuclear balance that covered only ground-based missiles.
The de-escalation of the superpower relations also ameliorated relations be-
tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In parallel to the INF negotiations, the two al-
liances worked on a follow-up format for the MBFR talks after 1986. Similar to the
dispute over the intermediate nuclear balance, the Soviet Union then made an im-
portant step towards overcoming the politicisation of force comparisons. As noted
above, it acknowledged in late 1988 and early 1989 that the conventional balance
featured certain imbalances that had to be addressed through asymmetric reduc-
tions, thus converging on theWestern position in the dispute over the conventional
balance.47
Third, whether and to what extent the shift from the politicisation of force
comparisons to a joint comparative framework contributed to the end of the Cold
War depends on the interpretation of the Cold War conflict. If the Cold War is
46 For the decisive role of Gorbachev’s new policies, see Risse-Kappen, Lessons from INF,
182–185.
47 See also Hartmann/Heydrich/Meyer-Landrut, Vertrag, 25–26.
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conceived foremost as an ideological conflict between two opposing social, eco-
nomic, and political systems, then Gorbachev’s domestic reforms and the series of
revolutions in Eastern Europe were arguably more consequential factors.48 Most
interpretations, nevertheless, treat the military confrontation and arms race be-
tween the two superpowers and their alliances as a key characteristic of the Cold
War.The two arms control agreements were the tools chosen by the two alliances to
stop the arms race and to stabilise and even reduce military competition. The gov-
ernance practices made possible by the negotiated resolution of the disputes over
force comparisons were thus central to de-escalating the military dimension of the
Cold War conflict. However, as hinted at, the de-escalation of the military dimen-
sion was but one factor among others that shaped how the Cold War ended. The
depoliticisation of force comparisons was therefore one element, though arguably
not the decisive element, that contributed to the end of the underlying situation of
competition and conflict.
5. Disputed and shared repertoires of comparisons
The arms control negotiations thus eventually produced a shared comparative
framework for the intermediate nuclear balance and the conventional balance in
Europe. The development of this framework was a means to an end. The arms
control agreements would arguably not have been possible without overcoming the
balance disputes. The purpose of the arms control agreements—the fixation and
implementation of equal limits on the number of certain weapon systems—re-
quired a common set of definitions that subsumed the actual weapons of both
sides under common abstract categories of weapon systems so that the arsenals
of both sides could be counted and regulated within a common framework. The
CFE Treaty, for instance, defined five categories of weapon systems for which it
set aggregate arsenal limits for West and East: each side was allowed no more than
20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, 20,000 pieces of artillery,
6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters (see articles II and IV). Both
in the case of the INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty, the joint comparative framework
served not only to set normative limits for the military competition but was
also backed up by provisions for the ongoing verification—through information
exchanges and inspections—of whether the military competition would in the
future stay within the agreed normative limits.
It would however be to too superficial to associate shared repertoires of com-
parisons solely with situations after—or without—disputes over comparisons. It
would, relatedly, also be too superficial to equate the effects of the politicisation
48 See for instance Westad, The Cold War, 579–616 and Gaddis, The Cold War, 237–259.
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of comparisons solely with the intensification of differences and disputes. In fact,
political disputes over comparisons usually draw on a common repertoire; and,
moreover, politicisation can generate dynamics that foster shared repertoires.
On the one hand, the politics of comparison usually involve a certain degree of
shared comparative practices. As the present case study illustrates, both the East
and the West assessed the distribution of military power in terms of several func-
tional and regional ‘balances’ (e.g. the intermediate nuclear balance, the conven-
tional balance in Europe, and the strategic nuclear balance) and thus used the same
comparative template and standard. What is more, this comparative standard was
shared in a twofold way: first, as a standard for measuring the distribution of mili-
tary power existing prior to the arms control agreements; and second, as a norma-
tive standard—interpreted as numerical parity of weapon systems—that guided
the ordering and modification of the distribution of military power through the
arms control treaties.
On the other hand, the shared repertoire may be deepened through the very dy-
namics that drive the politicisation of comparisons. The arms control negotiations
and the propaganda battle point to two mechanisms that generate such effects: the
first mechanism relates to the synchronisation of the comparative practices within
the two alliances. As the arms control negotiations were essentially conducted not
between individual states but between the two alliances, each alliance had to in-
ternally develop and maintain a coherent group position on the comparisons and
balance interpretations it sought to promote. This internal synchronisation was
all the more important because differences and inconsistencies in the statements
of different members of the same alliance could potentially be exploited by the
other alliance in the public contest over the most appropriate comparisons and
balance interpretations. For example, because France and Spain refused to be in-
cluded in NATO’s ‘Force Comparisons’, the East could accuse NATO of downplaying
its numerical strength—and thus of deliberately distorting its balance interpreta-
tion—by not including all the armed forces that were likely to fight on the Western
side in case of a war.49 The politicisation of force comparisons therefore increased
the pressure on each alliance to use a shared and coherent set of comparisons.
The second mechanism stems from the nature of the struggles over compar-
isons as a contest in which each side reacts to the arguments and moves of the
other side. The shared repertoire, for instance, grows if these action–reaction dy-
namics lead to the mirroring of the argumentative style of the respective other
side. Notably, the depiction of US and NATO armed forces in ‘Whence the Threat
to Peace’ imitated to a considerable degree the depiction of Soviet and Warsaw
Pact forces in ‘Soviet Military Power’. Moreover, as already highlighted, the pol-
itics of comparison were dominated by a relatively small set of key comparative
49 See e.g. Soviet Union,Whence the Threat to Peace, 1984, 78–79.
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indicators.The disputes over comparisons in this sense condensed the field of rele-
vant comparisons and generated a common discourse and repertoire of arguments
and counter-arguments over some select comparisons. Two characteristics of the
balance disputes fostered this effect: the long-time stagnation of the balance dis-
putes, especially in the case of MBFR, gave rise to a repetitive pattern of arguments
and counter-arguments. And the arms control negotiations functioned as reference
points that foregrounded those numerical comparative indicators that formed part
of the proposed arms control frameworks.
6. Conclusion
This chapter started with the question how the politicisation of comparisons
shapes, and is shaped by, situations of competition and conflict. Although situ-
ations of competition and conflict do not lead automatically to the politicisation
of comparisons, such situations are, nevertheless, particularly conducive to public
disputes over comparisons when they have certain characteristics. The empirical
case study underscored that competing political preferences over governance
practices—in the present case study: the conventional and intermediate nuclear
arms control negotiations—trigger such disputes when the choice for a particular
comparison or a particular set of comparisons is deemed by the relevant actors to
be relevant and decisive for the form and outcome of the governance practices.
The next research step is to examine how typical the politicisation of compar-
isons is for situations of competition and conflict. How frequent is the politici-
sation of comparisons in such situations, and which characteristics of situations
of competition and conflict increase the likelihood for the politicisation of com-
parisons and the ensuring public disputes over comparisons? Moreover, whether
or not the politicisation of comparisons is typical for situations of competition
and conflict is a question of the variance of patterns and dynamics of practices of
comparing across different types of situations. Is the politicisation of comparisons
more likely to arise and to be more frequent in situations characterised by compe-
tition and conflict than in situations that are not (or are less) defined and shaped
by competition and conflict?
Whereas these questions focus on the effects of the situational characteristics
on the politicisation of comparisons, the present chapter showed that the politici-
sation of comparisons also reshapes the situations in which it arises. In fact, the
politicisation of comparisons—which, after all, creates and/or intensifies a par-
ticular type of contest, namely, a contest over the uses of comparisons—adds a
(further) layer of competition/conflict to the underlying situation. In other words,
even if the underlying situation does not (yet) amount to a situation of compe-
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tition and conflict, the politicisation of comparisons nonetheless transforms this
situation into a situation of competition and conflict.
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Genealogies of Modernism
Curatorial Practices of Comparing in the Exhibitions
Cubism and Abstract Art and documenta I
Britta Hochkirchen
Abstract
The article examines how exhibitions come up with their own diverging definitions of the ge-
nealogies of modern art through curatorial practices of temporal comparing.The focus will be
on the exhibitions Cubism and Abstract Art that took place 1936 in the Museum of Mod-
ern Art in New York and on documenta I in Kassel in 1955. Both exhibitions deal with the
concept of abstraction, which is proposed to be the teleological quality of modernism. While
both exhibitions are widely recognized as examples of a formalistic view on the artworks and
the development in the history of art, we will see that they use completely different practices
of comparing to point out these formal issues.
I. Preliminaries
“Learning from Athens”—this was the guiding notion behind the documenta 14 in
Kassel in summer 2017.1 This seemed to be a striking title for an exhibition ded-
icated to contemporary art, or more precisely, one that should show the current
state of the art. Is this a return to classicism and its strict norms? On the contrary,
Adam Szymczyk, the artistic director of the fourteenth volume of documenta, al-
tered the plans for this venerable major exhibition of contemporary art that has
been held in Kassel, Germany, since 1955. In contrast to all the former volumes of
this exhibition, documenta 14 was held in two locations at nearly the same time:
Athens and Kassel. Artworks were exhibited in both places where they were sup-
posed to take issue with each city. According to Szymczyk, the idea was to drop the
auctorial perspective—the hegemonial authority over meaning assumed by north-
ern and western Europe—in favor of presenting different nonhierarchical points of view
and ways of thinking at the same time. The curator’s emphasis on contemporaneity
1 The documenta 14was held in Kassel from 10 June to 17 September 2017 and in Athens from 8
April to 17 July, 2017.
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is striking, because it alludes to the perpetual defining question at any documenta:
“What is contemporary art?”
Documenta 14 offered the possibility of a relation between two perspectives, but
they could be perceived, and compared, only through a bodily and temporal shift:
Visitors had to travel from one city to the other and therefore still perceived the
works successively. They compared a “beforehand” with an “afterward”—at least in
their own perception and experience. But even the separate exhibition venues in
Kassel and Athens created, by juxtapositions, a condition that prompted compara-
tive viewing: Marta Minujín’s Parthenon of Books, a work of contemporary art allud-
ing to the temple for Pallas Athena in Athens as a democratic symbol2 decked with
censored books, was installed next to the Fridericianum, the first public museum
building on the European Continent from the eighteenth century, and one that
is oriented architectonically toward Greek antiquity. Standing next to each other
stimulated the visitor’s comparative view. The architectonic pillars-and-pediment
structure is the tertium comparationis of these two buildings, which in this constella-
tion, both turn out to be imitations of an antique ideal—but imitations originating
in different times: the eighteenth century and our contemporary time. The act of
comparing, executed with the viewer’s body presence together with both the com-
parata, produces by this means new relations between past, present, and future.
These temporal dimensions are the topic of this chapter. Let me make a few
brief preliminary remarks about what it means to examine practices of comparing
with respect to curatorial practices at exhibitions. The phenomenon of changing
temporary exhibitions demonstrates what the art historian Felix Thürlemann con-
tended about pictures in general: “they are more than one image.”3 This statement
2 Marta Minujín, The Parthenon of Books, 2017, Installation. Kassel, Friedrichsplatz, documenta
14. The Parthenon of censored books was placed at the Friedrichsplatz where the National
Socialists burned books on May 19, 1933.
3 Felix Thürlemann, Mehr als ein Bild. Für eine Kunstgeschichte des hyperimage, München 2013.
Thürlemann brings up the concept of the hyperimage that is also useful for research on ex-
hibitions: “Mit hyperimagewird eine kalkulierte Zusammenstellung von ausgewählten Bildobjek-
ten – Gemälden, Zeichnungen, Fotografien und Skulpturen – zu einer neuen, übergreifenden Einheit
bezeichnet. Der Begriff verweist auf verschiedene Arten des Zusammenspiels von Bildern, wie sie bei
der Präsentation von Kunstwerken in Museen und Ausstellungen, bei der Projektion im Unterricht,
aber auch im Layout von Bildbänden beobachtet werden können” (7). As an amplification to Thür-
lemann’s concept of the hyperimage, practices of comparing open up the possibility of also
looking at those aspects that are cropped and cut down through combining or linking two or
more pictures. Furthermore, practices of comparing do not just concentrate on the intended
meaning by the acteur–curator but are also sensitive for the meanings that occur coinciden-
tally in a specific context. For the hyperimage, see also: Felix Thürlemann, Vom Einzelbild
zumhyperimage. Eine neueHerausforderung für die kunsthistorischeHermeneutik, in: Gerd
Blum et al. (eds.), Pendant Plus, Berlin 2012, 23–46; David Ganz/Felix Thürlemann (eds.), Das
Bild im Plural. Mehrteilige Bildformen zwischen Mittelalter und Gegenwart, Berlin 2010.
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is surprising if one considers how much the definition of modern art is based on
the idea of autonomy, that is, on the independence and self-referentiality of the
individual work. However, every exhibition is, in fact, per se a site of comparing of
multiple works of art. It is therefore a contradictory act when modern art is deeply
connected with the temporal exhibition that is, in itself, a modern medium.4 The
characteristic quality of exhibitions of art is the interaction of different times in
a performative mode.5 On the level of the artworks, there is a clash between the
different times of their origins, but also of the times they depict, and, not least,
the multiple times of their reception.6 But the exhibition transforms these differ-
ent kinds of temporalities into a new logic of time: First, there is the overall quality
of presence through which the exhibition brings all these different times toward
a contemporaneity of presence for the experience of the beholder. The presence is
emphasized even more through the ephemeral character of the so-called temporal
exhibition. But, furthermore, the exhibition forms and produces the temporality of
the presented artworks: The pieces of art are not shown separated on their own,
but in special constellations and displays to initiate a comparative viewing by the
4 One of the many “births” of the temporary exhibition is the so-called “Salon” in Paris, the
exhibition of the Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture held regularly every year or
every second year from 1737 onward. The “Salon” was open to the public and showed the
contemporary art of the members of the academy. See Anja Weisenseel, Bildbetrachtung in
Bewegung. Der Rezipient in Texten und Bildern zur Pariser Salonausstellung des 18. Jahrhunderts
(Ars et Scientia. Schriften zur Kunstwissenschaft, vol. 14), Berlin/Boston 2017, 10.
5 Cf. Beatrice von Bismarck, Der Teufel trägt Geschichtlichkeit oder Im Look der Provoka-
tion: When Attitudes become Form, Bern 1969/Venice 2013, in: Eva Kernbauer (ed.), Kunst-
geschichtlichkeit. Historizität und Anachronie in der Gegenwartskunst, Paderborn 2015, 233–248,
see 234; Beatrice von Bismarck, The Exhibition as Collective, in: Kai-UweHemken (ed.), Kritis-
che Szenografie. Die Kunstausstellung im21. Jahrhundert, Bielefeld 2015, 185–199, see 186. See for
the question of the special quality of time in exhibitions: Beatrice von Bismarck et al. (eds.),
Timing. On the Temporal Dimension of Exhibiting (Cultures of the Curatorial, vol. 2), Berlin 2014.
See further: Krzysztof Pomian, L’Ordre du temps, Paris 1984.
6 See for the differentiation between the multiple temporalities of pictures, especially be-
tween the time of the depiction and the depicted time: Heinrich Theissing, Die Zeit im Bild,
Darmstadt 1987; Gottfried Boehm, Bild und Zeit, in: Hannelore Paflik (ed.): Das Phänomen
Zeit in Kunst und Wissenschaft, Weinheim 1987, 1–24; Götz Pochat, Bild – Zeit. Zeitgestalt und
Erzählstruktur in der bildenden Kunst von den Anfängen bis zur frühen Neuzeit, Wien 1996. For
the reception-esthetic temporality of pictures, see Johannes Grave, Der Akt des Bildbe-
trachtens. Überlegungen zur rezeptionsästhetischen Temporalität des Bildes, in: Michael
Gamper/Helmut Hühn (eds.), Zeit der Darstellung. Ästhetische Eigenzeiten in Kunst, Literatur
und Wissenschaft, Hannover 2014, 51–72; Johannes Grave, Form, Struktur und Zeit. Bildliche
Formkonstellationen und ihre rezeptionsästhetische Temporalität, in: Michael Gamper/Eva
Geulen/Johannes Grave et al. (eds.), Zeit der Form – Formen der Zeit (Ästhetische Eigenzeiten,
vol. 2), Hannover 2016, 139–162.
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beholder.7 This transforms the specific temporality of a work of art and super-
imposes a new temporality produced through curatorial practices of comparing.8
Hanging one piece of art next to another (or more) leads the beholder to compare
between them. The comparison between two (or more) comparata produces one or
more tertium comparationis: If there is one landscape hanging next to another, the
genre landscape will be the aspect of similarity. On the basis of this similarity, the
tertium comparationis highlighted by the comparison could be, for example, the color
scheme, the brushwork, or a compositional element. If one of these landscapes is
hung next to a completely different painting, the aspect being emphasized will also
change. To bring it to the point, curatorial practices of comparing within exhibi-
tions shift those features and qualities of a piece of art that are highlighted. To
put it even more strongly, the highlighted qualities are not essential parts of the
pieces of art, but are produced through the act of comparing.9 Here, the perfor-
mative modus of the exhibition becomes connected with the performative modus
of comparing.
Curatorial practices, such as the selection of works of art and the form of
their presentation, createmicrosituations of comparing between different pieces of
art in individual exhibition rooms.10 Every exhibition accordingly initiates spaces
of potential comparative viewing. The curatorial practices of comparing empha-
size particular characteristics of the comparata; others recede into the background.
Therefore, the qualities of a work of art can shift depending on which artwork it
is being compared to in which situational context. Curatorial practices that stim-
ulate the viewer to look comparatively are a strategy with which to generate visual
evidence.11 Exemplary research studies have shown that every exhibition draws out
a specific interpretation of, for example, an artist’s oeuvre, an art movement, or a
7 Beatrice von Bismarck therefore emphasizes the need to look at an exhibition as a “collective”
that consists of a continuous change of relations between the constellations of the works of
art and the beholders. Von Bismarck, The Exhibition as a Collective, 186.
8 For the shifting temporal effect with regard to the practices of comparing pictures, see Jo-
hannes Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis. Vorüberlegungen zu einer praxistheoretisch orien-
tierten Untersuchung von Vergleichen, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt
beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 135–159, esp. 150.
9 For the manipulating quality of practices of comparing, see Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart,
Die Welt beobachten – Praktiken des Vergleichens, in: Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.):
Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2015, 7–34, esp. 15.
10 These microsituations are examined exemplarily to determine the way the exhibition bears
its meaning: through not only curatorial intention but also situational and material perfor-
mative coincidences.
11 See Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis, 138.
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style; and, of course, of a historical epoch such as modernism.12 Curatorial prac-
tices of comparing produce specific significations and hierarchizations by showing
a particular narration of history or art history—namely, by means of a chosen re-
lationship between past, present, and future. Thus, practices of comparing sug-
gest attributes such as “before” and “after,” even though everything that we see at
an exhibition is present to the same degree. These temporal comparisons play an
important role in exhibitions dealing with a genealogy of a special time such as
modernism.13 They help to mediate the underlying historiographic concept of the
exhibition. Values are attached to these categories of “before” and “after” that may
cater to specific political ideologies.14 However, as practices of comparing at exhibi-
tions, most of the time these power-laden values remain unspoken and suggestive.
My intent throughout, though, is to see how exhibitions come upwith their own
diverging definitions of modern art and their own definitions of the genealogies
of modern art through curatorial practices of temporal comparing. I shall focus
on the exhibition Cubism and Abstract Art held in the Museum of Modern Art in
New York in 1936. I shall also return to documenta, but then to the first one in 1955.
Both exhibitions deal with the concept of abstraction that is proposed to be the
teleological quality of modernism. To argue for the development of abstraction as
a modernist indicator, the artworks have to be compared to pieces of art that follow
a figurative, respectively mimetic mode of depiction.Whereas both exhibitions are
widely recognized as examples for a formalistic view on artworks and developments
in art history, I shall show that they use completely different practices of comparing
to point out these formal issues.
The dichotomy between abstraction and figuration or, respectively, a mimetic
mode of depiction is often connected with twentieth-century visual art.15 Most of
the time, these representational conventions are assigned very unidimensionally to
12 See Hubert Locher, Die Kunst des Ausstellens. Anmerkungen zu einem unübersichtlichen
Diskurs, in: Hans D. Huber/Hubert Locher/Karin Schulte (eds.), Kunst des Ausstellens. Beiträge,
Statements, Diskussionen, Ostfildern-Ruit 2002, 15–30, see 18-19.
13 In this chapter, the concept ofmodernism is taken as an ever-changing constructiondrivenby,
for example, practices of comparingwithin exhibitions. For a similar definition ofmodernism,
see Katja Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen. Zur Transformation des Kunstbegriffs
auf der Documenta 11, Bielefeld 2013, 71.
14 For an understanding of the exhibition as a “political ritual” in modern democratic soci-
eties, see Dorothea von Hantelmann/Carolin Meister, Einleitung, in: Dorothea von Hantel-
mann/CarolinMeister (eds.),Die Ausstellung. Politik eines Rituals, Zürich/Berlin 2010, 7–18, see
8-9.
15 See Serge Guilbeut,Wie New York die Idee der Modernen Kunst gestohlen hat. Abstrakter Expres-
sionismus, Freiheit und Kalter Krieg [1983], Dresden 1997; Christine Lindlay, Art in the Cold War.
From Vladivostok to Kalamazoo, 1945–1962, London 1990. The concept of abstraction is inter-
preted in many different ways with regard to its pictorial relation to the world and its histor-
ical classification. See Gottfried Boehm, Abstraktion und Realität. Zum Verhältnis von Kunst
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political systems or ideologies: abstraction to theWest, which flirts with aesthetical
and political autonomy; figuration to the East, which uses art for explicit political
purposes. But there are also some temporal references that can be assigned to the
mode of the mimetic and the nonmimetic depiction. In image theory, the temporal
characteristics of abstraction and figuration are based primarily on what Sebastian
Egenhofer has set forth as “an artwork’s relationship with the world,”16 which is
assumed to have changed during modernism. According to him, the model of the
representational image—an image that depicts something according to the prin-
ciple of resemblance and follows a mimetic modus—always refers to a past world,
to an original image (an Urbild) that is conceived as anteceding it, even when that
image is a product of the imagination.17 This concept is based on resemblance, on
referentiality, and it is therefore connected with a temporality of the past, because
the image shows something that was “before itself.” Egenhofer argues that because
of their nonmimetic mode, works of abstraction do not refer to some antecedent.
Instead, they are situated solely within the context of the world beyond the image.
They participate only within the context of a continually changing “outside” that
makes the abstract work of art always refer to the future.18 Egenhofer’s argument
with regard to the theory of images is that the representational, referential work of
figuration stays linked to the past, whereas the abstract work, at any point, makes
reference to the future. Following on from these theoretical assumptions with re-
gard to the temporal structure of the image, this chapter will show that abstraction
and figuration can be seen as indicators of the temporal qualities of the construc-
tion of (art-)historiographical models of modernism. Abstraction and figuration
are relational qualities, as is the concept of modernism on the whole, that are con-
structed through practices of comparing. Hence, this chapter links an examination
of comparative practices with questions of temporality, assuming that exhibitions
always relate different times to each other in a complex way. In the development
and realization of these (potential) time references, practices of comparing are of
particular importance.The chapter asks about the importance of comparative cura-
torial practices for the accentuation of temporal references by examining the emer-
gence of modernism concepts in two exemplary exhibitions.
Within the Collaborative Research Center “Practices of Comparing”, we are ex-
amining different but connected lines of change in practices of comparing: alter-
ations to which these practices are subjected, as well as alterations that trigger
them. We ask, on the one hand, how practices of comparing change; and on the
und Kunstphilosophie in der Moderne [1990], in: Gottfried Boehm, Die Sichtbarkeit der Zeit.
Studien zum Bild in der Moderne, ed. by Ralph Ubl, Paderborn 2017, 173–185.
16 Sebastian Egenhofer, Abstraktion, Kapitalismus, Subjektivität. Die Wahrheitsfunktion des Werks
in der Moderne, München 2008, 13 (“Weltverhältnis des Werks”).
17 Cf. Egenhofer, Abstraktion, 13.
18 Egenhofer, Abstraktion, 11–12.
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other hand, how alterations in these practices of comparing bring about histor-
ical change. Transferred to exhibitions, this means, to inquire into how compar-
ing in the form of curatorial practices changes over the course of history, more
specifically, what different kinds of comparisons are produced. With regard to the
twentieth century, I shall compare curatorial comparisons by isolating and analyz-
ing some exemplary microsituations of comparing from exhibitions. Thus, I can
demonstrate that, historically, differing comparison aspects were employed to ne-
gotiate a forced distinction between abstraction and figuration in order to declare
a concept of modernism.19 Thereby, in the following, I shall show that figuration
and abstraction are not fixed and are not essential qualities of works of art, but are
produced through practices of comparing within exhibitions.
Comparing is a practice that has to be performed.20 In the following, I shall
therefore show that curatorial practices of comparing are not fully controllable,
despite their great interest in highlighting a particular reading of abstraction and
modernism.21The specific narration that curators intend for their exhibition is fre-
quently underscored in the exhibition’s paratexts.22 I denote as paratexts all state-
ments published before or during the exhibition, but foremost, also all exhibition
texts or didactical signs within the exhibition. These paratexts also introduce ver-
bal and visual comparisons—for example, by placing two reproduced pictures side
by side. All the visual comparisons are framed verbally within these paratexts. If
those comparisons are then transferred to the exhibition—often on the basis of
the same compared pieces of art—those comparisons frequently seem to contra-
dict the prescribed reading: The comparison does not work out in the same way
as it did in the medium of language. With the materiality and size of the work of
art as well as with real space, resistances emerge. In “real space,” two juxtaposed
works of art suddenly suggest different aspects of comparison. When the viewer
performs the comparative view at the exhibition, her or his bodily participation, the
very physical presence of the works, and their presentation produce within their
spatial situation something new and unintended that may even run counter to the
original idea. Then the exhibition becomes not only an indicator but also a factor
of historical change—and practices of comparing, as I shall show, are fundamental
in this.
19 For practices of comparing as a mode of constructing a genealogy of modernism, see also
Epple/Erhart, Die Welt beobachten, 27–28.
20 Cf. Epple/Erhart, Die Welt beobachten, 19; Grave, Vergleichen als Praxis, 152.
21 For the aspect of performance of exhibitions, see von Bismarck, The Exhibition as Collective,
198.
22 For the concept of the paratext, see Gérard Genette, Paratexte. Das Buch vomBeiwerk des Buches
[French Original 1987], Frankfurt a. M. 1989.
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II. Abstraction by comparing motifs: Cubism and Abstract Art
In 1936, the founding director of the Museum of Modern Art, Alfred H. Barr, orga-
nized the exhibition Cubism and Abstract Art displaying 400 works from the visual
arts including painting and sculpture but also graphic design, architecture, film,
and design.23 As Barr explained in the catalogue, the exhibition considered itself
to be a retrospective on “an important movement in modern art,”24 by which he
primarily meant a retrospective on abstraction, especially on abstract art in Eu-
rope descending from Cubism.25 Barr is widely known and criticized for having
laid down the formalist narration for western modernism:26 on the one side, in the
exhibition catalogue; on the other side, within the exhibition. I want to show that
there are some differences in the way this narration is told and presented. Barr
describes the historical derivation of abstraction in the catalogue as follows:
“Sometimes in the history of art it is possible to describe a period or a generation
of artists as having been obsessed by a particular problem. The artists of the early
fifteenth century for instance were moved by a passion for imitating nature”.27
That which is depictable, the dictum of similitude, which Barr pointed out here for
Renaissance art, is therewith based on the modus of referentiality. The image is,
when recalling Egenhofer’s remarks on temporality and image theory, related back
to a preceding Urbild, if not to nature itself. This means that the depicting image is
23 The exhibition was held fromMarch 2 to April 19, 1936 and was shown afterward in San Fran-
cisco, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, Cleveland, Baltimore, Providence, and Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan. See the exhibition catalogue: AlfredH. Barr (ed.), Cubism andAbstract Art. Painting, Sculp-
ture, Constructions, Photography, Architecture, Industrial Art, Theatre, Films, Posters, Typography,
New York 1936. For Barr’s curatorial work, see Sybil Gordon Kantor, Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the
Intellectual Origins of the Museum of Modern Art, Massachusetts 2002. The display of the exhi-
bition Cubism and Abstract Art is examined in Mary Anne Staniszewski, The Power of Display. A
History of Exhibition Installations at the Museum of Modern Art, London 1998, 60–83.
24 Alfred H. Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 9.
25 For this indication, see Susan Noyes Platt, Modernism, Formalism, and Politics: The “Cubism
and Abstract Art” Exhibition of 1936 at TheMuseum ofModern Art, in: Art Journal 47 (4/1988),
284–295, see 284: “Cubism andAbstract Art [...] established Cubism as the central issue of early
modernism, abstraction as the goal.” In 1927, Barr also organized an exhibition entitled Pro-
gressive Modern Painting from Daumier and Corot to Post Cubism at Wellesley that highlighted
the development of Cubism out of nineteenth-century art. See Platt, Modernism, Formalism,
and Politics, 287. See also Leah Dickerman, Abstraction in 1936: Cubism and Abstract Art at
the Museum of Modern Art, in: Leah Dickerman (ed.), Inventing Abstraction 1910–1925: how a
radical idea changed modern art, London 2012, 364–369, here 364.
26 See, e.g., William J. T. Mitchell, Picture Theory. Essays on Verbal and Visual Representations,
Chicago/London 1994, 231–236; BenjaminH. D. Buchloh, From Faktura to Factography, in: An-
nette Michelson et al. (eds.), October: The First Decade, 1976–1986, Cambridge 1987, 77–113.
27 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 11.
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implicitly conveyed as being connected to the past. The art of modernism operates
entirely differently, according to Barr’s implicit argumentative comparison:
“In the early twentieth century the dominant interest was almost exactly the op-
posite. The pictorial conquest of the external visual world had been completed
and refined many times and in different ways during the previous half millen-
nium. The more adventurous and original artists had grown bored with painting
facts. By a common and powerful impulse they were driven to abandon the imi-
tation of natural appearance”.28
For Barr, modern art, consequently, negated the generation of likeness, and def-
initely did not refer to something antecedent to itself: It is claimed to be non-
mimetic. Hence an immanent vector in the direction of the future enters into
modern art, which Barr equates with abstraction. He therefore also proposes a
definition of abstraction that emphasizes the nonreferentiality and concreteness
of the picture: “For an ‘abstract’ painting is really a most positively concrete paint-
ing since it confines the attention to its immediate, sensuous, physical surface far
more than does the canvas of a sunset or a portrait.”29 These statements are the
reason why Barr has been recognized as a formalist: He proposed modernism in a
“proto-Greenbergian language”30 only by reference to formal issues. But, as I shall
show, Barr’s formalismwas thus constructed through practices of comparing based
on the aspect of similarity as the mimetic motif. Only through the comparison of
several mimetic motifs could he point to the abstraction he wanted to assume on
the formal level.
Barr’s idea of the development of modern art in the form of a teleological his-
tory of progress is translated specifically into a diagram that he designed and used
to adorn the catalogue’s front cover (Fig. 1).31This chart shows, from top to bottom,
the network and genesis of the individual “isms” of western modernism over the
last 45 years—namely, from 1890 to 1935, therefore, almost up to the present time
of the exhibition. Following the chart in the vertical direction, one gets to know,
for instance, that Neoimpressionism influences Cubism, which in turn, exerts an
influence on Constructivism, which ultimately ends in Geometrical Abstract Art.
The transitions are marked by arrows; non-Western influences are mentioned in
28 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 11.
29 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 11.
30 Kantor, Alfred H. Barr, Jr., 318.
31 See Astrit Schmidt-Burkhardt, Stammbäume der Kunst. Zur Genealogie der Avantgarde, Berlin
2005, 114–187. See also Hal Foster, Museum Tales of Twentieth-Century Art, in: Studies of Art
74 (2009), 253–375.
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Fig. 1: Alfred H. Barr, Cover of the exhibition catalogue ›Cubism
and Abstract Art‹, MoMA 1936. New York, Museum of Modern Art
(MoMA).
Offset, printed in color, 7 3/4 x 10 1/4’ (19.7 x 26 cm). The Museum of
Modern Art Library, New York. MA143.
red and framed in boxes, for instance, “Japanese prints” or “Negro sculpture.”32
Along the horizontal, these “isms” branch out into the division between “non-ge-
ometrical abstract art” and “geometrical abstract art.” The illustration ends with
this distinction at its lower edge for 1935; both these branches are the “main tradi-
tions of abstract art,”33 as Barr explains in the catalogue. According to him, both
32 There were also comparisons to non-European art within the exhibition when Barr juxta-
posed Picasso’s Dancer with an African sculpture. See Platt, Modernism, Formalism, and Pol-
itics, 284.
33 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 19.
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traditions find their origin in Impressionism. Nevertheless, one essential disparity
separates them that Barr emphasizes very strongly in the catalogue: Nongeomet-
ric abstract art works with organic forms, is emotional, decorative, and irrational,
whereas geometric abstract art is intellectual and structural. This distinction be-
comes very apparent in Barr’s diagram with the division of both parts occurring
at the latest in 1935. It is only in the foregoing years that some “isms” still seem
to be changing allegiances. The art historian Julia Voss has pointed out that Barr’s
model for an evolving history of modern art resembles the evolution diagram of
On the Origin of Species from 1859 by the natural scientist Charles Darwin.34 She
emphasizes that there is one important difference, though: In Barr’s diagram, the
“losers” and those influences external to art would remain invisible. According to
Voss, his model presents art history as an autonomous process of development.35
Furthermore all the arrows point in only one direction: into the future, and the
future is abstraction.36 Voss argues that coincidence and environment, two factors
that were of great importance to Darwin, are not indicated by Barr—they simply
do not figure at all.37
Right at the beginning of the catalogue and in Barr’s introductory text, there is
an invitation to perform comparative viewing (Fig. 2).38 There is a juxtaposition of
two reproductions of posters for the World Press Exhibition (Weltpresseausstellung)
held in Cologne in 1928.The figures in this case are not equally large.These illustra-
tions are literally “trimmed” for the purpose of the comparison and are reproduced
in the catalogue’s uniform black-and-white print at the same horizontal level.Their
placement side by side makes common aspects stand out: In both instances, they
are posters from the exhibition in Cologne in 1928; so, a contemporaneity does
34 See Julia Voss,Wer schreibt Kunstgeschichte? Kritik, Kunstwissenschaft, Markt undMuseum,
in: Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 78 (2015), 16–31, see 18. For a discussion of Barr’s diagram,
see also Charlotte Klonk, Spaces of Experience. Art Gallery Interiors from 1800 to 2000, New
Haven/London 2009, 135–141; Glenn D. Lowry, Abstraction in 1936: Barr’s Diagrams, in: Leah
Dickerman (ed.), Inventing Abstraction 1910–1925: how a radical idea changed modern art, Lon-
don 2012, 359–363, see 361; Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, 95; Marcia Bren-
nan, Curating Consciousness. Mysticism and the Modern Museum, London 2010, 30–57; Mitchell,
Picture Theory, 231–235. For the development of Barr’s diagram and its relation to other art
historiographical models, see Astrit Schmidt-Burkhardt, Shaping Modernism. Alfred Barr’s
genealogy of art, in:Word & Image 16 (4/2000), 387–400.
35 Cf. Voss, Wer schreibt Kunstgeschichte?, 19.
36 For the naturalizingmodus of Barr’s diagram, see also Katja Hoffmann, Ausstellungen alsWis-
sensordnungen, 101; Eward R. Tufte, Beautiful Evidence, Ceshire 2006, 67.
37 Cf. Voss, Wer schreibt Kunstgeschichte?, 19–21. See also the critique of the complete separa-
tion of figuration and abstraction by the art historianMeyer Schapiro in his article TheNature
of Abstract Art, in:Marxist Quarterly 1 (1/1937), 78–97. See also Platt, Modernism, Formalism,
and Politics, 292.
38 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 10, figs. 1 and 2.
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Fig. 2: Illustration in ›Cubism and Abstract Art. Painting, Sculp-
ture, Constructions, Photography, Architecture, Industrial Art,
Theatre, Films, Posters, Typography‹, ed. by Alfred H. Barr, New
York 1936, 10.
exist. In both instances, we see the Cologne Cathedral, the River Rhine, the Ho-
henzollern Bridge, and the tower on the exhibition grounds. However, in one case,
the cathedral is visible on the left-hand side; and in the other, on the right-hand
side; the poster on the right is a plan view. The tertium produced here by the juxta-
positioning of the pictures is a motif, in this case, Cologne Cathedral. It is only on
the basis of this common theme, the motif, that the difference in the formalistic
manners of depiction becomes obvious. Furthermore, the arrangement provokes a
before-and-after sequence, that is, a temporal order: On the left-hand side of the
page, there is figuration; on the right-hand side, abstraction. Barr’s text on this
page then points out the underlying ideologies and their modification in changing
times:39
“Whywere two posters published andwhy do they differ in style? Because onewas
designed for theAnglo-Americanpublic, the other for theGermanpublic. In 1928 it
was thought that Americans, accustomed to an over-crowded and banally realistic
style, would not appreciate the simplicity and abstraction of the right hand poster.
39 For Barr’s shifting opinion toward abstraction in connectionwith the empowerment of the to-
talitarian politics through Stalinism and the National Socialists that he experienced through
his visit to Germany in 1932–1933, see Platt, Modernism, Formalism, and Politics, 289.
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The German public, on the contrary, through the activity of its museums and pro-
gressive commercial artists was quite used to an abstract style. Today times have
changed. The style of the abstract poster, which is just beginning to interest our
American advertisers, is now discouraged in Germany.”40
The emphasis on the manner of depiction, Barrs’s formalistic argument for ab-
straction, succeeds in this comparison only because of the presence of a common
mimetic motif.Thus, ultimately, it works on the basis of the recognitional gaze and
a correlation back to an antecedent in nature. The referentiality of the depiction is
at the very forefront. Thus, it is the comparing aspect of mimetic figuration that
creates a basis of similarity for a notion of abstraction that is so meaningful for
Barr’s formalist narration of the genealogy of modernism.
It is interesting now to look at how this aspect of comparison is applied in
curatorial practices within the exhibition space in theMuseum ofModern Art. Barr
hung paintings together with architectural models, furniture, and graphic prints in
uniformly whitewashed exhibition rooms. Brian O’Doherty coined the term “white
cube” for this form of white and “clean” exhibition room that emerged in the 1920s
and prevailed throughout the 20th century.41 The white cube plays a decisive role
in the inquiry into the practices of comparing and their temporal dimension.
“Unshadowed, white, clean, artificial—the space is devoted to the technology of
aesthetics. Works of art are mounted, hung, scattered for study. Their ungrubby
surfaces are untouched by time and its vicissitudes. Art exists in a kind of eternity
of display, and though there is lots of “period” (late modern), there is no time.
This eternity gives the gallery a limbolike status; one has to have died already to
be there.”42
According to O’Doherty, the white, closed gallery space is so neutralizing that even
the changing times are shut out. But precisely this neutrality makes the act of
comparing much more effective, and the same applies to the difference between
the “before” and “after.”
However, the arrangements on the walls do not illustrate the development that
Barr delineates in his diagram. Barr placed the “isms” into their own separate ex-
hibition rooms: There is, for example, one room with “De Stijl and Neo-Plasticism”
(Fig.3) and a room displaying analytical “Cubism” (Fig. 4). This practice of sepa-
rating the “isms” prevents a direct comparative viewing of the difference between
mimetic and nonmimetic pictures from the physical standpoint of the visitor inside
40 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 10.
41 BrianO’Doherty, Inside theWhiteCube [Original inArtforum 1976], introd. by ThomasMcEvilley,
Santa Monica/San Francisco 1999. See also Jérome Glicenstein, L’Art: une histoire d’expositions,
Paris 2009, 29–37.
42 O’Doherty, Inside the White Cube, 15.
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Fig. 3: Installation view of the exhibition ›Cubism and Abstract
Art‹. MoMA, NY, March 2, 1936 – April 19, 1936. New York, Mu-
seum of Modern Art (MoMA).
Photographic Archive. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New
York. Acc. n.: IN46.11B.
one room. Because the “isms” are presented in separate rooms from one another,
the disparity between nongeometrical and geometric abstract art does not moti-
vate their critical comparison. Instead, the aspect of comparison relates either to a
motif or to the manner of depiction. Furthermore, the separation suggests a com-
parison between nearly synchronic works of art: The development of abstraction is
recognizable only through a comparison between the different rooms and “isms.”
As I shall show, this partitioning of comparative aspects carries its own message.
Those spaces working with geometrical forms are represented as nonmimetic and
therefore nonreferential (Fig. 3).The room displaying works byTheo van Doesburg,
Georges Vantongerloo, and others prompts the comparative gaze to see what is
common among their formalistic manners of depiction. As a result, the comparative
view emphasizes the abstract manner of all shown paintings here on a formalis-
tic level. There is no referentiality to a precedent natural form: Thus, remembering
Egenhofer’s image-theoretical arguments, there is no longer any connection to the
past. By means of this comparison, Barr promotes geometrical abstraction as the
pictorial modus of the present and, what is more, of the future.
This alludes to the differentiation between “pure-abstraction” and “near-ab-
stractions” Barr explained within the catalogue. “Pure-abstraction,” as in the paint-
ings in this room, “has absolutely no dependence upon natural forms. It is purely
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Fig. 4: Installation view of the exhibition ›Cubism and Abstract
Art‹. MoMA, NY, March 2, 1936 – April 19, 1936.
Gelatin silver print, 5 x 7” (12.7 x 17.7 cm). Photographer: Beaumont
Newhall (copyright: The Museum of Modern Art, NY) Photographic
Archive. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New York. Object
Number: IN46.2. New York, Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).
abstract in its genesis as well as in its final form.”43 In a comment from 1925, Barr
emphasizes the impossibility of comparing motifs within artworks of the modern
era: “If all artists painted or drew Madonnas as they once did, how conveniently
we could compare them—but they don’t.”44 On the contrary, this is the case in a
room containing works by Georges Braque and Pablo Picasso in which the human
face, if not the whole body, becomes the basis of similarity that enables the act
of comparing (Fig. 4). This means that, here again, the comparison is drawing to
the forefront a motif and a reference external to the image. Barr refers to this ef-
fect in his catalogue text with the concept of “near-abstractions” that he defines as
“compositions in which the artist, starting with natural forms, transforms them
into abstract or nearly abstract forms. He approaches an abstract goal but does not
quite reach it.”45 To conclude, there is, in Barr’s opinion, a qualitatively hierarchized
development in abstraction in itself: from the “near-abstractions” up to the “pure
abstraction.” Barr emphasizes these hierarchized values of abstraction within the
43 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 12.
44 Cited by Platt, Modernism, Formalism, and Politics, 286. She gives the following reference
(293): “The Museum of Modern Art Archives: Alfred Hamilton Barr, Jr., Papers, unlabeled lec-
ture notes for seminar report (dated on internal evidence to Spring 1925).”
45 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 12–13.
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exhibition by practices of comparing, thereby separating these twomodes of depic-
tion.The result is mimetic and nonmimetic pictures in one exhibition dealing with
the development of abstraction. There would have been an entirely different effect
if a work by Picasso were to have been hung next to a composition by van Doesburg:
Then the attention would not have been attracted to a still depictive motif via the
tertium. Considered from the perspective of image theory, Barr’s hanging arrange-
ment and the comparative aspects produced by it summoned the past by reference
to antecedent nature for the “near-abstractions” so that they are understood as a
step toward the final “pure-abstraction.”
Looking at the exhibition display, it is striking that although Barr placed ab-
straction on the highest rung of his teleological history of progress, the actual dis-
play largely denied it. His use of curatorial practices of comparing emphasized the
figurativemotif very strongly as the aspect of similarity that provoked the compari-
son.This contradicts the propositionmade in the exhibition catalogue that modern
art is no longer about imitation and therefore no longer connected to antecedent
past. This contradiction was exacerbated by the situational context of the exhibi-
tion space. The material presence of the artworks and the real space operate as
factors in the act of comparing that can counteract the intended meaning. When,
in the act of comparing, the material or “real space” resists the intended aim, the
extent to which modernism is constructed becomes apparent.The comparisons af-
forded by the exhibition space literally outbid the imitation theory, respectively the
mimetic quality, of the picture by presenting a comparison motif in “real space.”
Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase (1912) was, in fact, hung next to a real
stairway, again guiding a viewer’s attention to the motif of the steps as a tertium
(Fig. 5).46 Here again, the formalistic manner is not emphasized through the act of
comparing.
A similarly motif-weighted aspect of figurative comparison was produced with
an artwork by Malevich that was Barr’s example for “pure-abstraction” that “con-
fines the attention to its immediate, sensuous, physical surface” and not to the
representation of a motif. “Pure-abstraction” is, in Barr’s opinion, nonreferential
and therefore connected with the future, not with the past. But a different under-
standing occurs within the exhibition room because of the practices of comparing:
Malevich’s Suprematist Composition: white on white (1918) was presented between two
blinded windows covered in white cardboard (Fig. 6).47
46 For this display, see also Brennan, Curating Consciousness, 33–40.
47 Kazimir Malevich, Suprematist Composition: white on white, 1918, oil on canvas, 80 x 80 cm.
Lent anonymously. Platt also refers to the striking display of Malevich’s artwork describing
that this juxtaposition “underscored its inherent elegance.” Platt, Modernism, Formalism,
and Politics, 285.
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Fig. 5: Installation view of the exhibition ›Cubism and Abstract
Art‹. MoMA, NY, March 2, 1936 – April 19, 1936.
Gelatin silver print,4 1/2 x 6 1/2” (11.4 x 16.5 cm). Photographer:
Beaumont Newhall (copyright: The Museum of Modern Art, NY).
Photographic Archive. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New
York. Object Number: IN46.22A. New York, Museum of Modern Art
(MoMA).
Comparative viewing highlights the aspect of the motif of the window. Again,
it is the aspect of figuration that brings up the idea of abstraction that is, therefore,
bound back to the past. In the history of art since Leon Battista Alberti’s treatise
on painting, the window is a theme that opens the eye to illusionistic spatial depth
and therefore exemplarily stands for the model of likeness.48 In this situation, it
was assigned double significance: not only as a motif but also semantically. It un-
derscored one more time that the comparisons prompted by the exhibition placed
the motif of the window and therefore the referentiality at the focus of attention.49
The formalistic manner of depiction, in contrast—which, of course, constitutes the
decisive criterion for abstraction and its specific temporality—was less prominent.
This also becomes evident in a central juxtapositioning of two works by Picasso
at opposite ends of an exhibition room (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8).
48 Leon Battista Alberti, Della Pittura – Über die Malkunst, ed. by Oskar Bätschmann/Sandra Gi-
anfreda, Darmstadt 2007, 93.
49 Nonetheless, it is striking that the image of the opaque window corresponds with the norms
of formalism because it does not present anything else but itself.
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Fig. 6: Installation view of the exhibition ›Cubism and Abstract
Art‹. MoMA, NY, March 2, 1936 – April 19, 1936.
Gelatin silver print, 4 1/2 x 6” (11.4 x 15.2 cm). Photographer: Beau-
mont Newhall (copyright: The Museum of Modern Art, New York).
Photographic Archive. The Museum of Modern Art Archives, New
York. Object Number: IN46.36B. New York, Museum of Modern Art
(MoMA).
Both paintings depict the scene of a painter and his model.50 The choice of the
topic on its own, “painter and model,” already elicits the reference to an antecedent
likeness. Here, too, the figuratively recognizable motif is the tertium uniting the
two comparata. However, in this case, the viewer is notably compelled to stand in
the space between the pictures and thus to occupy the external space personally.
The thesis advanced in the catalogue that modern art is gradually detaching itself
from any mimetic referentiality to preexisting nature is contradicted by the situa-
tions of comparison set in the exhibition by the arrangements of the works of art
and the spatial interplay with the visitor’s body. By separating the “isms,” Barr also
splits the tertia—on one side, the motif; on the other side, the formalistic man-
ner—to provoke the temporal experience of the development of art up to “pure-
abstract” geometric art. The temporal comparison that results in the understand-
ing of an evolution does not take place within one display or room, but between the
separated “isms” and their highlighted mimetic or nonmimetic manner. “Stylistic
50 See Platt, Modernism, Formalism, and Politics, 285. Pablo Picasso, The Studio, 1928, oil on
canvas, 59 cm x 84 cm. New York, Museum of Modern Art, Gift of Walter P. Chrysler Jr.; Pablo
Picasso, The Painter and His Model, 1928, oil on canvas, 130.2 x 97.2 cm. New York, Collection
Sidney Janis.
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Figs. 7 and 8: Installation view of the exhibition ›Cubism and Abstract Art‹. MoMA, NY,
March 2, 1936 – April 19, 1936.
(Fig. 7) Gelatin silver print,4 4 1/2 x 6 1/2” (11.4 x 16.5 cm). Photographer: Beaumont Newhall
(copyright: The Museum of Modern Art, NY). Photographic Archive. The Museum of Modern
Art Archives, New York. Object Number: IN46.23. New York, Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).
(Fig. 8) Gelatin silver print,4 4 1/2 x 6 1/2” (11.4 x 16.5 cm). Photographer: Beaumont Newhall
(copyright: The Museum of Modern Art, NY). Photographic Archive. The Museum of Mod-
ern Art Archives, New York. Object Number: IN46.24A. New York, Museum of Modern Art
(MoMA).
developments”51 connected to modernism are thus presented on the back of the
tertium of a mimetic motif.
III. Abstraction by comparing formalistic issues: documenta I
Turning now to the practices of comparing at the first documenta, I shall show that
almost the same narration of modernism—a formalistic promotion of abstraction
as the art of the present day and, most of all, the future52—was fulfilled by a com-
pletely different manner of comparing. The documenta I bearing the title “Art of the
20th Century” was organized by Arnold Bode and Werner Haftmann in 1955 to be
presented in the heavily war-damaged Fridericianum in Kassel.53 Bode’s aimwas to
51 Platt, Modernism, Formalism, and Politics, 286.
52 Hoffmann therefore describes the concept of art underlying the documenta I as connected
closely to the discourse of modernism within the USA: “Zugleich positionierten sich die Kasseler
Kunstereignisse mit ihrer exklusiven Ausrichtung auf die Abstraktion als Antipode zum Sozialistis-
chen Realismus und flankierten damit eine insbesondere von der USA forcierte Kulturpolitik.” Hoff-
mann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, 72.
53 The exhibition took place from July 15 to September 18, 1955. For the first documenta, see Har-
ald Kimpel, Documenta. Mythos und Wirklichkeit, Köln 1997; Walter Grasskamp, documenta
– Die Kunst des XX. Jahrhunderts. Internationale Ausstellung im Museum Fridericianum in
Kassel. 15. Juli bis 18. September 1955, in: Bernd Klüser/Katharina Hegewisch (eds.),Die Kunst
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reconnect with the Europeanmodern art that the National Socialists had banned as
“degenerate”—and even to show its continuity within contemporary German art.54
Thus in 1955, the intention was also to take stock of contemporary art and to record
its development; but again, with regard to abstraction as the teleological quality of
modernist painting. Therefore, in his publication Painting in the Twentieth Century,
which was published in 1954, the art historianWerner Haftmann promoted the no-
tion that there had been a historical change within painting frommimetic painting
up to abstract painting:
“Modern painting is indeed the most striking expression of the universal process
by which one cultural epoch with a long history yields its place to another. It bears
witness to the decline of an old conception of reality and the emergence of a new
one. The view of the world that is being superseded today is that which was first
shaped by the early Florentine masters with their naïve enthusiasm for the con-
crete reality of the visible world, which they set out to define.”55
Here again, we remember Barr’s introductory text about the change from the
mimetic to the abstract picture of modernism. Haftmann also goes back to
Renaissance art to explain this shift. Haftmann, who was mainly in charge of
the selection of artworks in documenta I, was, like Barr, driven by a formalist
understanding of a teleological development in art history that aims toward
abstraction.56 The exhibition accordingly presented works of art from the most
important trends in twentieth-century European art such as Fauvism, Cubism,
and Expressionism.57 However, non-European art, socially engaged art, and figu-
rative art such as, for instance, the “Social Realism” prescribed by the East German
state (GDR), were left out.58 Against this backdrop, Werner Haftmann, who had
der Ausstellung. Eine Dokumentation dreißig exemplarischer Kunstausstellungen dieses Jahrhun-
derts, Frankfurt a. M./Leipzig 1991, 116–125.
54 This is the main thesis of the chapter “Coming to terms with the past” in: Harald Kimpel, doc-
umenta. Die Überschau. Fünf Jahrzehnte Weltkunstausstellung in Stichwörtern, Köln 2002, 11–26.
Walter Grasskamp also emphasizes the “comparison” (101, 113) as amain practice in this exhi-
bition with regard to narration of an ongoing modernism and narration of “German discon-
tinuity” (98). Walter Grasskamp, Die unbewältigte Moderne. Kunst und Öffentlichkeit,München
1989. See also Walter Grasskamp, documenta I 1955, in: Bernd Klüser/Katharina Hegewisch
(eds.), Die Kunst der Ausstellung. Eine Dokumentation dreißig exemplarischer Kunstausstellungen
dieses Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt a. M./Leipzig 1991, 116–125, see 117. Kurt Winkler, II. documenta
59 – Kunst nach 1945, in: Uwe M. Schneede (ed.), Stationen der Moderne. Die bedeutenden Kun-
stausstellungen des 20. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland, Berlin 1988, 426–473, see 427.
55 Werner Haftmann, Painting in the Twentieth Century [German Original 1954], London 1960, 10.
56 See Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, 76.
57 Cf. Charlotte Klonk, Die phantasmagorische Welt der ersten documenta und ihr Erbe,
in: Dorothea von Hantelmann/Carolin Meister (eds.), Die Ausstellung. Politik eines Rituals,
Zürich/Berlin 2010, 131–160, see 142.
58 Cf. Klonk, Die phantasmagorische Welt der ersten documenta und ihr Erbe, 142.
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assisted Bode in preparing the exhibition, wrote emphatically: “Now, for the first
time, we can compare how European countries are reacting to each other by their
present artistic expressions.”59 To show this, Haftmann and also Bode wanted to
focus on the manner of depiction, not on the motif.
For this formalist purpose, Bode set one artwork by an internationally
renowned artist next to one by a contemporary German artist in the central space
on the first floor of the Fridericianum: On the one forefront, he hung Picasso’s
work Girl before a Mirror; on the other, he installed Fritz Winter’s remittance work
Komposition vor Blau und Gelb at the opposite ends of the exhibition hall (Fig. 9 and
Fig. 10).60
Figs. 9 and 10 (following page): Installation view of the large painting
hall, Museum Fridericianum, documenta I (1955).
59 Werner Haftmann, Einleitung, in: Arnold Bode (ed.), documenta − Kunst des XX. Jahrhunderts.
Internationale Ausstellung imMuseum Fridericianum in Kassel, München 1955, 15–25, see 25.
60 Pablo Picasso, Girl before a Mirror, 1932, oil on canvas, 162.3 x 130.2 cm. New York, Museum of
Modern Art, Gift of Mrs. Simon Guggenheim. Fritz Winter, Komposition vor Blau und Gelb (title
today: Durchbrechendes Rot), 1955, 381 x 615 cm, oil on canvas. Wadersloh-Liesborn, Museum
Abtei Liesborn des Kreises Warendorf, Leihgabe Fritz-Winter-Haus, Ahlen. See for Winter’s
painting, Anna Rühl, Ausgewählt. Der neue Kernbestand der Fritz-Winter-Stiftung, in: Fritz
Winter. Ausgewählt. Kernbestand der Fritz-Winter-Stiftung, München 2018, 55–95, esp. 71–72.
For the confrontation of these two paintings, see Klonk, Die phantasmagorischeWelt der er-
sten documenta und ihr Erbe, 143; Klonk, Spaces of Experience, 179; Christian Spies, Fritz Win-
ter. Kontinuität und Experiment, in: Wilfried Utermann (ed.), Fritz Winter. Vom Bauhaus zur
Documenta, Dortmund 2018, 34–47, see 34.
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As had been the case with Picasso’s paintings at the exhibition on Cubism and
Abstract Art, the viewer stood between the two artworks, and this required an alter-
nating turn of the head and gaze. Moreover, the viewer was also placed between
twenty years of art history, the twenty years of fascism:61 Picasso’s work is from 1932
and Fritz Winter’s piece of art from 1954/55. Hence, Haftmann and Bode installed
a temporal comparison that functions on the basis of diachronism62 in contrast
to Barr’s temporal comparison that was based on what was nearly a synchronism
of the artworks. But to make this comparison possible within the Fridericianum,
something actually had to be done: The size of Winter’s painting had to be trimmed
20 cm on all four sides to realize the confrontation with Picasso at the front ends
of the great hall.63 Nevertheless, there was a huge difference within the size and
dimensions of these two confronted paintings: whereasWinter’s painting takes the
size of the whole wall, Picasso’s Girl before a Mirror is surrounded by much painted
wall space. But also the tertium of the comparison in Kassel is completely differ-
ent to the tertium of the motif in the exhibition Cubism and Abstract Art. Whereas
Picasso’s piece presents a girl in front of a mirror reflecting a completely blurry
image that is impossible to discern (Fig. 9); we see in Fritz Winter’s composition
61 Cf. Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, 79.
62 Cf. Hoffmann, Ausstellungen als Wissensordnungen, 78.
63 Cf. Iris Herpers, Fritz Winter, “Durchbrechendes Rot”. Restaurierung und Transport eines
großformatigen documenta I-Gemäldes, in: VDR-Beiträge zur Erhaltung von Kunst- und Kul-
turgut, Bonn 2011, 61–67, see 63. I thank Peter Gaida for the suggestion regarding these cir-
cumstances.
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a play of forms and colors that presents no likeness and thus subverts any refer-
entiality (Fig. 10). This comparison offers no similarity and no tertium on the level
of a motif. Instead, the tertium is on the level of formal issues such as colors and
linear forms. This comparison constructs the thesis of an augmenting rejection of
referentiality: The development of art aims teleologically toward abstraction. The
juxtapositioning with Picasso’s Girl before a Mirror detaches Winter’s composition
from any reference to antecedent nature, and hence presents it as pointing into the
future (a process ongoing since the early Avant-gardes of the twentieth century, a
progress that was destroyed by the Nazi regime).64The comparative gaze prompted
by Bode in this microsituation does not aim at the motif but at the manner of de-
piction, and is, in this case, even more formalistic than most of the comparisons
we can find in Barr’s Cubism and Abstract Art.
Looking at these two exhibitions, one can consider that they both follow the idea
of a teleological development of art that finds its aim in the abstract mode charac-
terizing modernism. Both exhibitions promote a linear development of art based
on the change in the formalistic manner. But a close look at the microsituations of
comparing within these two exhibitions reveals differences in the relational con-
struction of abstraction. Most of the comparative views initiated in Barr’s exhibi-
tion Cubism and Abstract Art are based on the figurative, still mimetic,motif. Beyond
that, most of the comparisons staged in this exhibition are synchronistic, because
they deal with comparata of more or less the same time.This is in direct contrast to
Bode’s and Haftmann’s use of the comparative view: They arrange diachronic com-
parata that bear formalistic tertia. Both exhibitions promote the western discourse
of modernism, but the narration of the development of art is shown via different
manners of temporal comparisons: In Cubism and Abstract Art, abstraction is bound
back to the past, whereas the first documenta evolves abstraction only around for-
malistic issues on the level of the present and the future. In both exhibitions, the
analyses of the practices of comparing disclose the construction of modernism and
abstraction as relational qualities.
But this relational quality often becomes naturalized through the practices of
comparing that are provoked within exhibitions: At the end of documenta 14, the
state of the art embodied by the Parthenon of Books has been revealed to be nothing
more than a scaffolding and a construction next to the Fridericianum. Again, the
tertium of the comparative view is a mimetic motif: the antique Parthenon as a sign
for democracy but also for the idealism of classicism. Perhaps, therefore, this new
occasion for comparing has also evidenced that “learning from Athens” may well
sound intriguing in current-day politics; but in art history, it just leads to classical
frames of reference and genealogies.
64 See Grasskamp, Die unbewältigte Moderne, 113.
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Comparing in the Digital Age
The Transformation of Practices
Anna Neubert/Silke Schwandt
Abstract
What do we do when we compare? This central question of the Research Center at Bielefeld
University does not only apply to historical actors but to us and our contemporary practices
as well. This article focuses on these contemporary practices, questioning the transformation
of practices that accompany the ongoing digitization of all fields of society. The lens through
which we observe these transformations are digital practices of comparing in the academic
field. The article discusses these practices as a change in scholarly practices and methods but
also as a change on the larger scale of how digitization needs to be analyzed as a motor of
cultural transformation.
Introduction
Comparing would seem to be a ubiquitous operation in our everyday lives.We con-
stantly compare ourselves to others, we compare prices at the supermarket, or we
use comparative platforms on the Web to do such comparisons for us. Applying
for jobs or schools, moving to another city, and choosing a suitable neighborhood
to raise our children—all these activities are accompanied by practices of compar-
ing. Using Internet platforms and digital devices for these comparisons leads us
straight to the question presented in this chapter: What does it mean to compare
in the digital age? At first glance, comparing in the digital age connotes comparing
things to each other digitally, or comparing digital or digitized objects. However,
it is also about comparing lots of data. Going back to the impressions from com-
paring in everyday life, large amounts of data seem to enhance the reliability of
comparisons. But is that true? Or do we merely rely on the sense that having lots
of information will naturally improve its reliability?
Likewise, in academia, comparing is one of the most important and most well-
known scholarly practices. And, as with our everyday examples, comparing in the
digital age poses quite a few challenges to this practice and requires innovations.
Dealing with digital data and digital objects changes the way in which comparing
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is being done across all the sciences. It furthers the development of tools and al-
gorithms that help us deal with lots of information at one and the same time. But
when algorithms compare, are they actually doing the same thing as researchers
did before?1
The computational turn has long since arrived in the humanities and “is funda-
mentally changing the way in which we engage in the research process […] affecting
both the epistemologies and ontologies that underlie a research programme.”2 Fur-
thermore, libraries, archives, and othermemory institutions have engaged inmany
digitization projects, making their material available in ways accessible to every-
one. But what does that imply? In which ways are research questions linked to the
digitization of historical or literary sources?
For as many as nearly 70 years now, researchers from across various fields of
the humanities have been developing tools3 and standardized formats4 that help
to create and analyze digital objects. Most of these projects can be placed in the
field of digital humanities—“a genuinely intellectual endeavor with its own profes-
sional practices, rigorous standards, and exciting theoretical explorations.”5 One
of its main lines of research addresses the question how research practices—rang-
ing from digitization to the development of new methodologies with their own
questions and perspectives—is changing in the digital age.
Therefore, this chapter will follow a twofold perspective: On the one hand, it
will analyze the transformation of the scholarly practice of comparing in the digital
age; on the other hand, it will look at historical practices and their digital repre-
sentation. After taking a closer look at selected examples, it introduces a research
approach implemented within the Collaborative Research Center 1288 for working
on a “Begriffsgeschichte” of the “Practices of Comparing.” It will close by thinking
about the various challenges and opportunities the digital holds for exploring the
past.
1 Cf. Elena Esposito, Reading With Algorithms: Interpretation and Information in Digital Text Pro-
cessing, 2018 (unpublished manuscript).
2 David M. Berry, The Computational Turn: Thinking About the Digital Humanities, in: Culture
Machine 12 (2011), 1–12, see 1.
3 For a first overview, see TAPor at http://tapor.ca/home or DiRT – Digital Research Tools at
http://dirtdirectory.org/ [both links last accessed June 8, 2018].
4 For instance, the Text Enocding Initiative (TEI) at http://www.tei-c.org/index.xml or CIDOC-
CRM at http://www.cidoc-crm.org/ [both links last accessed June 8, 2018].
5 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis, Chicago
2012, 24.
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Comparing as a scholarly practice
In a talk back in 2000, the professor of English and university librarian John
Unsworth proposed a model for translating scholarly practices into the digital
age that has served as a basis for many discussions on modeling scholarly work-
flows until today. He deliberated the question: “which methods have humanities
researchers in common, and how might our tools reflect this?”6 This question is
central to the whole enterprise of digital humanities and all related disciplines.
Digitization provides us with a lot of material that can be viewed online and
stored in corpora and repositories. But it is the documentation and advancement
of scholarly practices that enable the further development of digital methods.
Unsworth identified seven scholarly practices that he described as having “some
basic functions common to scholarly activity across disciplines, over time, and in-
dependent of theoretical orientation.”7 These operations thus consist of “discover-
ing, annotating, comparing, referring, sampling, illustrating, and representing.”8
The intention in collecting these as basic research functions is to make them trans-
ferable into the field of computing. It is only by modeling these practices in a ma-
chine-readable way that we can start to translate them properly into algorithms
and other forms of technologically enhanced methods.
Comparing, according to Unsworth, is
“one of themost basic scholarly operations—a functional primitive of humanities
research, as it were. Scholars in many different disciplines, working with many
different kinds of materials, want to compare several (sometimes many) objects
of analysis, whether those objects are texts, images, films, or any other species of
human production”.9
Researchers compare in order to make sense of data—data being understood as
a general term encompassing all kinds of research material. Following Unsworth,
several factors are involved in comparing:
• Comparing relates to space. Researchers can only compare things that share
the same space—be it, for example, objects in a museum or printed books on
a table. The same thing might be true for concepts or ideas shared in the space
6 John Unsworth, Scholarly primitives:Whatmethods do humanities researchers have in com-
mon, and how might our tools reflect this? in: University of Virginia, May 13, 2000, URL:
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~jmu2m/Kings.5-00/primitives.html [last accessed June 8,
2018].
7 Unsworth, Scholarly primitives.
8 Unsworth, Scholarly primitives.
9 Unsworth, Scholarly primitives.
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of a common imagination. Virtual space changes our spatial perception. It lets
us put things together in one space that normally do not appear together.
• Using a computer program or a comparative website to compare allows more
operations in less time. The relations of thousands of tokens can be compared
to each other in seconds.
• Comparing in the digital age, according to Unsworth, is free from hierarchies.
We can compare anything we want, and we shall still generate a statistically
or mathematically valid result. Also, comparing can overcome existing catego-
rizations and generate new ones. Seeing things in relation that we did not see
before can provoke new interpretations. This is one way in which practices of
comparing can initialize, change, or stabilize order.
• Comparing in the digital age enables us to see new relations between objects
and preserve them by way of creating linked data. Through linking, or anno-
tating, the researcher can preserve all logical or structural relations in the ma-
terial.
The range of transformations in the practices of comparing through the digital can
be illustrated very well in different areas of humanities research. Many digital re-
search projects known in the scientific community emphasize important aspects of
developments in the digital practices of comparing and demonstrate a high stan-
dard of data models, visualizations, aggregations, and analyses of their respective
research material. To understand the change in these practices, the selected ex-
amples listed below showcase the altered parameters. They shape a new approach
to the future of processes of scholarly research and may also modify the scholarly
primitives themselves.
Premises and requirements for digital research in the humanities are mani-
fold10 and rely on various basic conditions such as the digital representation of
research objects and several layers of data that allow the research process to be
performed. Digital tasks that are carried out on this basis then include “statistical
processing […] linking […] modelling […] the creation of structured data […] and
iterative editing and version control.”11 These practices are shaping the research
process profoundly, and they pave the path for new ways of making analogue com-
parisons in digital space as well as enabling new practices of comparing that were
not yet possible without data processing in the background.
The following selection of projects will grant a first insight into the scope and
limits of comparing in the digital age for humanities researchers.12 The examples
10 Cf. Jeffrey Schnapp, A short guide to the digital humanities, in: Anne Burdick et al. (eds.),
Digital_Humanities, Cambridge 2012, SG2—SG15.
11 Schnapp, A short guide, SG3.
12 Needless to mention that the chosen examples represent a small scale of possible DH
projects that showcase new possibilities of the practices of comparing in the digital age. The
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highlight two modes of how the digital is transforming researchers’ practices. Ex-
amined are, first, the ways in which the digital is changing general research prac-
tices, methods, and theories; and, second, the ways in which research material and
findings are being published and made available. The wide range of humanities
data in all cases is not to be dismissed and is thus always the key component of the
modeling process. The high heterogeneity of data and the different approaches to
theories and methods provide many opportunities for digital endeavors to create
new ways of understanding research materials.
Distant Reading
Our first example is a chart generated with Google Ngram Viewer.13 It shows two
separate lines: one representing the use of the word comparison; the other, the use
of the word comparing. The y-axis shows the frequency of the respective term; the
timeline on the x-axis represents the years ranging from 1600 to 2000.
Fig. 1: Chart for “comparison” and “comparing” in the English corpus from 1600 to 2000.
There are two levels of comparison linked to this figure: One level concerns the
chart itself and what it suggests to the eyes of the researcher.We immediately start
to relate the lines to each other, noticing the way they rise, sink and cross.The other
selection derives from the personal background of the two authors who have years of expe-
rience in the field of digital humanities and decided that these were the projects that best
emphasized their argument on the transformation of practices.
13 Cf. Google Ngram Viewer, URL: https://books.google.com/ngrams [last accessed June 8,
2018].
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level concerns the data represented by the graphs. Linking the data points in the
form of a line compares them to each other in relation to their respective values
on the axes. And although the operation seems natural and facilitated by the way
of visualization, there are questions to be asked considering the way the data has
been compiled.
• Although the chart shows percentages for the frequency of the words at a cer-
tain point in time, it does not tell us the amount of books providing the basis for
this calculation. It is rather improbable that there are as many publications in
Google books for the seventeenth century as there are for the twentieth century.
• The chart also does not give any information on the kind of data that it repre-
sents.The observer does not knowwhich books or genres she or he is looking at.
However, for humanities researchers, the provision of corpus data is important
for the scientific value and the interpretation of findings.
• Reliable information that can be taken from the graph is that the two lines cross
around 1750, and whereas the red line for “comparing” remains relatively stable,
the blue line for “comparison” rises.Without further information, however, this
observation remains superficial.
For digital comparing as a scholarly practice, this carries several insights: Graphs
guide the practice of comparing by specifying the way in which we compare. They
do so by ways of visualization.Therefore, the reflection on practices of comparison
needs to comprise the reflection on visualization practices. Such practices deter-
mine practices of interpretation because they decide which data is represented and
therefore have to be part of the analysis.14
With their work on digital literary sources, Franco Moretti and his colleagues
at the Stanford Literary Lab15 serve as our second example. Moretti has coined the
paradigm of “distant reading.”16 In his article on “Conjectures in World Literature,”
first published in 2000, he motivates this concept by referring to the work of Im-
manuel Wallerstein, who, like almost any other researcher, bases his synthesis on
the analyses carried out by others before him. In order to write about world lit-
erature, Moretti argues, one has to do the same and keep one’s distance from the
texts themselves to see the system. “But in that case, literary history will become
[…] second hand: a patchwork of other people’s research, without a single direct
textual reading.”17 In a way, Moretti makes the argument for Google Ngrams when
14 Cf. Silke Schwandt, Digitale Methoden für die Historische Semantik. Auf den Spuren von Be-
griffen in digitalen Korpora, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 44 (2018), 107–134.
15 Stanford Literary Lab, URL: https://litlab.stanford.edu/ [last accessed June 8, 2018].
16 Cf. Franco Moretti, Distant Reading, Konstanz 2016.
17 Moretti, Distant Reading, 44.
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he says “we know how to read texts, now let’s learn how not to read them” and offers
a definition for what he means by “distant reading”:
“distance […] is a condition of knowledge: it allows you to focus on units that are
much smaller or much larger than the text: devices, themes, tropes—or genres
and systems. And if, between the very small and the very large, the text itself dis-
appears, well, it is one of those cases when one can justifiably say, less is more.
If we want to understand the system in its entirety, we must accept losing some-
thing.”18
Following this train of thought, that which we move aside for a new practice is the
single text and the practice of “close reading.”
This is not the place to trace Moretti’s arguments and those of his opponents
in their entirety, but what is important for the transformation of scholarly prac-
tices is that there is a controversy about how we should read, if we should read,
and what we should read. Joseph North in his book “Literary Criticism,” published in
2017, argues that Moretti’s method “is not really reading at all: rather, it is a method
that, when it appears elsewhere as the uncontroversial stock-in-trade of many sci-
entific or social-scientific disciplines, is unproblematically labeled things like ‘data
analysis,’ ‘data mining’ (if using specialized search engines), or similar.”19 Here, it
seems, the argument is not about the fact that practices change and develop once
the material they deal with changes. Rather, it is about the labeling that Moretti
chose for his new perspective on how to write a history of world literature. North
continues:
“The phrase [distant reading] seems to be offered as a kind of antonym to “close
reading,” but […] the two terms are not opposites at all, because they do not refer
to the same order of things: the real opposition here is that between data analysis
and reading per se. Our question then becomes as to what is gained by framing
an argument against reading-in-general as an argument against “close reading”
in particular”.20
Another tool that illustrates a different approach to the dichotomy of close and dis-
tant reading is the tool “DiaCollo”21 available from the German Text Archive. This
provides scholars with the possibility to look up typical collocations of a keyword
over a particular period of time. By “visualizing global features,”22 it shows fre-
18 Moretti, Distant Reading, 48.
19 Joseph North, Literary Criticism. A Concise Political History, Cambridge/London 2017, 110.
20 North, Literary Criticism, 112; Cf. Esposito, Reading with Algorithms.
21 Cf. DiaCollo, URL: http://kaskade.dwds.de/dstar/dta/diacollo/ [last accessed April 17, 2018].
22 Stefan Jänicke et al., On Close and Distant Reading in Digital Humanities: A Survey and Fu-
ture Challenges, in: Rita Borgo/Fabio Ganovelli/Ivan Viola (eds.), Europgraphics Conference on
Vizualization (EuroVis)—STARs, The Eurographics Association, 2015, 2.
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quently used words and changes in the meaning of those words.23 Figure 2 shows
the beginning of a timeline that presents all words related to the term “Vergleich*”
from 1850 to 1940 running on the corpus of the German Text Archive.
Fig. 2: Screenshot—DiaCollo with the term “Vergleich*” from 1850- 1940.
Within the tool, there are various scenarios of comparing that allow the user
to interact with the research material: the first one being a keyword and its collo-
cations; the second option being the comparison of two similar keywords by dif-
ferences in their collocations in different time periods; and the third option being
the comparison of several similar keywords with regard to their frequency of use in
certain time periods.These presentations benefit from close reading by implication
and enable new ways of interacting with the textual features.24
It can be argued that we have to bridge the divide between close and distant
reading and take the changes in scholarly practices brought by the digital age seri-
ously. Looking at big data and comparing quantitative data offers new perspectives
that might lead to new interpretations.25 However, we have to acknowledge the
methods and traditions of our respective disciplines and try to integrate the new
methods into the old. It is always necessary to go back to the text after looking at
the big picture in order to come up with a solid interpretation of the material. It
is important to zoom in and zoom out, to move from distant back to close. It is
imperative for the fruitful implementation of digital methods in the humanities to
carefully design these methods.
Another field of research within the digital humanities is concerned with edit-
ing texts. Our following examples thus provide an insight into how comparing in
the field of scholarly editing is transformed through the digital.
23 See https://clarin-d.de/de/kollokationsanalyse-in-diachroner-perspektive [last accessed
April 17, 2018].
24 Cf. Schwandt, Digitale Methoden.
25 Cf. Schwandt, Digitale Methoden, 131.
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Digital music edition
Like any other scholarly editor,music editors produced and still produce their criti-
cal editions by traveling from archive to archive around the globe, scanning through
different sources, and taking notes. In order to publish a critical edition of a mu-
sical piece, editors need to compare over space and time and therefore have to rely
solely on their notes and their memories of similarities and differences in their
sources. Furthermore, money and access restrictions to important sources com-
plicate progress and sometimes make the management of the formation process
distressing.26 Published versions of themusic edition—inmost cases27—consist of
two printed parts: the edited text in one part and the critical apparatus with results
of the transacted comparisons in another part.28 Music editions are sold at a high
price, so that it is almost always only libraries that can afford to buy and provide
access to this field of research. Because access to and dealing with these special
research materials in and after the research process is not always an easy task, the
digital provides new opportunities to deal with various obstacles and initiates new
possibilities for research in this field.
The research project Edirom29 at the University of Paderborn and the School
of Music in Detmold was established in 2006 to develop “tools for digital forms of
critical music editions”.30 As pioneers in this field of research, the project imple-
mented a research software that changed the formation and publication process
of music editions altogether.31 By aligning images of various sources and the un-
derlying data in an XML format in the standard of the Music Encoding Initiative
(MEI),32 the music editor is now able to compare sources on the basis of mea-
sures—so-called aligned concordances.
26 Cf. Joachim Veit, Musikwissenschaft und Computerphilologie—eine schwierige Liaison?
in: Jahrbuch für Computerphilologie 7 (2005), 67–92. See http://computerphilologie.tu-darm-
stadt.de/jg05/veit.html [last accessed June 8, 2018].
27 Most music editions are published in print, but funding bodies and publishing houses in-
creasingly expect digital components (cf., e.g., music editions funded by the Akademie der
Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz; see http://www.adwmainz.de/projekte/musikwis-
senschaftliche-editionen.html [last accessed April 17, 2018]).
28 Cf. Johannes Kepper, Musikedition im Zeichen neuer Medien: Historische Entwicklung und gegen-
wärtige Perspektiven musikalischer Gesamtausgaben, Norderstedt 2011, 5–19.
29 Cf. Edirom, archived project page, URL: http://www.edirom.de/edirom-projekt/das-
forschungsprojekt/ [last accessed April 17, 2018].
30 Cf. Edirom, archived project page.
31 The software is still maintained and further developed at https://github.com/Edirom/Edi-
rom-Online [last accessed April 17, 2018].
32 Music Encoding Initiative (MEI), URL: http://music-encoding.org/ [last accessed April 17,
2018].
33 See the Digital edition of the opera “Der Freischütz” by Carl Maria von Weber at http://frei-
schuetz-digital.de/edition/ [last accessed April 17, 2018].
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Fig. 3: Screenshot—Concordances of the digital edition of “Der Freischütz.”33
Figure 3 shows ten different sources for the opera “Der Freischütz,” an opera
by the German composer Carl Maria von Weber and one of the first digital music
editions ever published. The whole publication consists of fifteen musical sources,
sixteen sources of the libretto, twelve associated texts, and six recordings of the
opera. Technically, it is possible to align all sources simultaneously and compare
these sources all at once on a computer screen without being limited to the ma-
terials that are physically and immediately at hand. By browsing from measure to
measure, editors are given various possibilities of interacting with their sources,
and they can perform comparisons right on the spot.34 The edition created in this
way can be published online—thus users are able to comprehend and pursue each
step of the decisions the scholar made—but also in the usual print media.
Another option customized by these tools is the display of variants and the
results of comparing in one place. Figure 4 illustrates the view of a commentary
in the digital critical apparatus of “Der Freischütz” that contains the comment on
the left upper side along with all sources affected by the results of the comparison.
In print, the critical apparatus consists of only textual descriptions that detail the
findings of the editor; in digital, each variance is visible on screen.
In Edirom, editors—and users—are also able to compare transcribed libret-
tos, other textual sources dealing with topics related to the opera, and recordings.
These add another layer of understanding and facilitate new interpretations of the
musical work of the composer—a feature that is only possible through the digital.
As demonstrated, the digital medium provides a broader and more comprehen-
sive view of the music edition and allows access to digital objects involved in the
research process.
34 For more information on technical features of Edirom tools, visit http://www.edirom.de/edi-
rom-projekt/software/ [last accessed April 17, 2018].
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Fig. 4: Screenshot—Display of variants in all affected sources in the digital edition of “Der
Freischütz”.
Digital text edition
Digitality in text editions clusters new demands and “envisage[s] fresh conceptu-
alizations for the future”35 of critical editing.36 These conceptualizations appear in
different models and formats, as demonstrated by the two following examples.The
projects highlight different approaches to the modes of access and representation
of their materials and findings in the digital age.
The “Vincent van Gogh—The Letters” digital edition, “a product of 15 years of
research at the Van Gogh Museum and Huygens ING,” contains digitized versions
35 Cf. Hans W. Gabler, Foreword, in: Matthew J. Driscoll/Elena Pierazzo (eds.), Digital Scholarly
Editing: Theories and Practices, Cambridge 2016, xiii.
36 Formore information on digital scholarly editing, cf. Matthew James Driscoll/Elena Pierazzo,
Digital Scholarly Editing—Theories and Practices, Cambridge 2016.
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and authorized English translations of all of Van Gogh’s letters, “richly annotated
and illustrated,” as well as supplementary material such as sketches and paint-
ings.37
Fig. 5: Screenshot—Alignment of different versions of a text in the “Vincent van Gogh—The
Letters” digital edition.
Figure 5 illustrates another approach that is enabled through the deployment
of digital tools. The alignment of facsimile, commentary, transcription, and trans-
lation of the original text with the respective artwork shows various layers of infor-
mation on one screen and opens up wide possibilities for the editor and the user
to search, browse, and interact with the texts—practices that enrich comparisons
in the digital realm. Within the digital edition, the search for letters according to
criteria such as “sketch” and “person” and the possibility of combining criteria in
many sophisticated ways establishes new ways of understanding and interpreting
texts.38
Another approach for displaying and making results on the scholarly practice
of comparing available is implemented by the “Internet Shakespeare Edition,”39 an
endeavor that has been running at the University of Victoria since 1996. It is also
possible to review facsimiles of all sources and browse through any content—as in
37 See http://vangoghletters.org/vg/ [last accessed April 17, 2018].
38 This feature is supported by paradigmatic regression in graphical user interfaces that delivers
newdynamics ofmethodological interactionwith text as it is (cf. Joris van Zundert, Barely Be-
yond the Book?, in: Matthew J. Driscoll/Elena Pierazzo (eds.),Digital Scholarly Editing: Theories
and Practices, Cambridge 2016, 86.).
39 See http://internetshakespeare.uvic.ca/ [last accessed April 17, 2018].
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the “Vincent van Gogh—The Letters” digital edition. One additional feature of this
edition is the possibility of displaying all variants inline. This facilitates a feeling
for the change of words over time and through different sources.
Fig. 6: Screenshot—Display of different word variants in the “Internet Shakespeare Edi-
tion”.
As shown in Figure 6, the word “Running” was transcribed quite differently in
various sources (e.g., “Roaming,” “Wrong,” “Wronging,” and “Wringing”) that all
have different meanings and each change the context of the sentence.This practice
of making comparisons visible right on the spot introduces a whole new way of
interacting with the research material itself and provides a perspective for com-
municating and disseminating scholarly research on a different level.
The interoperability and integration of the works at hand and their presen-
tations change the way in which humanities scholars interact with their material
and open up new prospects on researchmaterial and respective questions as well as
on the practices of comparing. All these practices and the resulting computational
tools contribute to a reformulation of questions and “have the potential to trans-
form the content, scope, methodologies, and audience of humanistic inquiry.”40
40 Cf. Schnapp, A short guide, SG3.
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Historical practices of comparing and their digital analysis
The lines of inquiry presented in the different contributions to this volume all cir-
cle around two central questions: What do we do when we compare? And what do
or did (historical) actors do when they compare(d)? The focus in answering these
questions lies in the analysis of practices—not just scholarly practices, but also his-
torical practices. It lies with the paradigm of “doing comparisons.”41 But what are
these practices and how do we find them? Comparisons can be defined as opera-
tions that relate at least two objects to each other. The specificity of a relation that
constitutes a comparison is that this relation is constructed with a comparative
intention of relating the objects to each other in a specific regard.42 For example,
comparing apples to oranges can be done with regard to them being fruits, with
regard to their color, or with regard to their taste. In this way, the result of the
comparison highlights either commonalities, similarities, or differences. Follow-
ing this definition and dealing mostly with textual evidence, comparisons should
be easy enough to address. But this is only true on a superficial level. Comparisons
as cognitive operations seem to follow a specific logic that can be linked to a specific
linguistic structure. Practices of comparing are more than that. They comprise ob-
vious comparisons in which the compared objects and the comparative regard are
stated explicitly as well as statements or practices that state them only implicitly
or that describe practices that represent comparisons. Examples for these different
levels could be statements like these:
Fig. 7: Some examples for speech acts performing comparisons.
Applying digital methods to the analysis of practices of comparison makes it
necessary to look for the common structure in these sentences. In a way, we need to
compare that which we believe to be a comparison. And we do that through mod-
eling. Modeling is “a process by which researchers make and manipulate external
41 Cf. Angelika Epple/Walter Erhart, Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, in: An-
gelika Epple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a.
M./New York 2015, 7–31, see 17.
42 Epple/Erhart, Die Welt beobachten, 7–31.
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representations […] to make sense of the conceptual objects and phenomena they
study.”43 It is a scholarly practice in itself. And although it seems more common
to researchers in the field of the natural sciences than in the humanities, it is also
quite common in digital humanities. Computer-enhancedmethods for humanities
research work mostly with patterns and models. In order to develop digital meth-
ods and tools, our workflows need to be modeled in a way that can be adapted by a
computer program. It is this abstract view on research methods and practices that
makes digital humanities not only a convenient toolbox but a theoretical frame-
work of its own.
Modeling the ways in which we as researchers compare helps us to understand
practices on an abstract level. It enables us to comprehend structures and modes
of comparing that can be translated into a machine-readable model leading us to
new tools for research. Taking the researcher’s practices of comparing as a research
object will provide insight into the history of the humanities or the history of schol-
arship. On a theoretical level, this helps us to understand how changing practices
might change our view of the world.
Observing practices and applying digital methods
Focusing on historical actors and their practices of comparing works in a similar
way. We want to observe and model historical practices of comparing. How did
artists and curators integrate practices of comparison in their work? How did trav-
elers implement them into their travelogues, using practices of comparing to bring
new discoveries into the existing view of the world? How did legal frameworks have
to change through practices of comparing the colonists’ law to the legal practices
of indigenous peoples?44 Willibald Steinmetz and his 7
colleagues focus on the conceptual history of (practices of) comparisons.45 This
historical discipline is one of the most productive fields for the implementation
of digital methods.46 This is partly because the methods of “Begriffsgeschichte” can
be translated easily into digital methods, as shown in the example of text mining
43 Arianna Ciula/Øyvind Eide, Modelling in digital humanities: Signs in context, in: Digital
Scholavrship in the Humanities 32 (2017), i33–i46, see i33.
44 Cf. the research program of the SFB 1288: https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/sfb1288/ [last ac-
cessed May 3, 2018].
45 Cf. https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/sfb1288/projekte/c03.html [last accessed May 3, 2018]
and Willibald Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’ – eine begriffsgeschichtliche Skizze, in: Angelika Ep-
ple/Walter Erhart (eds.), Die Welt beobachten. Praktiken des Vergleichens, Frankfurt a. M./New
York 2015, 85–134.
46 Cf. Schwandt, Digitale Methoden, 109.
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with DiaCollo. The practice of collecting all instances in a corpus in which a cer-
tain keyword is being used and then analyzing the results statistically can be done
with almost any form of digital corpus.47 Some of the research questions regarding
practices of comparison can be addressed in this way. A simple keyword in a con-
text search will find any instances that use any word form of comparison or compare,
or their German equivalents Vergleich/vergleichen/vergleichbar. The following graphs
(Figures 7 and 8) show the frequency of the German terms Vergleichung and Vergle-
ich in the corpus of the Digital Dictionary of the German Language.48 Both graphs
plot the frequency on a timeline dating from 1600 to 1990.
Fig. 8: Total frequency of the German term “Vergleichung” in the digital
corpus of the DTA.49
Looking at these graphs, researchers immediately start comparing. Again, two
levels of practices can be observed: One is the researcher comparing single data
points to each other by drawing a graph or comparing two graphs to each other;
the other is the data set itself representing the historical evidence for the use of the
terms Vergleichung and Vergleich.
But practices of comparison do not only happen in speech acts containing
words from the word family of comparison/compare/comparative.Willibald Steinmetz
47 Cf. as a further example, Silke Schwandt, Virtus as a Political Concept in the Middle Ages, in:
Contributions to the History of Concepts 10 (2/2015), 71–90.
48 Cf. https://www.dwds.de/ [last accessed May 3, 2018]. “Vergleichung” can also be translated as
“comparison” or “collation.”
49 Graph taken from Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 97.
50 Graph taken from Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 98.
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Fig. 9: Total frequency of the German term “Vergleich” in the digital corpus
of the DTA.50
has argued that a conceptual history of comparison should encompass not only
analyses of the use of the vocabulary itself, but also analyses of speech acts that
can themselves be understood as practices of comparing. He suggests that these
sentences would adhere to any of the following patterns:
• Simple as well as complex statements of similarity or difference: a is like b; seen
from perspective x, a is like b; a is to b as x is to y; a is not like b; and so forth
• Comparative comparisons: a is better than b; a is best among n
• Ordering or classificatory comparisons: Regarding x, a is like or similar to b,
but differs from b regarding y (and therefore belongs to another category)
• Comparisons stating equivalence despite dissimilarity: Although a is com-
pletely different from b, it is worth as much as b, or as suitable as b to achieve
goal y
• Statements of incomparability: a is incomparable to b (sentences like these
seem to be paradox, because they suggest that a comparison—mostly from a
third party—has already been made)51
Categorizations or models like these take us away from the keyword in context and
pose a new challenge: How do we model these patterns in order to make them
understandable to an algorithm?
51 Cf. Steinmetz, ‘Vergleich’, 88–89. [Translations by Silke Schwandt].
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Going back to the examples in Figure 6, themapping of the suggested sentences
to Steinmetz’s models could look like this:
Fig. 10: Mapping sentences to models.
Applying amodel like this shows how similar the apparently different sentences
are. In this way, the model serves as a strategy for making sense. “Contextualizing
modeling within a semiotic framework means indeed to consider it as a strategy to
make sense (signification) via practical thinking (creating and manipulating mod-
els).”52 Formalizing this kind of categorization for our example could look like this:
Fig. 11: Interface of a Filemaker Database collecting Data Sets of Speech Acts Performing
Comparisons.53
52 Ciula/Eide, Modelling in digital humanities, i34.
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By way of a database interface, researchers can mark sentences as comparisons
and apply different categories representing certain types of comparisons.This prac-
tice of categorization can be understood as what John Unsworth called “annotat-
ing.”54 Through categorization, we arrive at what can be called linked data—data
sets that are related to each other and can be visualized, for example, as networks. A
category such as “statements of incomparability” can then be a node in the network
linking different speech acts to each other. Researchers arrive at such categories by
observing their own practices: Which criteria lead us to identify a specific speech
act as a “statement of incomparability?” Following this observation, the researcher
creates a semantic annotation. Unfortunately, semantic knowledge is still a form
of knowledge specific to human interpretation, and it is difficult to teach to a com-
puter program.
But even if our examples in Figure 9 seem to belong to the same or similar cate-
gories semantically, they remain different linguistically. A model that looks more at
such formalities might be helpful in order to find a way of identifying speech acts
performing comparisons automatically. One possible set of formalities to describe
language is provided in linguistic models.The example below shows the application
of a model with part of speech tags.55 56
Fig. 12: Part of speech tags for sentences performing practices of compar-
ing.
There are several part of speech tags that seem to hint at comparisons.Themost
obvious is JJR (= adjective, comparative) in the first example. Looking for this mor-
phological characteristic in a (historical) text corpus might generate a subcorpus
53 This database is part of the research process within SFB 1288. It represents an early stage of
the system of categories used in Subproject C03 by Willibald Steinmetz and his team.
54 John Unsworth, Scholarly Primitives.
55 Brill tagger: https://cst.dk/online/pos_tagger/uk/index.html [last accessed 08 May 2018].
First published in “A Simple Rule-Based Part of Speech Tagger” by Eric Brill, 1992.
56 Cf. tag set used in the Penn Treebank Project for English. See https://www.ling.u-
penn.edu/courses/Fall_2003/ling001/penn_treebank_pos.html [last accessed May 8, 2018].
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of comparative comparisons. Applying a part of speech tagger to such a subcor-
pus will then provide the researcher with more information on the morphological
structure of comparative comparisons. Examples (2) and (3) suggest that simple
statements of similarity can be identified through the combination of IN (= prepo-
sition or subordinating conjunction) and NNP (= proper noun singular), while the
use of DT (= determiner) alone is not enough to denote a comparison. Here, again,
it would be more promising to look for combinations with NNP or NNS (= noun,
plural).
Although the morphological annotation with part of speech tags does supply
the researcher with a more formalistic model, the potential for the automatic iden-
tification is still improvable. The sole annotation with morphological information
is too unspecific. Part of speech tags annotating adverbs or determiners can denote
a large number of words that may or may not be part of a comparison. It seems to
be necessary to expand the levels of annotation to syntactic and/or semantic anno-
tations. Hence, it becomes clear that the automatization of research practices is a
complex task.
Conclusions: Digital research practices and practices of comparing
The computational turn has brought about quite a few transformations of prac-
tices and makes even more of them necessary. In our article, we have shown that
by using digital techniques and methods, scholars can add new meaning to old
research questions and pose new questions that arise by taking on innovative ap-
proaches and challenges. The accessibility of a vast array of resources in a digital
form and their alleged synchronicity change our view of researchmaterial and pro-
vide a new perspective, thus fundamentally changing viewing patterns and break-
ing with long-established practices and habits.
For using various tools to perform comparisons, scholars require knowledge of
digital standards, tools, and methods in order to be able to read, compare, and edit
sources in different formats. These new modes of practices and (re)presentations
alter the interaction with research material. Collecting data from digital material
as well as producing digital material in the process of doing research will enable
us to compare the modeled practices. From there it will be easier to arrive at a
typology of practices of comparing—both digital and historical.
Hence, considering various practices of comparing in the digital age leads us
in two directions:
• It helps us to reflect on our own practices of comparing, evaluating, and his-
toricizing them. It also makes us aware of the necessity to look at the impact
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of digitization on scientific practices—the impact that can already be observed
as well as the impact that is yet to be expected.
• Modeling research practices enables us to find new perspectives on historical
practices of comparing. Observing and modeling increase the level of abstrac-
tion and further the conjected concept of a typology of practices.
Resulting from these reflections, work on the presented topics within the field of
digital humanities is not only about developing research with digital methods but
also about contributing to research on digital methods and digitization.
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